Plato’s Phaedrus, Alcidamas’ On Sophists and Plato’s Protagoras

Alcidamas in his On Sophists misrepresented Plato’s view on the authentic philosopher’s word expressed in the Phaedrus; Plato corrected the misrepresentation in the Protagoras.

In the last section of the Phaedrus Plato deprecates the art of writing: ‘Writing has this strange feature (Deinon tout’ echei graphȇ), which makes it truly like painting (kai hȏs alȇthȏs homoion zȏgraphiai). For its offspring as well (kai gar ta ekeinȇs ekgona) stand there as if alive (hestȇke men hȏs zȏnta), but if you ask them something (ean d’ anerȇi ti), they maintain a most solemn silence (semnȏs panu sigai). It is the same with written speeches (t’auton de kai hoi logoi). You would think (doxais men an) that they talk as if they were thinking something (hȏs ti phronountas autous legein), but if you ask them about anything they say (ean de ti erȇi tȏn legomenȏn), from a desire to learn (boulomenos mathein), they say one and the same for ever (hen ti sȇmainei monon t’auton aei) (275d4-9) … And when it is ill-treated (plȇmmeloumenos de) and unjustly abused (kai ouk en dikȇi loidorȇtheis) it always needs its father’s help (tou patros aei deitai boȇthou), for it is unable to defend or help itself (autos gar out’ amunasthai oute boȇthȇsai dunatos hautȏi, 275e3-5).’

This he contrasts with ‘another word that we can see (allon horȏmen logon), the lawfully begotten brother of that one (toutou adelphon gnȇsion), how it comes into being (tȏi tropȏi te gignetai), and how much better (kai hosȏi ameinȏn) and more powerful (kai dunatȏteros) it is than the other (toutou phuetai; 276a1-3).’ It is the word ‘which is written with knowledge (hos met’ epistȇmȇs graphetai) in the soul of the learner (en tȇi tou manthanontos psuchȇi), is capable to defend itself (dunatos men amunai heautȏi), and knows to whom it should speak and to whom it should say nothing (kai epistȇmȏn de legein te kai sigan pros hous dei, 276a5-7) … it is the word of a man who knows (Ton tou eidotos logon legeis), which is living and has soul (zȏnta kai empsuchon), of which the written speech (hou ho gegrammenos) would rightly be called a kind of phantom (eidȏlon an ti legoito dikaiȏs, 276a8-9).’

Alcidamas in his ‘accusation of written speeches’ (katȇgoria tȏn graprȏn logȏn) appropriated Plato’s deprecation of the written word and his praise of the spoken word ‘which is living and has soul’; he presented the latter as a praise of extempore speeches of which he was the exponent: ‘And I think (hȇgoumai d’) that it is not even right to call ‘speeches’ the written pieces (oude logous dikaion einai kaleisthai tous gegramenous), but phantoms (all hȏsper eidȏla), and figurines (kai schȇmata), and imitations of speeches (kai mimȇmata logȏn). And the fairest opinion I would have about them is the same (kai tȇn autȇn kat’ autȏn eikotȏs an doxan echoimi) as about the bronze sculptures (hȇnper kai kata tȏn chalkȏn andriantȏn) and statues of stone (kai lithinȏn agalmatȏn) and painted living beings (kai gegrammenȏn zȏiȏn). For just as these (hȏsper gar tauta) are imitations of true bodies (mimȇmata tȏn alȇthinȏn sȏmatȏn esti), and it is pleasurable to see them (kai terpsin men epi tȇs theȏrias echei), but they are of no use in human life (chrȇsin d’ oudemian tȏi tȏn anthrȏpȏn biȏi paradidȏsi), it is the same with the written speech (ton auton tropon ho gegrammenos logos). Being of one and the same form and arrangement (heni schȇmati kai taxei kechrȇmenos), seen in a book it may astound (ek bibliou men theȏroumenos echei tinas ekplȇxeis), but when opportune moments come (epi de tȏn kairȏn), being immobile (akinȇtos ȏn), it gives no advantage to its owners (oudemian ȏpheleian tois kektȇmenois paradidȏsin). And just as real bodies look much worse than beautiful statues (all’ hȏsper andriantȏn kalȏn alȇthina sȏmata polu cheirous tas theȏrias echonta) but when at work provide us with much greater profits (pollaplasious epi tȏn ergȏn tas ȏphelias paradidȏsin), so the speech spoken at the given moment from the mind itself (houtȏ kai logos ho men ap’ autȇs tȇs dianoias en tȏi parautika legomenos) has soul and is living (empsuchos esti kai zȇi) and follows the matter in hand (kai tois pragmasin hepetai) and resembles the real bodies (kai tois alȇthesin aphȏmoiȏtai sȏmasin), but the written one (ho de gegrammenos), in its nature a semblance of speech (eikoni logou tȇn phusin homoian echȏn), is bereft of all well-doing (hapasȇs euergesias amoiros kathestȇken). (On Sophists 27-28)

