Questions: 5f Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating, with reference to the Phaedrus

At 165b Critias defined sôphrosunê as knowing oneself. At 165c-166b Socrates raised objection against the possibility and usefulness of such knowledge. At 166 c Critias objected that Socrates was trying to refute him and ignoring what the discussion was all about. At 166c-d Socrates rejected Critias’ criticism: if he was subjecting to rigorous scrutiny what Critias was saying, he was subjecting to scrutiny his own views as well. He did so, for he was afraid that he might think he knew what in fact he did not know.

Socrates: ‘Well then, Critias, don’t be discouraged (Tharrôn toinun, ô makarie), and give me the answer, as you see it, to the question (apokrinomenos to erôtômenon hopê̢ soi phainetai). Never mind (ea chairein) whether it’s Critias (eite Kritias estin) or Socrates (eite Sôkratês) who is the one refuted (ho elenchomenos). Just concentrate on the argument itself (all’ autô̢ prosechôn ton noun tô̢ logô̢), and consider (skopei) what on earth will become of it if it is examined (hopê̢ pote ekbêsetai elenchomenos).’ – Critias: ‘I’ll do that (Alla poiêsô houtô), because I think that what you’re saying is quite reasonable (dokeis gar moi metria legein).’ (166d7-e3)

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D. Watt translates elenchomenos at 166e1 as ‘refuted’, at 166e2 as ‘examined’. In this case, the distinction is arbitrary. With Socrates, the primary aim is always examination – self-examination, whereas with the sophists the primary emphasis was on refuting and not being refuted.

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Socrates: ‘Well then, tell me what do you say about sôphrosunê (Lege toinun peri tês sôphrosunês pôs legeis)?’ – Critias: ‘Well, I say (Legô toinun) that it alone (hoti monê) of the knowledges (tôn allôn epistêmôn) is the knowledge both of itself and of the other knowledges (autê te hautês estin kai tôn allôn epistêmôn epistêmê).’ – S. ‘Would it be a knowledge of ignorance too (Oukoun kai anepistêmosunês epistêmê an eiê), if it is a knowledge of knowledge (eiper kai epistêmês;)? Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge). – S. ‘So the sôphrôn [D.W. ‘the self-controlled man’] alone (Ho ara sôphrôn monos) will know himself (autos te hauton gnôsetai) and be able to examine (kai hoios te estai exetasai) what in fact he knows (ti te tunchanei eidôs) and what he doesn’t (kai ti mê), and he will be capable of looking at other people in the same way (kai tous allous hôsautôs dunatos estai episkopein) to see what any of them knows and thinks he knows (ti tis oiden kai oietai), if he does know (eiper oiden); and what, on the other hand, he thinks he knows (kai ti au oietai men eidenai), but does not (oiden d’ ou). No one else will be able to do that (tôn de allôn oudeis). In fact, that is the sôphronein [D.W. ‘being self-controlled’] (kai estin dê touto to sôphronein te) and sôphrosunê [D.W. ‘self-control’] (kai sôphrosunê) and knowing oneself (kai to heauton auton gignôskein) – knowing (to eidenai) what one knows (ha te oiden) and what one doesn’t (kai ha mê oiden). Is that (ara tauta estin) what you’re saying (ha legeis;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes (Egôge).’ – S. ‘Well then, third time lucky (Palin toinun, to triton tô̢ sôtêri). Let’s go back to the beginning again, as it were (hôsper ex archês), and consider (episkepsômetha) – whether or not it is possible for that to be the case (prôton men ei dunaton estin tout’ einai ê ou) – to know that one knows and that one does not know (to ha oiden kai ha mê oiden eidenai hoti oide kai hoti ouk oiden); and secondly (epeita), if it is perfectly possible (ei hoti malista dunaton), what benefit our knowing that would bring us (tis an eiê hêmin ôphelia eidosin auto).’ – Cr. ‘Indeed we ought to look at that (Alla chrê skopein).’ (166e4-167b5)

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D. Watt notes on ‘third time lucky’ (Palin toinun, to triton tô̢ sôtêri): ‘Literally, “the third (libation) to (Zeus) the Saviour”. The third cup of wine of a libation was dedicated to Zeus the Saviour. To drink this third cup was to pray [my emphasis, J.T.] for good luck.’

