Strepsiades’
assumption that Socrates was teaching for money was wrong, as I have shown in
the 6th entry on ‘Socrates in Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon’. But
what about his assumption that Socrates was teaching the art of speaking, which
enables a man to win any court case, both when one is in the right and when one
is in the wrong? Strepsiades makes it abundantly clear to Socrates that this is
what he wants from him ‘I want to learn to speak. I am oppressed by unbearable
debts. My goods are going to be seized for debt (239-241) … Teach me the other
of your systems of arguments, the one that enables a person to escape repaying
his debts (244-245).’ Socrates does not promise to teach him forensic rhetoric
– instead, he asks him, whether he wants to discuss his matters with the
Clouds, Socrates’ deity (257-258) – but he allows him to persist in his belief
that forensic rhetoric is what he would be taught by him. This theme is central
to Aristophanes’ caricature of Socrates in the Clouds. Is there anything in Plato and Xenophon that might enable
us to view it as a caricature of Socrates?
In the light
of this question, let me examine Plato’s Phaedrus.
Socrates: ‘The subject we proposed for inquiry just now (hoper nun prouthemetha skepsasthai) was the nature of good and bad
speaking and writing (ton logon hopȇi
kalȏs echei legein te kai graphein kai hopȇi mȇ): so we are to inquire into
that (skepteon). – Phaedrus: ‘Plainly
(Dȇlon).’ – Socrates: ‘Then (Ar’ oun) does not a good and successful
discourse presuppose (ouch huparchein dei
tois eu ge kai kalȏs rȇthȇsomenois) a knowledge in the mind of the speaker
(tȇn tou legontos dianoian eiduian)
of the truth (to alȇthes) about this
subject (hȏn an peri legein mellȇi)?’
– Phaedrus: ‘As to that, dear Socrates, what I have heard (Houtȏsi peri autȏn akȇkoa, ȏ phile Sȏkrates) is that the intending
orator is under no necessity (ouk einai
anankȇn tȏi mellonti rȇtori esesthai) of understanding what is truly just (ta tȏi onti dikaia manthanein), but only
what is likely to be thought just by the body of men who are to give judgment (alla ta doxant’ an plȇthei hoiper dikasousin);
nor need to know what is truly good (oude
ta ontȏs agatha) or noble (ȇ kala),
but what will be thought so (all’ hosa
doxei); since it is on the latter, not the former, that persuasion depends
(ek gar toutȏn einai to peithein all’ ouk
ek tȇs alȇtheias).’ – Socrates: ‘Not to be lightly rejected, Phaedrus, is
any word (Outoi apoblȇton epos einai dei,
ȏ Phaidre) of the wise (ho an eipȏsi
hoi sophoi); perhaps they are right: one has to see (alla skopein mȇ ti legȏsi). And in particular this present assertion
must not be dismissed (kai dȇ kai to nun
lechthen ouk apheteon).’ (259e1-7, tr. R. Hackforth)
Socrates:
‘Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be (Ar’ oun ou to men holon hȇ rȇtorikȇ an eiȇ technȇ) a kind of
influencing of the mind by means of words (psuchagȏgia
tis dia logȏn), not only in courts of law (ou monon en dikastȇriois) and other public gatherings (kai hosoi alloi dȇmosioi sullogoi), but
in private places also (alla kai en tois
idiois)?’ (261a7-9, tr. Hackforth)
***
Hackforth
notes on Socrates’ definition of rhetoric as ‘a kind of influencing of the mind
by means of words’ (psuchagȏgia):
‘The word psuchagȏgein, as we have
seen, is used by Isocrates, ad Nicoclem
II, par. 49, where it has the depreciatory sense of “allure”. It is quite
possible that the use of the corresponding noun was suggested to Plato by this
passage, though his use of it is not depreciatory but neutral.’ – Hackforth’s
‘as we have seen’ refers to the ‘Introduction’ to his ‘Translation and
Commentary’, where in Ch. I. ‘Date of composition’ he notes that Nicocles, for
whom Isocrates wrote the speech, ‘succeeded his father Euagoras in 374 B.C. and
the oration is believed to be not more than a few years later in date,’ and
says: ‘I will therefore give as my guess 370 B.C.’ (pp. 5-7)
I suggest
that both Plato in the Phaedrus and
Isocrates in ad Nicoclem refer to
Aristophanes’ Birds, where ‘psychagogizes
Socrates’ (psuchagȏgei Sȏkratȇs,
1555).