Alcidamas did not pretend that these thoughts came out of his own head; he extolled the ability of an extempore speaker to lay his hands on arguments suiting his purpose and to incorporate them in his own speech. He pointed his finger at Plato as the author of thoughts expressed in paragraphs 27-28, distancing himself from the radical deprecation of the art of writing. In paragraph 29-30 he wrote: ‘Perhaps, someone might say (isȏs an oun eipoi tis) that it is absurd to disparage the power of writing (hȏs alogon esti katȇgorein men tȇs graphikȇs dunameȏs) when one appears to be displaying his talent by the means of it (auton de dia tautȇs tas epideixeis poioumenon), and to begin by inciting prejudice against the very occupation (kai prodiaballein tȇn pragmateian tautȇn) through which one is getting ready to become famous among the Greeks (di’ hȇs eudokimein paraskeuazetai para tois Hellȇsin), and when one devotes his time to philosophy (eti de peri philosophian diatribonta) to commend extempore speeches (tous autoschediastikous logous epainein) … But firstly (egȏ de prȏton men), not because I completely disapprove of writing (ou pantelȏs apodokimazȏn tȇn graphikȇn dunamin) … I said these words (toutous eirȇka tous logous)’.

By appropriating Plato’s praise of the spoken word ‘which is living and has soul, of which the written speech would rightly be called a kind of phantom’ in his praise of extempore speeches Alcidamas misrepresented Plato’s views. This had to be corrected. Plato had to show that extempore speeches deserved the same criticism to which he exposed the written speeches.

In the Protagoras Socrates came to Protagoras with Hippocrates and told him that the young man would like to become his pupil: ‘he says that he would be glad to know what benefit he will derive from associating with you’ (hoti oun autȏi apobȇsetai, ean soi sunȇi, hȇdeȏs an phȇsi puthesthai, 318a3-4). Protagoras explained: ‘What I teach is the proper management of public affairs (to de mathȇma estin euboulia peri tȏn oikeiȏn), how best to run one’s household (hopȏs an arista tȇn heautou oikian dioikoi), and the management of public affairs (kai peri tȏn tȇs poleȏs), how to make the most effective contribution to the affairs of the city both by word and action (hopȏs ta tȇs poleȏs dunatȏtatos an eiȇ kai prattein kai legein, 318e5-319a2).’ In response, Socrates gave him his reasons for doubting that ‘the political art’ (politikȇ technȇ, 319a4) can be taught (319a8-320b8), and asked: ‘So if you can show us more clearly (ei oun echeis enargesteron hȇmin epideixai) that excellence can be taught (hȏs didakton estin hȇ aretȇ), please don’t grudge us your proof, but proceed (mȇ phthonȇsȇis all’ epideixon, 320b8-c1))’.

