The Phaedrus and Laws X – revised

In the Phaedrus Plato defines the soul as ‘that which moves itself’ (to auto heauto kinoun, 245e7-8), and in Laws X he defines it as ‘the motion that has the property of moving itself ‘ (tȇn dunamenȇn autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin, 896a1-2, tr. T. Griffith). But there is a difference. In the Phaedrus the soul is emphatically agenȇton, i.e. it ‘cannot come into being’, as Hackforth translates agenȇton at 245 d1, ‘does not come into being’, as he translates agenȇton at 246d3, and ‘is not born’, as he translates agenȇton at 246a1. But in Laws X the soul is genomenȇ ‘it has come into being’, as Griffith translates genomenȇ at 892a5. Plato goes on: ‘But if this is so (ei d’estin tauta houtȏs), then things related to soul must necessarily have come into being earlier than things belonging to body, mustn’t they (ar’ ouk ex anankȇs ta psuchȇs sungenȇ protera an eiȇ gegonota tȏn sȏmati prosȇkontȏn), since soul is older than body (ousȇs autȇs presbuteras ȇ sȏmatos;) (892a7-b1)?’

Malcolm Schofield in his note on the given passage explains away Plato’s insistence that ‘soul must necessarily have come into being earlier than things belonging to body, since soul is older than body’. He says: ‘By “older”, the Athenian here as elsewhere means no more than “metaphysically and causally more fundamental”.’

But this won’t do, for in the Timaeus, which stands in between the Phaedrus and the Laws, Plato maintains that only a very small portion of mankind (genos brachu ti, 51e6) can see the Forms. The soul had to be created, for in the Palinode in the Phaedrus it was the eternal uncreated soul (agenȇton), which saw the Forms prior to its first incarnation, that made human speech possible: ‘For a man must understand (dei gar anthrȏpon sunienai) in accordance with Form what’s said (kat’ eidos legomenon), coming out of many sense perceptions (ek pollȏn ion aisthȇseȏn), brought into unity by reasoning (eis hen logismȏi sunairoumenon); and this is a recollection of those things (touto d’ estin anamnȇsis ekeinȏn), which our soul once saw (ha pot’ eiden hȇmȏn hȇ psuchȇ) when she travelled in company with God (sumporeutheisa theȏi) … and rose up to what really is (kai anakupsasa eis to on ontȏs).’ (249b7-c4)

When Plato realised that only a tiny portion of humanity can see the Forms, the humans had to be created, endowed by their creator with the capacity to understand the spoken word, which is ‘coming out of many sense perceptions’. Plato realised that sense perceptions mediating speech between men, flowing through the air, are fundamentally different from the words they mediate. The words, which are in the mind of the speaker, as they are spoken, give rise to many sense perceptions, which hit the ear of the listener, and are turned into words in the mind of the listener.

***

It appears that Plato envisaged, and did his best to prevent, attempts to explain away the discrepancy between the Phaedrus and the Timaeus; not out of fear that they would try to make the Phaedrus late, but anticipating the desire of his followers to see his philosophy in unity, form his first to his last dialogue.

The discussion in the Timaeus takes place two days after Socrates’ narration of the discussion contained in the Republic. In the Timaeus he says that the Demiurge ‘constructed (sunestȇsato) Soul (psuchȇn) older than the body (presbuteran sȏmatos) by birth (genesei), and prior to it in excellence (aretȇi proteran)’ (34c4-5). To emphasise Soul’s being older than the body, he began by explaining the universe as a bodily structure, then came the soul, and then he corrects his narration.

Timaeus narrates: ‘The ever-existing God made the universe smooth and equal on all sides from the centre, a whole and perfect body compounded of perfect bodies. And in the midst thereof He set the Soul, which he stretched throughout the whole of it, and therewith He enveloped also the exterior of its body; and as a Circle revolving in a circle He established one sole and solitary Heaven, able of itself because of its excellence to company with itself and needing none other beside, sufficing unto itself as acquaintance and friend. And because of all this He generated it to be a blessed God.

