Plutarch in
his Dion describes the early days of
Plato’s arrival in Syracuse at the court of Dionysius II: ‘When Plato came to
Sicily (Platôn eis Sikelian aphikomenos),
in the first instances (peri men tas
prôtas apantêseis) he met with astonishing friendliness and honour (thaumastês etunchane philophrosunês kai
timês). For a royal chariot (kai gar
harma tôn basislikôn), magnificently adorned, awaited him as he left his
trireme (autô̢ parestê kekosmêmenon
diaprepôs apobanti tês triêrous), and the tyrant offered a sacrifice of
thanksgiving (kai thusian ethusen ho
turannos) for the great blessing that had been bestowed upon his government
(hôs eutuchêmatos megalou tê̢ archê̢
prosgegonotos). Moreover, the modesty that characterized his symposia (aidôs de sumposiôn),
the decorum of the courtiers (kai
schêmatismos aulês), and the mildness of the tyrant himself (kai pra̢otês autou tou turannou) in all
his dealings with the public (peri
hekasta tôn chrêmatizomenôn), inspired the citizens with marvellous
hopes of his reformation (thaumastas
enedôken elpidas metabolês tois politais). There was also something like
a general rush for letters and philosophy (phora
de tis ên epi logous kai philosophian hapantôn), and the palace was
filled with dust, as they say, owing to the multitude of geometricians there (kai to tyranneion, hôs phasi, koniortos
hupo plêthous tôn geômetrountôn kateichen).’ [Geometrical figures were
traced in loose sand strewn upon the floor.] (Ch. XIII 1-4, the note and
translation by B. Perrin.)
I am dating
the Symposium in 364 B.C., that is the
second year of Plato’s ‘temporary’ stay in Athens, the first year having been
devoted to the Phaedo and the Parmenides, dialogues directed at his
disciples in the Academy, which he intended to leave for good. But when the
first year passed without his being summoned back, his eyes turned to Dionysius
and the task of transforming him into a philosopher-king. Choosing the
symposium as the framework for his dialogue, his thoughts went back to the early
days of his intercourse with Dionysius, before it was sullied by Dionysius’
expulsion of Dion.
The theme
discussed in Plato’s Symposium is
Eros, the god of love; Plutarch’s description of Dionysius’ relationship to
Plato after his expulsion of Dion sheds light on this choice of theme: ‘As for
Plato, Dionysius at once removed him to the acropolis (Platôna de Dionusios euthus men eis tên akropolin mestestêsen),
where he contrived to give him a guard of honour under pretence of hospitable
kindness (entimon autô̢ schêmati xenias
philanthrôpou phrouran mêchanêsamenos), in order that he might not
accompany Dion (hôs mê sumpleoi Diôni)
and bear witness to his wrongs (martus
hôn êdikeito). But after time and intercourse (chronô̢ de kai sundiaitêsei) … he conceived a passion for him
that was worthy of a tyrant (êrasthê
turannikon erôta), demanding that he alone should have his love returned
by Plato (monos axiôn hupo Platônos
anterasthai) and be admired beyond all others (kai thaumazesthai malista pantôn), and he was ready (hetoimos ôn) to entrust Plato with the
administration of the tyranny (epitrepein
ta pragmata kai tên turannida) if only he would not set his friendship for
Dion above that (mê protimônti tên
pros Diôna philian) which he had for him (tês pros hauton).’ (Dion
XVI, 1-2, tr. Perrin)
Plato gives
substance to Plutarch’s account when he says in the Seventh Letter that in those days it had been proclaimed (diêngelmenon) ‘that Dionysius is
wonderfully devoted to Plato’ (hôs
Platôna Dionusios thaumastôs hôs aspazetai),’ and goes on to say: ‘But
what were the facts (to d’ eichen dê
pôs;)? For the truth (to gar
alêthes) must be told (dei phrazein).