In response, Protagoras gave a long speech. Socrates, having reproduced the speech in his narration, went on to say: ‘So Protagoras concluded this lengthy exhibition of his skill as a speaker (Prȏtagoras men tosauta kai toiauta epideixamenos apepausato tou logou, 328d3-4) … Now if you went to any of the orators about this question (ei men tis peri autȏn toutȏn [‘concerning these things’] sungenoito hotȏioun tȏn dȇmȇgorȏn), you would perhaps get a similar speech from Pericles (tach’ an kai toioutous logous akouseien ȇ Perikleous), or some other able speaker (ȇ allou tinos tȏn hikanȏn eipein); but if you asked them any question (ei de epaneroito tina ti), they are no more capable of answering or asking anything themselves than a book is (hȏsper biblia ouden echousin oute apokrinasthai oute autoi eresthai, 328e6-329a4, translation from Protagoras C.C.W. Taylor).

John Muir asks ‘Who influenced whom?’ – did Plato influence Alcidamas, or were they both influenced directly by Socrates?

When I wrote ‘John Muir’s Alcidamas – a welcome surprise’, my last post, was I overhasty in supposing that John Muir presents Alcidamas as the borrower form Plato’s Phaedrus?

Alcidamas says in §§ 27 and 28: ‘And I do not think it is right that speeches written down should even be called speeches (hȇgoumai d’ oude logous dikaion einai kaleisthai tous gegramenous), but should be thought of as images and patterns and imitations of speeches (all hȏsper eidȏla kai schȇmata kai mimȇmata logȏn), and we could reasonably have the same opinion about them (kai tȇn autȇn kat’ autȏn eikotȏs an doxan echoimi) as we have about bronze statues (hȇnper kai kata tȏn chalkȏn andriantȏn) and stone monuments (kai lithinȏn agalmatȏn) and depictions of animals (kai gegrammenȏn zȏiȏn). For just as these are imitations of real bodies (hȏsper gar tauta mimȇmata tȏn alȇthinȏn sȏmatȏn esti) and give delight to the view (kai terpsin men epi tȇs theȏrias echei) but offer no use in human life (chrȇsin d’ oudemian tȏi tȏn anthrȏpȏn biȏi paradidȏsi), (28) in the same way the written speech (ton auton tropon ho gegrammenos logos), having a single form and arrangement (heni schȇmati kai taxei kechrȇmenos), produces certain striking effects when it is conned from the book (ek bibliou men theȏroumenos echei tinas ekplȇxeis), but, being fixedly unable to respond to critical moments (epi de tȏn kairȏn akinȇtos ȏn), is of no use to those who have got hold of it (oudemian ȏpheleian tois kektȇmenois paradidȏsin). Just as real bodies present an appearance far inferior to that of fine statues (all’ hȏsper andriantȏn kalȏn alȇthina sȏmata polu cheirous tas theȏrias echonta) but yet are many times more useful for getting things done (pollaplasious epi tȏn ergȏn tas ȏphelias paradidȏsin), so too speech spoken straight from the heart on the spur of the moment (houtȏ kai logos ho men ap’ autȇs tȇs dianoias en tȏi parautika legomenos) has a soul in it and is alive (empsuchos esti kai zȇi) and follows upon events (kai tois pragmasin hepetai) and is like those real bodies (kai tois alȇthesin aphȏmoiȏtai sȏmasin), while the written speech  (ho de gegrammenos) whose nature corresponds to a representation of the real thing (eikoni logou tȇn phusin homoian echȏn) lacks any kind of living power (hapasȇs euergesias amoiros kathestȇken).’ (Translation John Muir)

John Muir comments: ‘The striking idea of speech as an inanimate, living thing is certainly related to Plato, Phaedrus 275d-276a. There Socrates tells the story of the god, Theuth, the proud inventor of writing, who brings his invention to Thamos, the king of Egyptian Thebes. Thamos then expresses considerable reservations about the benefits of writing and the illusions it will produce. In the amplification of the story which Socrates gives to Phaedrus he compares writing to painting (zȏgraphia): paintings give the illusion of life but, when questioned, they cannot answer back. So it is with writing: writing cannot answer back either. The clinching evidence for the connection between the Phaedrus and OWS [On those who write written speeches] comes with the answer Phaedrus gives to Socrates’ subsequent suggestion of an alternative mode of writing ‘which is written with knowledge in the soul of the one who has understanding’ (hos met’ epistȇmȇs graphetai en tȇi tou manthanontos psuchȇi). Phaedrus replies: ‘You mean the living and animate speech of the knowledgeable man, of which writing could rightly be called a kind of image’ (ton tou eidotos logon legeis zȏnta kai empsuchon hou ho gegrammenos eidȏlon an ti legoito dikaiȏs). The coincidences of thought and vocabulary between this and Alcidamas’ text cannot be accidental.’ (op. cit. p. 61).

