I’ve looked
at the Wikipedia entry on Plato’s Republic.
In the section on ‘Scholarly views’ Bertrand Russell with his History of Western Philosophy has a
prominent place. This prompts me to discuss more thoroughly Russell’s view of
Plato’s theory.
Russell
writes: ‘According to the metaphysical part of the doctrine, the word “cat”
means a certain ideal cat, “the cat”,
created by God, and unique. Particular cats partake of the nature of the cat, but more or less imperfectly;
it is only owing to this imperfection that there can be many of them. The cat
is real; particular cats are only apparent.’ (B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, Routledge Classics 2004, p. 123)
In making
this assertion, Russell is wrong. There is no place in Plato where he might
speak of God as a creator of ‘the cat’, i.e. the Idea or Form of a cat or any
other animal or natural object or substance like a tree, fire, or water. How
did it happen to Russell that he misinterpreted Plato so badly?
Russell goes
on: ‘In the last book of the Republic,
as a preliminary to a condemnation of painters, there is a very clear
exposition of the doctrine of ideas or forms. Here Plato explains that,
whenever a number of individuals have a common name, they have also a common
‘idea’ or ‘form’. For instance, though there are many beds, there is only one
‘idea’ or ‘form’ of a bed. Just as a reflection of a bed in a mirror is only
apparent and not ‘real’, so the various particular beds are unreal, being only
copies of the ‘idea’, which is the one real bed, and is made by God.’ (p. 123)
This is a
brilliant exposition of the opening part of the 10th book of the Republic. Russell erred in viewing
Plato’s theory of Forms through the looking glass of this introductory section
of the 10th book. What facilitated this mistake, was his viewing the
10th book through the looking glass of Plato’s exposition of the
theory of Forms in Republic V-VII. We
shall see how it happened if we simply follow his exposition.
Russell: ‘Of
this one bed, made by God, there can be knowledge,
but in respect of the many beds made by carpenters there can be only opinion’ [Russell’s italics] (p. 123).
There is no such
statement in the 10th book of the Republic. Here Russell projects into the 10th book Plato’s
view of the Forms introduced in the 5th book.
Socrates:
‘Those who gaze on many beautiful things (Tous
ara polla kala theȏmenous), and who yet neither see absolute beauty
(auto de to kalon mȇ horȏntas), nor
can follow any guide who points the way thither (mȇd’ allȏi ep’ auto agonti dunamenous hepesthai); who see instances
of justice (kai polla dikaia), but
not absolute justice (auto de to dikaion
mȇ), and the like (kai panta houtȏ),
such persons may be said in all their pronouncements to have opinion but not knowledge (doxazein phȇsomen hapanta, gignȏskein de hȏn
doxazousin ouden) .’ – Glaucon: ‘That is certain (Anankȇ).’ – Socrates: ‘But those who in everything look to the
absolute and eternal and immutable (Ti de
au tous auta hekasta theȏmenous kai aei kata t’auta hȏsautȏs echonta) may
be said to know (ar’ ou gignȏskein), and not to have
opinion only (all’ ou doxazein)?’ –
Glaucon: ‘Neither can that be denied (Anankȇ
kai touto).’ (479e1-9, tr. B. Jowett)
***
Here I must
take issue with Jowett’s yet, which I have underlined. It has no
counterpart in the original. Plato speaks simply of those ‘who neither see
absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither’. For this
distinction between knowledge and opinion substantiates the distinction between
philosophers and non-philosophers announced earlier: ‘We must (Anankaion) explain (diorisasthai) whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to
rule the State (tous philosophous tinas legontes tolmȏmen phanai dein archein);
having brought them to light (hina
diadȇlȏn genomenȏn), our defence will be (dunȇtai tis amunesthai) that there are some natures who ought to
study philosophy and to be leaders in the State (endeiknumenos hoti tois men prosȇkei phusei haptesthai te philosophias
hȇgemoneuein t’ en polei); and others who are not born to be philosophers (tois d’ allois mȇte haptesthai), and are
meant to be followers rather than leaders (akolouthein
te tȏi hȇgoumenȏi).’ (474b4-c3, tr. Jowett)
Jowett’s
‘explain’ stands for Plato’s diorisasthai,
which means ‘draw a boundary through’, ‘delimit’, ‘separate’; Jowett’s ‘others
who are not born to be philosophers’ stands for Plato’s tois d’ allois mȇte haptesthai, which means: ‘the others must not
even touch philosophy’. I pointed to similar bowdlerizing of Plato’s Republic by Jowett (and Russell) in ‘1 Bertrand
Russell on “The Theory of Ideas” and Plato’s Republic’ posted on July 23.