He became indeed more and more devoted as time advanced (êspazeto men aei proïontos tou chronou mallon), according as he
grew familiar with my disposition and character (kata tên tou tropou te kai êthous sunousian), but he was desirous
that I should praise him more than Dion (heauton
de epainein mallon ê Diôna ebouleto me) and regard him rather than Dion
as my special friend (kai philon
hêgeisthai diapherontôs mallon ê ‘keinon), and this triumph he was
marvellously anxious to achieve (kai
thaumastôs ephilonikei pros to toiouton). But the best way to achieve
this, if that was to be achieved (hê̢ d’
an houtôs egeneto, eiper egigneto, kallista) – namely, by occupying
himself in learning and in listening to discourses on philosophy and by
associating with me – this he always shirked (ôknei hôs dê manthanôn kai akouôn tôn peri philosophian logôn kai
emoi sungignesthai) owing to his dread of the talk of slanderers (phoboumenos tous tôn diaballontôn logous),
lest he might be hampered in some measure (mê
pê̢ parapodistheiê) and Dion might accomplish all his designs (kai Diôn dê panta eiê diapepragmenos).
I, however (egô de), put up with all
this (panta hupemenon), holding fast
the original purpose (tên prôtên
dianoian phulattôn) with which I had come (hê̢per aphikomên), in the hope that he might possibly gain a
desire (ei pôs eis epithumian elthoi)
for the philosophic life (tês
philosophou zôês); but he, with his resistance, won the day (ho d’ enikêse antiteinôn).’ (330a1-b7,
tr. Bury)
As their mutual
intercourse did not make progress in the direction in which Plato wanted it to go,
he departed for Athens; his departure was to be temporary, until the next
sailing season; Dionysius ‘promised him that in the summer he would summon Dion
home’ (sunthemenos eis hôran etous
metapempsasthai Diôna, Plut. Dion
XVI.4).
It is
noteworthy that Plato speaks of that first stay in Sicily as epidêmia (Letter VII, 330b8), ‘staying at home’, and for his departing for
Athens he uses the verb apodêmeô
(330c2), ‘to be away from home’. When Plato went to Syracuse at Dion’s bidding,
summoned by Dionysius, he went there with the intention to make it his home for
the end of his days.
During his
‘temporary’ stay in Athens Plato remained true to his hope that he might awaken
in Dionysius a desire for philosophy, although the latter broke his promise to
summon him and Dion ‘in the summer’ (eis hôran
etous). If he was to have any chance of making his hope true, he had to do
something extraordinary; because he could not use the power of his spoken word,
he had to take recourse to writing. He had to rekindle Dionysius’ love for him
and direct it towards philosophy. This is the road along which Plato in the Symposium, in the guise of ‘most wise
Diotima’ (sophôtatê Diotima, 208b8),
suggests a talented young man, erotically inclined, should be guided, beginning
with love towards the beauty of one body, marching towards the boundless love
of wisdom, and ending with the sight of the Beauty itself (210a-212a).
***
Plato opens
his Second Letter, addressed to Dionysius,
with the words: ‘I hear from Archedemus (Êkousa
Archedêmou) that you think (hoti su
hêgê̢) that not only I myself should keep quiet (chrênai peri sou mê monon eme hêsuchian agein) but my friends
also (alla kai tous emous epitêdeious)
from doing or saying anything bad about you (tou phlauron ti poein ê legein peri se); and that “you except Dion
only” (Diôna de monon exaireton poiê̢,
310b4-c1; translations from the Letters
are Bury’s).’
These words
indicate that Dionysius believed he had reason to be indignant and injured and
that he was in a position to tell to Plato how to behave concerning himself.
Plato responds by deploring his lack of influence on Dion and Dionysius: ‘Now
your saying this, that Dion is excepted, implies (houtos de ho logos sêmainei, to Diôna exaireton einai) that I have no control over my friends (hoti ouk archô egô tôn emôn epitêdeiôn);
for had I had this control over you and Dion, as well as the rest (ei gar êrchon egô houtô tôn te allôn
kai sou kai Diônos), more blessings would have come to us all (pleiô an ên hêmin te pasin agatha) and
to the rest of the Greeks also (tois te
allois Hellêsin), as I affirm (hôs
egô phêmi, 310c1-5).’
