Meno at odds with Socrates

 At the end of the dialogue Socrates asks Meno to persuade Anytus of what he himself had been persuaded, for if he succeeds in doing so, he will thereby benefit the Athenians. Socrates does not specify what in his view Meno had been persuaded of, so let us try to discover what does he have in mind. In my attempt of doing so I am dividing the dialogue into three sections: 1/ Meno at odds with Socrates, 2/ Meno becomes persuaded, 3/ Enters Anytus. The present post I am going to devote to the first section.

Meno opens the dialogue by asking Socrates whether he can tell him in which way a man can acquire virtue (70a1-4). Socrates replies that he does not even know what virtue is, so that he cannot know in what way it can be acquired (71a5-b4). Meno asks whether it is true that Socrates does not even know what virtue is, and whether he is to report this about him when he returns home, i.e. to Thessaly. Socrates replies: ‘Not only this (Mȇ monon ge), my friend (ȏ hetaire), but also (alla kai) that I never yet came across anybody who did know (hoti oud’ allȏi pȏ enetuchon eidoti), in my opinion (hȏs emoi dokȏ).’ – Meno: ‘What (Ti de;)? You did not meet Gorgias (Gorgiai ouk enetuches) when he was here (hote enthade ȇn;)?’ – S.: ‘I did (Egȏge).’ – M.: ‘And you did not consider (Eita ouk edokei soi) that he knew (eidenai;)?’ – S.: ‘I have not a very good memory (Ou panu eimi mnȇmȏn), Meno (ȏ Menȏn), so I cannot tell (hȏste ouk echȏ eipoein) at the moment (en tȏi paronti) how he struck me then (pȏs moi tote edoxen). It may be that he did know (all’ isȏs ekeinos te oide), and that you know what he said (kai su ha ekeinos elege): remind me therefore (anamnȇson oun me) how he expressed it (pȏs elege); or if you like (ei de boulei), make your own statement (autos eipe), for I expect you share his views (dokei gar dȇpou soi hapar ekeinȏi).’ – M.: ‘I do (Emoige).’ (71c3-d3, translation W.R.M. Lamb.)

Meno has no difficulty (ou chalepon) in telling (eipein) Socrates what virtue is: ‘First of all (Prȏton men), if you take the virtue of a man (ei boulei andros aretȇn), it is easily stated (raidion) that a man’s virtue is this (hoti hautȇ estin andros aretȇ) – that he be competent to manage the affairs of his city (hikanon einai ta tȇs poleȏs prattein), and to manage them so (kai prattonta) as to benefit his friends (tous men philous eu poiein) and harm his enemies (tous d’ echthrous kakȏs), and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself (kai auton eulabeisthai mȇden toiouton pathein). Or take a woman’s virtue (ei de boulei gunaikos aretȇn) … And the child has another virtue (kai allȇ estin paidos aretȇ) … and there is another for elderly men (kai presbuterou andros), one, if you like, for free men (ei men boulei, eleutherou), and yet another for slaves (ei de boulei doulou) … for it is according to each activity (kath’ hekastȇn gar tȏn praxeȏn) and age (kai tȏn hȇlikiȏn) that every one of us, in whatever we do, has his virtue (pros hekaston ergon hekastȏi hȇmȏn hȇ aretȇ estin); and the same (hȏsautȏs), I take it (de oimai), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), will hold also of vice (kai hȇ kakia).’ (71e172a5, translation W.R.M. Lamb.)

But Socrates does not want to know in what way virtues differ, but what they have in common (hȏi ouden diapherousin, alla t’auton eisin hapasai, 72c2-3): ‘However many and different they may be (k’an ei pollai kai pantodapai eisin), they all have a certain form (hen ge ti eidos t’auton hapasai echousin) thanks to which they are virtues (di’ ho eisin aretai), and on this the answerer would do well to have his eyes fixed (eis ho kalȏs pou echei apoblepsanta ton apokrinomenon), in order to explain to the questioner (tȏi erȏtȇsanti ekeino dȇlȏsai) what is virtue (ho tunchanei ousa aretȇ).’ (72c5-d1)

Meno admits that he does not fully understand what Socrates’ question is all about (72d1-2), and when thinks he understands, he fails to answer the question acceptably.

