In addition
to his ‘remarkable conclusions’ (see the 8th entry on this theme,
posted on June 9) Dover adds the following observation:
‘Again, that
Socrates tells Strepsiades (742) to solve a problem orthȏs diairȏn kai skopȏn has no bearing on the diairesis which is introduced by Plato
in Phaedrus 266 b, assumes great
importance in Sophist and Politicus, and is part-object of
Epicrates’ caricature of Plato. To break down a problem into its components is
a necessary stage towards its solution, and diairein
was used before Aristophanes both of physical division (Herodotus) and
(Herakleitos B1) of dividing a topic into items; Plato also uses it (Laches 197 d) of Prodikos’ semantic
distinctions. What Xenophon (Memorabilia
iv. 5. 12) calls dialegein kata genȇ
is seen, if we examine the context carefully, to be quite different from
Platonic diairesis.’ (xliii)
In Plato’s Phaedrus 266 b Socrates says: ‘Believe
me, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these (Toutȏn
dȇ egȏge autos te erastȇs, ȏ Phaidre) divisions and collections (diaireseȏn kai sunagȏgȏn), that I may
gain the power to speak and to think (hina
hoios te ȏ legein te kai phronein); and whenever I deem another man able to
discern an objective unity and plurality (ean
te tin’ allon hȇgȇsȏmai dunaton einai eis hen kai epi polla pephukoth’ horan),
I follow “in his footsteps where he leads as a god” (touton diȏkȏ “katopisthe met’ ichnion hȏste theoio” [Perhaps an
adaptation of Odyssey v, 193, ho d’ epeita met’ ichnia baine theoio.]
Furthermore (kai mentoi kai) – whether
I am right in doing so, God alone knows – it is those that have this ability
whom for the present I call dialecticians (tous
dunamenous auto dran ei men orthȏs ȇ mȇ prosagoreuȏ, theos oide, kalȏ de oun
mechri toude dialektikous).’ (Tr. and the note on the Odyssey R. Hackforth.)
Whether Socrates’
exhortation in Aristophanes’ Clouds,
addressed to Strepsiades – ‘after relaxing your subtle mind (schasas tȇn phrontida leptȇn), consider
your affairs step by step (kata mikron
periphronei ta pragmata) correctly dividing and investigating them (orthȏs diairȏn kai skopȏn, 740-742)’ –
has, or does not have, any bearing on Socrates’ love of diairesis expressed in Phaedrus
266 b can be properly established only after considering the Phaedran ‘divisions
and collections’. Reflecting on the two speeches on love, which he presented
earlier in the dialogue, Socrates says: ‘For the most part I think (Emoi men phainetai ta men alla) our
festal hymn has really been just a festive entertainment (tȏi onti paidiai pepaisthai); but we did casually allude to a
certain pair of procedures (toutȏn de
tinȏn ek tuchȇs rȇthentȏn duoin eidoin), and it would be very agreeable if
we could seize their significance in a scientific fashion (ei autoin tȇn dunamin technȇi labein dunaito tis, ouk achari).’ –
Phaedrus: ‘What procedures do you mean (Tinȏn
dȇ)?’ This is R. Hackforth’s translation.
