Socrates rejected Meno’s eristic argument, according to which a man cannot enquire either about what he knows, because he knows it, nor about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to enquire. Meno asked on what ground can he be rejecting it. In response Socrates referred to wise priests and priestesses, to Pindar and many other poets of heavenly gifts: ‘They say (phasi gar) that the soul of man (tȇn psuchȇn tou anthrȏpou) is immortal (einai athanaton), and at one time comes to an end (kai tote men teleutan), which is called dying (ho dȇ apothnȇiskein kalousi), and at another is born again (tote de palin gignesthai), but never perishes (apollusthai oudepote) … Seeing then that the soul is immortal (Hate oun hȇ psuchȇ athanatos te ousa) and has been born many times (kai pollakis gegonuia), and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms (kai heorakuia kai ta enthade kai ta en Haidou kai panta chrȇmata), she has acquired knowledge of everything (ouk estin ho ti ou memathȇken); so that it is no wonder (hȏste ouden thaumaston) that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things (kai peri aretȇs kai peri allȏn hoion t’ einai autȇn anamnȇsthȇnai, ha ge kai proteron ȇpistato) … if we have courage (ean tis andreios ȇi) and faint not in the search (kai mȇ apokamnȇi zȇtȏn); since, it would seem, research and learning are wholly recollection (to gar zȇtein ara kai to manthanein anamnȇsis holon estin) … Putting my trust in its truth (hȏi egȏ pisteuȏn alȇthei einai), I am ready to inquire with you (ethelȏ meta sou zȇtein) into the nature of virtue (aretȇ ho ti estin).’ (81c5-e2, translation from the Meno is in this post by W.R.M. Lamb).
Meno wants
Socrates to prove to him ‘that what we call learning (hȇn kaloumen mathȇsin) is recollection (anamnȇsis estin, 81e4). Socrates warns that it is not easy (ou raidion), but he
is willing to do his best for Meno’s sake (ethelȏ prothumȇthȇnai sou heneka): ‘Just call (alla moi proskaleson) one of your own
troop of attendants there (tȏn pollȏn akolouthȏn toutȏni tȏn sautou hena), whichever one you please (hontina
boulei), that he may serve for my demonstration (hina en toutȏi soi epideixȏmai).’ (82a7-b2)
I’ll give
just the essential points of Socrates’ questioning of the boy. Socrates draws a
figure in the sand and asks the boy whether he knows it is a square. The boy
says he knows it. Socrates: Does it have four equal sides? The boy: It does. S.:
If the side of the square is two feet, how many feet is the square? Boy: Four. S.:
How many square feet will be a square twice the size? Boy: Eight feet. S.: The
side of the four feet square is two feet, how big will be the side of the
square twice as big? Boy: The side will be twice as big. (82b9-e3)
At this
point Socrates turns to Meno: ‘Do you observe (Horais), Meno (ȏ Menȏn), that I am not teaching the boy anything (hȏs egȏ touton ouden didaskȏ), but merely asking him each time (all’ erȏtȏ panta;)? And now he supposes that he knows (kai
nun houtos oietai eidenai) about the line required to make a figure of
eight square feet (hopoia estin aph’ hȇs to oktȏpoun chȏrion genȇsetai); or do you not think he does (ȇ ou dokei soi;)?’ Meno: ‘I do (Emoige).’ –
S.: ‘Well, does he know (Oiden oun;)?’ M.: ‘Certainly not (Ou dȇta).’
… S.: ‘Now watch his progress in recollecting (Theȏ dȇ auton anamimnȇskomenon ephexȇs), by the proper use of memory (hȏs dei anamimnȇskesthai).’ (82e4-13)
Socrates
draws in the sand a square the side of which is four feet. The boy can see that
the size of such a square is sixteen feet, four times bigger than the original
square, not twice as big. Socrates asks: ‘Then the line on the side of the
eight-foot square (Dei ara tȇn tou oktȏpodos chȏriou grammȇn)
should be more than this of two feet (meizȏ men einai tautȇs tȇs dipodos), and less than the other of four (elattȏ de tȇs tetrapodos;)?’ – Boy: ‘It should (Dei).’