***
After pointing out that rhetoric operates ‘not only in courts
of law and other public gatherings, but in private places also’, Socrates
continued: ‘And must it not be the same art that is concerned with great issues
and small (hȇ autȇ smikrȏn te kai megalȏn
peri), its right employment commanding no more respect (kai ouden entimoteron to ge orthon) when
dealing with important matters than with unimportant (peri spoudaia ȇ peri phaula gignomenon)? Is that what you have been
told about it (ȇ pȏs su tauta akȇkoas)?’ - Phaedrus: ‘No indeed (Ou ma ton Di’), not exactly that (ou pantapasi houtȏs): it is principally, I should say, to lawsuits
that an art of speaking and writing is applied (alla malista men pȏs peri tas dikas legetai te kai graphetai technȇi)
– and of course to public harangues also (legetai
de kai peri dȇmȇgorias). I know of no wider application (epi pleon de ouk akȇkoa).’ (261a9-b5,
tr. Hackforth)
Phaedrus’ ‘I have not heard of any wider application’ (epi pleon de ouk akȇkoa, 261b5) suggests
that the definition of rhetoric as psuchagȏgia
is Socrates’ own definition.
Socrates: ‘What is it that the contending parties in
lawcourts do (en tois dikastȇriois hoi
antidikoi ti drȏsin)? Do they not in fact contend with words (ouk antilegousi mentoi), or how else
should we put it (ȇ ti phȇsomen)? …
About what is just (Peri tou dikaiou te)
and unjust (kai adikou)? … And he who
possesses the art of doing this (Oukoun
ho technȇi touto drȏn) can make the same thing appear (poiȇsei phanȇnai to auto) to the same people (tois autois) now just (tote
men dikaion), now unjust, at will (hotan
de boulȇtai, adikon)? … And in public harangues (kai en dȇmȇgoriai), no doubt (dȇ),
he can make the same things seem to the community (tȇi polei dokein ta auta) now good (tote men agatha), and now the reverse of good (tote d’ au t’anantia)? … Then can we fail to see that the Palamedes
of Elea has an art of speaking (Ton oun
Eleatikon Palamȇdȇn legonta ouk ismen technȇi), such that he can make the
same things appear to his audience (hȏste
phainesthai tois akouousi ta auta) like (homoia) and unlike (kai
anomia), or one (kai hen) and
many (kai polla), or again at rest (menonta te au) and in motion (kai pheromena)?’ (261c4-d8, tr. Hackforth)
Hackforth notes on ‘the Palamedes of Elea’: ‘i.e. Zeno, whose
method of argument was to show that an opponent’s thesis led to two
contradictory consequences. For the contradictory pairs here mentioned cf. Parm. 127e6, 129b5, and 129e1; and see
F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides,
pp. 57-59.’
I don’t have Cornford’s
Plato and Parmenides, but I have little doubt that he takes the reference
as the indicator that the Phaedrus
was written after the Parmenides, believing
both to be late dialogues. In the ‘Introduction’ to his Plato’s Theory of Knowledge Cornford writes: ‘The Parmenides describes a meeting imagined
as taking place about 450 B.C. between Socrates, who was then about twenty, and
the Eleatic philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno. To suppose that anything
remotely resembling the conversation in this dialogue could have occurred at
that date would make nonsense of the whole history of philosophy in the fifth
and fourth centuries; and I believe, with M. Diès, that the meeting itself is a
literary fiction, not a fact in the biography of Socrates.’ (Cornford, p. 1)
In ‘Plato’s defence of the Forms
in the Parmenides’ (on my website) I
have shown the inextricable difficulties and warped images of Parmenides, Plato
and Socrates in which the interpreters of the Parmenides have got implicated because of their view that ‘the
meeting itself is a literary fiction’. In his reference to ‘the Palamedes of Elea’ Plato in the Phaedrus refers to the discussion
between Socrates and Zeno that took place at that meeting.