The passage
is difficult, yet crucial for our understanding of Plato’s? Socrates? view of ‘divisions
and collections’ in the Phaedrus. I
give therefore the same passage in C. J. Rowe’s translation: ‘To me it seems
that the rest (Emoi men phainetai ta men
alla) really was playfully done, by way of amusement (tȏi onti paidiai pepaisthai); but by chance two principles of
method of the following sort were expressed (toutȏn de tinȏn ek tuchȇs rȇthentȏn duoin eidoin), and it would be
gratifying If one could grasp their significance in a scientific way (ei autoin tȇn dunamin technȇi labein dunaito
tis, ouk achari).’ – Phaedrus: ‘What were these?’ (Tinȏn dȇ)
Both
Hackforth and Rowe appear to have missed the fact that Socrates’ toutȏn de tinȏn ek tuchȇs rȇthentȏn
‘these being said by chance’ refers to Socrates’ two speeches on love, which
were ‘for the most part, in truth, playfully made for amusement’ (ta men alla tȏi onti paidiai pepaisthai),
yet were marked by ‘two forms’ (duoin
eidoin), which ‘it would be very agreeable if one could grasp their power
scientifically’ (ei autoin tȇn dunamin
technȇi labein dunaito tis). Hermeias remarks on toutȏn de tinȏn ek tuchȇs rȇthentȏn (‘these being said by chance’):
‘As he earlier ascribed the discourse to Pan, and Nymphs, and Muses (hȏsper anȏterȏ eis Pana, kai Numphas kai Mousas
anetithei ton logon), so now too he ascribes it to chance’ (houtȏ kai nun eis tuchȇn anagei ton logon).
(Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum
Scholia ed. P. Couvreur (1901).
In the Clouds Socrates introduces Clouds as ‘great
goddesses (megalai theai) to men of
leisure (andrasin argois); they (haiper) give as (hȇmin parechousin) thought (gnȏmȇn),
discourse (dialexin), and intellect (kai noun, 316-17)’. Could it be that
Plato in the Phaedrus depicts the
same aspect of Socrates’ self-awareness – his view that thought, discourse, and
intellect comes to him ‘from above’, ‘from outside’, ‘god knows from where’ –
which Aristophanes caricatured by depicting Socrates’ deity as Clouds that have
no definite form? (See my 2nd entry on this theme, posted on May 27.)
Let me bring
in Socrates’ first ascription of discourse to something external to him.
Phaedrus finished reading the discourse in which his beloved Lysias argued that
a boy should give his sexual favours to a non-lover rather than lover.
Phaedrus: ‘The outstanding feature of the discourse is just this, that it has
not overlooked any important aspect of the subject, so making it impossible for
anyone else to outdo what he has said with a fuller or more satisfactory
oration.’ – Socrates: ‘If you go as far as that I shall find it impossible to
agree with you; if I were to assent out of politeness, I should be confuted by
the wise men and women who in past ages have spoken and written on this theme.’
– Phaedrus: To whom do you refer? Where have you heard anything better than this?’
– Socrates: ‘I can’t tell you off-hand; but I’m sure I have heard something
better, from the fair Sappho maybe, or the wise Anacreon, or perhaps some prose
writer. What ground, you may ask, have I for saying so? Good sir, there is
something welling up within my breast, which make me feel that I could find
something different, and something better, to say. I am of course well aware it
can’t be anything originating in my own mind, for I know my own ignorance; so I
suppose it can only be that it has been poured into me, through my ears, as
into a vessel, from some external source.’ (235b1-d1, tr. Hackforth)
As Socrates
begins to tell his ‘rival discourse on the same theme’, he himself begins to be
surprised at the flow of his eloquence: ‘Well, Phaedrus my friend (Atar, ȏ phile Phaidre), do you think, as
I do (dokȏ ti soi, hȏsper emautȏi),
that I am divinely inspired (theion
pathos peponthenai, 238c5-6, tr. Hackforth)?’
***
Let us
proceed to those ‘two forms’ by which Socrates’ two speeches on love ‘spoken by
chance’ are marked ‘by chance’. Phaedrus asked ‘What are they?’ Socrates: ‘The
first is that in which we bring a dispersed plurality under a single form,
seeing it all together: the purpose being to define so-and-so, and thus to make
plain whatever may be chosen as the topic for exposition. For example, take the definition given just now of love (hȏsper ta nundȇ peri erȏtos); whether it
was right or wrong (eit’ eu eite kakȏs
elechthȇ), at all events it was that which enabled our discourse to achieve
lucidity and consistency (to goun saphes
kai to auto hautȏi homologoumenon dia tauta eschen eipein ho logos).’ –
Phaedrus: ‘And what is the second procedure
you speak of, Socrates (To d’ heteron dȇ eidos ti legeis, ȏ Sȏkrates)?’ –
Socrates: ‘The reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled to divide into
forms, following the objective articulation; we are not to attempt to hack off
parts like a clumsy butcher, but to take example from our two recent speeches.