– Socrates: ‘Try and tell me (Peirȏ dȇ legein) how much you would say it is (pȇlikȇn tina phȇis autȇn einai)?’ – Boy: ‘Three feet (Tripoda).’ (83d4-e2) Socrates draws the
square the side of which is three feet. The boy realises that its size is nine square
feet. Socrates asks again, what will be the side of the eight-foot square: ‘And
if you would rather not reckon it out (kai ei mȇ boulei arithmein), just show what line it is (alla deixon apo poias).’
– Boy: ‘Well, on my word (Alla ma ton Dia), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), I for one (egȏge)
do not know (ouk oida).’ (83e11-84a2)
At this point Socrates turns again to
Meno: ‘There now, Meno, do you observe (Ennoeis au, ȏ Menȏn) what progress he has already made in his
recollection (hou estin ȇdȇ badizȏn hode tou anamimnȇiskesthai)? At first he did not know (hoti to men prȏton ȇidei men ou) what is the line that forms the
figure of eight feet (hȇtis estin hȇ tou oktȏpodos chȏriou grammȇ), and he does not know even now (hȏsper oude nun pȏ oiden): but at any rate he thought he knew
then (all’ oun ȏieto g’ autȇn tote eidenai), and confidently answered (kai tharraleȏs apekrineto) as though he knew (hȏs eidȏs), and was aware of no difficulty (kai ouch hȇgeito aporein); whereas now he feels the difficulty he is in (nun de hȇgeitai aporein ȇdȇ), and besides not knowing (kai hȏsper ouk oiden) does not think he knows (oud’ oietai eidenai) –
Meno: ‘That is true (Alȇthȇ legeis).’ – S.: ‘And is he not better off (Oukoun nun beltion echei) in
respect of the matter (peri to pragma) which he did not know (ho ouk ȇidei;)?’ – M.: ‘I think that too is so (kai touto moi dokei).’ (84a3-b5)
Does Meno
realize that by this admission he is at the point of seeing his preceding
discussion with Socrates in a new light? Socrates: ‘Now, by causing him to
doubt (Aporein oun auton poiȇsantes) and giving him the torpedo’s shock
(kai narkan hȏsper hȇ narkȇ), have we done him any harm (mȏn ti eblapsamen)?’ – Meno: ‘I think not (Ouk emoige dokei).’ (84b6-8)
Compare what
Meno said earlier to Socrates: ‘I consider that both in your appearance and in
other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish (kai dokeis
moi pantelȏs, ei dei ti kai skȏpsai, homoiotatos einai to te eidos kai t’alla tautȇi tȇi plataiai narkȇi tȇi thalattiai); for it benumbs anyone who
approaches and touches it (kai gar hautȇ
ton aei plȇsiazonta kai haptomenon narkan poiei), and something of the sort is what I find you have done to
me now (kai su dokeis moi nun eme toiouton ti pepoiȇkenai). For in truth (alȇthȏs gar) I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed (egȏge kai tȇn psuchȇn kai to stoma narkȏ), and I am at a loss what answer to
give you (kai ouk echȏ hoti apokrinȏmai soi). And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue
(kaitoi muriakis ge peri aretȇs pampollous logous eirȇka)
to various people (kai pros pollous) – and very good speeches they were
(kai panu eu), so I thought (hȏs ge emautȏi edokoun) – but now (nun de) I cannot say one word as to what it is (oud’
hoti estin to parapan echȏ eipein, 80a4-b4).
Socrates goes
on pressing the point: ‘And we have certainly given him some assistance (Prourgou
g’oun ti pepoiȇkamen), it would seem (hȏs eoike), towards finding out the truth of the matter (pros to exeurein hopȇi echei): for now he will push on in the search gladly (nun men gar kai zȇtȇseien an hȇdeȏs), as lacking knowledge (ouk eidȏs);
whereas then (tote de) he would have been only too ready to suppose he
was right in saying, before any number of people any number of times (raidiȏs an kai pros pollous kai pollakis ȏiet’ an eu legein), that the double space must have a line of double the
length of its side (peri tou diplasiou chȏriou, hȏs dei diplasian tȇn grammȇn echein mȇkei).’