After this, Muir asks: ‘Who influenced whom?’ He answers: ‘I think there can be little doubt that Alcidamas took his ideas and phraseology either from a reading of the Phaedrus or directly from Socrates himself (Plato may well not have shared Socrates’ attitudes to writing).’ (op. cit. p. 62) If Alcidamas took his ideas and phraseology from a reading of the Phaedrus, then the Phaedrus was written prior to Alcidamas’ On Sophists; but if he took it from Socrates directly, his On Sophists has no relevance for the dating of the Phaedrus. Let me try and view the situation on the latter supposition.

Alcidamas wrote his essay around 390 B.C. (Muir p. XV), so he kept Socrates’ words in his memory for more than nine years before he put them on paper. But Plato kept them in his mind for 29 years or more if we date the Phaedrus around 370 B.C. with the author of the Wikipedia entry on ‘Phaedrus (dialogue)’, he kept them in his mind for some 50 years or more if we date it ‘certainly later than the Timaeus; possibly or probably later than the Parmenides, the Theaetetus, the Sophist and the ; and probably earlier than the Philebus’ with C.J. Rowe (PLATO Phaedrus, Aris & Phillips Classical Texts 2^nd edition 1988, p. 14; cf. his ‘LA DATA RELATIVA DEL FEDRO in ‘Understanding the Phaedrus’, Proceedings of the II Symposium Platonicum, Published under the auspices of the International Plato Society, 1992).

Presumably, Alcidams’ memory of Socrates’ words has no relation to Plato’s memory of those words and vice versa: a remarkable feat of memory. But before applauding Plato on his remarkable memory, we ought to consider that the most striking correspondence between Alcidamas’ ‘speech spoken straight from the heart on the spur of the moment (houtȏ kai logos ho men ap’ autȇs tȇs dianoias en tȏi parautika legomenos) has a soul in it and is alive (empsuchos esti kai zȇi)’, and Plato’s ‘the living and animate speech of the knowledgeable man, of which writing could rightly be called a kind of image’ (ton tou eidotos logon legeis zȏnta kai empsuchon hou ho gegrammenos eidȏlon an ti legoito dikaiȏs)’. But Plato ascribes these words to Phaedrus, not to Socrates; it seems that Plato wanted thus to emphasize that this was how he (the author) viewed Socrates’ way of discussing philosophy.

In paragraphs 24-26 Alcidamas extols the extempore speakers for their ability to snatch useful arguments from their opponents and incorporate them in their own speech; paragraphs 27 and 28 appear to exemplify this ability.

Let me give paragraphs 24-26 in Muir’s translation:

‘(24) We can see that these two sets of people cannot make the same kind of use even of arguments which are presented to them in actual law-suits (oude tois par’ autȏn tȏn agȏnȏn enthumȇmasi didomenois homoiȏs horȏmen hekaterous chrȇsthai dunamenous). For those speaking without a text (tois men gar agrapha legousin) are easily capable of fitting into their structure any argument they may take from the opponents or any idea they conceive of their own accord since their intellect is at full stretch (an ti para tȏn antidikȏn enthumȇma labȏsin ȇ dia tȇn suntonian tȇs dianoias autȏn para sphȏn autȏn dianoȇthȏsin, euporon estin en taxei theinai). For, because they are setting everything out on the spur of the moment (tois gar onomasin ek tou parautika peri hapantȏn dȇlountes), they produce a speech which is by no means uneven and confused, even when they say more than they planned (oud’ hotan pleiȏ tȏn eskemmenȏn legȏsin, oudamȇi ton logon anȏmalon kai tarachȏdȇ kathistasi). (25) But for those fighting law-suits with written speeches (tois de meta tois graptois logois agȏnizomenois), if some argument is presented beyond what has been prepared (an ara ti chȏris tȇs paraskeuȇs enthumȇma dothȇi), it is hard to fit it in (chalepon enarmosai) and use in the proper way (kai chrȇsthai kata tropon); for the precision of working out the words in the text (hai gar akribeiai tȇs tȏn onomatȏn exergasias) does not admit of improvisation (ou paradechontai tous automatismous), but it is necessary (all’ anankaion) either to make no use (ȇ mȇden chrȇsthai) of arguments presented by chance (tois apo tȇs tuchȇs enthumȇmasi dotheisin) or, if one does use them (ȇ chrȏmenon), to undo (dialuein) and unbalance (kai sunereipein) the disposition of the text (tȇn tȏn onomatȏn oikonomian), so that saying some things with precision and others at random (kai ta men akribȏs ta d’ eikȇi legonta) renders the style confused and discordant (tarachȏdȇ kai diaphȏnon kathistanai tȇn hermȇneian). (26) Now (kaitoi), who in his right mind (tis an eu phronȏn) would adopt such a practice (apodexoito tȇn toiautȇn meletȇn) which sets itself against the use even of those advantages which come of their own accord (hȇtis kai tȏn automatȏn agathȏn epiprosthen tȇi chrȇsei kathestȇke), and which sometimes give parties to a suit less help than chance would offer (kai cheirȏ tȇs tuchȇs eniote tois agȏnizomenois tȇn epikourian paradidȏsi), and, while other arts customarily lead human life towards improvement (kai tȏn allȏn technȏn epi to beltion agein ton tȏn anthrȏpȏn bion eithismenȏn), this one gets in the way of even gratuitous resource (hautȇ kai tois automatois euporȇmasin empodȏn estin;)?’

The connection between paragraphs 24-26 and 27-28 appears to be clear; in the former Alcidamas vaunts the ability of extempore speakers to make use of arguments presented by chance and in the latter he gives brings that ability into action.

It might be objected against this that in paragraphs 24-26 Alcidamas speaks of extempore speakers, but paragraphs 27 and 28 are written as part of his written speech. As if aware of such an objection, in paragraph 6 he says that ‘no-one who thinks sensibly would fail to believe (tois men legein deinois oudeis an phronȏn apistȇseien) that, with a small alteration to their mental framework, those who are good at speaking will write scripts for speeches appropriately (hȏs ou mikron tȇn tȇs psuchȇs hexin metarruthmisantes epieikȏs logographȇsousi, translation J. Muir).’ Incidentally, the term logographȏ is a broader term than ‘writing scripts for speeches’; it can mean ‘writing speeches’ as well as ‘writing books’, as Fridrich Ast notes in his Lexicon Platonicum. I do believe that Alcidamas did read his essay On Sophists to a wide audience or audiences interested in Isocrates and in Plato, but that he at the same time wrote it to gratify his ambition ‘to leave behind memorials of himself’ (mnȇmeia katalipein hȇmȏn autȏn), of which he speaks in § 32.

Again, it might be objected that in paragraphs 24-26 Alcidamas attributes the ability to appropriate the opponent’s arguments to those who fight law-suits. But this limitation is caused by Muir’s translation. Alcidamas’ agȏn and agȏnizomenoi may indicate any kind of contest. Alcidamas calls his piece ‘a case against written speeches’, as Muir translates Alcidamas’ katȇgoria tȏn graptȏn logȏn (1). In the ‘Introduction’ to On those who write written speeches or On Sophists he translates more appositely, though with a question mark: ‘Alcidamas’ claim to be making an accusation – katȇgoria – in §1 does not classify the work.’ Katȇgoria may not classify the work according to the accepted classifications, but it characterises Alcidamas’ On Sophists.

I cannot agree with Muir that in Alcidamas’ essay ‘there is no form of address to a real or imaginary audience’. Alcidamas’ opening sentence responds to Isocrates’ attack on him in Against the Sophists; the On Sophists is thus addressed to all those who read Isocrates’ piece.