Now as regards the Soul, although we are assaying to describe it after the body, God did not likewise plan it to be younger than the body; for, when uniting them, He would not have permitted the elder to be ruled by the younger; but as for us men, even as we ourselves partake largely of the accidental and casual, so also do our words. God, however, constructed Soul to be older than Body and prior in birth and excellence, since she was to be the mistress and ruler and it to be ruled.’ (34a8-35a1, tr. R.G. Bury)

***

To emphasize the difference between the Laws and the Phaedrus, Plato in Laws X emphasises again and again that Soul ‘came into being before all bodies’ (sȏmatȏn emprosthen pantȏn genomenȇ). As in the Timaeus, he comes to the Soul after the construction of the bodily universe, narrating the cosmology in terms of ten different kinds of motion, beginning with the circular motion, and ending with the motion of Soul. Then he says that of the ten motions, the motion of Soul, which in his narrative came as tenth, ought to be rightly seen as that which came to being first (prȏton genesei, 894d10).

Speaking about the generation of Soul (autȇs peri geneseȏs), he emphasises that she was brought into being (genomenȇ) before all bodies (sȏmatȏn emprosthen pantȏn), and that therefore all things related to Soul came into being earlier than (protera gegonota) things belonging to body (tȏn sȏmati prosȇkontȏn) (892a4-b1). He enumerates a number of the soul’s motions : ‘the soul ‘drives (agei) everything in the heavens (panta ta kat’ ouranon), the earth (kai gȇn), and the sea (kai thalattan) by her own motions’ (tais hautȇs kinȇsesin), which are named (hais onomata estin) ‘will’ (boulesthai), ‘reflection’ (skopeisthai), ‘concern’ (epimeleisthai), ‘deliberation’ (bouleuesthai) … ‘apprehension’ (phoboumenȇn, ‘hate’ (misousan), ‘love’ (stergousan), ‘and by all the motions (kai pasais) which are related to these (hosai toutȏn sungeneis)’ (896e8-897a4), but one motion is missing, the motion by which the Soul apprehends what’s said, transforming into words what is ‘coming out of many sense perceptions’ (ek pollȏn ion aisthȇseȏn), i.e. the motion that makes speech possible. The same is true about the Timaeus. Why is it missing?

The ability to speak is shared by the tiny minority of those who can see the Forms (Tim. 51e), and by all those who can’t see the Forms. In the Phaedrus, in the Palinode, Plato presented the Forms in a spectacular manor: ‘The region above the heavens has never yet been celebrated as it deserves by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. But it is like this – for one must be bold enough to say what is true, especially when speaking about truth. This region is occupied by being which really is, which is without colour or shape, intangible, observable by the steersman of the soul alone, by intellect, and to which the class of true knowledge relates.’ (247c3-d1, tr. C.J. Rowe)

And so it happened that many of those, who read the Phaedrus, believed that they could see the Forms, although they could not do so. But what was worse, Plato himself mistakenly believed that they could do so. This is not a mere conjecture, for we know from the Phaedrus, that this is what happened to Lysias’ brother Polemarchus, and to Plato concerning Polemarchus. We can know it with certainty, for only on that basis could Plato end the Palinode with the prayer to Eros, in which Socrates prays that Eros may turn Lysias ‘to philosophy (epi philosophian) as his brother Polemarchus has been turned to it’ (hȏsper hadelphos autou Polemarchos tetraptai)’, so that Phaedrus and his beloved Lysias can direct their life ‘simply towards love (haplȏs pros Erȏta) accompanied by philosophic discussions’ (meta philosophȏn logȏn). – Phaedrus: ‘I join in your prayer (Suneuchomai soi), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), if indeed it is better for us (eiper ameinon tauth’ hȇmin einai).’ (Phdr. 257b3-6, tr. C.J. Rowe)

Socrates thus prays that Eros enables Lysias to see the Forms, for only on that basis the lover’s soul and the soul of his beloved can live together in love free of sex, to which the Palinode is devoted. When Plato wrote the Palinode, he believed that Polemarchus could see the Forms.

From the end section of the Phaedrus we may learn that before finishing it, Plato realised that concerning Polemarchus he was badly mistaken. The Phaedrus ends with a very different prayer. Socrates: ‘Dear Pan and all the gods of this place, grant me that I may become beautiful within; and that what is in my possession outside me may be in friendly accord with what is inside. And may I count the wise man as rich; and may my pile of gold be of a size which only a man of moderate desires could bear or carry.

Do we still need anything else, Phaedrus? For me that prayer is enough.’

Phaedrus: ‘Make the prayer for me too (Kai emoi tauta suneuchou); for what friends have they share (koina gar ta tȏn philȏn). – Socrates: ‘Let’s go’ (Iȏmen). (279b8-c8, tr. C.J. Rowe)