John Muir’s Alcidamas – a welcome surprise

When I wrote ‘Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, Alcidamas’ On Sophists, and Plato’s Phaedrus’ – my last post – I thought there was no English translation of Alcidamas’ On Sophists. Convinced that anybody who would read Alcidamas’ essay attentively could never again think of Plato’s Phaedrus as a late dialogue, I translated paragraphs that evocate the corresponding passages in the Phaedrus and gave a picture of the other paragraphs, in which Alcidamas expresses his own view in his own words.

In the meantime, I learnt that J. Muir produced an English translation side by side with the Greek original, with a commentary. In the ‘Introduction’ to Alcidamas’ essay On those who write written speeches or On Sophists he writes: ‘Alcidamas had clearly picked up some notion of the theory of Forms and had also read at least the last section of the Phaedrus where the mythical story of Theuth is taken up by Socrates to expand on the limitations of the written word.’ (Alcidamas The Works & Fragments, Bristol Classical Press, 2001, p. xiv).

Alcidamas opens paragraph 27 with the words: ‘And I do not think it is right that speeches written down should even be called speeches, but should be thought of as images and patterns and imitations of speeches’ (hȇgoumai d’ oude logous dikaion einai kaleisthai tous gegrammenous, all’ hȏsper eidȏla kai schȇmata kai mimȇmata logȏn). In his note on eidȏla kai schȇmata kai mimȇmata logȏn Muir writes: ‘the most obvious echo of Plato’s ideas; it is hard to believe that Alcidamas had not come across some version of the theory of Forms and remembered it as apt for his purposes … It has been suggested that Plato may have been influenced by Alcidamas in the formation of his thinking with regard to both the theory of Forms and his ideas about literature in general. However, the connections between paragraph 28 and the Phaedrus strongly suggest that the influence was in the other direction.’

In his note on Alcidamas’ ‘the speech spoken straight from the heart on the spur of the moment has a soul in it and is alive’ (logos ho men ap’ autȇs tȇs dianoias en tȏi parautika legomenos empsuchos esti kai zȇi) in paragraph 28, Muir writes: ‘The striking idea of speech as an inanimate, living thing is certainly related to Plato, Phaedrus 275d-276a … The clinching evidence for the connection between the Phaedrus and OWS [On those who write written speeches] comes with the answer Phaedrus gives to Socrates’ subsequent suggestion of an alternative mode of writing ‘which is written with knowledge in the soul of the one who has understanding’ (hos met’ epistȇmȇs graphetai en tȇi tou manthanontos psuchȇi). Phaedrus replies: ‘You mean the living and animate speech of the knowledgeable man, of which writing could rightly be called a kind of image’ (ton tou eidotos logon legeis zȏnta kai empsuchon hou ho gegrammenos eidȏlon an ti legoito dikaiȏs). The coincidences of thought and vocabulary between this and Alcidamas’ text cannot be accidental.’

In view of all this, isn’t it time to reopen the question of the dating of the Phaedrus? In the Wikipedia entry I can still read: ‘The Phaedrus was presumably composed around 370 BC, about the same time as Plato's Republic and Symposium.’

But Alcidamas’ essay was written around 390 BC, i.e. twenty years earlier.

Christopher Rowe writes in the ‘Introduction’ to his edition and translation of the Phaedrus: ‘the Phaedrus is certainly later than the Republic and other middle dialogues … certainly later than the Timaeus … and probably earlier than the Philebus.’ (Plato: Phaedrus, Ars & Phillips Classical Texts, 2^nd ed. 1988, p. 14). In other words, In Rowe’s view, the Phaedrus is the second latest, if not the latest dialogue of Plato. On this kind of dating of Plato’s Phaedrus the International Plato Society was founded – with its Symposia Platonica and its foundation stone: ‘Understanding the Phaedrus’ (Proceedings of the II Symposium Platonicum).

The Czech Platonic Society at its first meeting, in 1998, decided that the next but one International Symposium was to be devoted to Plato’s Phaedrus. But at the very end of the next International Symposium (in 1999) it was announced – without any debate on the matter – that the next International Symposium was going to be devoted to the Protagoras. When I asked for an explanation, the president, Aleš Havlíček, began to speak in Czech. I said: ‘Please, speak in English, so that all can understand!’ Aleš began to speak again in Czech. I said again: ‚In English, please!‘ So Havlíček sat down, no explanation given. Unofficially, I was then told that the foreign participants would have withdrawn all their financial support, if the Czechs insisted on the Phaedrus as the theme of the next International Symposium.