In paragraphs 9 and 10 of Against the Sophists Isocrates criticised ‘those who profess to teach political discourse’ (tois tous politikous logous hupischnoumenois): ‘They are themselves so stupid (houtȏ anaisthȇtȏs autoi te diakeintai) and conceive others to be so dull (kai tous allous echein hupeilȇphasi) that (hȏste), although the speeches which they compose are worse (hȏste cheiron graphontes tous logous) than those which some laymen improvise (ȇ tȏn idiȏtȏn tines autoschediazousin), nevertheless they promise to make their students such clever orators (homȏs hupischnountai toioutous rȇtoras tous sunontas poiȇsein) that they will not overlook any of the possibilities which a subject affords (hȏste mȇden tȏn enontȏn en tois pragmasi paralipein, 9).’ (Translation G. Norlin)

Alcidamas opened the On Sophists as follows: ‘Since some of those who are called sophists (Epeidȇ tines tȏn kaloumenȏn sophistȏn) have been neglectful of knowledge and education (historias men kai paideias ȇmelȇkasi), and as to the ability to give speeches (kai tou dunasthai legein) they are as inexperienced as laymen (tois idiȏtais apeirȏs echousi), devoting themselves to writing speeches (graphein de memeletȇkotes logous) and displaying their wisdom through means of no permanence (di abebaiȏn deiknuntes tȇn heautȏn sophian), they affect a grave and solemn air and think highly of themselves (semnunontai kai mega phronousi), and being in possession of only a minor part of the power of rhetoric (kai polloston meros tȇs rȇtorikȇs kektȇmenoi dunameȏs) they claim to possess the art in its entirety (holȇs tȇs technȇs amphisbȇtousi), for this reason (dia tautȇn tȇn aitian) I shall undertake to make an accusation (epicheirȇsȏ katȇgorian poiȇsasthai) of the written discourses (tȏn graptȏn logȏn)’.

This is my translation of Alcidamas’ opening sentence, for John Muir’s translation obscures the relation of Alcidamas’ On Sophists to Isocrates’ Against the Sophists. Muir translates: ‘Since some of those who are called sophists have neglected an enquiring approach and training’, but there is nothing in Alcidamas’ text that suggests that he objected ‘a lack of an enquiring approach’ (historias men kai paideias ȇmelȇkasi) to those who prided themselves on their writings. Isocrates tells us in Antidosis 193 that he wrote his Against the Sophists at the outset of his career as a teacher; prior to it he earned his living by writing forensic speeches, the first of which is dated 403 and the last 393 B.C. Alcidamas’ ‘Since some of those who are called sophists have been neglectful of knowledge and education’, reflects on Isocrates’ preoccupations in the decade that preceded his becoming a teacher and writing Against the Sophists.

But my main objection to Muir’s translation of § 1 is his acceptance of Reiske’s ‘emendation’ of dia bibliȏn for the MSS di abebaiȏn: ‘demonstrating their cleverness through texts (dia bibliȏn deiknuntes tȇn hautȏn sophian)’ instead of ‘displaying their wisdom through means of no permanence (di abebaiȏn deiknuntes tȇn heautȏn sophian)’. Had ‘demonstrating their cleverness through texts’ been in the text, how could any scribe have changed it into the counterintuitive ‘through means of no permanence (di abebaiȏn)’?

Guido Avezzù in his critical edition gives the textual alternatives that show how the scribes struggled with the text. Manuscripts ΞAm₄M give di’ abebaiȏn (through means of no permanence); K gives diabebaiȏn, leaving it to the reader to choose between di’ abebaiȏn (‘through means of no permanence’) and dia bebaiȏn (through means of permanence); Am₁EMuNT Ald. give dia bebaiȏn.

