3 C. J. Rowe’s arguments for a late dating of the Phaedrus – the Phaedrus and Laws X

In point 4 Rowe says: ‘4. Other clear connections with Laws 10, as has long been noticed, are to be found in the arguments for immortality (245c-246a).’

The connections are undeniable, but do they offer us any reasons for the late dating of the Phaedrus? Let me begin with the arguments for immortality in Phaedrus 245c-246a.

Having defined Love (Erȏs) as madness (mania, 244a), Socrates is going to prove ‘that this sort of madness is a gift of the gods, fraught with the highest bliss (hȏs ep’ eutuchiai tȇi megistȇi para theȏn hȇ toiautȇ mania didotai). The proof (hȇ apodeixis) … must begin (dei oun prȏton) with comprehending the truth about the nature of the soul, both divine and human, by observing its experiences and actions (psuchȇs phuseȏs peri theias te kai anthrȏpinȇs idonta pathȇ te kai erga t’alȇthes noȇsai). The beginning of the proof is this (archȇ de apodeixeȏs hȇde):

‘All soul is immortal (Psuchȇ pasa athanatos). For that which is always in movement is immortal (to gar aeikinȇton athanaton); that which moves something else (to d’ allo kinoun) and is moved by something else (kai hup’ allou kinoumenon), in ceasing from movement (paulan echon kinȇseȏs), ceases from living (paulan echei zȏȇs). Only that which moves itself (monon dȇ to hauto kinoun), because it does not abandon itself (hate ouk apoleipon heauto), never stops moving (oupote lȇgei kinoumenon). It is also source and first principle of movement for the other things which move (alla kai tois allois hosa kineitai touto pȇgȇ kai archȇ kinȇseȏs). A first principle is something which does not come into being (Archȇ de agenȇton). For all that comes into being must come into being from a first principle (ex archȇs gar anankȇ pan to gignomenon gignesthai), but a first principle itself cannot come into being from anything at all (autȇn de mȇd’ ex henos); for if a first principle came into being from anything (ei gar ek tou archȇ gignoito), it would not do so from a first principle (ouk an ex archȇs gignoito). Since it does not come into being (epeidȇ de agenȇton estin), it must also be something which does not perish (kai adiaphthoron auto anankȇ einai). For if a first principle is destroyed (archȇs gar dȇ apolomenȇs), neither will it ever come into being from anything nor anything else from it (oute autȇ pote ek tou oute allo ex ekeinȇs genȇsetai), given that all things must come into being from a first principle (eiper ex archȇs dei ta panta gignesthai). It is in this way, then (houtȏ dȇ), that that which moves itself is first principle of movement (kinȇseȏs men archȇ to auto hauto kinoun). It is not possible for this either to be destroyed or to come into being (touto de out’ apollusthai oute gignesthai dunaton), or else the whole universe (ȇ panta te ouranon) and the whole of that which comes to be (pasan te genesin) might collapse together (sumpesousan) and come to a halt (stȇnai), and never again have (kai mȇpote authis echein) a source from which things will come to be moved (hothen kinȇthenta genȇsetai). And since that which is moved by itself has been shown to be immortal (athanatou de pephasmenou tou huph’ heautou kinoumenou), it will incur no shame to say that this is the essence and the definition of soul (psuchȇs ousian te kai logon touton auton tis legȏn ouk aischuneitai). For all body (pan gar sȏma) which has its source of motion outside itself (hȏi men exȏthen to kineisthai) is soulless (apsuchon), whereas that which has it within itself and from itself (hȏi de endothen autȏi ex hautou) is ensoled (empsuchon), this being the nature of soul (hȏs tautȇs ousȇs phuseȏs psuchȇs); and if this is so (ei d’ estin touto houtȏs echon) – that that which moves itself is nothing other than soul (mȇ allo ti einai to auto heauto kinoun ȇ psuchȇn), soul will be necessarily something which never comes into being nor dies (ex anankȇs agenȇton te kai athanaton psuchȇ an eiȇ).’ (245b7-246a2, translation C.J. Rowe)