Socrates: ‘Seeing that (Epeidȇ toinun) it is the same virtue in all cases (hȇ autȇ aretȇ pantȏn esti), try and tell me (peirȏ eipein), if you can recollect (kai anamnȇsthȇnai), what Gorgias -and you in agreement with him – say it is (ti auto phȇsi Gorgias einai kai su met’ ekeinou).’ – Meno: ‘Simply that it is the power of governing mankind (Ti allo g’ ȇ archein hoion te einai tȏn anthrȏpȏn;) – if you want some single description (eiper hen ge ti zȇteis) to cover all cases (kata pantȏn).’ – Socrates: ‘That is just what I am after (Alla mȇn zȇtȏ ge). But is the virtue the same in a child (all’ara kai paidos hȇ autȇ aretȇ), and in a slave (kai doulou) – an ability to govern each his master (archein hoiȏ te einai tou despotou)? And do you think (kai dokei soi) he who governed would still be a slave (eti an doulos einai ho archȏn;)?’ (73c6-d4, tr. Lamb)

Meno must admit that he is not yet able (ou gar dunamai pȏ) to follow Socrates’ line of search (hȏs su zȇteis), and find a single virtue common to all (mian aretȇn labein kata pantȏn, 74a10-b1). In an effort to help them forward and show Meno what he is after, Socrates gives a definition of a figure (schȇma, 74b5), and of colour (chrȏma, 76a7). After giving, and thoroughly discussing, these examples (74b-76a), Socrates asks Meno once again to define virtue. Meno tries to oblige him: ‘Virtue is (aretȇn einai), in the poet’s words (kathaper ho poiȇtȇs legei, [perhaps Simonides, as Lamb suggests]), “to rejoice in things honourable (chairein te kaloisi) and to be able for them (kai dunasthai)”; and that, I say, is virtue (kai egȏ touto legȏ aretȇn) – to desire what is honourable (epithumounta tȏn kalȏn) and be able to procure it (dunaton einai porizesthai, 76b2-5, tr. Lamb).’

Lamb’s (and Jowett’s) ‘honourable’ for Meno’s kala does not quite work; for kala, ‘beautiful [things]’, has an aspect of ‘subjectivity’ – i.e. ‘this or that is kalon for me, whatever anybody may think about it’ – which the term ‘honourable’ does not allow. Having pointed this out, I shall use Lamb’s translation in the discussion that follows; within its framework Meno becomes persuaded by Socrates on a point of some importance.