***
Russell goes
on: ‘The philosopher, as such, will be interested only in the one ideal bed,
not in the many beds found in the sensible world. He will have a certain
indifference to ordinary mundane affairs: “how can he who has magnificence of
mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human
life?” (p. 123)
Speaking of the one ideal bed in
contrast to many sensible beds, Russell appears to be in Book X, but in fact he
jumped into Book VI. Socrates: ‘Then how can he who has magnificence of mind (Hȇi oun huparchei dianoiai megaloprepeia)
and is the spectator of all time (kai
theȏria pantos men chronou) and all existence (pasȇs de ousias), think human life to be a great thing (hoion te oiei toutȏi mega ti dokein einai
ton anthrȏpinon bion)?’ (486a8-10, tr. Jowett)
Having thus
constructed his view of Plato’s theory of Forms by viewing Books V-VII through
the looking glass of Book X, and Book X through the looking glass of Books V-VII,
Russell subjects his theoretical construct to criticism.
Russell: ‘For
Parmenides there is only the One; for Plato, there are many ideas. There are
not only beauty, truth, and goodness, but, as we saw, there is the heavenly
bed, created by God; there is a heavenly man, a heavenly dog, a heavenly cat,
and so on through a whole Noah’s ark. All this however, seems, in the Republic, to have been not adequately
thought out. A Platonic idea or form is not a thought, though it may be the
object of a thought. It is difficult to see how God can have created it, since
its being is timeless, and he could not have decided to create a bed unless his
thought, when he decided, had had for its object that very Platonic bed which we
are told he brought into existence. What is timeless must be uncreated.’ (p.
129-130)
Let me
confront Russell’s view of Plato’s Forms with Plato’s view of the Forms in the Phaedrus, Republic VI, and Timaeus.
In the Phaedran Palinode Plato’s Socrates depicts the region of true being,
that is of the Forms, as follows:
‘The region
above the heavens (Ton de huperouranion
topon) has never yet been celebrated as it deserves by any earthly poet,
nor will it ever be (oute tis humnȇse pȏ
tȏn tȇide poiȇtȇs oute pote humnȇsei kat’ axian). But it is like this (echei de hȏde) – for one must be bold
enough to say what is true (tolmȇteon gar
oun to ge alȇthes eipein), especially when speaking about truth (allȏs te kai peri alȇtheias legonta).
This region is occupied by being which really is, which is without colour or
shape, intangible, observable by the steersman of the sole alone, by intellect,
and to which the class of true knowledge relates (hȇ gar achrȏmatos te kai aschȇmatistos kai anaphȇs ousia ontȏs ousa,
psuchȇs kubernȇtȇi monȏi theatȇ nȏi, peri hȇn to tȇs alȇthous epistȇmȇs genos,
touton echei ton topon). Thus because the mind of a god (hat’ oun theou dianoia) is nourished by
insight and knowledge unmixed (nȏi te kai
epistȇmȇi akȇratȏi trephomenȇ), and so too that of every soul (kai hapasȇs psuchȇs) which is concerned (hosȇi an melȇi) to receive what is
appropriate to it (to prosȇkon dexasthai),
it is glad at last to see what is and is nourished and made happy by gazing on
what is true (idousa dia chronou to on
agapai te kai theȏrousa t’alȇthȇ trephetai te kai eupathei), until the
revolution brings it around in a circle to the same point (heȏs an kuklȏi hȇ periphora eis t’auton perienenkȇi). In its
circuit (en de tȇi periodȏi) it
catches sight of justice itself (kathorai
men autȇn dikaiosunȇn), of self-control (kathorai de sȏphrosunȇn), of knowledge (kathorai de epistȇmȇn) – not
that knowledge to which coming into being attaches (ouch’ hȇi genesis prosestin), or that which seems to be different
in each different one of the things that we now say are (oud’ hȇ estin pou hetera en heterȏi ousa hȏn hȇmeis nun ontȏn kaloumen),
but that which is in what really is and which is really knowledge (alla tȇn en tȏi ho estin on ontȏs epistȇmȇn
ousan).’ (247c3-e2, tr. C. J. Rowe)
To view this
passage through the looking glass of the 10th book of the Republic means distorting it beyond
recognition.