– Meno: ‘It seems so (Eoiken).’ – S.: ‘Now do you imagine (Oiei oun)
he would have attempted to inquire or learn what he thought he knew, when he
did not know it (an auton proteron epicheirȇsai zȇtein ȇ manthanein touto, ho ȏieto eidenai ouk eidȏs),
until he had been reduced to perplexity (prin eis aporian katepesen) of realizing
that he did not know (hȇgȇsamenos mȇ eidenai), and had a craving to know (kai
epothȇse eidenai;)?’ – M.: ‘I think not (Ou moi dokei), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates).’ – S.: ‘Then the torpedo’s shock
was of advantage to him (Ōnȇto ara narkȇsas;)?’ – M.: ‘I think so (Dokei moi).’
(84b9-c9)
As can be
seen, Socrates makes a parallel between his questioning of the boy and his
previous questioning of Meno. In the following questioning of the boy, in the
course of which the boy finds the side of the square doble the size of the
original square, Socrates adumbrates the discussion he hopes to resume with
Meno on virtue.
Socrates
introduces the discussion with the boy by asking Meno: ‘Now you should note
how, as a result of this perplexity (Skepsai de ek tautȇs tȇs aporias), he will go on and discover
something by joint enquiry with me (hoti kai aneurȇsei zȇtȏn met’ emou), while I merely ask questions (ouden all’ ȇ erȏtȏntos emou) and do not teach him (kai ou didaskontos); and be on the watch (phulatte
de) to see if at any point you find me teaching him (an pou heurȇis didaskonta) or expounding to him (kai diexionta autȏi),
instead of questioning him on his opinions (alla mȇ tas toutou doxas anerȏtȏnta,
84c10-d2).’
Socrates
draws in the sand the original four feet square, adding to it three more such
squares, so that together they make a sixteen feet square. He then draws a line
from corner to corner of each of the four squares, which form a square inside
the sixteen feet square which is half its size, i.e. eight square feet, thus
being twice the size of the original four-square feet square. The boy realises
that the side of it is formed by the line drawn from corner to corner of the
four square-feet square, thus solving the problem.
Socrates:
‘What do you think (Ti soi dokei), Meno (ȏ Menȏn)? Was there any opinion that he did not give as an
answer of his own thought (estin hȇntina doxan ouch hautou houtos
apekrinato;)?’ –
Meno: ‘No (Ouk), they were all his own (all’ heautou).’ – S.: ‘But
you see, he did not know (Kai mȇn ouk ȇidei ge), as we were saying a while since (hȏs ephamen oligon proteron).’ – M.: ‘That is true (Alȇthȇ legeis).’ – S.: ‘Yet he had in him these
opinions (Enȇsan de ge autȏi hautai hai doxai), had he not (ȇ ou;)?’ – M.: ‘Yes (Nai).’ – S.:
‘So that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they be, may have
true opinions on such matters, about which he knows nothing (Tȏi ouk eidoti ara peri hȏn an mȇ eidȇi eneisin alȇtheis doxai peri toutȏn hȏn ouk oiden;)?’ – M.: ‘Apparently (Phainetai).’ – S.: ‘And at this
moment those opinions have just been stirred up in him, like a dream (Kai
nun men ge autȏi hȏsper onar arti anakekinȇntai hai doxai hautai); but if he were repeatedly asked
these same questions in a variety of forms (ei de auton tis anerȇsetai pollakis ta auta tauta kai pollachȇi),
you know he will have in the end as exact an understanding of them as
anyone (oisth’ oun hoti teleutȏn oudenos hȇtton akribȏs epistȇsetai peri toutȏn).’ (85b8-d1)
***
Let us now cast our eye on Socrates’ request with which the dialogue ends: Meno should persuade Anytus of what he himself became persuaded, ‘for if you can persuade him you will do a good turn to the people of Athens’. Plato wanted his readers to see the Meno in its political significance. In the course of Socrates’ questioning of the boy Plato demonstrated his and Socrates’ democratic credentials. Any citizen of Athens could acquire knowledge that was prerequisite for governing the city well, ‘if he were courageous and faint not in the search (81d3-4).