In Laws X the Athenian stranger undertakes to prove the existence of gods (hȏs eisin theoi, 891b4). He begins by pointing out that the impious talks have their root in the doctrine according to which ‘fire and water, earth and air are the first of all things (pur kai hudȏr kai gȇn kai aera prȏta hȇgeisthai tȏn pantȏn einai), and these very things they call nature (kai tȇn phusin onomazein tauta auta), and that the soul came out of them later (psuchȇn de ek toutȏn husteron, 891c2-4) … It’s the soul (psuchȇn), my good friend (ȏ hetaire)’ – he says to Cleinias, the Cretan – ‘that nearly everybody seems to have misunderstood (ȇgnoȇkenai kinduneuousi men oligou sumpantes), not realizing its nature (hoion te on tunchanei) and power (kai dunamin hȇn echei). Quite apart from the other points about it (tȏn te allȏn autȇs peri), people are particularly ignorant about its birth (kai dȇ kai geneseȏs). It is one of the first creations (hȏs en prȏtois esti), born before all bodies (sȏmatȏn emprosthen pantȏn genomenȇ), and is the chief cause of all their alterations and transformations (kai metabolȇs te autȏn kai metakosmȇseȏs hapasȇs archei pantos mallon). (892a2-7, translation Saunders, with some changes; since I am giving the Greek original, it compels me and enables me to be closer to the original.)

The Athenian is going to define the soul as ‘motion capable of moving itself’ (tȇn dunamenȇn autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin, 896a1-2). In the Phaedrus Plato defined the soul as ‘that which moves itself‘ (to auto heauto kinoun, 245e7-8). The connection between the two is obvious. This fundamental similarity forms the basis for referring to Laws X in dating the Phaedrus late, by Rowe and others.

But note a fundamental difference between the two. In the Phaedrus Plato emphasises again and again that the soul ‘does not come into being’: it is agenȇton (245d1, d3, 246a1), it is not possible for it to come into being (touto de oute gignesthai dunaton, 245d7-8). But in Laws X he speaks about its birth (autȇs peri geneseȏs 892a4): it was born before all bodies (sȏmatȏn emprosthen pantȏn genomenȇ 892a5).

Presumably, the creation of the soul in the Timaeus provided the basis for Plato’s revision of the Phaedran conception of the soul in Laws X.

Let me go through the relevant passages in Laws X. ‘All things related to the soul will necessarily have been created before things related to the body (ex anankȇs ta psuchȇs sungenȇ protera an eiȇ gegonota tȏn sȏmati prosȇkontȏn), since soul itself is older than body (ousȇs autȇs presbuteras tou sȏmatos, 892a8-b1).’ He says that those who deny the existence of the gods, ‘when they use the word “nature”, they mean the process by which the first things came into being (phusin boulontai legein genesin tȇn peri ta prȏta). But if it can be shown that the soul came first (ei de phanȇsetai psuchȇ prȏton), not fire (ou pur) or air (oude aȇr), and that it was one of the first things to be created (psuchȇ d’ en prȏtois gegenȇmenȇ), it will be quite correct to say that soul is pre-eminently by nature (schedon orthotat’ legoit’ an einai diapherontȏs phusei). This is true (taut’ esth’ houtȏs echonta), provided you can demonstrate that soul is older than body (an psuchȇn tis epideixȇi presbuteran einai sȏmatos), but not otherwise (allȏs de oudamȏs).’ (892c2-7)

It can be shown that ‘the motion (kinȇsis) that moves both itself and other things (tȇn te hautȇn te kinousan kai heteron, 894c4-5) is the first by birth (prȏton genesei te estin) as well as in power (kai rȏmȇi kata logon, 894d10)’. And it can be shown that it is archȇ, the first principle of motion: ‘When that which moves itself by itself effects an alteration in something (hotan ara auto hauto kinȇsan heteron alloiȏsȇi), and that in turn in something else (to d’ heteron allo), so that motion is transmitted to thousands upon thousands of things (kai houtȏ chilia dȇ epi muriois gignetai ta kinȇthenta), will there be any other initial principle of the entire sequence of their movements (mȏn archȇ tis autȏn estai tȇs kinȇseȏs hapasȇs allȇ) than the change that moves itself by itself (plȇn hȇ tȇs autȇs hautȇn kinȇsasȇs metabolȇ;)?’ (894e4-895a3).