Watt’s note goes some way to amending the frivolous ‘third time lucky’. In the discussion that follows, the possibility and the benefit of Socrates’ scrutinizing and investigating himself is exposed to doubt, and in the dialogue it remains unresolved.

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Socrates begins the proposed investigation by disputing the very possibility of self-reflexivity: ‘Come on then (Ithi dê), Critias (ô Kritia), look at it (skepsai), and see whether you can be shown to be closer to a solution in these matters than I (ean ti peri autôn euporôteros phanê̢s emou), because I am at a loss (egô men gar aporô). Shall I tell you where I find myself in difficulties (hê̢ de aporô, phrasô soi;)? – Critias: ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘Well then, if what we were saying a moment ago really is the case, won’t it all amount to this, that there is some one knowledge which is the knowledge of nothing but itself and the other knowledges (Allo ti oun, panta taut’ an eiê, ei estin hoper su nundê eleges, mia tis epistêmê, hê ouk allou tinos estin ê heautês te kai tôn allôn epistêmôn epistêmê), this same knowledge being the knowledge of ignorance too (kai dê kai anepistêmosunês hê autê hautê;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ (167b6-c3)

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D. Watt puts the foregoing Socrates’ entry into a ‘we’ form; in fact, Socrates starts by attributing the starting point of the investigation to Critias, as Jowett correctly translates. Socrates: ‘Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this (Allo ti oun, panta taut’ an eiê, ei estin hoper su nundê eleges): that there must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of other sciences (mia tis epistêmê, hê ouk allou tinos estin ê heautês te kai tôn allôn epistêmôn epistêmê), and that the same is also the science of the absence of science (kai dê kai anepistêmosunês hê autê hautê;)?’

It is only in his next entry that Socrates identifies himself with Critias’ position, using the ‘we’ instead of ‘you’.

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Socrates: ‘See (Ide dê) what a strange thing (hôs atopon) we’re trying to say, my friend (epicheiroumen, ô hetaire, legein). If you look at the same proposition in other cases (en allois gar pou to auto touto ean skopê̢s), it’ll come to seem to you (doxei soi), I think (hôs egô̢mai), that it is impossible (adunaton einai).’ – Critias: ‘How (Pôs dê)? In what cases (kai pou;)?’. – S. ‘In these (En toisde). Consider (ennoei gar) whether you think there is a vision (ei soi dokei opsis tis einai) which is not the vision of what the other visions are visions of (hê hôn men hai allai opseis eisin, ouk estin toutôn opsis), but is the vision of itself and the other visions (heautês de kai tôn allôn opseôn opsis estin), and non-visons in the same way (kai mê opseôn hôsautôs): and though it is a vision, it sees no colour (kai chrôma men hora̢ ouden opsis ousa), only itself (hautên de) and the other visions (kai tas allas opseis). Do you think there is such a vision (dokei tis soi einai toiautê;)?’ – Cr. ‘Heaven’s (Ma Di’), no, I don’t (ouk emoige).’ – S. ‘What about a hearing (Ti de akoên) which hears no sound (he phônês men oudemias akouei); but hears itself and the other hearings (hautês de kai tôn allôn akoôn akouei) and non-hearings (kai tôn mê akoôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘No, not that either (Oude touto).’ – S. ‘Take all the senses together (Sullêbdên dê skopei peri pasôn tôn aisthêseôn). Do you think there is some sense of the senses (ei tis soi dokei einai aisthêseôn men aisthêsis) and of itself (kai heautês) which, however, senses nothing of what the other senses sense (hôn de dê hai allai aisthêseis aisthanontai, mêdenos aisthanomenê;)?’ – Cr. ‘No, I don’t (Ouk emoige).’ – S. ‘Do you think there is some desire (All’ epithumia dokei tis soi einai) which is the desire for no pleasure (hêtis hêdonês oudemias estin epithumia), but for itself (hautês de) and the other desires (kai tôn allôn epithumiôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘Certainly not (Ou dêta).’ – S. ‘Nor indeed, I think, is there a wish (Oude mên boulêsis, hôs egô̢mai) which wishes for no good (hê agathon men ouden bouletai), but which wishes for itself and for the other wishes (hautên de kai tas allas boulêseis bouletai).’ – Cr. ‘No, definitely not (Ou gar oun).’ – S. ‘Would you say there was some love of that kind (Erôta de phaiês an tina einai toiouton), which is actually the love of no beautiful thing (hos tunchanei ôn erôs kalou men oudenos), but of itself (hautou de) and the other loves (kai tôn allôn erôtôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘No, I don’t (Ouk egôge).’ – S. ‘Have you ever observed a fear (Phobon de êdê tina katanenoêkas) which fears itself and the other fears (hos heauton men kai tous allous phobous phobeitai), but fears none of the things which are frightening (tôn deinôn d’ oude hen phobeitai;)?’ – Cr. ‘No, I haven’t (Ou katanenoêka).’ – S. ‘Or any opinion (Doxan de) which is an opinion of opinions (doxôn doxan) and of itself (kai hautês), but which holds no opinion about what the other opinions hold opinions about (hôn de hai allai doxazousin mêden doxazousan;)?’ Cr. ‘Not at all (Oudamôs).’ (167d4-168a5)