The single general form which they postulated was irrationality; next, on the
analogy of a single natural body with its pairs of like-named members, right
arm or leg, as we say, and left, they conceived of madness as a single
objective form existing in human beings: wherefore the first speech divided off
a part on the left, and continued to
make divisions, never desisting until it discovered one particular part bearing
the name of ‘sinister’ love, on which it very properly poured abuse. The
other speech conducted us to the forms of madness which lay on the right-hand
side, and upon discovering a type of love that shared its name with the other
but was divine, displayed it to our view and extolled it as the source of the
greatest goods that can befall us.’ (265d3-266b1, tr. Hackforth)
Let me note
that Hackforth’s procedure, which
stands for Phaedrus’ eidos,
obfuscates and misrepresents Socrates’ actual procedure. Eidos is that what could be observed on those two speeches; it is
not a procedure that Socrates consciously followed as he was producing them.
Similarly, Hackforth’s ‘For example,
take the definition given just now of love’ misrepresents Socrates’ hȏsper ta nundȇ peri erȏtos, which means
‘as those [speeches now spoken] now about Eros’, pointing to the two speeches not
as examples, but as that on which he observes the two forms.
Of course,
one might say, Plato as a writer of the dialogue had the method of ‘divisions
and collections’ at his finger-tips when he began to write the dialogue, and he
composed Socrates’ two speeches on love accordingly. Yes, and no. For consider Socrates’
first speech: ‘wherefore the first speech divided off a part on the left (ho men to ep’ aristera temnomenos meros,
266a3). In fact, Socrates presented his first speech on Eros as a rival to
Lysias’ speech. Phaedrus: ‘Lysias has described how a handsome boy was tempted,
but not by a lover: that’s the clever part of it: he maintains that surrender
should be to one who is not in love rather than to one who is (227c5-8, tr.
Hackforth).’ The theme of Lysias’ speech thus compels Socrates to ‘praise the
wisdom of the one [i.e. of the non-lover] and censuring the folly of the other
[i.e. of the lover]’ (tou men to
phronimon enkȏmiazein, tou de to aphron psegein, 235e7-236a1); the theme
was thus given to him, not chosen by him.
As far as
this point is concerned, this could be explained by Socrates’ declaration that
the two speeches on love were ‘for the most part, in truth, playfully made for
amusement’ (ta men alla tȏi onti paidiai
pepaisthai), thus pointing to Plato’s playful composition of those two
speeches. But the words describing the method of the first speech – ‘wherefore
the first speech … continued to make divisions (palin touto temnȏn), never desisting (ouk epanȇken) until it discovered one particular part bearing the
name of ‘sinister’ love (prin en autois
epheurȏn onomazomenon skaion tina erȏta, 266a3-6)’ – have nothing to do
with the actual first speech. What the words describe is the method of
‘divisions’ that Plato’s Eleatic stranger uses in the Sophist and the Statesman,
the method which indeed has nothing to do with the historical Socrates’
‘divisions’. True to his love of divisions, even facing the impending trial,
Socrates in the Sophist and the Statesman appears to enjoy the method of
divisions, with which the Eleatic Stranger regales him in those two dialogues.
We may learn
more about the ‘divisions’ entertained by the historical Socrates if we follow
up Dover’s ‘Plato also uses it (Laches
197 d) of Prodikos’ semantic distinctions’. In that dialogue two famous
Athenian generals discuss, rather intemperately, courage. Nicias: ‘There is a
difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and courage. I am of
the opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but
that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are
very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children, many animals.