What Plato
says next allows us to date the Letter:
‘I do not say this as though what Cratistolus and Polyxenus have told you is to
be trusted (kai tauta legô hôs ouch
hugies ti Kratistolou kai Poluxenou pros se eirêkotôn); for it is said
that one of these men declares (hôn
phasi legein ton heteron) that at Olympia he had heard (hoti akouoi Olumpiasi) quite a number
of my companions maligning you (pollôn
tinôn tôn met’ emou se kakêgorountôn). No doubt his hearing is more
acute than mine (isôs gar oxuteron emou
akouei); for I certainly heard no such thing (egô men gar ouk êkousa, 310c6-d3).’
The Olympic
Festival referred to must be that of 364 B.C. This means that Plato’s
disappointment with Dionysius’ breaking his promise of summoning Dion back home
‘next summer’ was acutely felt by him, and that Dion must have been seething
with resentment. This explains Dionysius’ ‘excepting Dion’ from saying or doing
anything against him. But Dionysius presumably continued sending to Dion the revenues
of his vast property, and he still kept open the prospect of summoning both
Plato and Dion back to Sicily. Plato, on his part, is clearly interested in
their maintaining friendly relations, untainted by detractors and calumniators:
‘For the future, whenever anyone makes such a statement about any of us, what
you ought, I think, to do is (chrê de,
hôs emoi dokei, houtôsi se poiein tou loipou, hotan ti toiouton legê̢ tis
peri hêmôn tinos) to send me a letter of inquiry (grammata pempsanta eme eresthai); for I shall tell the truth (egô gar t’alêthê legein) without
scruple or shame (oute oknêsô oute
aischunoumai, 310d3-6).’
After
dismissing Dionysius’ complaint as based on fabrications, Plato invites him to
view their relationship as it is stands, as it is seen by people: ‘Now as for
you and me (emoi de dê kai soi), the
relation in which we stand towards each other (ta pros allêlous) is really this (houtôsi tunchanei onta). There is not a single Greek, one may say,
to whom we are unknown (oute autoi
agnôtes esmen oudeni Hellênôn hôs epos eipein), and our intercourse is
a matter of common talk (oute hê
sunousia hêmôn sigatai); and you may be sure of this (mê lanthanetô de se), that it will be
common talk also in days to come (hoti
oud’ eis ton epeita chronon sigêthêsetai), because so many have heard
tell of it (tosoutoi hoi paradedegmenoi
eisin autên) owing to its duration and its publicity (hate ouk oligên gegenêmenên oud’ êrema, 310d6-e4; following
Novotný and Bury, I accept
H. Richards emendation of tosoutoi,
‘so many’, for toioutoi, ‘such’, ‘of
such quality’, of the manuscripts, retained by Burnet).’
Plato’s
sudden concern for the opinion of common people, for what people may think and
say about him and Dionysius, sounds strange when Socrates in his dialogues is
concerned only with what is right,
not with what people think to be
right.