Socrates: ‘But it would appear we’re saying that there is some such knowledge (All’ epistêmên, hôs eoiken, phamen tina einai toiautên), which is the knowledge of no branch of learning (hêtis mathêmatos men oudenos estin epistêmê), but is the knowledge of itself and the other knowledges (hautês de kai tôn allôn epistêmôn epistêmê)?’ – Critias: ‘Yes, we are (Phamen gar)!’ – S. ‘Isn’t it strange, then (Oukoun atopon), if it really does exist (ei ara kai estin;)? In fact, let’s not state categorically just yet that it doesn’t exist (mêden gar pô diischurizômetha hôs ouk estin), but let’s keep investigating whether it does exist (all’ ei estin eti skopômen).’ – Cr. ‘You’re right (Orthôs legeis).’ (168a6-b1)

Socrates: ‘Come on, then (Phere dê). This knowledge is (estin hautê hê epistêmê) the knowledge of something (tinos epistêmê), and it has some such faculty (kai echei tina toiautên dunamin), so as to be of something (hôste tinos einai), hasn’t it (ê gar;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘For example, we say that that which is superior has some such faculty (Kai gar to meizon phamen toiautên tina echein dunamin), so as to be superior of something, don’t we (hôste tinos einai meizon;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes, it does (Echei gar).’ – S. ‘Then that something is inferior (Oukoun elattonos tinos), if the other is to be superior (eiper estai meizon).’ – Cr. ’It must be (Anankê).’ – S. ‘Now, if we were to find some superior thing (Ei oun ti heuroimen meizon) which is the superior of those things which are superior (ho tôn men meizonôn estin meizon) and of itself (kai heautou), but the superior of none of those things of which the other superior things are the superiors (hôn de t’alla meizô estin mêdenos meizon), I’m quite sure that what would be the case with it would be this (pantôs an pou ekeino d’ autô̢ huparchoi): if it were the superior of itself (eiper heautou meizon eiê), it would also be the inferior of itself (kai elatton heautou einai), wouldn’t it (ê ou;)?’ – Cr. ‘It would certainly have to (Pollê anankê), Socrates (ô Sôkrates).’ (168b2-c3)

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I don’t know why D. Watt translated meizon (‘bigger’) as ‘superior‘, elatton (‘smaller’) as ‘inferior’; one might imagine that one and the same person can suffer both a superiority and an inferiority complex. Socrates chose ‘greater’ and ‘smaller’, for one and the same thing cannot be greater of itself and smaller of itself. Jowett translates: ‘And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself and greater than other great things (Ei oun ti heuroimen meizon ho tôn men meizonôn estin meizon kai heautou), but not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater (hôn de t’alla meizô estin mêdenos meizon), then that thing would have the property (pantôs an pou ekeino d’ autô̢ huparchoi) of being greater and also less than itself (eiper heautou meizon eiê kai elatton heautou einai, ê ou;)?’ – Critias: ‘That, Socrates, is the inevitable inference (Pollê anankê, ô Sôkrates).’