Socrates: ‘Do you say (Ara legeis) that he who desires the honourable (ton tȏn kalȏn epithumounta) is desirous of the good (agathȏn epithumȇtȇn einai;)?’ – Meno: ‘Certainly (Malista ge).’ – S.: ‘Implying that there are some (Ara hȏs ontȏn tinȏn) who desire the evil (hoi tȏn kakȏn epithumousin), and others the good (heterȏn de hoi tȏn agathȏn;)? Do not all men (ou pantes), in your opinion, my dear sir, desire the good (ȏ’riste, dokousi soi tȏn agathȏn epithumein;)?’ – M.: ‘I think not (Ouk emoige).’ – S.: ‘There are some who desire the evil (Alla tines tȏn kakȏn;)?’ – M.: ‘Yes (Nai).’ – S.: ‘Thinking the evil to be good (Oiomenoi ta kaka agatha einai), do you mean (legeis), or actually recognizing it to be evil (ȇ kai gignȏskontes, hoti kaka estin), and desiring it nevertheless (homȏs epithumousi autȏn;)?’ – M.: ‘Both (Amphotera), I believe (emoige dokei).’ – S.: ‘Do you really believe (Ȇ gar dokei tis soi), Meno (ȏ Menȏn), that a man knows (gignȏskȏn) the evil (ta kaka) to be evil (hoti kaka estin), and still desires it (homȏs epithumein autȏn;)?’ – M.: ‘Certainly (Malista).’ – S.: ‘What do you mean by “desires” (Ti epithumein legeis;)? Desires the possession of it (ȇ genesthai autȏi;)?’ – M.: ‘Yes (Genesthai); what else could it be (ti gar allo;)?’ – S.: ‘And does he think (Poteron hȇgoumenos) the evil benefits him (ta kaka ȏphelein ekeinon) who gets it (hȏi an genȇtai), or does he know (ȇ gignȏskȏn) it harms him (ta kaka hoti blaptei) who has it (hȏi an parȇi;)?’ – M.: ’There are some (Eisi men) who think (hoi hȇgoumenoi) the evil is a benefit (ta kaka ȏphelein), and others (eisi de kai) who know (hoi gignȏskontes) that it does harm (hoti blaptei).’ – S.: ‘And, in your opinion (Ȇ kai dokousi soi), do those know the evil (gignȏskein ta kaka), that it is evil (hoti kaka esti), who think (hoi hȇgoumenoi) that evil is a benefit (ta kaka ȏphelein;)?’ – M.: ‘I do not think that at all (Ou panu moi dokei touto ge).’ – S.: ‘Obviously (Oukoun dȇlon) those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they supposed to be good (hoti houtoi men ou tȏn kakȏn epithumousin, hoi agnoountes auta, alla ekeinȏn, ha ȏionto agatha einai), though it is really evil (esti de tauta ge kaka); so that those who are ignorant of it (hȏste hoi agnoountes auta) and think it good (kai oiomenoi agatha einai) are really desiring the good (dȇlon hoti tȏn agathȏn epithumousin, ȇ ou;).’ – M.: ‘It would seem to be so in their case (Kinduneuousin houtoi ge).’ – S.: ‘Well now (Ti de;), I presume those who, as you say, desire the evil (kakȏn men epithumountes, hȏs phȇis su), and consider that the evil harms him (hȇgoumenoi de ta kaka blaptein ekeinon) who gets it (hȏi an gignȇtai), know (gignȏskousi dȇpou) that they will be harmed by it (hoti blabȇsontai hup’ autȏn;)?’ – M.: ‘They needs must (Anankȇ).’ – S.: ‘But do they not hold that those who are harmed (Alla tous blaptomenous houtoi ouk oiontai) are miserable (athlious einai) in proportion to the harm they suffer (kath’ hoson blaptontai;)?’ – M.: ‘That too must be (Kai touto anankȇ).’ – S.: ‘And are not the miserable ill-starred (Tous de athlious ou kakodaimonas; Jowett gives ‘ill-fated’ for kakodaimonas.)?’ – M.: ‘I think so (Oimai egȏge).’ – S.: ‘Then is there anyone who wishes (Estin oun hostis bouletai) to be miserable and ill-starred (athlios kai kakodaimȏn einai;)?’ – M.: ‘I do not suppose there is (Ou moi dokei), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates).’ – S.: ‘No one, then, Meno, desires evil (Ouk ara bouletai, ȏ Menȏn, ta kaka oudeis), if no one desires to be such a one (eiper mȇ bouletai toioutos einai): for what is being miserable (ti gar allo estin athlion einai) but desiring evil (ȇ epithumein tȏn kakȏn) and obtaining it (kai ktasthai;)?’ – M.: ‘It seems that what you say is true (Kinduneueis alȇthȇ legein), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), and that nobody desires evil (kai oudeis boulesthai ta kaka).’ (77b6-78b2, tr. Lamb, with minor changes.)