‘Through means of permanence’ corresponds to how one normally thinks of writing in comparison to speaking, but as such it is a praise of writing. Alcidamas himself, having distanced himself, in § 29, from the radicality of the denunciation of the written word in §§ 27 and 28, and explained in §§ 30 and 31 why he himself takes recourse to writing when he finds it appropriate, says in § 32: ‘For it is not easy to judge if our extempore speaking is better now than it was before (ei men gar beltion autoschediazomen nun ȇ proteron ou raidion epikrinein esti), for the recollection of what has been said is difficult (chalepai gar hai mnȇmai tȏn proeirȇmenȏn logȏn kathestȇkasi). But it is easy by examining written texts to contemplate, as it were in a mirror, the progress of the soul (eis de ta gegrammena katidontas hȏsper en katoptrȏi theȏrȇsai tas tȇs psuchȇs epidoseis raidion estin). Also, we undertake the writing of speeches both because we are eager to leave behind memorials of ourselves and to gratify ambition (eti de kai mnȇmeia katalipein hȇmȏn autȏn spoudazontes kai tȇi philotimiai charizomenoi logous graphein epicheiroumen).’ But Alcidamas is engaged in disparaging those who devote their lives to writing in § 1, not in praising them, so that ‘displaying their wisdom through means of permanence’ (dia bebaiȏn deiknuntes tȇn heautȏn sophian)’ is wholly inappropriate in that context.

But if ‘displaying their wisdom through means of no permanence (di abebaiȏn deiknuntes tȇn heautȏn sophian)’ is not only counterintuitive, but is at variance with what Alcidamas himself thought about writings, why did he take recourse to it in the opening paragraph of his ‘accusation’ (katȇgoria)?

We can find the answer to this question in the opening sentence of Socrates’ reflections on his Egyptian myth about Theuth’s invention of writing and in his closing assessment of writing. At Phaedrus 275c5-7 Socrates says: ‘Then anyone who leaves behind him a written manual (Oukoun ho technȇn oiomenos en grammasi katalipein), and likewise anyone who takes it over from him (kai au ho paradechomenos), on the assumption that such writing will provide something reliable and permanent (hȏs ti saphes kai bebaion), must be exceedingly simple-minded (pollȇs an euȇtheias gemoi, tr. R. Hackforth).’ At Phaedrus 277d6-10 he says: ‘whether Lysias (eite Lysisas) or anyone else (ȇ tis allos) ever wrote (pȏpote egrapsen) or shall write (ȇ grapsei) privately (idiai), or publicly proposing the laws (ȇ dȇmosiai nomous titheis), so writing a political composition (sungramma politikon graphȏn), and thinking there is any great permanence or clarity in it (kai megalȇn tina en autȏi bebaiotȇta hȇgoumenos kai saphȇneian), then it is a reproach to its writer (houtȏ men oneidos tȏi graphonti)’.

Let me end this post with Alcidamas’ paragraph 29, which indicates that he took from Plato the ideas and phraseology expressed in paragraphs 27 and 28: ‘Perhaps someone would say (isȏs an oun eipoi tis) that it is illogical to bring accusations against the ability to write (hȏs alogon esti katȇgorein men tȇs graphikȇs dunameȏs) whilst oneself being seen to produce public demonstrations in this medium (auton de dia tautȇs tas epideixeis poioumenon), and to criticise the activity (kai prodiaballein tȇn pragmateian tautȇn) by means of which one tries to get a reputation among the Greeks (di hȇs eudokimein paraskeuazetai para tois Hellȇsin), and, while spending one’s time on methodical study (eti de peri philosophian diatribonta), to praise extempore speeches (tous autoschediastikous logous epainein), and to consider chance more serviceable for the task than forethought (kai prourgiaiteron hȇgeisthai tȇn tuchȇn tȇs pronoias) and those who improvise more prudent (kai phronimȏterous tous eikȇi legontas) than those who write after preparation (tȏn meta paraskeuȇs graphontȏn).’

This is Muir’s translation, concerning which must I make several remarks. Muir’s ‘and to criticise the activity’ falls short of Alcidamas’ kai prodiaballein tȇn pragmateian tautȇn. Liddell&Scott render prodiaballein as ‘raise prejudices against beforehand’, ‘accuse beforehand’, where ‘beforehand’ corresponds to the prefix pro. The absurdity lies, as Alcidamas can see it, in Plato’s disparagement of writing in his first writing, which in fact became part and parcel of his preparations to become famous among the Greeks by means of his writings – the similarities of ideas and phraseology in On Sophists §§ 27 and 28 and in the corresponding passages in the Phaedrus make it clear to the reader Alcidamas refers to Plato. His prodiaballein (‘accuse beforehand’) chimes with the ancient tradition according to which the Phaedrus was Plato’s first dialogue (see Diog. Laert. III. 38).