‘Now let’s put the point in a different way (Eti dȇ kai tȇide eipȏmen). Suppose the whole universe were somehow to coalesce and come to a standstill (ei staiȇ pȏs panta homou genomena), which of the motions we have enumerated would inevitably be the first to arise in it (tin’ ara en autois anankȇ prȏtȇn genesthai tȏn eirȇmenȏn;)? The one that moves itself by itself, surely (tȇn autȇn heautȇn dȇpou kinȇsan), because no antecedent impulse can ever be transmitted from something else (hup’ allou gar ou mȇpote emprosthen metapesȇi) in a situation where no antecedent impulse exists (mȇdemias ge en autois ousȇs emprosthen metaptȏseȏs). The first principle of all motions (archȇn ara kinȇseȏn pasȏn), which is the first born among things that stand still (kai prȏtȇn en te hestȏsi genomenȇn), and is the first among things that move (kai en hestȏsi ousan), is the motion that moves itself by itself (tȇn hautȇn kinousan); we shall say (phȇsomen) that it is necessarily (anankaiȏs einai) the oldest (presbutatȇn) and most potent of all changes (kai kratistȇn metabolȇn pasȏn).’ (895a5-b6; E.B. England notes on the last sentence: ‘prȏtȇn with genomenȇn has a different meaning from that which it has with ousan; it is the first to come into being, and when in being (ousan) it ranks highest. These two expressions correspond to the following presbutatȇn and kratistȇn respectively’.)

In Laws X Plato views 'the motion that moves itself by itself’ (tȇn hautȇn kinousan kinȇsin) as archȇ, the first principle of motion and change, just as he viewed motion ‘that moves itself’ (to hauto kinoun) as archȇ in the Phaedrus. But the notion of archȇ is profoundly different. In the Phaedrus the archȇ is agenȇton, it ’does not come into being’, whereas in Laws X it is the first principle (archȇn) that came into being (genomenȇn). To this difference corresponds the different outcome of the thought experiments in which all that moves came to a standstill. In the Phaedrus if ‘the whole universe (panta te ouranon) and the whole of that which comes to be (pasan te genesin) collapsed together (sumpesousan) and come to a halt (stȇnai), it would never again have (kai mȇpote authis echein) a source from which things will come to be moved (hothen kinȇthenta genȇsetai)’; in Laws X, if all came to standstill, it would be the motion that moves itself, which of necessity would be the first to come into being.

The Athenian then asks: ‘If we ever saw this (Ean idȏmen pou tautȇn)’ – i.e. the motion moving itself – ‘arise in something made of earth (genomenȇn en tȏi gȇinȏi) or water (ȇ enudrȏi) or fire (ȇ puroeidei), alone (kechȏrismenȏi) or in combination (ȇ kai summigei), what state we would say it to be in (ti pote phȇsomen en tȏi toioutȏi pathos einai;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘Don’t you really ask me (Mȏn ara me erȏtais), whether we shall say it to be alive (ei zȇn auto proseroumen) when it moves itself by itself (hotan auto hauto kinȇi;)?’ – Ath. ‘Yes (Nai). – Cl. ‘To be alive (Zȇn), of course (pȏs gar ou).’ (895c4-10)

The Athenian then gives Cleinias an elementary lecture in philosophy: ‘Now, hold on a minute (Eche dȇ), for heaven’s sake (pros Dios). Aren’t you prepared to recognize three elements concerning each thing (ar’ ouk an ethelois peri hekaston tria noein;)?’ Cl.: ‘What do you mean (Pȏs legeis;)?’ – Ath.: ‘The first point is what the object actually is (Hen men tȇn ousian), the second is its definition (hen de tȇs ousias ton logon), and the third is its name (hen de onoma). And, in addition, there are two questions to be asked about every existing thing (kai dȇ kai erȏtȇseis einai peri to on hapan duo).’ – Cl. ‘Two (Pȏs duo;)?’ – Ath.: ‘Sometimes we put forward the mere name (Tote men hȇmȏn hekaston t’ounoma proteinomenon auto) and want to know the definition (ton logon apaitein), and sometimes we put forward the definition (tote de ton logon auton proteinomenon) and ask for the name (erȏtan d’ au t’ounoma) … a number has the name “even” (tȏi kath’ arithmon onoma men artion) and its definition is (logos de) “a number divisible into two equal parts (arithmos diairoumenos eis isa duo merȇ)” … when we call it “even” and define it as “a number divisible in two, it’s the same thing we’re talking about (artion onomati, kai logȏi dicha diairoumenon arithmon, prosagoreuontes t’auton on).’ (895d1-e8)