This was the important point of which Socrates wanted to persuade Men. But notice that although Meno did get persuaded, he did so reluctantly.

Socrates goes on: ‘Well now (Oukoun), you were saying a moment ago (nun dȇ eleges) that virtue is (hoti estin hȇ aretȇ) the desire and ability for good (boulesthai te t’agatha kai dunasthai;)?’ – M.: ‘Yes, I was (Eipon gar).’ – S.: ‘One part of the statement – the desire – belongs to our common nature (Oukoun tou lechthentos to men boulesthai pasin huparchei), and in this respect (kai tautȇi ge) one man is no better than another (ouden ho heteros tou heterou beltiȏn;)?’ – M.: ‘Apparently (Phainetai).’ – S.: ‘But it is plain that (Alla dȇlon hoti) if indeed one man is better than another (eiper estin beltiȏn allos allou), he must be superior in the ability (kata to dunasthai an eiȇ ameinȏn).’ – M.: ‘Certainly (Panu ge).’ – S.: ‘Then virtue, it seems by your account, is (Tout’ estin arta, hȏs eoike, kata ton son logon aretȇ) ability to procure goods (dunamis tou porizesthai t’agatha).’ – M.: ‘I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter (Pantapasi moi dokei, ȏ Sȏkrates, houtȏs echein, hȏs su nun hupolambaneis).’ (78b3-c2, tr. Lamb)

It seems that we have here an instance of Meno’s having been persuaded concerning a matter of some importance. Meno’s definition of virtue implied that there are some people who desire the bad thinks (tȏn kakȏn), and others the good things (tȏn agathȏn;) When Socrates asked him whether he thinks that there are people who want to have bad things, knowing that bad things are bad, he maintains that this is the case. But in the end Socrates appears to have persuaded him that everybody desires good things and nobody desires bad things.

Can this be the persuasion of which Socrates wants Meno to persuade Anytus? At this stage, we have no reason to believe that Anytus held Meno’s view that some people desire evil things, so let us suspend our judgement until after Anytus enters the stage. But we can note that Meno’s agreement with Socrates’ view that nobody desires evil is hesitant: ‘It seems that what you say is true (Kinduneueis alȇthȇ legein, 78a8)’. Compare it with his wholehearted ‘agreement’ with Socrates when he, mistakenly, believes that Socrates has accepted the second half of his definition of virtue – ‘virtue is ability to procure goods’ (dunamis tou porizesthai t’agatha) – as the definition of virtue he was after: ‘I entirely agree  (Pantapasi moi dokei, 78c1-2), Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter’.

I prefaced Socrates’ discussion of Meno’s definition of virtue by pointing out that Lamb’s ‘honourable’ for Meno’s kala is not quite right. But since Socrates immediately turned Meno’s kala into t’agatha – ‘Do you say (Ara legeis) that he who desires the honourable (ton tȏn kalȏn epithumounta) is desirous of the good (agathȏn epithumȇtȇn einai;)?’ – Lamb’s ‘honourable’ for Meno’s kala did not affect the discussion that followed. But what did seriously affect it was Lamb’s rendering of Socrates’ and Meno’s t’agatha as ‘the good’, which becomes apparent when Socrates begins to discuss Meno’s improved definition of virtue.

Socrates: ‘You say virtue is the ability to procure goods (t’agatha phȇis hoion t’einai porizesthai aretȇn einai;)?’ – Meno: ‘I do (Egȏge).’ – S.: ‘And do you not mean by goods (Agatha de kaleis ouchi) such things as (hoion) health (hugieian) and (te kai) wealth (plouton;)?’ – M.: ‘Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver (Kai chrusion legȏ kai argurion ktasthai), and of state honours (kai timas en polei) and offices (kai archas).’ – S.: ‘Are there any things besides this sort, that you class as goods (Mȇ all’ atta legeis t’agatha ȇ ta toiauta;)?’ M.: ‘No (Ouk), I refer only to everything of that sort (alla panta legȏ ta toiauta).’ (78c4-d1)

In view of Meno’s clarification of what he means by t’agatha, ‘the goods’, we may presume that at this stage he had no notion of ‘the good’. We may further presume that he was initiated to this notion, if he stayed to be ‘initiated’, as I believe he did, for Meno expressed his readiness to do so earlier (see 76e6-77a2).