***
Xenophon writes in the Memorabilia
that when Socrates ‘found that Critias loved Euthydemus and wanted to lead him
astray, he tried to restrain him by saying that it was mean and unbecoming in a
gentleman to sue like a beggar to the object of his affection, whose good
opinion he coveted, stooping to ask a favour that it was wrong to grant. As
Critias paid no heed whatever to this protest, Socrates, it is said, exclaimed
in the presence of Euthydemus and many others, “Critias seems to have a feeling
of a pig: he can no more keep away from Euthydemus than pigs can help rubbing
themselves against stones.” Now Critias bore a grudge against Socrates for
this; and when he was one of the Thirty and was drafting laws with Charicles,
he bore it in mind. He inserted a clause which made it illegal “to teach the
art of words” (logȏn technȇn [i.e.
the rhetoric] mȇ didaskein). It was a
calculated insult to Socrates, whom he saw no means of attacking, except by
imputing to him the practice constantly attributed to philosophers, and so
making him unpopular … When the Thirty
were putting to death many citizens of the highest respectability and were
encouraging many in crime, Socrates had remarked: “It seems strange enough to
me that a herdsman who lets his cattle decrease and go to the bad should not
admit that he is a poor cowherd; but stranger still that a statesman when he
causes the citizens to decrease and go to the bad, should feel no shame or
think himself a poor statesman.” This remark was reported to Critias and
Charicles, who sent for Socrates, showed him the law and forbade him to hold conversation
with the young. “May I question you,” asked Socrates, “in case I do not
understand any point in your orders?” “You may,” said they. “Well now,” said
he, “I am ready to obey the laws. But lest I unwittingly transgress through
ignorance, I want clear directions from you. Do you think that the art of words
(poteron tȇn tȏn logȏn technȇn) from
which you bid me abstain is associated with sound or unsound reasoning (sun tois orthȏs legomenois einai nomizontes
ȇ sun tois mȇ orthȏs apechesthai keleuete autȇs)? For if with sound (ei men gar sun tois orthȏs), then
clearly I must abstain from sound reasoning (dȇlon hoti aphekteon an eiȇ tou orthȏs legein): but if with unsound
(ei de sun tois mȇ orthȏs), then
clearly I must try to reason soundly (dȇlon
hoti peirateon orthȏs legein).” “Since you are ignorant, Socrates,” said
Charicles in an angry tone, “we put our order into language easier to
understand. You may not hold any converse whatever with the young.” “Well
then,” said Socrates, “that there may be no question raised about my obedience,
please fix the age limit below which a man is to be accounted young.” “So
long,” replied Charicles, “as he is not permitted to sit in the Council,
because he as yet lacks wisdom. You shall not converse with anyone who is under
thirty.” “Suppose I want to buy something, am I not even then to ask the price
if the seller is under thirty?” “O yes,” answered Charicles, you may in such
cases. But the fact is, Socrates, you are in the habit of asking questions to
which you know the answer: so that is what you are not to do.” “Am I to give no
answer, then, if a young man asks me something that I know? – for instance,
‘Where does Charicles live?’ or ‘Where is Critias?’” “O yes,” answered
Charicles, “you may, in such cases.” “But you see, Socrates,” explained
Critias, “you will have to avoid your favourite topic – the cobblers, builders
and metal workers; for it is already worn to rags by you in my opinion.” “Then
must I keep off the subjects of which these supply illustrations, Justice,
Holiness, and so forth?” “Indeed yes,” said Charicles, “and cowherds too: else you may find the cattle decrease (ei de mȇ, phulattou, hopȏs mȇ kai su
elattous tous bous poiȇsȇis).” Thus the truth was out: the remark about the
cattle had been repeated to them: and it was this that made them angry with
him.’ (I.ii.29-38, tr. E. C. Marchant)
***
When Critias, with Socrates in mind, ‘inserted a clause in
the laws (en tois nomois egrapse) that
the art of rhetoric must not be taught (logȏn
technȇn mȇ didaskein), thus
abusively threatening him’ (epȇreazȏn
ekeinȏi), he was thinking of the art of rhetoric as Socrates defined it in
Plato’s Phaedrus; so did Socrates
when he asked him and Charicles whether they bid him abstain from the art of
speaking associated with sound or unsound reasoning; and so did the three of
them referring to Socrates’ usual discussions ‘about the cobblers, builders and
metal workers’ as ‘the subjects of which these supply illustrations, Justice,
Holiness, and so forth’.