After this preparation, the Athenian asks: ‘So what’s the definition of the thing we call soul (Hȏi dȇ psuchȇ t’ounoma, tis toutou logos;)? Do we have any other than the one we said a moment ago [at 895c4-10] (echomen allon plȇn ton nundȇ rȇthenta): “the motion capable of moving itself by itself” (tȇn dunamenȇn autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin;)? – Cl.: ‘Do you mean that the motion that moves itself is the definition of the same entity (To heauto kinein phȇis logon echein tȇn autȇn ousian), which we all call by the name soul (hȇnper t’ounoma ho dȇ pantes psuchȇn prosagoreuomen)?’ – Ath.: ‘I do (Phȇmi ge). And if this is true (ei d’ esti touto houtȏs echon), are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t we got ourselves a satisfactory proof (ara eti pothoumen mȇ hikanȏs dedeichthai) that soul is identical (psuchȇn t’auton on) with the first generation (kai tȇn prȏtȇn genesin) and motion (kai kinȇsin) of all past, present and future things (tȏn te ontȏn kai gegonotȏn kai esomenȏn) and their contraries (kai pantȏn au tȏn enantiȏn toutois;)? When it has been shown (epeidȇ ge anephanȇ) to be the cause of all change and motion in everything (metabolȇs te kai kinȇseȏs hapasȇs aitia hapasin;)?’ – Cl.: ’Dissatisfied? No! (Ouk), On the contrary (alla), it has been proved most sufficiently (hikanȏtata dedeichthai) that soul is the oldest of all things (psuchȇ tȏn pantȏn presbutatȇ), the first principle of motion that was generated (genomenȇ ge archȇ kinȇseȏs) … Ath.: ‘So it was equally correct, final and complete statement of the truth (Orthȏs ara kai kuriȏs alȇthestata te kai teleȏtata eirȇkotes an eimen), when we said that soul was generated prior to body (psuchȇn men proteran gegonenai sȏmatos hȇmin), and that body came second (sȏma de deuteron te) and later (kai husteron), soul being the master (psuchȇs archousȇs), and body its natural subject (archomenon kata phusin).’ (895e10-896c3)

Let me compare to this ‘final and complete statement of the truth’ in Laws X the concluding statement of the proof of immortality of soul in the Phaedrus: ‘All body (pan gar sȏma) which has its source of motion outside itself (hȏi men exȏthen to kineisthai) is soulless (apsuchon), whereas that which has it within itself and from itself (hȏi de endothen autȏi ex hautou) is ensoled (empsuchon), this being the nature of soul (hȏs tautȇs ousȇs phuseȏs psuchȇs); and if this is so (ei d’ estin touto houtȏs echon) – that that which moves itself is nothing other than soul (mȇ allo ti einai to auto heauto kinoun ȇ psuchȇn), soul will be necessarily something which never comes into being nor dies (ex anankȇs agenȇton te kai athanaton psuchȇ an eiȇ).’

The similarity is undeniable, but so is the difference. In Laws X the soul was generated (genomenȇ), it was brought into being prior to the body, the body came second, in the Phaedrus the soul has never come into being, it was ‘of necessity (ex anankȇs) agenȇton’.

2 C. J. Rowe’s arguments for a late dating of the Phaedrus – with a digression: Plato on writing – Laws X, the Phaedrus, and the Timaeus

In my first post I discussed the first part of point 3 of Rowe’s arguments, that is his claim that ‘the Phaedrus rejects the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body (246c-d)’, and that ‘such a conception of them is present in the Timaeus (38e, 41a-b)’. In this post I shall discuss the second part of it, that is his claim that the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body ‘is absent from Laws X’.