Plato asks: ‘What now is the point of this remark (ti oun dê legô nuni;)?’ He answers: ‘I will go back to the beginning and tell you (erô anôthen arxamenos). It is natural for wisdom and great power to come together (pephuke sunienai eis t’auton phronêsis te kai dunamis megalê), and they are for ever pursuing and seeking each other (kai taut’ allêla aei diôkei kai zêtei) and consorting together (kai sungignetai). Moreover (epeita), these are qualities which people delight in discussing themselves in private conversation (kai hoi anthrôpoi chairousin peri toutôn autoi te dialegomenoi) and hearing others discuss in their poems (kai allôn akouontes en te idiais sunousiais kai en tais poiêsesi). For example (hoion kai), when men talk about Hiero (peri Hierônos hotan dialegôntai anthrôpoi) or about Pausanias (kai Pausaniou) the Lacedaemonian (tou Lakedaimoniou) they delight (chairousi) to bring in their meeting with Simonides (tên Simônidou sunousian parapherontes) and what he did (ha te epraxen) and said to them (kai eipen pros autous). [Bury remarks: ‘Hiero, the elder, was tyrant of Gela and Syracuse 485-467 B.C. Pausanias defeated the Persians at Plataea 479 B.C. Simonides of Ceos was a famous lyric poet.] … The poets, too, follow their example (kai dê tauta mimoumenoi hoi poiêtai), and bring together Creon and Tiresias (Kreonta men kai Teiresian sunagousin), Polyeidus and Minos (Polueidon de kai Minô), Agamemnon and Nestor (Agamemnona de kai Nestora), Odysseus and Palamedes (kai Odussea kai Palamêdê); and so it was, I suppose (hôs d’ emoi dokei), that the earliest men also brought together Prometheus and Zeus (kai Promêthea Dii tautê̢ pê̢ sunêgon hoi prôtoi anthrôpoi). [Bury remarks: ‘Creon and Tiresias are characters in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone; Polyeidus and Minos in Euripides’ Polyeidus; the rest in Homer; Aeschylus in Prometheus Vinctus tells us about Zeus and Prometheus.] And of these some were – as the poets tell – at feud with each other, and others were friends; while others again were now friends and now foes, and partly in agreement and partly in disagreement (toutôn de tous men eis diaphoran, tous d’ eis philian allêlois iontas, tous de tote men eis philian tote d’ eis diaphoran, kai ta men homonoountas, ta de diapheromenous a̢dousi, 310e4-311b7).’
Plato asks: ‘What now is the point of this remark (ti oun dê legô nuni;)?’ He answers: ‘I will go back to the beginning and tell you (erô anôthen arxamenos). It is natural for wisdom and great power to come together (pephuke sunienai eis t’auton phronêsis te kai dunamis megalê), and they are for ever pursuing and seeking each other (kai taut’ allêla aei diôkei kai zêtei) and consorting together (kai sungignetai). Moreover (epeita), these are qualities which people delight in discussing themselves in private conversation (kai hoi anthrôpoi chairousin peri toutôn autoi te dialegomenoi) and hearing others discuss in their poems (kai allôn akouontes en te idiais sunousiais kai en tais poiêsesi). For example (hoion kai), when men talk about Hiero (peri Hierônos hotan dialegôntai anthrôpoi) or about Pausanias (kai Pausaniou) the Lacedaemonian (tou Lakedaimoniou) they delight (chairousi) to bring in their meeting with Simonides (tên Simônidou sunousian parapherontes) and what he did (ha te epraxen) and said to them (kai eipen pros autous). [Bury remarks: ‘Hiero, the elder, was tyrant of Gela and Syracuse 485-467 B.C. Pausanias defeated the Persians at Plataea 479 B.C. Simonides of Ceos was a famous lyric poet.] … The poets, too, follow their example (kai dê tauta mimoumenoi hoi poiêtai), and bring together Creon and Tiresias (Kreonta men kai Teiresian sunagousin), Polyeidus and Minos (Polueidon de kai Minô), Agamemnon and Nestor (Agamemnona de kai Nestora), Odysseus and Palamedes (kai Odussea kai Palamêdê); and so it was, I suppose (hôs d’ emoi dokei), that the earliest men also brought together Prometheus and Zeus (kai Promêthea Dii tautê̢ pê̢ sunêgon hoi prôtoi anthrôpoi). [Bury remarks: ‘Creon and Tiresias are characters in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone; Polyeidus and Minos in Euripides’ Polyeidus; the rest in Homer; Aeschylus in Prometheus Vinctus tells us about Zeus and Prometheus.] And of these some were – as the poets tell – at feud with each other, and others were friends; while others again were now friends and now foes, and partly in agreement and partly in disagreement (toutôn de tous men eis diaphoran, tous d’ eis philian allêlois iontas, tous de tote men eis philian tote d’ eis diaphoran, kai ta men homonoountas, ta de diapheromenous a̢dousi, 310e4-311b7).’