In the Republic V-VII, the philosopher-ruler is
in the centre of attention. What makes him a ruler by nature, whether he
becomes a ruler in reality or no, is his ability to see the Forms, i.e. to see
the truth, being that truly is, exempt from any change and coming-to-be, as it
is described in the Phaedran Palinode. Socrates says in the 6th
book: ‘Let us suppose it agreed that philosophical minds (Touto men dȇ tȏn philosophȏn phuseȏn peri hȏmologȇsthȏ hȇmin) love
any form of science (hoti mathȇmatos aei
erȏsin) which may give them a glimpse (ho
an autois dȇloi) of an eternal reality not
disturbed by generation and decay (ekeinȇs
tȇs ousias aei ousȇs kai mȇ planȏmenȇs hupo geneseȏs kai phthoras).’ (485a10-b3,
tr. Jowett)
Concerning the Timaeus
I may refer to passage 27d5-28b2, which I quoted in ‘Bertrand Russell “Theory
of Ideas”, Plato’s Republic and his Timaeus’ posted on August 1. To this
passage I may add the following: ‘If (ei
men) mind (nous) and (kai) true opinion (doxa alȇthȇs) are two distinct classes (eston duo genȇ), then I say that there certainly are these
self-existent ideas unperceived by sense (pantapasin
einai kath’ hauta tauta, anaisthȇta huph’ hȇmȏn eidȇ), and apprehended only
by the mind (nooumena monon) … But we
must affirm them to be distinct (duo dȇ lekteon
einai), for they have a distinct origin (dioti chȏris gegonaton) and are of a different nature (anomoiȏs te echeton); the one is
implanted in us by instruction (to men gar
autȏn dia didachȇs), the other by persuasion (to d’ hupo peithous hȇmin engignetai) … every man may be said to
share in true opinion (kai tou men panta
andra metechein phateon), but mind is the attribute of the gods (nou de theous) and of very few men (anthrȏpȏn de genos brachu ti). Wherefore
also we must acknowledge (toutȏn de
houtȏs echontȏn homologȇteon) that one kind of being is the form which is
always the same (hen men einai to kata
t’auta eidos echon), uncreated (agennȇton) and (kai) indestructible (anȏlethron),
never receiving anything into itself from without (oute eis heauto eisdechomenon allo allothen) nor itself going to
any other (oute auto eis allo poi ion),
but invisible (aoraton de) and
imperceptible by any sense (kai allȏs
anaisthȇton), and of which contemplation is granted to intelligence only (touto ho dȇ noȇsis eilȇchen episkopein).
(Pl. Tim. 51d3-52a4, tr. Jowett)
Contrast with these passages the passage in Republic X, in which god creates the idea of bed: ‘Here we find three beds (trittai tines klinai hautai gignontai):
one existing in nature (mia men hȇ en tȇi
phusei ousa), which is made by the God … another (mian de ge) is the work of the carpenter (hȇn ho tektȏn) … the work of the painter is a third (mia de hȇn ho zȏgraphos) … God (ho men dȇ theos), whether from choice or
from necessity (eite ouk ebouleto, eite
tis anankȇ epȇn) made one bed in nature and one only; two or more such beds
neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God (mȇ pleon ȇ mian en tȇi phusei apergasasthai auton klinȇn, houtȏs
epoiȇsen mian monon autȇn ekeinȇn ho estin klinȇ; duo de toiautai ȇ pleious
oute ephuteuthȇsan hupo tou theou oute mȇ phuȏsin) … Because even if He had
made but two (hoti ei duo monas poiȇseien),
a third would still appear behind them (palin
an mia anaphaneiȇ) of which they again both possessed the form (hȇs ekeinai an au amphoterai to eidos
echoien), and that would be the real bed and not the two others (kai eiȇ an ho estin klinȇ ekeinȇ all’ ouch
hai duo) … God knew this, I suppose (Tauta
dȇ oimai eidȏs ho theos), and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed
(boulomenos einai ontȏs klinȇs poiȇtȇs
ontȏs ousȇs), not a kind of maker of a kind of bed (alla mȇ klinȇs tinos mȇde klinopoios tis), and therefore he created
a bed which is essentially and by nature one only (mian phusei autȇn epoiȇsen).’ (597b5-d3, tr. Jowett)
In my
preceding post I asked: Why did Plato in the last book of the Republic introduce the notion of God as
creator of Forms? I answered that he did so to protect the Republic from an accusation of introducing new deities, the
accusation for which Socrates was sentenced to death. In the Phaedrus Plato’s Socrates proclaims that
‘God has his divinity by virtue of being with the Forms’ (pros hoisper theos ȏn theios estin, 249c6)’. If anything, this
clearly sounds like introducing the Forms as a new deity. If we view the Phaedrus as a dialogue written prior to
the death of Polemarchus in the hands of the Thirty tyrants, as I have argued
in The Lost Plato on my website,
Plato as the author of the Phaedrus
was protected by the amnesty announced by the victorious democrats after their
defeat of the Thirty. Any reader with a little bit of intelligence – such as Isocrates and his followers, sharply
criticised in the 6th book of the Republic for their pandering to the appetites of hoi polloi – could see that the Forms
discussed in Republic V-VII are the
Forms introduced in the Phaedrus.