In the opening paragraph of Laws X an Athenian Stranger (Athȇnaios xenos) says: ‘The penalty for offensive remarks about the gods or outrageous actions against their interests should be prefaced by these words of exhortation (hosa de logȏi kai hosa ergȏi peri theous hubrizei tis legȏn ȇ prattȏn, to paramuthion hupothemenȏi rȇteon ha dei paschein. estȏ de tode): “No one who believes in gods as the law directs ever voluntarily commits an unholy act (Theous hȇgoumenos einai kata nomous oudeis pȏpote oute ergon asebes ȇrgasato hekȏn) or lets any lawless word pass his lips (oute logon aphȇken anomon). If he does, it is because of one of three possible misapprehensions (alla hen dȇ ti tȏn triȏn paschȏn): either, as I said (ȇ touto, hoper eipon) , he believes (1) the gods do not exist (ouch hȇgoumenos), or (2) (ȇ to deuteron) that they exist (ontas) but take no thought for the human race (ou phrontizein anthrȏpȏn), or (3) (ȇ triton) that they are influenced by sacrifices and supplications and can easily be won over (euparamuthȇtous einai thusiais te kai euchais paragomenous).” (885b2-9, translations from Laws X are by Trevor J. Saunders)

Cleinias, a Cretan, says to the Athenian: ‘Well sir, don’t you think that the god’s existence is an easy truth to explain (Oukoun ȏ xene, dokei raidion einai alȇtheuontas legein hȏs eisin theoi;)?’ – Athenian: ‘How (Pȏs;)? – Cleinias: ‘Well, just look at the earth and the sun and the stars and the universe in general (Prȏton men gȇ kai hȇlios astra te kai ta sumpanta); look at the wonderful procession of the seasons (kai ta tȏn hȏrȏn diakekosmȇmena kalȏs houtȏs) and its articulation into years and months (eniautois kai mȇsin diakekosmȇmena)! Anyway, you know that all Greeks and all foreigners are unanimous in recognizing the existence of gods (kai hoti pantes Hellȇnes te kai barbaroi nomizousin einai theous).’ (885e7-886a5) – Athenian: ‘When you and I present our proofs for the existence of gods (emou gar kai sou, hotan tekmȇria legȏmen hȏs eisin theoi) and adduce what you adduced (tauta auta propherontes) – sun (hȇlion te), moon (kai selȇnȇn), stars (kai astra) and earth (kai gȇn) – that they are gods and divine beings (hȏs theous kai theia onta), the proselytes of these clever fellows will say (hupo tȏn sophȏn toutȏn anapepeismenoi an legoien) that these things are just earth and stones (hȏs gȇn te kai lithous onta tauta), and are incapable of caring for human affairs (kai ouden tȏn anthrȏpeiȏn pragmatȏn phrontizein dunamena).’ (886d4-e1)

The Athenian stranger asks his two companions, Cleinias, a Cretan, and Megillos, a Spartan, what should he do. Shouldn’t they simply pass the law that the gods exist, ‘so that the mere preface (mȇ kai to prooimion) doesn’t turn out longer than the actual code (hȇmin makroteron gignetai tȏn nomȏn; 887a2-3)? Cleinias replies that there is no reason to prefer a brief explanation to a full one: ‘It’s vital that somehow or other we should make out a plausible case for supposing (diapherei d’ ou smikron hamȏs ge pȏs pithanotȇta tina tous logous hȇmȏn echein) that gods do exist (hȏs theoi t’ eisin), that they are good (kai agathoi), and that they respect justice more than men do (dikȇn timȏntes diapherontȏs anthrȏpȏn). Such a demonstration would constitute just about the best and finest preamble our penal code could have (schedon gar touto hȇmin huper hapantȏn tȏn nomȏn kalliston te kai ariston prooimion an eiȇ, 887b5-c2).’