***
Socrates summarised what the theory of recollection was all about: ‘And if the truth of all things that are is always in our soul (Oukoun ei aei hȇ alȇtheia hȇmin tȏn ontȏn estin en tȇi psuchȇi), then the soul must be immortal (athanatos an hȇ psuchȇ eiȇ); so that you should take heart and, whatever you do not happen to know at present – that is, what you do not remember – you must endeavour to search out and recollect (hȏste tharrounta chrȇ ho mȇ tunchaneis epistamenos nun – touto d’estin ho mȇ memnȇmenos – epicheirein zȇtein kai anamimnȇiskesthai)?’ Meno replies: ‘What you say commends itself to me (Eu moi dokeis legein), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), I know not how (ouk oid’ hopȏs).’ (86b1-5) As can be seen, with his answer to Socrates Meno expresses his wholehearted agreement with all that Socrates said about the theory of recollection. Lamb lefts untranslated Socrates’ opening oukoun, concerning which De Places remarks that the thought introduced by it follows from what preceded (‘L’idée introduite par oukoun suit de ce qui précède’, quoted by J.D. Denniston in The Greek Particles, 2nd edition, 1950, p. 437.)
Note that
the order of the main points is reversed, compared to the form in which the
theory was introduced. Initially, with reference to wise priests, priestesses,
to Pindar and other excellent poets Socrates maintained that the soul is
immortal, being immortal and born many times, and on that basis he maintained
that the soul has acquired knowledge of all and everything (81a-c). Meno wanted
him to prove this, and he did so by questioning the boy concerning a
mathematical problem. When the boy succeeded in solving the problem, Socrates
inferred that the boy would do this ‘with all geometry and every branch of
knowledge’ (85e2-3). It is on this basis, i.e. as the result of his questioning
of the boy, that he now asked Meno whether he agrees that ‘if the truth of all
things that are is always in our soul, then the soul must be immortal’
(86b1-2).
When Meno
wholeheartedly agreed with the conclusion – ‘What you say commends itself to
me, I know not how’ – Socrates appreciated it: ‘And so it does to me’ (Kai
gar egȏ emoi, 86b6). But then he qualifies his agreement, presumably
realising that it transcended his philosophic ignorance: ‘Most of the points (kai
ta men ge alla) I have made in support of my argument are not such as I can
confidently assert (ouk an panu huper tou logou diischurisaimȇn,
86b6-7).
Having regained the safe ground of
philosophic ignorance, Socrates went on to confront Meno’s eristic argument, according to which a man cannot enquire
either about what he knows, because he knows it, nor about what he does not
know, since he does not know about what he is to enquire (80d5-8), i.e. the
argument in response to which Socrates elaborated the theory of recollection.
For Socrates
continued: ‘But that the belief in the duty of inquiring (hoti d’ oiomenoi
dein zȇtein) after what we do not know (ha mȇ tis oide) will make us better (beltious an eimen) and braver (kai
andrikȏteroi) and less helpless (kai hȇtton argoi) than the notion (ȇ ei oioimetha) that there is not even a
possibility of discovering what we do not know (ha mȇ epistametha, mȇde dunaton einai heurein), nor any duty of inquiring after it
(mȇde dein zȇtein) – this is a point for which I am
determined to do battle (peri toutou panu an diamachoimȇn),
so far as I am able (ei hoios t’ eiȇn), both in word (kai logȏi)
and deed (kai ergȏ).’ Meno responds: ‘There also I
consider that you speak aright (Kai touto men ge dokeis moi eu legein),
Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates).’ (86b7-c3)
As can be
seen, Socrates succeeded in persuading Meno that his eristic argument was
misguided and that the awareness of one’s own ignorance should prompt one to do
his best to overcome it. Is this the persuasion of which Meno ought to persuade
Anytus, as Socrates asks him to do at the end of the dialogue (100c)?
