4a An interlude with Xenophon’s Hellenica – Critias’ speech, with a reference to Plato’s Apology and Charmides

Critias continued: “Now to let you know (Hina de eidête) that this man’s present doings are nothing new (hoti ou kaina tauta houtos poiei), but that he is, rather, a traitor by nature (alla phusei prodotês estin), I will recall to you his past deeds (anamnêsô humas ta toutô̢ pepragmena). This man in the beginning (houtos gar ex archês men), although he had received honours at the hands of the democracy, was extremely eager, like his father Hagnon, to change the democracy into the oligarchy of the four Hundred (timômenos hupo tou dêmou kata ton patera Hagnôna, propetestatos egeneto tên dêmokratian metastêsai eis tous tetrakosious), and he was a leader in that government (kai eprôteuen en ekeinois).” (II. iii. 30)

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Brownson wrongly translates Critias’ last sentence. According to his translation Theramenes ‘was extremely eager, like his father Hagnon, to change the democracy into the oligarchy of the four Hundred’, but according to Critias,  ‘although he had received honours at the hands of the democracy (timômenos hupo tou dêmou) like his father Hagnon (kata ton patera Hagnôna), he became extremely eager (propetestatos egeneto) to change the democracy into the oligarchy of the four Hundred (tên dêmokratian metastêsai eis tous tetrakosious)’.

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“When (Epei), however (de), he perceived (ê̢stheto) that some opposition to the oligarchy (antipalon ti tê̢ oligarchia̢) was gathering (sunistamenon), he took the lead again – as champion of the democrats against the oligarchs (prôtos au hêgemôn tô̢ dêmô̢ ep’ ekeinous egeneto)! That is the reason (hothen), you know (dêpou), why he is nicknamed ‘Buskin’ (kai kothornos epikaleitai): for as the buskin seems to fit both feet (kai gar ho kothornos harmottein men tois posin amphoterois dokei), so he faces both ways (apoblepei de ap’ amphoterôn). But, Theramenes, the man who deserves to live ought (dei de, ô Thêramenês, andra ton axion zên) not to be clever at leading his comrades into dangerous undertakings (ou proagein men deinon einai eis pragmeta tous sunontas) and then, if any hindrance offers itself (an de ti antikoptê̢), to turn around on the instant (euthus metaballesthai), but he ought, as one on shipboard, to hold to his task until they come into a fair breeze (all’ hôsper en nêI diaponeisthai, heôs an eis ouron katastôsin). Otherwise (ei de mê), how in the world would sailors reach the port for which they are bound (pôs an aphikointo pote entha dei), if they should sail in the opposite direction the moment any hindrance offered itself (ei epeidan ti antikopsê̢ euthus eis enantia pleoien;)? It is true, of course, that all sorts of changes in government are attended by loss of life (kai eisi men dêpou pasai metabolai politeiôn thanatêphoroi), but you (su de), thanks to your changing sides so easily (dia to eumetabolos einai), share the responsibility (pleistois men metaitios ei), not merely for the slaughter of a large number of oligarchs by the commons (ex oligarchias hupo tou dêmou apolôlenai), but also for the slaughter of a large number of democrats by the aristocracy (pleistois d’ ek dêmokratias hupo tôn beltionôn ‘by the better ones’).” (II. iii. 30-32)

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Antony Andrews wrote in his entry on Theramenes in The Oxford Classical Dictionary: ‘His frequent changes of side were censured both by democrats like Lysias and by oligarchs like Critias, but for Aristotle and for others in the fourth century he was a moderate seeking a genuine political mean. If he was sincere, he must nevertheless bear much of the blame for the internal troubles which lamed Athens in the last phase of the war.’

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“And this Theramenes, you remember (houtos de toi), was the man who (estin hos), although detailed (kai tachtheis) by the generals to pick up the Athenians whose ships were disabled (anelesthai hupo tôn stratêgôn tous kataduntas Athênaiôn) in the battle of Lesbos (en tê̢ peri Lesbon naumachia̢), failed to do so (autos ouk anelomenos), and nevertheless was the very one who accused the generals (homôs tôn stratêgôn katêgorôn)  and brought about their death (apekteinen autous) in order that he might save his own life (hina autos perisôtheiê)!” (II. iii. 32)