And so the Athenian explains to his companions the views of the atheists, so that they might comprehend what a task it would be to try to persuade them of their error: ‘They maintain that fire, water, earth and air owe their existence to nature and chance (pur kai hudȏr kai gȇn kai aera phusei panta einai kai tuchȇi phasin), and that it is by means of these entirely inanimate substances that the secondary physical bodies – the earth, sun, moon and stars – have been produced (kai ta meta tauta au sȏmata, gȇs te kai hȇliou kai selȇnȇs astrȏn te peri, dia toutȏn gegonenai pantelȏs ontȏn apsuchȏn, 889b1-5) … the first thing these people say about gods is that they are artificial concepts (theous einai prȏton phasin houtoi technȇi) corresponding to nothing in nature (ou phusei); they are legal fictions (alla tisin nomois), which moreover vary very widely (kai toutous allous allȇi) according to the different conventions people agree on when they produce a legal code (hopȇi hekastoi heautoisi sunȏmologȇsan nomothetoumenoi, 889e3-5).’

So Cleinias makes a passionate plea: ‘Well (Ti de), sir (ȏ xene;), we put up with one long discussion, about inebriation in the cause of culture (peri methȇs kai mousikȇs houtȏ makra legontas hȇmas autous periemeinamen), so surely we can tolerate another, about theology and so forth (peri theȏn de kai tȏn toioutȏn ouch hupomenoumen;). And of course (kai mȇn kai) this helps intelligent legislation tremendously (nomothesiai ge estin pou tȇi meta phronȇseȏs megistȇ boȇtheia), because legal instructions (dio ta peri nomous prostagmata), once written down (en grammasi tethenta), remain fixed and permanent, ready to stand up to scrutiny for ever (hȏs dȏsonta eis panta chronon elenchon, pantȏs ȇremei). So there’s no reason for alarm if at first they make difficult listening (hȏste out’ ei chalepa kat’ archas akouein estin phobȇteon), because your slow learner will be able to go back again and again and examine them (ha g’ estai kai tȏi dusmathei pollakis epanionti skopein). Nor does their length (oute ei makra), provided they’re useful (ȏphelima de), justify any man in committing what seems to me (dia tauta logon oudamȇi echei), at least, an impiety (oude hosion emoige einai phainetai): I mean refusing to facilitate these explanations as best he can (to mȇ ou boȇthein toutois tois logois panta andra kata dunamin).’ – Megillus, the Spartan: ‘Yes, sir, I entirely approve of what Cleinias says (Arista, ȏ xene, dokei moi legein Kleinias).’ (890e4-891a7)

***

Here I must digress, for Cleinias’ words stand in contrast to everything that Plato said in the last section of the Phaedrus about writing. At Phaedrus 275c5-7 Socrates says: ‘anyone who leaves behind a written manual, and likewise anyone who takes it over from him, on the supposition that such writing will provide something reliable and permanent (ho technȇn oiomenos en grammasi katalipein, kai au ho paradechomenos hȏs ti saphes kai bebaion ek grammatȏn esomenon), must be exceedingly simple-minded (pollȇs an euȇtheias gemoi, tr. Hackforrth).’ Cleinias maintains that writing down the legal instructions is of the greatest help (megistȇ boȇtheia). Socrates maintains that the written text ‘is incapable of defending and helping itself’ (out’ amunasthai oute boȇthȇsai dunatos hautȏi, 275e5). Cleinias says that the written legal instructions, ‘once written down (en grammasi tethenta), remain fixed and permanent (pantȏs ȇremei), ready to stand up to scrutiny for ever (hȏs dȏsonta eis panta chronon elenchon). Socrates in the Phaedrus maintains that ‘the written words speak as if they were thinking something (hȏs ti phronountas autous legein), but if you ask them something about anything they say (ean de ti erȇi tȏn legomenȏn), wanting to learn (boulomenos mathein), they always point to just one and the same thing (hen ti sȇmainei monon t’auton aei, 275d7-9)’. Cleinias points out that it is because the written instructions ‘remain completely fixed and permanent’ (pantȏs ȇremei), ‘even a slow learner will be able to go back again and again and examine them (ha g’ estai kai tȏi dusmathei pollakis epanionti skopein)’.