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Socrates: ‘And if something is the double (Oukoun kai ei ti diplasion estin) both of the other doubles (tôn te allôn diplasiôn) and of itself (kai heautou), it would itself constitute a half (hêmiseos dêpou ontos heautou te), as would the others (kai tôn allôn), if it were double (diplasion an eiê), since there is not (ou gar estin), I’m sure (pou), a double of anything (allou diplasion) but a half (ê hêmiseos).’ – Critias: ‘True (Alêthê).’ – S. ‘That which is superior of itself (Pleon de hautou on ‘That which is more than itself’) will be the inferior of itself too (ou kai elatton estai; ‘won’t it be les than itself as well?’), and what is heavier (kai baruteron on), lighter (kouphoteron), and what is older (kai presbuteron on), younger (neôteron), and so on (kai t’alla panta hôsautôs ‘and the same of other things’, tr. Jowett). Whatever relates its own faculty to itself (hotiper an tên heautou dunamin pros heauto echê̢) will also have that essential nature (ou kai ekeinên hexei tên ousian) to which its faculty was related, won’t it (pros hên hê dunamis autou ên;)? I mean something like this (legô de to toionde): hearing, for example (hoion hê akoê), we say (phamen) is the hearing of nothing other than sound (ouk allou tinos ên akoê ê phônês), isn’t it (ê gar;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes (Nai).’ – S. ‘If it is to hear itself (Okoun eiper autê heautês akousetai), it will hear itself as possessing a sound (phônên echousês heautês akousetai), since it couldn’t hear otherwise (ou gar an allôs akouseien).’ – Cr. ‘Most definitely (Pollê anankê).’ – S. ‘And vision (Kai hê opsis), of course (ge pou), my good friend (ô ariste), if it is to see itself (eiper opsetai autê heautên), must have some colour (chrôma ti autên anankê echein), since vision will certainly never see anything that is colourless (achrôn gar opsis ouden mê pote idê̢).’ – Cr. ‘No, it definitely won’t (Ou gar oun).’ – S. ‘Do you see (Hora̢s), then (oun), Critias (ô Kritia), that of all the examples we’ve gone through (hoti hosa dielêluthamen), for some it seems to us absolutely impossible (ta men autôn adunata pantapasi phainetai hêmin), while in the case of the others it is very difficult to believe (ta d’ apisteitai sphodra), that they could ever relate their own faculty to themselves (mê pot’ an tên heautôn dunamin pros heauta schein;)? It is absolutely impossible for magnitudes and numbers and the like (megethê men gar kai plêthê kai ta toiauta pantapasin adunaton), isn’t it (ê ouchi;)? – Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘Whereas hearing (Akoê d’au) and vision (kai opsis), and also (kai eti ge) motion moving itself (kinêsis autê heautên kinein) and heat burning itself (kai thermotês kaein) and everything like that (kai panta ta toiauta), would excite disbelief in some people (tois men apistian an paraschoi), though perhaps not in others (isôs de tisin ou).’ (168c4-169a1)