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I discussed the question of Meno’s initiation in my ‘Digression 4’ published on 21. April, from which I give here the relevant passage:

Socrates: ‘But yet, son of Alexidemus, I am inclined to think the other [Socrates’ definition of figure] was the better of the two (All’ ouk estin, ȏ pai Alexidȇmou, hȏs egȏ emauton peithȏ, all’ ekeinȇ beltiȏn); and I believe you also would prefer it (oimai de oud’ an soi doxai), if you were not compelled, as you were saying yesterday, to go away (ei mȇ, hȏsper chthes eleges, anankaion soi apienai) before the mysteries (pro tȏn mustȇriȏn), and could stay awhile (all’ ei perimeinai) and be initiated (kai muȇtheiȇs).’ – Meno: ‘But I should stay (Alla perimeinoim’ an), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), if you would give me many such answers (ei moi polla toiauta legois).’ – Socrates: ‘Well then, I will spare no endeavour (Alla mȇn prothumias ge ouden apoleipsȏ), both for your sake (kai sou heneka) and for my own (kai emautou).’ (76b4-77a4)

 

In these few lines we learn that Socrates and Meno had a discussion a day before, or at least, that Socrates was present when Meno said that he must leave before the mysteries. We learn that Meno was ready to stay and get initiated, if Socrates would tell him ‘many such things (polla toiauta)’ as was the definition of colour ‘in the manner of Gorgias’. And Socrates was ready to make his best, both for Meno’s sake and for his own. And Meno was ready to stay, although Socrates told him that if he stayed and were initiated, he would learn that the definition of figure was better than that of colour that pleased him so much.

But what was the initiation all about? František Novotný remarks in his Czech translation of the dialogue: ‘Double meaning; 1/ in its normal meaning concerning time – meaning probably the great Eleusinian Mysteries, which were celebrated in Athens in the month boedromion (September-October), 2/ in its deeper meaning, which Socrates gives to these words, philosophic mysteries, into which one needs to be initiated.’ This much is unquestionably true, but what were the ‘philosophic mysteries’ to which he Meno was initiated? In the Phaedrus, after proving the immortality of the soul, Plato turns his readers’ eyes to ‘the region above the heavens  (ton huperouranion topon)’, which is ‘occupied by being which really is, which is without colour or shape, intangible, observable by the steersman of the soul alone, by intellect, and to which the class of true knowledge relates (hȇ gar achrȏmatos te kai aschȇmatistos kai anaphȇs ousia ontȏs ousa, psuchȇs kubernȇtȇi monȏi theatȇ nȏi, peri hȇn to tȇs alȇthous epistȇmȇs genos, touton echei ton topon)’ (247c3- d1, tr. C.J. Rowe)

The only immediate indication that Meno is to be initiated to ‘being which really is’ is Socrates’ remark that if Meno stayed he would find Socrates’ definition of figure preferable to the one concerning colour. What can Socrates mean by that? Colour is a primary sensory datum, it is there to be seen, not to be defined; the definition of colour ‘in the manner of Gorgias’ is full of problematic hypothetical ‘scientific’ notions, with which colour only appears to be defined. When Socrates asked what the form of virtue is, he used the term eidos (72c7-d1), which involves mental seeing; any definition of it can only point towards it; in its truth it can only be seen by the soul’s eye. The most important indication that Meno is to be initiated to the forms is the Meno in its entirety; for the initiation transcends the dialogue, it surpasses everything that he is told within its framework. Plato is turning his readers’ eyes through the Meno back to the Phaedrus.