Cleinias’ speech points out what Plato rejected in the Phaedrus as wrong, and thus prepares the reader for what he views as true and permanent in it. For the speech is followed by the Athenian’s proof of the existence of the gods, which depends on the conception of the soul defined as ‘motion capable of moving itself (autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin, 896a1-2), which is central to Plato’s proof of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedrus (245c5-246a2).

***

In this post I’ll skip the Athenian’s lengthy proof of the god’s existence, for I shall devote to it my next post (in which I shall discuss Rowe’s point 4: ‘Other clear connections with Laws 10, as has long been noticed, are to be found in the arguments for immortality (245c-246a)’. In the following I shall present just the final stage of the Athenian’s proof.

Athenian: ‘If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon, and the other heavenly bodies (Hȇlion kai selȇnȇn kai ta alla astra, eiper psuchȇ periagei panta), does it not impel each individually (ar’ ou kai hen hekaston;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘Of course (Ti mȇn;).’ – Ath.: ‘Let’s take a single example (Peri henos dȇ poiȇsȏmetha logous): our results will then obviously apply to all the other heavenly bodies (hoi kai epi panta hȇmin astra harmottontes phanountai).’ – Cl.: ‘And your example is … (Tinos;)? – Ath.: ‘… the sun. Everyone can see its body (Hȇliou pas anthrȏpos sȏma men horai), but no one can see its soul (psuchȇn de oudeis) – not that you could see the soul of any other creature, living or dying (oude gar allou sȏmatos oudenos oute zȏntos oute apothnȇiskontos tȏn zȏiȏn). Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that we are in fact held in the embrace of some such thing though it is totally below the level of our bodily senses (alla elpis de pollȇ to parapan to genos hȇmin touto anaisthȇton pasais tais tou sȏmatos aisthȇsesi peripephukenai), and is perceptible by reason alone (noȇton d’ einai). So by reason and understanding (nȏi monȏi dȇ kai dianoȇmati) let’s get hold of a new point about the soul (labȏmen autou peri to toionde).’ – Cl.: ‘What (Poion;)?’ – Ath.: ‘If soul drives the sun (Hȇlion eiper agei psuchȇ), we shan’t go far wrong if we say that it operates in one of three ways (triȏn autȇn hen legontes dran schedon ouk apoteuxometha). – Cl.: ‘And what are they (Tinȏn;)? – Ath.: ‘Either (a) the soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries it wherever it goes (Hȏs ȇ enousa entos tȏi peripherei toutȏi phainomenȏi sȏmati pantȇi diakomizei to toiouton), just as our soul takes us around from one place to another (kathaper hȇmas hȇ par’ hȇmin psuchȇ pantȇi peripherei), or (b) it acquires its own body of fire or air of some kind (ȇ pothen exȏthen sȏma hautȇi porisamenȇ puros ȇ tinos aeros), as certain people maintain (hȏs logos esti tinȏn), and impels the sun by the external contact of body with body (ȏthei biai sȏmati sȏma), or (c) it is entirely immaterial (ȇ triton autȇ psilȇ sȏmatos ousa), but guides the sun along its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful powers (echousa de dunameis allas tinas huperballousas thaumati, podȇgei).’ – Cl.: ‘Yes (Nai), it must necessarily be one of these methods that the soul manages the universe (touto men anankȇ, toutȏn hen ti drȏsan psuchȇn panta diagein).’ – Ath. ‘Now, just wait a minute (Autou dȇ ameinon). Whether we find that it is by stationing itself in the sun and driving it like a chariot, or moving it from outside, or by some other means, that this soul provides us all with light, every single one of us is bound to regard it as a god (tautȇn tȇn psuchȇn, eite en harmasin echousa hȇmin hȇlion agei phȏs tois hapasin, eite exȏthen, eith’ hopȏs eith’ hopȇi, theon hȇgeisthai chreȏn panta andra). Isn’t that right (ȇ pȏs;)? – Cl.: ‘Yes (Nai), one would be absolutely stupid not to (ton ge pou mȇ epi to eschaton aphigmenon anoias).’ – Ath.: Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and months and all the seasons (Astrȏn dȇ peri pantȏn kai selȇnȇs eniautȏn te kai mȇnȏn kai pasȏn hȏrȏn peri): what can we do but repeat the same story (tina allon logon eroumen ȇ ton auton touton)? A soul or souls – and perfectly virtuous souls at that – have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena (hȏs epeidȇ psuchȇ men ȇ psuchai pantȏn toutȏn aitiai ephanȇsan, agathai de pasan aretȇn), and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we shall insist that these souls are gods (theous autas einai phȇsomen, eite en sȏmasin enousai, zȏia onta, kosmousin panta ouranon, eite hopȇi kai hopȏs;). Can anybody admit all this (esth’ hostis tauta homologȏn) and still put up with people who deny that ‘everything is full of gods (hupomenei mȇ theȏn einai plȇrȇ panta;)’? – Cl.: ‘No sir, nobody could be so mad (Ouk estin houtȏs, ȏ xene, paraphronȏn oudeis). (898d3-899b9)

