Dover says: ‘Many points of contact between Nu. (Clouds)
and the extant corpus of Socratic dialogues have been considered, and many have
been thought to show that Aristophanes knew, and expected his audience to
recognize, characteristic peculiarities of Socrates’ methods and manners. The
test case is 137, where the student tells Strepsiades that by knocking at the
door so noisily he has “caused the miscarriage of a discovery” (phrontid’ exȇmblȏkas exȇurȇmenȇn). The
metaphor reminds us of the famous passage in Theaetetus where Plato makes Socrates speak of his technique as
‘midwife’ to the birth of ideas from the minds of others; the term exambloun [‘miscarry’] is used there
(150e) of those who have left Socrates’ company too soon.’ (xlii)
Dover argues that ‘if this is a genuine point of contact,
some remarkable conclusions follow’ … These conclusions so lack plausibility
that they tempt us to seek another explanation of exȇmblȏkas [‘you caused the miscarriage’], and the obvious
explanation is that since tiktein
[‘give birth’] and gennan [‘beget’]
were so freely used in a metaphorical sense the corruption of an intellectual
exercise by a shock and a loud noise was appropriately described as
‘miscarriage’. Strepsiades, whose life has been spent in close acquaintance
with sheep and goats (45, 71 f.), creatures which are sensitive to sudden
fright when pregnant, is naturally interested.’ (xlii-xliii)
Dover names three such ‘remarkable conclusions’, and I shall
discuss each separately.
‘The first is that Aristophanes is so well acquainted with
Socrates’ terminology that he can allude to it in a single word, without any
enlargement.’ (xlii)
Not only this; Aristophanes must expect that his audience
would get it.
In Theaetetus
Socrates introduces his technique as a ‘midwife’ by asking the young
Theaetetus: ‘Do you mean to tell me you haven’t heard that I’m the son of a
fine strapping midwife called Phaenarete? – Theaetetus: ‘Yes, I’d heard that.’
(149a1-3, tr. McDowell). The reference is not only to Socrates with his
‘midwifery’, but to his mother as well. Aristophanes thus reminds the audience
of the Acharnians, the comedy with which
he won the first prise in 425. In it he made a long sequence of elaborate jokes
the butt of which was Euripides and his tragedies; the sequence ended with a
joke directed at his mother who was a gardener and used to sit in the market
selling her herbs. Dicaeopolis: ‘My own Euripides, my best and sweetest, perdition
seize me if I ask aught else save this one thing, this only, only this, give me
some chervil, borrowing from your mother.’ – Euripides: ‘The man insults us.’ (Acharnians 475-9, tr. B. B. Rogers) To say
more would spoil the joke. The link between the Acharnians and the Clouds,
between Euripides and Socrates is reinforced towards the end of the play.
Pheidippides came from Socrates’ House-of-thought full of Euripides. Strepsiades
says that his son began to beat him for speaking ill of Euripides. Pheidippides:
‘Not justly (ou dikaiȏs), you, who doesn’t
praise Euripides as being the wisest (hostis
ouk Euripidȇn epaineis sophȏtaton, 1377-8)?’ – Contemporary comic writers depicted
Euripides as deriving the ‘wise ideas’ for his plays from Socrates (see Diogenes
Laertius, II. 18).
‘The second is that, if this is so, the play should be full
of similar allusions; yet, as we read on, we find that the words and phrases
which sound like allusions (479 f. mȇchanas
… prospherȏ, 489 f. hotan ti
probalȏmai sophon … eutheȏs hupharpasei) are not attested in Plato.’
(xliii)
Let us consider line 479 to which Dover refers. Socrates
opens his preparatory education of Strepsiades by asking him ‘make plain to me
your character (age dȇ kateipe moi su ton
sautou tropon), so that, knowing it (hin’
auton eidȏs hostis esti), I then, accordingly, apply to you knew methods of
teaching (mȇchanas ȇdȇ ’pi toutois
pros se kainas prospherȏ).’ Strepsiades understands mȇchanas as ‘engines of war’: ‘What now (ti de)? Do you have in mind to besiege me (teichomachein dianoei moi pros tȏn theȏn)?’ – Socrates: ‘No (ouk), but I want to ask you a few things
(alla brachea sou puthesthai boulomai).
(477-482) Socrates knew methods of teaching consist in method of questioning.