And you, and men in general, call by the term “courageous” actions which I call
rash; – my courageous actions are wise actions.’ Laches wants to repost by
saying something rude, but Socrates interposes: ‘Do not answer him, Laches; I
rather fancy that you are not aware of the source from which his wisdom is
derived. He has got all this from my friend Damon, and Damon (ho de Damȏn) is always with Prodicus (tȏi Prodikȏi polla plȇsiazei), who, of
all the Sophists, is considered (hos dȇ
dokei tȏn sophistȏn) to be the best puller to pieces of words of this sort
(kallista ta toiauta onomata diairein).’ (197b1-d5, tr. Jowett)
Jowett’s ‘Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of
this sort’ obfuscates Socrates’ reference to Prodicus’ method of
‘divisions’, or rather his method of verbal distinctions (onomata diairein).
I have no
objections against Dover’s ‘Plato also uses it [i.e. the term diairein],
(Laches 197 d) of Prodikos’ semantic
distinctions’, for all that Plato writes is Plato’s, but there are good reasons
to believe that Plato’s Socrates in the Laches
is as historical as Plato could make him. In the Cratylus Socrates tells Hermogenes, who wants to learn the truth
about the meaning of his name: ‘The knowledge of names is a great part of
knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course
of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language –
these are his own words – and then I should have been at once able to answer
your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard
the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such
matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation
of them.’ (384b1-c3, tr. Jowett) In the Phaedrus
Socrates refers to Prodicus with appreciation: ‘When once Prodicus heard me
saying this, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered what kind of
speeches are needed: what are needed are neither long speeches nor short ones,
but ones of a fitting length (267b2-5, tr. Rowe).’
***
Dover says
that ‘What Xenophon (Memorabilia iv.
5. 12) calls dialegein kata genȇ is
seen, if we examine the context carefully, to be quite different from Platonic diairesis.’ So let us begin with iv. 5.
11, where Socrates tells young Euthydemus: ‘Only the self-controlled (tois enkratesi monois) have power to
consider (exesti skopein) the things that matter most (ta kratista tȏn pragmatȏn), and, sorting them out after their kind,
by word and deed alike (kai logȏi kai
ergȏi dialegontas kata genȇ) to
prefer the good (ta men agatha
proaireisthai) and reject the evil (tȏn
de kakȏn apechesthai).’ In iv. 5. 12 Xenophon concludes: ‘And thus (Kai houtȏs), he said (ephȇ), men become supremely good and
happy (aristous te kai eudaimonestatous
andras gignesthai) and skilled in discussion (kai dialegesthai
dunatȏtatous). The very word “discussion,” according to him (ephȇ de kai to dialegesthai), owes its name (onomasthȇnai) to the practice of meeting together for common
deliberation (ek tou suniontas koinȇi
bouleuesthai), sorting, discussing things after their kind (dialegontas kata genȇ ta pragmata): and therefore
one should be ready and prepared for this and be zealous for it; for it makes
for excellence (ek toutou gar gignesthai
andras aristous), leadership (te kai
hȇgemonikȏtatous) and skill in discussion (kai dialektikȏtatous).’
(Tr. E. C. Marchant.) Here dialegontas kata genȇ ta pragmata means the same as diairontas kata genȇ ta pragmata, i.e. ‘dividing things after their
kinds.’ Xenophon thus helps us understand why Socrates in the Phaedrus concludes his exposition on
‘divisions and collections’ with the words: ‘I am myself a lover of these divisions
and collections (diaireseȏn kai sunagȏgȏn),
that I may gain the power to speak and to think (hina hoios te ȏ legein te kai phronein); and … it is those that
have this ability whom I call dialecticians (dialektikous, 266b3-c1). In
grammar, Xenophon’s dialektikȏtatous is the superlative of Plato’s dialektikous.
As can be
seen, pace Dover, Plato’s Phaedrus and Laches, as well as Xenophon’s Memorabilia
help us to view Socrates’ exhortation in the Clouds – ‘after relaxing your subtle mind (schasas tȇn phrontida leptȇn), consider your affairs step by step (kata mikron periphronei ta pragmata)
correctly analysing and investigating them (orthȏs
diairȏn kai skopȏn, 740-742) – as a very poignant caricature of the
historical Socrates.
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