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A few years later, Socrates referred to this incident in the Defence speech at his trial: ‘The only office of state which I ever held, O men of Athens (egô gar, ô andres Athênaioi, allên men archên oudemian pôpote êrxa en tê̢ polei), was that of a senator (ebouleusa de): the tribe of Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency (kai etuchen hêmôn hê phulê Antiochis prutaneuousa) at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a body (hote humeis tous deka stratêgous tous ouk anelomenous tous ek tês naumachias ebouleusasthe hathroous krinein), contrary to law (paranomôs), as you all thought afterwards (hôs en tô̢ husterô̢ chronô̢ pasin humin edoxe); but at the time I was the only one of the Prytanes (tot’ egô monos tôn prutaneôn) who was opposed to the illegality (ênantiôthên humin mêden poiein para tous nomous), and I gave my vote against you (kai enantia epsêphisamên); and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me (kai hetoimôn ontôn endeiknunai me kai apagein tôn rêtorôn), and you called (kai humôn keleuontôn ‘and you were all urging them on’, H. Tredennick) and shouted (kai boôntôn), I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law and justice with me (meta tou nomou kai dikaiou ô̢mên mallon me dein diakinduneuein), rather than take part in your injustice (ê meth’ humôn genesthai mê dikaia bouleuomenôn) because I feared imprisonment (phobêthenta desmon) and death (ê thanaton).’ (Plato, Apology, 32a9-c3, tr. Jowett)

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Critias went on: “Now when a man clearly shows (Hostis ge mên phaneros esti) that he is always looking out for his own advantage (tou men pleonektein aei epimelomenos) and taking no thought for honour or his friends (tou de kalou kai tôn philôn mêden entrepomenos), how in the world can it be right to spare him (pôs toutou chrê pote pheisasthai)? Ought we not surely, knowing of his previous changes, to take care that he shall not be able to do the same to us also (pôs de ou phulaxasthai, eidotas autou tas metabolas, hôs mê kai hêmas t’auto dunasthê̢ poiêsai;)? We therefore arraign him (hêmeis oun touton hupagomen) on the charge of plotting against (kai hôs epibouleuonta) and betraying (kai hôs prodidonta) both ourselves (hêmas te) and you (kai humas). And in proof that what we are thus doing is proper (hôs d’ eikota poioumen), consider this fact also (kai tad’ ennoêsate). The constitution of the Lacedaemonians is, we know, deemed the best of all constitutions (kallistê men gar dêpou dokei politeia einai hê Lakedaimoniôn). Now in Lacedaemon if one of the ephors should undertake (ei de ekei epicheirêseie tis tôn ephorôn) to find fault with the government and to oppose what has been done instead of yielding to the majority (anti tou tois pleiosi peithesthai psegein te tên archên kai enantiousthai tois pepragmenois), do you not suppose that he would be regarded, not only by the ephors themselves but also by all the rest of the state (ouk an oiesthe auton kai hup’ autôn tôn ephorôn kai hopo tês allês hapasês poleôs), as having merited the severest punishment (tês megistês timôrias axiôthênai;)? Even so you (kai humeis oun), if you are wise (ean sôphronête), will not spare this Theramenes, but rather yourselves (ou toutou all’ humôn autôn pheisesthe); for to leave him alive (hôs houtos sôtheis men) would cause many of those who hold opposite views to yours to cherish his thoughts (pollous an mega phronein poiêseie tôn enantia gignôskontôn humin ‘would greatly encourage the thoughts of those who hold opposite views to yours’), while to destroy him (apolomenos de) would cut off the hopes of them all, both within and without the city (pantôn kai tôn en tê̢ polei kai tôn exô hupotemoi an tas elpidas).” ‘When Critias had so spoken, he sat down (Ho men taut’ eipôn ekathezeto).’ (II.iii.33-34, tr. Brownson)

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Critias ended his speech with an appeal to sôphrosunê, here in its verb form, sôphronein, translated by Brownson as ‘being wise’, quite in line with its use in Plato’s Charmides. Do we have here Critias’ real concept of sôphrosunê: doing everything that is needed to assure once self-preservation? It neatly contrasts with Socrates’ view of true wisdom, true sôphrosunê; Socrates ended the story about his involvement in the trial of the generals by stating that he preferred risking imprisonment and death, rather than participating in injustice. But to be fair to Critias, he was convinced that what he was doing was in accordance with justice, and he died in defence of what he was doing; he and Charmides died in 403 in the battle at Munychia, in which the Thirty were defeated by the exiled democrats.

Critias’ speech is worth comparing with Plato’s Charmides. In the dialogue, Critias’ first definition of sôphrosunê is ‘doing one’s own job’ (to ta hautou prattein, 161b); his second definition is ‘knowing oneself’ (to gignôskein auton heauton, 165b). The two definitions are in fact closely related; one must know oneself in order to know what ta hautou (‘one’s own things’) – that is one’s true concerns, preoccupations, one’s own job – are. Critias viewed himself and the Thirty as the best men (tous beltistous, Xen. Hell. II.iii.19), as such he considered it as their right and duty to ‘strive for more’ (pleonektein) than the lesser mortals could aspire to or were entitled to, and, as he told Theramenes when he still saw him as a friend and partner, ‘to put out of the way those who were best able to thwart them’ (ekpodôn poieisthai tous hikanôtatous diakôluein, II.iii.16). Critias’ insistence on ‘doing one’s job’ comes to the fore when he compares the task of the Thirty to that of one on a ship: ‘to hold to his task until they come into a fair breeze’ (hôsper en nêi diaponeisthai, heôs an eis ouron katastôsin, II.iii.31)