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In the Phaedrus Plato’s Socrates proves the soul’s immortality, defining it as ‘motion moving itself’: ‘All souls is immortal (Psuchê pasa athanatos); for that which is ever in motion is immortal (to gar aeikinêton athanaton). But that which while imparting motion is itself moved by something else (to d’ allo kinoun kai hup’ allou kinoumenon) can cease to be in motion (paulan echon kinêseôs), and therefore can cease to live (paulan echei zôês); it is only that which moves itself (monon dê to hauto kinoun) that never intermits its motion, inasmuch as it cannot abandon its own nature (hate ouk apoleipon heauto, oupote lêgei kinoumenon); moreover this self-mover is the source and first principle of motion for all other things that are moved (alla kai tois allois hosa kineitai touto pêgê kai archê kinêseôs) … The self-mover, then, is the first principle of motion (houtô dê kinêseôs men archê to auto hauto kinoun): and it is as impossible that it should be destroyed as that it should come into being (touto de out apollusthai oute gignesthai dunaton): were it otherwise, the whole universe, the whole of that which comes to be, would collapse into immobility (ê panta ton ouranon pasan te genesin sumpesousan stênai), and never find another source of motion to bring it back into being (kai mêpote authis echein hothen kinêthenta genêsetai). And now that we have seen that that which is moved by itself is immortal (athanatou de pephasmenou tou huph’ heautou kinoumenou), we shall feel no scruple in affirming that precisely that is the essence and definition of the soul, to wit self-motion (psuchês ousian te kai logon touton auton tis legôn ouk aischuneitai 245c5-e3, tr. Hackforth).

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Putting the definition of the soul as the self-moving motion into Socrates’ mouth, Plato in the Phaedrus fragrantly violated his self-awareness of ignorance. Socrates had to protest; the Apology testifies to it that he must have protested, or else he could not have founded his defence in front of the jury on his philosophic ignorance; Charmides testifies to it that Plato enacted Socrates’ protest in the dialogue that followed the Phaedrus.

Nevertheless, one may say on behalf of Plato as the author of the Phaedrus that the endeavour to attain self-knowledge could be understood as self-motion, and thus as an extension of and reflection on Socrates’ philosophic activities. This is why Socrates has been driven to subject to his radical doubting his pursuit of self-knowledge.

Socrates’ reaction to the Phaedrus appears to have reminded Plato of the way Socrates had reacted to the Pythian oracle, which his friend Chaerephon brought from Delphi: ‘he actually asked the oracle (êreto gar dê) to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was (ei tis emou eiê sophôteros), and the Pythian prophetess answered (aneilen oun hê Puthia) that there was no man wiser (mêdena sophôteron einai)’. (Pl. Apology 21a5-7, tr. Jowett). If so, this is why in the introductory paragraph of the Charmides it is Chaerephon who welcomes Socrates after his return from the military camp at Potidaea (153a-b), and why it is Chaerephon’s praise of Charmides’ beauty that occasions Socrates’ enquiry into sôphrosunê (154d).

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Giving vent to Socrates’ re-emphasized philosophic not-knowing, Plato at the same time indicated that Socrates’ scrutiny and his doubts did not affect his, that is Plato’s, view of the soul as the self-moving mover. When Socrates’ doubts as to the possibility of self-knowledge reached their finale by pointing to ‘motion moving itself (kinêsis autê heautên kinein) and heat burning itself (kai thermotês kaein)’, he continued: ‘What we need, my friend, is some great man (megalou dê tinos, ô phile, andros dei) to determine satisfactorily for all instances (hostis touto kata pantôn hikanôs diairêsetai) whether none of the things which exist (poteron ouden tôn ontôn) relates its own faculty to itself naturally (tên hautou dunamin auto pros heauto pephuken echein), but to something else instead (alla pros allo), or whether some do (ê ta men), but others don’t (ta d’ ou) … I don’t believe I’m competent to settle these questions (egô men ou pisteuô emautô̢ hikanos einai tauta dielesthai). (169a1-8)

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Let me end this post by noting that in Plato’s thought ‘motion moving itself’ (kinêsis autê heautên kinein) and ‘heat burning itself’ (kai thermotês kaein), with which Socrates’ doubts concerning the possibility of self-reflective entities culminated, are, presumably, closely related. Plato was a Heraclitean prior to his philosophic encounter with Socrates, as Aristotle informs us in Metaphysics 987a33-b1; Heraclitus proclaimed that ‘this cosmos (kosmon tonde), which is the same for all beings (ton auton hapantôn), has not been created by any god or man (oute tis theôn oute anthrôpôn epoiêse), but always was (all’ ên aei), is (kai estin), and will be the ever-living fire (kai estai pur aeizôn, Diels-Kranz, frgm. B 30).’

Questions

Friday, July 7, 2017

5f Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating, with reference to the Phaedrus

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