 

 ***

Socrates: ‘Very well (Eien): procuring gold and silver (chrusion de dȇ kai argurion porizesthai) is virtue (aretȇ estin), according to Meno (hȏs phȇsi Menȏn), the ancestral friend of the Great King (ho tou megalou basileȏs patrikos xenos, 78d1-3).’

***

The biting irony, with which Socrates begins to question Meno’s definition of virtue is palpable. It has particular force when we realise that the discussion takes place, dramatically, two years after the abject defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, which took place in 404 B.C., and which could not have taken place without the financial support that the Great King accorded to Sparta and its allies in the decisive years of the War.

The dramatic dating of the dialogue is unquestionable. It took place when Anytus was elected into the highest offices (90b2-3); the Athenian democracy was restored in 403 B.C. Meno was visiting Anytus prior to his joining the expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes, which took place in 401 B.C. Plato appears to have had no inkling of Meno’s joining Cyrus’ expedition when he composed and published the dialogue. Consider the irony with which Socrates refers to Meno as the ancestral friend of the Great King. How could Plato have given those words into Socrates’ mouth after he learnt that Meno betrayed his fellow commanders, thus causing their death in the hands of the Persians, and was in the end himself tortured to death by the Persians? (For my dating of the Meno see ‘Digression 4, Plato’s Meno and Xenophon’ Meno’ published on April 21, 2020.)

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Socrates continued: ‘Tell me, do you add to such procuring (poteron prostitheis toutȏi tȏi porȏi), Meno (ȏ Menȏn), that it is to be done justly (to dikaiȏs) and piously (kai hosiȏs), or is this indifferent to you (ȇ ouden soi diapherei), but even though a man procures these things unjustly (alla k’an adikȏs tis auta porizȇtai), do you call them virtue all the same (homoiȏs su auta aretȇn kaleis;)?’ – Meno: ‘Surely not (Ou dȇpou), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates).’ – S.: ‘Rather, vice (Alla kakian).’ – M.: ‘Yes, of course (Pantȏs dȇpou).’ – S.: ‘Then it seems that justice or temperance or holiness or some other part of virtue must accompany the procuring of these things (Dei ara, hȏs eoike, toutȏi tȏi porȏi dikaiosunȇn ȇ sȏphrosunȇn ȇ hosiotȇta proseinai, ȇ allo ti morion aretȇs); otherwise (ei de mȇ) it will not be virtue (ouk estai aretȇ), though it provides one with goods (kaitoi ekporizousa t’agatha).’ – M.: ‘Yes, for how, without these, could it be virtue (Pȏs gar aneu toutȏn aretȇ genoit’ an;)?’ … S.: ‘And here you are (Eita), Meno (ȏ Menȏn), making fun of me (paizeis pros me;)?’ – M.: ‘How so (Ti dȇ), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates;)?’ – S.: ‘Because after my begging you (Hoti arti emou deȇthentos sou) not to break virtue into small change (mȇ katagnunai mȇte kermatizein tȇn aretȇn), and giving you a pattern (kai dontos paradeigmata) on which you should answer (kath’ ha deoi apokrinesthai), you have ignored all that (toutou men ȇmelȇsas), and now you tell me (legeis de moi) that virtue is (hoti aretȇ estin) the ability to procure good things (hoion t’einai t’agatha porizesthai) with justice (meta dikaiosunȇs); and this, you tell me, is part of justice (touto de phȇis morion artetȇs einai;) … Then answer me (Apokrinai toinun) again (palin) from the beginning (ex archȇs): what do both you and your associate [Gorgias] say that virtue is (ti phȇis aretȇn einai kai su kai ho hetairos sou;)?’ (78d3-79e6)

Meno is not amused: ‘Socrates (Ō Sȏkrates), I used to be told (ȇkouon men egȏge), before I began to meet you (prin kai sungenesthai soi), that yours was just a case of being in doubt yourself (hoti su ouden allo ȇ autos te aporeis) and making others to doubt also (kai tous allous poieis aporein); and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and incantations (kai nun, hȏs ge moi dokeis, goȇteueis me kai pharmatteis kai atechnȏs katepaideis), which have reduced me to utter perplexity (hȏste meston aporias gegonenai, 79e7-80a4).’