***
R. G. Bury refers to this passage as an argument against the
authenticity of the Second Letter:
‘Can we imagine the real Plato … trotting out a list of sages and potentates to
suggest his own magnanimity and the magnificence of Dionysius? (Prefatory Note to ‘Epistle II’, vol. IX
of the LCL edition of Plato, pp. 399-400). In fact, this passage provides a
telling testimony to its authenticity, for it is hard to imagine how anybody
could forge this letter in view of Dionysius’ final years, and if anyone did,
how such a forgery could be accepted by the Academy as genuine. Plutarch says
that ‘after he had been conveyed to the camp of Timoleon (komistheis eis to tou Timoleontos stratopedon), where for the first
time he was seen as a private person and in humble garb (tote prôton idiôtês kai tapeinos ophtheis), he was sent off to
Corinth with a single ship and a small treasure (epi mias neôs kai chrêmatôn oligôn eis Korinthon apestalê),
having been born (gennêtheis men) and
reared (kai trapheis) in a tyranny (en turannidi) which was the greatest and
most illustrious of all tyrannies (tê̢
pasôn epiphanestatê̢ kai megistê̢, Timoleon
XIII, 8-9) … after his arrival at Corinth (Tou
de Dionusiou katapleusantos eis Korinthon) there was no Greek (oudeis ên Hellênôn) who did not long
to behold and speak to him (hos ouchi
theasasthai kai proseipein epothêsen auton) … For that age showed no work
either of nature or of art (ouden gar
oute phuseôs ho tote kairos oute technês) that was comparable to this
work of Fortune (hoson ekeino tuchês
ergon epedeixato), namely, the recent tyrant of Sicily (ton Sikelias oligon emprosthen turannon)
in Corinth (en Korinthô̢), whiling
his time away at a fishmonger’s (diatribonta
peri tên opsopôlin) or sitting in a perfumer’s shop (ê kathêmenon en muropôliô̢), drinking diluted wine (pinonta kekramenon) from the taverns (apo tôn kapêleiôn) and skirmishing (kai diaplêktizomenon) in public (en mesô̢) with common prostitutes (tois aph’ hôras ergazomenois gunaiois),
or trying to teach music-girls in their singing (tas de mousourgous en tais ô̢dais didaskonta), and earnestly
contending with them about songs for the stage (kai peri theatrikôn a̢smatôn erizein spoudazonta pros ekeinas) and
melody in hymns (kai peri melous
harmonias). Some thought that Dionysius did these things as an aimless
loiterer, and because he was naturally easy-going and fond of license (tauta d’hoi men allôs aluonta kai phusei
ra̢thumon onta kai philakolaston ô̢onto poiein ton Dionusion); but others
thought that it was in order to be held in contempt (hoi d’ huper tou kataphroneisthai) and not in fear by the
Corinthians (kai mê phoberon onta tois
Korinthiois), nor under suspicion (mêd’
hupopton) of being oppressed (hôs barunomenon)
by the change in his life (tên
metabolên tou biou) and of striving after power (kai pragmatôn ephiemenon), that he engaged in these practices and
played an unnatural part (epitêdeuein
kai hupokrinesthai para phusin), making a display of great silliness in the
way he amused himself (pollên abelterian
epideiknumenon en tô̢ scholazein). (Timoleon
XIV, 1-4, tr. Bernadotte Perrin.)
In view of all this, the Second
Letter could be included among Plato’s Letters
only if its authenticity was undisputed.
***
But let me return to the Second
Letter with a remark on Plato’s kai
dê tauta mimoumenoi hoi poiêtai
(311a7), which means ‘and the poets, imitating
these examples’. Bury’s translation ‘the poets, too, follow their example’ obscures
the fact that Plato keeps thinking of the poetry of Homer and the tragedians as
‘imitation’ (mimêsis), but unlike
Socrates in the Republic, he views it
now in positive terms. He goes on to say: ‘Now my object in saying this is to
make it clear (panta de tauta legô tode
boulomenos endeixasthai), that when we ourselves die men’s talk about us
will not likewise be silenced (hoti ouk,
epeidan hêmeis teleutêsômen, kai hoi logoi hoi peri hêmôn autôn
sesigêsontai); so that we must be careful about it (hôst’ epimelêteon autôn estin). We must necessarily (anankê gar), it seems (hôs eoike), have a care also for the
future (melein hêmin kai tou epeita
chronou), seeing that (epeidê),
by some law of nature (kai tunchanousin
kata tina phusin), the most slavish men (hoi men andrapodôdestatoi) pay no regard to it (ouden phrontizontes autou), whereas the
most upright (hoi d’ epieikestatoi) do
all they can (pan poiountes) to
ensure that they shall be well spoken of in the future (hopôs an eis ton epeita chronon eu akousôsin, 311b7-c7).’