Plato therefore had to devise a new protection; this he did by presenting god
as the creator of forms in the last book of the Republic.
If this is
right, is there any possibility of viewing the introductory passages of Republic X other than in the light of Republic III?
Socrates: ‘Again,
truth should be highly valued (Alla mȇn
kai alȇtheian ge peri pollou poiȇteon); if we were right in saying (ei gar orthȏs elegomen arti) that
falsehood is useless to the gods (kai tȏi
onti theoisi men achrȇston pseudos), and useful only as a medicine to the
men (anthrȏpois de chrȇsimon hȏs en
pharmakou eidei), then the use of such medicines should be restricted to
the physicians (dȇlon hoti to ge toiouton
iatrois doteon); private individuals have no business with them (idiȏtais de ouch’ hapteon) … Then if
anyone at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should
be the persons (Tois archousin dȇ tȇs
poleȏs, eiper tisin allois, prosȇkei pseudesthai); and they, in their
dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie
for the public good (ȇ polemiȏn ȇ politȏn
heneka ep’ ȏpheliai tȇs poleȏs).’ (389b2-9, tr. Jowett)
Plato’s philosopher
is a ruler by nature irrespective of whether he is given an opportunity to rule
in a State, or not, as Plato makes abundantly clear in books V-VII, and again
in book IX, which ends with the discussion on the nature and the way of life of
a true philosopher.
Socrates: ‘He
will look (All’ apoblepȏn ge) at the
city which is within him (pros tȇn en
hautȏi politeian), and take heed (kai
phulattȏn) that no disorder occur in it (mȇ ti parakinȇi hautou tȏn ekei), such as might arise either from
affluence (dia plȇthos ousias) or
from want (ȇ di’ oligotȇta); and upon
this principle he will regulate (houtȏs
kubernȏn) his property and gain or spend according to his means (prosthȇsei kai analȏsei tȇs ousias kath’
hoson t’ an hoios t’ ȇi).’ – Glaucon: ‘Very true (Komidȇi men oun).’ – Socrates: ‘And, for the same reason, he will
gladly accept and enjoy such honours as he deems likely to make him a better
man (Alla mȇn kai timas ge, eis t’auton
apoblepȏn, tȏn men methexei kai geusetai hekȏn, has an hȇgȇtai ameinȏ hauton
poiȇsein); but those, whether private or public, which are likely to
disorder his life, he will avoid (has d’
an lusein tȇn huparchousan hexin, pheuxetai idiai kai dȇmosiai)?’ –
Glaucon: ‘Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman (Ouk ara ta ge politika ethelȇsei prattein,
eanper totou kȇdȇtai).’ – Socrates: ‘By the dog of Egypt (nȇ ton kuna), he will! in the city which
is his own he certainly will (en ge tȇi
heautou polei kai mala), though in the land of his birth perhaps not (ou mentoi isȏs en ge tȇi patridi),
unless he have a divine call (ean mȇ
theia tis sumbȇi tuchȇ).’ – Glaucon: ‘I understand (Manthanȏ); you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we
are the founders (en hȇi nun diȇlthomen
oikizontes polei legeis), and which exists in idea only (tȇi en logois keimenȇi); for I do not
believe that there is such an one anywhere on earth (epei gȇs ge oudamou oimai autȇn einai)?’ – Socrates: ‘But perhaps
it is laid up as a pattern in heaven (All’
en ouranȏi isȏs paradeigma anakeitai), which he who desires may behold (tȏi boulomenȏi horan), and beholding (kai horȏnti), may set his own house in
order (heauton katoikizein – In a
note, Jowett offers an alternative translation of these words: ‘take up his
abode there’). But whether such a city exists or ever will exist in fact, is no
matter (diapherei de ouden eite pou estin
eite estai); for he will live after the manner of that city (ta gar tautȇs monȇs an praxeien), having
nothing to do with any other (allȇs de
oudemias).’ (591e1-592b5, tr. Jowett)
Viewing the
opening passages of Republic X, which
are alien to Plato’s thought, in the light of these passages from Republic III and IX is plausible, for
Plato had to protect the Republic not
only for his own sake but for the sake of his disciples in the Academy as well.
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