Ever since, all my efforts to present my views on the dating of the Phaedrus to discussion – be it at Charles University in Prague or at Oxford University – have been in vain. May I hope that thanks to Muir’s Alcidamas it will change?

Next year, in April, it will be 40 years since Anthony Kenny, the Master of Balliol College at Oxford University, visited my unofficial philosophy seminar in Prague. It was as a direct consequence of his visit that I began to be interested in the ancient dating of the Phaedrus. It would be great if this anniversary could be commemorated by an international seminar – in Prague or in Oxford – where I could present my views on this subject, the result of forty years of intensive study. If Oxford University and Charles University remain adamant in their ‘no’ to any such idea, can there be found a university in this post Velvet Revolution world that would be prepared to host such an event? Kenny’s visit in my seminar was interrupted by the Czech police; it was the last time I could see my students. I don’t find it right that the Czech police (with the KGB at the background?) should have been given the power to interrupt and thus to prevent – once and for all – discussion on Plato between me and Platonic scholars.

***

There is more of Plato’s Phaedrus in Alcidamas’ On Sophists than Muir suggests. Alcidamas’ essay opens with the words: ‘Since some of those who are called sophists (Epeidȇ tines tȏn kaloumenȏn sophistȏn) have been neglectful of knowledge and education (historias men kai paideias ȇmelȇkasi), and as to the ability to give speeches (kai tou dunasthai legein) they are as inexperienced as laymen (tois idiȏtais apeirȏs echousi), devoting themselves to writing speeches (graphein de memeletȇkotes logous), and displaying their wisdom through means of no permanence (di abebaiȏn deiknuntes tȇn heautȏn sophian) they affect a grave and solemn air and think highly of themselves (semnunontai kai mega phronousi)’.

With the striking description of writing as being of no permanence Alcidamas reminds the reader of Phaedrus 277d6-10: ‘whether Lysias (eite Lysisas) or anyone else (ȇ tis allos) ever wrote (pȏpote egrapsen) or shall write (ȇ grapsei) privately (idiai), or publicly proposing the laws (ȇ dȇmosiai nomous titheis), so writing a political composition (sungramma politikon graphȏn), and thinking there is any great permanence or clarity in it (kai megalȇn tina en autȏi bebaiotȇta hȇgoumenos kai saphȇneian), then it is a reproach to its writer (houtȏ men oneidos tȏi graphonti), whether anyone says so or no (eite tis phȇsin eite mȇ).’

In Muir’s edition of the text and in his translation there can be found no such connection to the Phaedrus; instead of ‘displaying their wisdom through means of no permanence (di abebaiȏn deiknuntes tȇn heautȏn sophian)’ Muir writes ‘demonstrating their cleverness through texts (dia bibliȏn deiknuntes tȇn hautȏn sophian).’

In the accompanying note Muir writes: ‘Reiske’s conjecture dia bibliȏn is more appropriate than the MSS di abebaiȏn. It is possible to account for the mistake either as phonetic confusion or in visual terms: BIBɅΩN/BEBAIΩN in uncials.’

Pace Muir, it is precisely because ‘Reiske’s conjecture dia bibliȏn is more appropriate than the MSS di abebaiȏn’ that I find it wrong. Had ‘demonstrating their cleverness through texts (dia bibliȏn deiknuntes tȇn hautȏn sophian)’ been in the text, how could any scribe have changed it into the counter-intuitive ‘through means of no permanence (di abebaiȏn)’? Guido Avezzù in his critical edition of the text gives all the textual alternatives that show how the scribes struggled with it: di’ abebaiȏn ΞAm₄M: diabebaiȏn K: dia bebaiȏn Am₁EMuNT Ald.

With this strikingly counter-intuitive metaphor of writing seen as being of no permanence, Alcidamas straight at the beginning turned the eyes of the reader to the Phaedrus with its censure of those, who see permanence in writing. For if one does see his writings as being of permanence, ‘then it is a reproach to its writer (houtȏ men oneidos tȏi graphonti, 277d9)’.