Here we have a case of Meno’s self-persuasion, occasioned by the totality of the preceding discussion.

Meno continued: ‘And if I am indeed to have my jest, I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish (kai dokeis moi pantelȏs, ei dei ti kai skȏpsai, homoiotatos einai to te eidos kai t’alla tautȇi tȇi plataiai narkȇi tȇi thalattiai); for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it (kai gar hautȇ ton aei plȇsiazonta kai haptomenon narkan poiei), and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me now (kai su dokeis moi nun eme toiouton ti pepoiȇkenai). For in truth (alȇthȏs gar) I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed (egȏge kai tȇn psuchȇn kai to stoma narkȏ), and I am at a loss what answer to give you (kai ouk echȏ hoti apokrinȏmai soi). And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue (kaitoi muriakis ge peri aretȇs pampollous logous eirȇka) to various people (kai pros pollous) – and very good speeches they were (kai panu eu), so I thought (hȏs ge emautȏi edokoun) – but now (nun de) I cannot say one word as to what it is (oud’ hoti estin to parapan echȏ eipein). You are well advised, I consider (kai moi dokeis eu bouleuesthai), in not voyaging (ouk ekpleȏn enthende) or taking a trip away from home (oud’ apodȇmȏn); for if you went on like this as a stranger in any other city (ei gar xenos en allȇi polei toiauta poiois) you would be cast in prison as a magician (tach’ an hȏs goȇs apachtheiȇs).’ (79e7-80b7, tr. Lamb, with a minor change. The translation of the last phrase - tach’ an hȏs goȇs apachtheiȇs – I have taken from Jowett. Bluck notes with a reference to Demosthenes: ‘Apagein is the regular term for summary arrest.’)

Socrates replied: ‘If the torpedo (ei men hȇ narkȇ) is torpid itself (autȇ narkȏsa) while causing others to be torpid (houtȏ kai tous allous poiei narkan), I am like it (eoika autȇi), but not otherwise (ei de mȇ, ou). For it is not from any sureness in myself (ou gar euporȏn autos) that I cause others to doubt (tous allous poiȏ aporein): it is from being in more doubt than anyone else (pantos mallon egȏ aporȏn) that I cause doubt in others (kai tous allous poiȏ aporein). So now, for my part, I do not know what virtue is (kai nun peri aretȇs ho estin egȏ men ouk oida), whilst you (su mentoi), though perhaps you may have known before you came in touch with me (isȏs proteron men ȇidȇstha prin emou hapsasthai), are now as good as ignorant of it also (nun mentoi homoios ei ouk eidoti). But none the less I am willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its nature (homȏs de ethelȏ meta sou skepsasthai kai suzȇtȇsai ho ti pote estin).’ (80c6-d4)

Meno ripostes sarcastically: ‘And how will you enquire (Kai tina tropon zȇtȇseis), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), into that which you do not know (touto ho mȇ oistha to parapan ho ti estin;)? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry (poion gar hȏn ouk oistha prothemenos zȇtȇseis;) And if, at the best, you hit upon it (ȇ ei kai hoti malista entuchois autȏi), how will you ever know (pȏs eisȇi) that this is the thing (hoti touto estin) which you did not know (ho su ouk ȇidȇstha;)?’ (80c9-d8; In translating Meno’s words I drew on Lamb’s and Jowett’s translations.)

With this response to Socrates’ self-awareness of ignorance  ends Plato’s description of Meno prior to the transformation which he is about to undergo.