In Plato’s Symposium
Diotima depicts the Eros in terms ‘reminiscent of the jokes the comic writers
directed at Socrates at Dionysia’ (atechnȏs
hoia auton Sȏkratȇn eskȏpton en Dionusiois hoi kȏmȏidoi, as Maximus Tyrius
observed, dis. XXIV. 4): ‘He is bold (andreios
ȏn), enterprising (kai itȇs),
strong (kai suntonos), a mighty
hunter (thȇreutȇs deinos), always
weaving some intrigue or other (aei tinas
plekȏn mȇchanas), keen in
pursuit of wisdom (kai phronȇseȏs
epithumȇtěs kai porimos, 203d5-7, tr. Jowett).’ In Plato’s Apology Socrates tells Meletus, his
accuser: ‘But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced
by you that a man can believe in the existence of the things divine and
superhuman, and the same man refuse to believe in gods and demigods and
heroes.’ (27e5-28a1, tr. Jowett) Somewhere in Jowett’s ‘no one will ever be
convinced by you’ is hidden Socrates’ mȇchanȇ
[mȇchanȇ, nom. sing, mȇchanas, acc. pl.]: hopȏs su tina peithois … oudemia mȇchanȇ esti ‘there is no way in which you might persuade’). Finally,
in Cratylus, Socrates’ attempt to get
to the deeper meaning of mȇchanȇ by
discovering its etymological roots indicates that he gave it some thought, nay,
that it was in the centre of his philosophical activities. For having explained
the term technȇ as ‘possession of
intellect’ (hexin nou), Socrates next
explains mȇchanȇ as anein epi polu ‘to accomplish a lot’,
deriving it from mȇkos ‘length’,
‘which somehow signifies “a lot” (to gar
mȇkos pȏs to polu sȇmainei)’, and anein,
which signifies ‘effect’, ‘accomplish’. Socrates’ questioning was a lengthy
process, and in the course of it he achieved, or hoped to achieve, a lot. His
explanation of mȇchanȇ is followed by
his deliberation on ‘virtue’ aretȇ
and ‘vice’ kakia. (Pl. Cratylus 414b-415a)
Dover’s next reference is line 489 f hotan ti probalȏmai sophon peri
tȏn meteȏrȏn eutheȏs hupharpasei
‘when I throw at you something wise
concerning the celestial matters snatch
it immediately’. Strepsiades: ‘What now (ti dai), shall I be fed wisdom like a dog’ (kunȇdon tȇn sophian sitȇsomai)?
Plato’s Socrates used the term proballȏ, and he used it as Aristophanes’ Socrates did. In Laches Socrates says: ‘It seems to me
that Homer must be thrown in’ (ton
Homȇron dokei moi chrȇnai proballesthai,
201b1-2). In Hippias Major Socrates’
alter ego pesters Socrates (and thus Socrates pesters the sophist Hippias) with
uncomfortable questions. Referring to his alter ego, Socrates tells Hippias: ‘But
sometimes (eniote de), as if having a
pity (hȏsper eleȇsas) on my
inexperience (mou tȇn apeirian) and
lack of education (kai apaideusian),
he himself throws at me (autos moi proballei) asking (erȏtȏn) if beauty seems to me to be this
(ei toionde moi dokei einai to kalon),
or concerning anything else (ȇ kai peri
allou) what he happens to be enquiring about’ (hotou an tuchȇi punthanomenos, 293d1-4). Hupharpazȏ can be found in the Euthydemus.
Socrates tells the story how the sophist Dionysodorus snatched the ‘opportune’
moment to have his say (ephȇ hupharpasas ho Dionusodȏros,
300d1).
In the Clouds can
be found other ‘similar allusions’ to Socrates’ philosophizing. Thus when
Strepsiades, after being thrown away from Socrates’ House-of-thinking as
hopeless, insists that his son must go and become Socrates’ disciple,
Pheidippides asks: ‘What could one learn from them that might be useful (ti d’ an par ekeinȏn kai mathoi chrȇston tis
an, 840)?’ – Strepsiades: ‘You will know thyself (gnȏsei de sauton) how ignorant you are (hȏs amathȇs ei) and how thick (kai
pachus, 842).’ In Plato’s Phaedrus
Socrates avers that his whole effort is focussed on ‘knowing myself’ (gnȏnai emauton) in obedience to the
Delphic adage (229e-230a). Aristotle maintained that Socrates propounded the
Delphic ‘Know thyself’ as the principle of philosophic investigation (Peri philosophias fr. 4,).