I have dated the Phaedrus
in 405-404, finished soon after the surrender of Athens with which the
Peloponnesian War ended (in April 404). The main reasons for this dating are
the following:
1. In the Phaedrus
Socrates ends the Palinode on love with a prayer to Eros: ‘If anything that
Phaedrus and I said earlier sounded discordant to thy ear, set it down to
Lysias, the only begetter of that discourse; and staying him from discourses
after this fashion turn him towards the love of wisdom, even as his brother
Polemarchus has been turned (epi
philosophian de, hȏsper hadelphos autou Polemarchos tetraptai, trepson).
Then will his lover here (hina kai ho
erastȇs hode autou) present no longer halt between two opinions, as now he
does, but live for Love in singleness of purpose with the aid of philosophic
discourse (all’ haplȏs pros Erȏta meta
philosophȏn logȏn ton bion poiȇtai).’ (256b1-6; tr. Hackforth with one
exception. He translates ho erastȇs hode
autou ‘his loving disciple here’.)
If Lysias turns to philosophy as Polemarchus has been turned
to it, Phaedrus can ‘live for Love in singleness of purpose with the aid of
philosophic discourse’; this means that they would live in terms specified at
256a7-b1: ‘And so, if victory be won by the higher elements of mind guiding
them in ordered rule of the philosophic life, their days on earth will be blessed with happiness and concord.’
(Tr. Hackforth.) I cannot see how Plato could have written this after the
Thirty put Polemarchus to death to get his money.
2. In the Phaedran Palinode Plato introduces the Forms as
supreme divine beings ‘a god’s nearness whereunto makes him truly divine’ (pros hoisper theos ȏn theios esti,
249c6). What protected Plato from being accused of ‘introducing new divinities’
in the Phaedrus – the crime for which
Socrates was sentenced to death five years later – was the amnesty the
democrats passed after their victory over the Thirty.
3. In the Seventh
Letter Plato says: ‘In my youth I went through the same experience as many
other men. I fancied that if, early in life, I became my own master, I should
at once embark on a political career … The existing constitution being
generally condemned, a revolution took place … thirty were appointed rulers
with full powers over public affairs as a whole. Some of these were relatives
and acquaintances of mine, and they at once invited me to share in their
doings, as something to which I had a claim. The effect on me was not
surprising in the case of a young man. I considered that they (ȏiȇthȇn gar autous) would, of course, so
manage the State as to bring men out of a bad way of life into a good one (ek tinos adikou biou epi dikaion tropon
agontas dioikȇsein tȇn polin).’ (324b8-d5, tr. J. Harward)
Plato must have finished the Phaedrus in the early days of the Thirty, for he wrote one more
dialogue, the Charmides, before, as
Plato says, ‘in quite a short time they made the former government seem by
comparison something precious as gold (SL,
324d7-8, tr. Harward)’; in it he describes the relationship between Critias and
Socrates as intellectually demanding, tense, but promising. (See Ch. 5 ‘The Charmides and the Phaedrus’ in The Lost Plato
on my website.)
***
Let me note that the discussion between Socrates and
Charicles – “Well then,” said Socrates, “that there may be no question raised
about my obedience, please fix the age limit below which a man is to be
accounted young.” “So long,” replied Charicles, “as he is not permitted to sit
in the Council, because he as yet lacks wisdom. You shall not converse with
anyone who is under thirty.” – implies that the Thirty forbade Socrates to talk
to Plato. Charicles’ ‘because he as yet lacks wisdom’ may have contributed to
the ancient story that the subject of the Phaedrus
has ‘something adolescent about it’ (echein
meirakiȏdes ti to problȇma, Diog. Laert. III. 38).
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