Lastly, I must object to Muir’s ‘methodical study’ for Alcidamas’ philosophia. Alcidamas speaks of the relationship of writing to philosophy very differently here from the way he spoke of it in the first paragraph. In the first paragraph he powerfully evoked Plato’s censure of writing in Phaedrus 275c-277d, and it is from that perspective that in the following § 2 he said that ‘those who spend their lives on writing have serious shortcomings in philosophy’ (tous ep’ auto touto ton bion analiskontas apoleleiphthai polu philosophias).  In § 29 he points his finger at Plato who has become famous among the Greeks by means of his writings and who thus made writing the main tool of philosophy.

Let me yet note that whoever reads § 2 Muir’s translation – ‘those who spend their lives on this particular skill have serious shortcomings in both oratorical skill and in philosophy (kai tous ep’ auto touto ton bion katanaliskontas apoleleiphthai polu kai rȇtorikȇs kai philosophias hupeilȇphȏs), and … would more justly be described as script-writers than as sophists (kai polu dikaioteron an poiȇtas ȇ sophistas prosagoreuesthai)’ – can hardly divine that Alcidamas refers here to Socrates’ ‘the man who does not possess things of more value (ton mȇ echonta timiȏtera) than the things he composed or wrote (hȏn sunethȇke ȇ egrapsen), turning them upside down over a long period of time (anȏ katȏ strephȏn en chronȏi), sticking them together and taking them apart (pros allȇla kollȏn te kai aphairȏn), you’ll rightly call a poet (en dikȇi pou poiȇtȇn prosereis, Phaedrus 278d8-e2)’. It might be objected that Alcidamas says ‘would more justly be called poets than sophists’ (kai polu dikaioteron an poiȇtas ȇ sophistas prosagoreuesthai), but when Socrates says ‘you’ll rightly call a poet’ (en dikȇi pou poiȇtȇn prosereis 278e1-2), he means ‘you would not call him a philosopher’; the name of a philosopher (kalein … philosophon, 278d3-4) Socrates reserved for a man who ‘speaking in his own person (legȏn autos) has the ability to show that what he has written is of little worth’ (dunatos ta gegrammena phaula apodeixai, 278c6-7, tr. C.J. Rowe). But Alcidamas, like the majority of intellectuals in his time made no distinction between a philosopher and a sophist; Plato’s disparagement of sophists and sharply distinguishing them from philosophers was yet to come.

Alcidamas’ ‘those who waste their lives writing (kai tous ep’ auto touto ton bion katanaliskontas) are very deficient (apoleleiphthai polu) both in rhetoric (kai rȇtorikȇs) and in philosophy (kai philosophias hupeilȇphȏs) in § 2 echoes Plato’s Euthydemus: ‘they are on the fence between a philosopher and a politician (methoria philosophou te andros kai politikou, 305c7) … they think they have a moderate amount of philosophy and a moderate amount of political wisdom (hȇgountai metriȏs men philosophias echein, metriȏs de politikȏn, 305d7-8) … but in fact (alla tȏi onti), these men (houtoi), participating in both (amphoterȏn metechontes), fall short of both (amphoterȏn hȇttous eisin, 306c2-3).

In the democratic Athens political activity and rhetoric were used synonymously in the sphere of politics, as can be seen in the Phaedrus. Muir’s ‘those who spend their lives on this particular skill have serious shortcomings in both oratorical skill and in philosophy’ for Alcidamas’ kai tous ep’ auto touto [‘on this very thing’] ton bion katanaliskontas apoleleiphthai polu kai rȇtorikȇs kai philosophias obscures Alcidamas’ reference to the Euthydemus. The reference is important; Alcidamas waited until he saw what Plato had said in his response to Isocrates’ attack on him in Against the Sophists; only then he wrote the On Sophists.