‘The third conclusion is that a Socratic metaphor so
important and well known that one word in Nu.
(Clouds) sufficed to make a humorous
allusion was wholly neglected by Plato in his earlier representations of
Socrates (including Apology) and
exploited, at a comparatively late date, in one dialogue alone.’ (xliii)
This is an interesting observation, but it has very little
to do with the question of Socrates’ intellectual ‘midwifery’. To settle this
question we must compare Plato’s Theaetetus
with Xenophon’s Symposium. In the Theaetetus Socrates connects the art of
midwifery (maieia 150d8, maieuesthai 150c7, technȇ tȇs maieuseȏs, 150b6) with the
art of match-making (promnȇstikȇ,
150a3), that is with his ability to guess quite well from whose intercourse
would benefit those, whom he does not find intellectually pregnant: ‘I arrange
matches for them (promnȏmai) … I’ve
given several of them to Prodicus, and several to other wise and gifted gentlemen.’
(151b, tr. McDowell) In Xenophon’s Symposium
Callias asks Socrates: ‘What are you proud of?’ Socrates: ‘The trade of match-maker’
(epi mastrȏpeiai, iii. 10) When
Callias asks Socrates ‘What can you advance in support of your pride in that disreputable
profession?’ Socrates explains procuring as the art of making people attractive
to each other, and he says that Antisthenes is good at it; he finds him good
not only in the art of match-making (mastrȏpeia),
but even in the art of ‘procuring’ (proagȏgeia).
Much incensed, Antisthenes asked: ‘What knowledge can you possibly have of my
being guilty of such a thing as that?’ – Socrates: ‘I know several instances. I
know that you acted the part between Callias here and the wise Prodicus, when you
saw that Callias was in love with philosophy and that Prodicus wanted money. I
know that you did the same for Hippias, the Elean, from whom Callias got his
memory system … And just recently, you remember, you introduced the stranger
from Heraclea [Zeuxippus, the painter. Cf. Plato, Protagoras 318 b, c] to me, after arousing keen interest in me by
your commendations …’ (iv. 56-63, tr. and n. on Zeuxippus by O. J. Todd.) Promnȇstikȇ Socrates professes to be
good at in Plato’s Theaetetus corresponds
to mastrȏpeia he professes to be good
at in Xenophon’s Symposium. The
difference in terms in which Socrates refers to it is due to the different
situations in which he speaks of it.
***
Dover’s observation that Socrates’ ‘midwifery’ ‘was
neglected by Plato in his earlier representations of Socrates (including Apology) and exploited, at a
comparatively late date, in one dialogue alone’ may have something to do with
the provenance of the dialogue. The main dialogue is prefaced by an
introductory conversation between Eucleides and Terpsion of Megara, friends and
followers of Socrates, who were present at his death (Phaedo 59c2). In it we learn that Theaetetus was being taken to
Athens from the army at Corinth, suffering from some wounds and from the
disease that has broken out in the army. Eucleides accompanied him a long way
towards Athens: ‘I recollected with admiration how prophetically Socrates had
spoken about him … It was shortly before his death, I think, that Socrates came
across him, when Theaetetus was a boy. He met him and had a discussion with
him, and he was extremely impressed by Theaetetus’ natural gifts. When I went
to Athens, he repeated to me what they said in their discussion … I made notes
on that occasion, as soon as I got home, and later, when I had time, I used to
recollect it and write it down. And whenever I went to Athens, I used to ask
Socrates again about what I didn’t remember, and make corrections when I came
back here. So I’ve got just about all of what they said written down.’
(142c-143a, tr. McDowell)
Cornford says in his Introductory note on the dialogue that
‘The anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus,
believed to date from the first or second century of our era, records the
existence of a second ‘rather frigid’ introductory dialogue of about the same
number of lines, beginning, “Boy, are you bringing the dialogue about
Theaetetus?” It has been argued that this lost introduction was probably
written by Plato – for why should anyone forge such a document – and that the
obvious occasion for substituting the existing one would be the death of
Theaetetus.’ (F. M. Cornford, Plato’s
Theory of Knowledge, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935, p. 15)
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