Point 3 of Rowe’s arguments is as follows: ‘The Phaedrus rejects the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body (246c-d): such a conception of them is present in the Timaeus (38e, 41a-b), but – pace Cornford – absent from Laws 10.’ Was he right in claiming that the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body is present in the Timaeus but absent from Laws 10?

To answer this question, let us recapitulate the last stage of the Athenians proof of the existence of the gods. Plato opened it by maintaining that it is the soul that drives the sun, moon, and the other heavenly bodies. He went on to say that every man can see the body of the sun, but nobody can see its soul; for no soul can be seen by ‘the bodily senses’ (tais tou sȏmatos aisthȇsesi), and is perceptible by reason alone (noȇton d’ einai). Then he pointed out three possibilities in which the soul can drive the sun: 1) by residing in its body, 2) or from outside, providing itself with some other body, of fire or air, and thus pushing the sun by force (ȏthei biai), body by body (sȏmati sȏma), 3) ‘soul itself being without body’ (autȇ psilȇ sȏmatos ousa, Saunders’ ‘it is entirely immaterial’ is misleading, for in all these three cases the divine soul as such ‘is entirely immaterial’), but in possession of some other powers (echousa de dunameis allas tinas) that are more wonderful than one can imagine (huperballousas thaumati), it leads the sun (podȇgei). (898e5-899a4}

With this passage in mind, I believe, Rowe claims that the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body is absent from Laws 10.

But at 899b3-9 Plato reformulated the three possibilities, when he pointed out that they equally applied to all stars and to the moon. There he says that ‘since soul or souls (epeidȇ psuchȇ men ȇ psuchai) have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena (pantȏn toutȏn aitiai ephanȇsan), we shall maintain that they are gods’ (theous autas einai phȇsomen, 899b7), and then he reformulates the first possibility: ‘either being in bodies [of the stars] (eite en sȏmasi enousai), thus being living beings (zȏia onta, 899b7-8)’. It must have been this reformulation that prompted Cornford to maintain that the concept of gods as living beings composed of soul and body is present in Laws X. For Plato’s ‘being in bodies (en sȏmasi enousai), thus being living beings (zȏia onta)’ in Laws 899b7-8 recalls Timaeus 38e3-6: ‘When each of the stars which were necessary for the creation of time had come to its proper orbit (epeidȇ dȇ oun eis tȇn heautȏi prepousan hekaston aphiketo phoran tȏn hosa edei sunapergazesthai chronon), they had become living creatures having bodies fastened by ensouled chains (desmois empsuchois sȏmata dethenta zȏia egennȇthȇ).’ Pace Rowe, Cornford was right.

Saunders’ ‘whether it is by their living presence in matter’ for Plato’s eite en sȏmasi enousai, zȏia onta obscures the matter.

My claims ‘It must have been this reformulation that prompted Cornford …’ and ‘Pace Rowe, Cornford was right’ depend on Rowe’s ‘pace Cornford’ and the accompanying note 70. ‘F. Cornford, Plato's cosmology (1937) 112 n. 1.’ For I don’t have this book of Cornford, although I read it in the Bodleian Library, of which I am reminded by quotations from it on the margins of my Oxford edition of Plato.