Socrates:
‘Then since we are of one mind as to the duty of inquiring into what one does
not know, do you agree to our attempting (Boulei oun, epeidȇ homonoumen, hoti zȇtȇteon peri hou mȇ tis oiden, epicheirȇsȏmen) a joint enquiry into the nature of virtue (koinȇi zȇtein ti pot’ estin aretȇ;)?’ – Meno: ‘By all means (Panu men
oun). But still (ou mentoi), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), for my part I would like best of
all to examine the question I asked first (all’ egȏge ekeino an hȇdista, hoper ȇromȇn to prȏton, kai skepsaimȇn), and hear your view (kai akousaimi) as to
whether in pursuing virtue we are to regard it as a thing to be taught (poteron
hȏs didaktȏi onti autȏi dei epicheirein), or as a gift of nature to mankind, or as arriving to them
in some other way which I should be glad to know (ȇ hȏs phusei ȇ hȏs tini pote tropȏi paragignomenȇs tois anthrȏpois tȇs aretȇs).’
(86c4-d2)
Socrates:
‘Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself (All’ ei men egȏ ȇrchon, ȏ Menȏn, mȇ monon emautou alla kai sou), we should not have begun considering (ouk an
eskepsametha proteron) whether virtue can or cannot be taught (eite
didakton eite ou didakton hȇ aretȇ) until we had first inquired into the main question of what
it is (prin ho ti esti prȏton ezȇtȇsamen auto, 86d3-6). Nevertheless, Socrates
appears to be quite happy to accede to Meno’s request, approaching his question
on the basis of a hypothesis: ‘What kind of thing must virtue be in the class
of mental properties (Ei poion ti estin tȏn peri tȇn psuchȇn ontȏn aretȇ), so as to be teachable or not (didakton an eiȇ ȇ ou didakton;) … is not this fact plain to
everyone (ȇ touto ge panti dȇlon) – that the one and only thing taught to men is
knowledge (hoti ouden allo didasketai anthrȏpos ȇ epistȇmȇn;)?’ – Meno: ‘I agree to that (Emoige dokei).’ –
S.: Then if virtue is a kind of knowledge (Ei de g’ estin epistȇmȇ tis hȇ aretȇ), clearly it must be taught (dȇlon hoti didakton an eiȇ)?’- M.: ‘Certainly (Pȏs gar ou;).’ … S.: ‘The next question (To dȇ meta touto), it would seem (hȏs eoike), that we have to consider is (dei
skepsasthai) whether virtue is knowledge (poteron estin epistȇmȇ hȇ aretȇ), or of another kind than knowledge
(ȇ alloion epistȇmȇs).’
– M.: ‘I should say (Emoige dokei) that this is the next thing we have
to consider (touto meta touto skepteon einai).’ (87b5-d1)
The enquiry
into the question whether virtue is knowledge is based on the hypothesis that
virtue is good. Socrates: ‘Well now (Ti de dȇ), surely we call virtue a good thing, do we not (allo ti ȇ agathon auto phamen einai tȇn aretȇn), and our hypothesis stands (kai hautȇ hȇ hupothesis menei hȇmin),
that it is good (agathon auto einai;).’ – Meno: ‘To be sure (Panu men
oun).’ (87d2-4)
***
Meno’s ‘To be sure’ is worth noting. Earlier on he expressed
a very different view. Socrates asked him what things he considered to be good:
‘Do you not mean such things as (Agatha de kaleis ouchi hoion)
health and wealth (hugieian te kai plouton;)?’ – Meno: ‘Yes, and I
include the acquisition of gold and silver (Kai chrusion legȏ kai argurion ktasthai), and of state honours and offices (kai timas en
polei kai archas).’ – Socrates: ‘Are there any things besides this sort,
that you class as things (Mȇ all’ atta legeis t’agatha ȇ ta toiauta;)?’ – Meno: ‘No (Ouk), I refer only to everything of
that sort (alla panta legȏ ta toiauta).’ (78c5-d1) On that occasion
Socrates met Meno’s words with biting irony: ‘Very well (Eien):
procuring gold and silver is virtue (chrusion kai argurion porizesthai aretȇ estin), according to Meno (hȏs phȇsi Menȏn), the ancestral friend of the Great King [the King of
the Persian empire] (ho tou megalou basileȏs patrikos xenos, 78d1-3).’