Plato strongly emphasizes this point as intimately linked to
his care for philosophy: ‘In our case, then – if God so grant – it still
remains possible (touto oun hêmin eti,
sun theô̢ eipein, exestin) to put right whatever has been amiss in word or
deed during our intercourse in the past (ei
ti ara mê kalôs pepraktai kata tên emprosthen sunousian, epanorthousthai kai
ergô̢ kai logô̢). For I maintain that, as regards the true philosophy (peri gar philosophian phêmi egô tên
alêthinên), men will think and speak well of it if we ourselves are
upright (doxan esesthai kai logon hêmôn
men ontôn epieikôn beltiô), and ill if we are base (phaulôn de, t’ounantion). And in truth we could do nothing more
pious than to give attention to this matter (kaitoi peri toutou hêmeis epimeloumenoi ouden an eusebesteron
prattoimen), nothing more impious than to disregard it (oud’ amelountes asebesteron).’
(311d6-e2)
***
Plato’s Socrates was interested in afterlife but not in
after-fame. The interest in after-fame Plato appears to have for the first time
expressed – in his writings – in the Seventh
Letter. It was an important thought; for Plato, it was closely linked to
his engagement in philosophy, and it deserved to be properly anchored in it.
This task he undertook in the Symposium,
in the guise of Diotima.
When Socrates’ turn came to give an encomium on Eros in the Symposium, he chose instead to tell ‘the tale about Eros (ton logon ton peri tou Erôtos) I once heard (hon pot’ êkousa) from a woman (gunaikos), Diotima of Mantinea (Mantinikês Diotimas), who was wise in this (hê tauta te sophê ên) and many other kinds of knowledge (kai alla polla, 201d2-3)’. Diotima tells the young Socrates that ‘universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality (athanasias gar charin panti hautê hê spoudê kai ho erôs hepetai, 208b5-6) … Of that, Socrates, you may be assured (Eu isthi, ô Sôkrates); – think only of the ambition of men (epei ge kai tôn anthrôpôn ei etheleis eis tên philotimian blepsai), and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways (thaumazois an tês alogias peri ha egô eirêka), unless you consider (ei mê ennoeis enthumêtheis) how they are stirred by the passionate love of fame (hôs deinôs diakeintai erôti tou onomastoi genesthai kai kleos es ton aei chronon athanaton katathesthai). They are ready to run all risks (kai huper toutou kindunous te kinduneuein hetoimoi eisi pantas), even greater than they would have run for their children (eti mallon ê huper tôn paidôn), and to pour out money (kai chrêmata analiskein) and undergo any sort of toil (kai ponous ponein houstinasoun), and even die (kai huperapothnê̢skein), if so they leave an everlasting name (kai kleos es ton aei chronon athanaton katathesthai, taken from above, where it remained untranslated). Do you imagine (epei oiei su) that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus (Alkêstin huper Admêtou apothanein an), or Achilles to avenge Patroclus (ê Achillea Patroklô̢ epapothanein), or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons (ê proapothanein ton humeteron Kodron huper tês basileias tôn paidôn), if they had not imagined (mê oiomenous) that the memory of their virtues, which still survives among us, would be immortal (athanaton mnêmên aretês peri heautôn esesthai, hên nun hêmeis echomen;)? Nay (pollou ge dei), she said (ephê), I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in the hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue (all’ oimai huper aretês athanatou kai toiautês doxês eukleous pantes panta poiousin, hosô̢ an ameinous ôsi, tosoutô̢ mallon); for they desire the immortal (tou gar athanatou erôsin).’ (208c1-e1, tr. B. Jowett)
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