After the 10th
entry on my blog devoted to Socrates in Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon I
needed a break. What better break for a not native English speaker insisting on
writing on Ancient Philosophy in English than reading Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy? I was in
the middle of my work on ‘Plato’s involvement with Dionysius’ when I needed a
break. On that occasion I read what Russell had to say on Socrates; it resulted
in weeks devoted to my exploration of Socrates in Aristophanes, Plato and
Socrates; I still have not managed to return to my essay. And so I took to my
‘day off’ with Russell with a bit of trepidation. And rightly so.
Russell
opens his Chapter 14 on ‘Plato’s Utopia’ as follows: ‘Plato’s most important
dialogue, the Republic, consists,
broadly, of three parts. The first (to near the end of Book V) consists in the
construction of an ideal commonwealth: it is the earliest of Utopias. One of
the conclusions arrived at is that rulers must be philosophers. Books VI and
VII are concerned to define the word “philosopher”. This discussion constitutes
the second section. The third section consists mainly of a discussion of
various kinds of actual constitutions and of their merits and defects. The
nominal purpose of the Republic is to
define ‘justice’. But at an early stage it is decided that, since everything is
easier to see in the large than in the small, it will be better to inquire what
makes a just State than what makes a just individual. And since justice must be
among the attributes of the best imaginable State, such a State is first
delineated, and then it is decided which of its perfections is to be called
“justice”.’
Reading
these lines, I wondered whether Russell looked at the Republic before he decided to present his students with ‘Plato’s
Utopia’. For in the 1st Book we are presented with Socrates’
endeavour to define justice that ‘makes a just individual’, which ends with his
relapse into ignorance: ‘And the result of the whole discussion has been that I
know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not
likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just
man is happy or unhappy.’ (354b9-c3, tr. B. Jowett) It is only after Plato’s
two brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, take Socrates into their hands in the 2nd
Book, and compel him to transcend his ignorance, that Socrates comes up with
the idea that ‘it will be better to inquire what makes a just State than what
makes a just individual’, and begins to construct ‘the best imaginable State’.
Similarly, the 10th Book does not fit Russell’s ‘three sections’
division of the Republic; it has
nothing to do with ‘various kinds of actual constitutions and of their merits
and defects’.
I let it
pass, thinking of Socrates in the Phaedrus.
As they were walking outside the city walls, Phaedrus asked: ‘Tell me,
Socrates, isn’t it somewhere about here that they say Boreas seized Oireithua
from the river? … but pray tell me, do you believe that story to be true?’ –
Socrates: ‘I should be quite in the fashion if I disbelieved it, as the men of
science do: I might proceed to give a scientific account of how the maiden,
while at play with Pharmaceia, was blown by a gust of Boreas [a personification
of the north wind, J. T.] … If our sceptic, with his somewhat crude science,
means to reduce every one of them [of such myths] to the standard of
probability, he’ll need a lot of time for it. I myself have certainly no time
for the business: and I’ll tell you why, my friend: I can’t as yet “know
myself”, as the inscription at Delphi enjoins; and so long as that ignorance
remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters.’ (229b4-230a1,
tr. R. Hackforth)
But further
on in Russel’s Ch. 14 I read a passage which I could not let pass without
comment: ‘On question of fact, we can appeal to science and scientific methods
of observation; but on ultimate questions of ethics there seems to be nothing
analogous. Yet, if this is really the case, ethical disputes resolve themselves
into contests for power – including propaganda power. This point of view, in a
crude form is put forth in the first book of the Republic by Thrasymachus … After Socrates has, for some time, been
amiably discussing justice with an old man named Cephalus, and with Plato’s
elder brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, Thrasymachus, who has been listening
with growing impatience, breaks in with a vehement protest against such
childish nonsense. He proclaims emphatically that ‘justice is nothing else than
the interest of the stronger’. This point of view is refuted by Socrates with
quibbles; it is never fairly faced.’ (p. 118)
Russsel’s
‘After Socrates has … been amiably discussing justice with an old man named
Cephalus, and with Plato’s elder brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, Thrasymachus
… breaks in with a vehement protest’ is wrong on several accounts. It is after
Socrates has discussed justice with Cephalus and his son Polemarchus that Thrasymachus breaks in. Furthermore, the
discussion between Cephalus, Socrates and Polemarchus was not as amiable as it
might seem. For Socrates asked Cephalus: ‘What do you consider to be the
greatest blessing (ti megiston oiei
agathon) which you have reaped from your wealth (apolelaukenai tou pollȇn ousian kektȇsthai)?’ Cephalus replies: ‘When
a man begins to think that his last hour is near … he begins to reflect and
consider (analogizetai ȇdȇ kai skopei)
any wrongs which he may have done to others (ei tina ti ȇdikȇsen) … But to him who has no injustice on his
conscience (tȏi de mȇden heautȏi adikon suneidoti),
sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of him who lives in
justice and holiness (hos an dikaiȏs kai
hosiȏs ton bion diagagȇi) … The great blessing of riches, I do not say to
every man, but to a good and upright man, is, that he has had no occasion to
deceive or to defraud others, even without intention (to mȇde akonta tina exapatȇsai ȇ pseusasthai [‘to lie’]); and that
when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about
offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men (opheilonta anthrȏpȏi chrȇmata).’ (330d2-331b3, tr. Jowett)
No occasion to
deceive or to defraud others; is this the blessing riches bestow on a rich man
if he is good and upright? Instead of challenging Cepahlus’ answer as such, Socrates
viewed it as an implicit definition of justice, which he made explicit and subjected
to questioning: ‘Well said indeed, Cephalus; but as concerning justice (touto d’ auto, tȇn dikaiosunȇn), what is
it? To speak the truth and to pay our debts – no more than this (potera tȇn alȇtheian auto phȇsomen eiani
haplȏs houtȏs kai to apodidonai an tis ti para tou labȇi)? May not these
very actions be sometimes justly (dikaiȏs)
and sometimes unjustly (adikȏs) performed?
Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he
asks for them when he is not in right mind, ought I to give them back to him?
No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more
than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in
this condition.’ – Cephalus: ‘You are quite right.’ – Socrates: ‘But then,
speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice
(Ouk ara houtos horos estin dikaiosunȇs,
alȇthȇ te legein kai ha an labȇi tis apodidonai).’ – Polemarchus
interposed: ‘Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed.’ –
Cephalus: ‘I fear that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices,
and I hand over the argument to the company.’ – Polemarchus: ‘Am I not your
heir (Oukoun egȏ tȏn ge sȏn klȇronomos, 331d8)?’
– Cephalus: ‘To be sure (Panu ge).’ –
Socrates: ‘Tell me then (Lege dȇ), O
thou heir of the argument (su ho tou
logou klȇronomos), what did Simonides say, and according to you truly say,
about justice (ti phȇis ton Simȏnidȇn
legonta orthȏs legein peri dikaiosunȇs)? – Polemarchus: ‘He said that the
repayment of a debt (Hoti to ta
opheilomena hekastȏi apodidonai) is just (diakion esti), and in saying so (touto legȏn) he appears to me to be right (dokei emoige kalȏs legein).’ (331c1-331e4, translation is Jowett’s, with one exception. Jowett wrongly translates 331d8 ‘Polemarchus,
then, is your heir? I said,’ giving the direct speech to Socrates. The Republic is narrated by Socrates, and
sometimes his reporting of direct speech in short sentences is rather
convoluted, as in this case: Oukoun, ephȇ,
egȏ, ho Polemarchos, tȏn ge sȏn klȇronomos.)
***
Every contemporary
of Plato knew that the riches Polemarchus inherited from his father caused his
undoing. Let me quote from the speech that his brother Lysias wrote against
Eratosthenes, one of the Thirty: ‘Polemarchus received from the Thirty their
accustomed order to drink hemlock … They had seven hundred shields of ours,
they had all that silver and gold, with copper, jewellery, furniture and
women’s apparel beyond what they had ever expected to get; also a hundred and
twenty slaves, of whom they took the ablest, delivering the rest to the
Treasury.’ (XII. 17-19, tr. W. R. M. Lamb)
When
Polemarchus took the argument over from his father, he did so as his heir, and
Socrates reemphasized this. Obviously, the contemporary reader would have
expected that Socrates would prove Polemarchus to be wrong, and that in doing
so Plato would recant his presentation of the latter in the Phaedrus as an exemplary philosopher
whose days on earth were bound to be blessed with happiness. (See Phaedrus 256a7-b1 and 257b2-6)
Russell
cannot be blamed for not knowing this; no interpreter of Plato could see this
ever since the Platonic scholarship dismissed the ancient tradition according
to which the Phaedrus was Plato’s
first dialogue, written during Socrates’ life-time. But I cannot absolve him from
dereliction of duty to his students and his readers. Let me repeat what he says
about the 1st Book of the Republic:
‘After Socrates has, for some time, been amiably discussing justice with an old
man named Cephalus, and with Plato’s elder brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus,
Thrasymachus, who has been listening with growing impatience, breaks in with a
vehement protest against such childish nonsense. He proclaims emphatically that
‘justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger’. This point of view
is refuted by Socrates with quibbles; it is never fairly faced.’
Let me end
by taking on Russell’s claim that Thrasymachus’ definition of justice ‘is
refuted by Socrates with quibbles’.
Socrates asks
Thrasymachus to clarify his definition of justice. Thrasymachus: ‘Have you
never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are
democracies, and there are aristocracies?’ – Socrates: ‘Yes, I know.’ –
Thrasymachus: ‘And the government is the ruling power in each state?’ –
Socrates: ‘Certainly’. – Thrasymachus: ‘And the different forms of government
make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their
several interests; and thereby proclaim that what is advantageous to themselves
is justice for those ruled; and him who transgresses this principle they punish
as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean, sir, when I say
that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the
interest of the established government; and as the government must be supposed
to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one
principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.’ – Socrates: ‘Do
you not admit that it is just for the subjects to obey their rulers? – ‘I do’ –
‘But are the rulers of the various states infallible, or are they sometimes
liable to err?’ – ‘To be sure, they are liable to err.’ – ‘Then in making their
laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?’ – ‘I think so.’
– ‘When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest;
when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?’ – ‘Yes.’ –
‘And whatever laws they make must be obeyed by their subjects, and that is what
you call justice?’ – ‘Doubtless.’ – ‘Then justice, according to your argument,
is not only observance of the interest of the stronger but the reverse?’
(338d7-339d3, tr. Jowett)
This
argument of Socrates points to the very foundation of his philosophy, grounded
as it is in the Delphic ‘Know Thyself’, as becomes clear from his discussion of
this principle in Xenophon’s Memorabilia,
where he tells Euthydemus: ‘Is it not true that through self-knowledge men come
to much good, and through self-deception to much harm? For those who know
themselves, know what things are expedient for themselves and discern their own
powers and limitations. And by doing what they understand, they get what they
want and prosper: by refraining from attempting what they do not understand,
they make no mistake and avoid failure. And consequently through their power of
testing other men too, and through their intercourse with others, they get what
is good and shun what is bad … and the same is true of communities. You find
that whatever state (Horais de kai tȏn
poleȏn), in ignorance of its power, goes to war with a stronger people, it
is exterminated or loses its liberty.’ (IV. ii. 26-29, tr. E. C. Marchant) – Socrates
extended the Delphic adage to the whole states, and thus to their governments.
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