***
On the hypothesis that virtue is good, Socrates asks whether
there is any good which is separated from knowledge (ei men ti estin agathon
allo chȏrizomenon epistȇmȇs):
‘for if there is nothing good (ei de mȇden estin agathon) that is not embraced by knowledge (ho
ouk epistȇmȇ periechei), our supposition that virtue is a kind of knowledge (epistȇmȇn an tin’ auto hupopteuontes einai) would be well founded (orthȏs hupopteuoimen, 87d4-8)’.
Expanding on the hypothesis that virtue is good, Socrates
points out that ‘it is by virtue that we are good (aretȇi d’ esmen agathoi), and if we are good (ei de agathoi), then we are
beneficial (ȏphelimoi, which Lamb and Jowett translate as
‘profitable’): for all good things are beneficial (panta gar t’agatha ȏphelima).’ (87e1-2) Then he examines what benefits us. He points out that all
such things as health (hugieia), strength (ischus), beauty (kallos),
and wealth (ploutos) are beneficial if they are used well, guided by
knowledge, harmful if they are not used well (87e5-88a5). Similarly, all
capacities of the soul, such as temperance (sȏphrosunȇ), justice (dikaiosunȇ), courage (andreia), intelligence (eumathia),
memory (mnȇmȇ) magnanimity (megaloprepeia), in so far as they are
not knowledge (mȇ epistȇmȇ einai) but different from it (all’ allo
epistȇmȇs), are sometimes harmful (tote men blaptei), sometimes
beneficial (tote de ȏphelei, 88a6-b3).
Socrates concludes: ‘Then may we assert this as a universal
rule (Oukoun houtȏ dȇ kata pantȏn eipein esti), that in man all other things
depend on the soul (tȏi anthrȏpȏi ta men alla panta eis tȇn psuchȇn anȇrtȇsthai), while the things of the soul
herself depend on wisdom (ta de tȇs psuchȇs autȇs eis phronȇsin
[phronȇsis and epistȇmȇ is used here by Plato interchangeably, as Bluck remarks]),
if they are to be good (ei mellei agatha einai): and so by this account (kai
toutȏi tȏi logȏi)
the beneficial will be wisdom (phronȇsis an eiȇ to ȏphelimon), and virtue, we say, is beneficial
(phamen de tȇn aretȇn ȏphelimon einai;)?’ – Meno: ‘Certainly (Panu ge).’
– Socrates: ‘Hence we conclude that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom (Phronȇsin ara phamen aretȇn einai, ȇtoi sumpasan ȇ meros ti;)? – Meno: ‘It seems to me that your
statement, Socrates, is excellent (Dokei moi kalȏs legesthai, ȏ Sȏkrates, ta legomena).’ (88e4-89a5)
If this is the case, Socrates argues, then ‘good men become
good by education’ (hoi agathoi agathoi gignontai mathȇsei).
Meno agrees: ‘We must now conclude, I think, that it is so (Dokei moi ȇdȇ anankaion einai); and plainly (kai dȇlon),
Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), on our hypothesis (kata tȇn hupothesin) that virtue is knowledge (eiper epistȇmȇ estin aretȇ), it must be taught (hoti didakton estin).’ (89b9-c4)
But Socrates is not satisfied: ‘If virtue is teachable (ei
estin didakton), there must be teachers and learners of it (anankaion
autou kai didaskalous kai mathȇtas einai, 89d6-8)’. – Meno: ‘But do you think
there are no teachers of virtue (all’ aretȇs didaskaloi ou dokousi soi einai)?’ – Socrates: ‘I must say I have
often inquired whether there were any (Pollakis oun zȇtȏn ei tines eien autȇs didaskaloi), but for all my pains (panta poiȏn) I cannot find one (ou dunamai heurein).’ (89e4-7)
The question of virtue and its teachability is of political
significance. Anytus, whom the Athenians elected into the highest offices, came
and sat by them just at the right moment. Socrates can’t but invite him to join
their discussion.
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