Plato’s
first attempt to turn Dionysius into a philosopher-king, which took place in
367-366, ended with a compact between the two: Dionysius’ would invite Plato
back ‘as soon as he had made his own power more secure’ and Plato promised that
he would return (Seventh Letter 338a5-b2).
When Plato arrived to Sicily as promised (in 361), he pointed out to Dionysius
what true philosophy was all about, how many preliminary subjects it entailed
and how much labour: ‘For on hearing this, if the pupil be truly philosophic …
he believes that he has been shown a marvellous pathway and that he must brace
himself at once to follow it … after this he braces both himself and him who is
guiding him on the path, nor does he desist until either he has reached the
goal of all his studies, or else has gained such power as to be capable of
directing his own steps without the aid of the instructor … this, then, was the
purport of what I said to Dionysius on that occasion’ (340b7-341a8, tr. Bury). Clearly,
Plato was prepared to devote the rest of his life to this task, which means
that ever since he returned to Athens in 366 he faced the task of preparing his
disciples in the Academy for doing philosophy without him, or rather, how to
ensure his spiritual presence among them after his physical departure.
Plato’s
conception of the state ruled by philosophers as the only properly governed
state stands and falls with his theory of Forms. Therefore, all those who
feared Plato’s influence on the court of Dionysius must have been interested in
debunking Plato’s Forms, and so were the sophists invited to the court.
Aristotle’s Metaphysics indicates
that even in Plato’s Academy arguments against the Forms were in vogue. And so
in the Parmenides Plato undertook to
defend the Forms by voicing the cardinal arguments against them, pointing out
that although such arguments of necessity pertained to the Forms, they had no
validity in the eyes of those who could see the Forms. This dialogue fulfils
this task jointly with the Republic,
to which the eyes of the readers are directed in its opening line: ‘When we
arrived at Athens from our home in Clazomenae, we met Adeimantus and Glaucon in
the Agora.’ In the Republic these two
brothers of Plato compel Socrates to transcend his philosophic ignorance (Republic 357a-368c) and outline the
state governed by philosophers, that is by those who can see the Forms.
Although the
Parmenides fulfils the task of
defending the Forms jointly with the Republic,
let me consider their specific contributions, beginning with the former, the
dramatic setting of which suggests that Plato had been acquainted with arguments
against the Forms in his early days, and that he found those arguments
irrelevant. For Plato’s half-brother Antiphon, only a few years younger than
Plato, diligently rehearsed arguments against the Forms in his teens (meirakion ȏn), to which his brother Adeimantus
testifies (Parm. 126c6-7).
***
The modern
Platonic scholarship has deprived itself of the possibility to perceive and
appreciate this point ever since it was ‘definitely established’ that the
ancient tradition, according to which Plato’s first dialogue was the Phaedrus, was ‘patently absurd’ (Cf.
e.g. R. Hackforth’s ‘Introduction’ to his translation of the Phaedrus, Cambridge, 1972, p. 3), for in
the Phaedrus Plato brings the Forms
prominently into view. (I defend the ancient tradition concerning the dating of
the Phaedrus in The Lost Plato on my website.)
Another misconception
that has bearing on this problem is the belief that ‘Diogenes 3. 6 reports that
Plato knew Socrates only from the age of twenty’. (Debra Nails, The People of Plato, Hackett Publishing
Company, 2002, p. 156). Plato must have known Socrates from his childhood; his
uncle Charmides was a friend of Socrates as we know both from Plato and from
Xenophon.
Aristotle,
one of the Thirty (ton tȏn triakonta genomenon, Parm. 127d2-3), was
Parmenides’ discussion partner in the Parmenides,
and Plato says in the Seventh Letter
that some of the Thirty were actually close connexions and acquaintances of his
(oikeioi te kai gnȏrimoi,
324d1-2). And so it is likely that Plato was acquainted with Parmenides’ arguments
against Socrates’ theory of Forms yet before his half-brother Antiphon began to
learn them by heart. As the dialogue suggests, Parmenides’ criticism left
Socrates in the state of a self-reflected philosophic ignorance, which a
philosophically minded young man could not find very attractive.
What
Diogenes says in 3. 5-6 is the following: ‘At first Plato used to study
philosophy in the Academy, and afterwards in the garden at Colonus, as a
follower of Heraclitus. Afterwards, when he was about to compete for the prize
with a tragedy, he listened to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysius,
and then consigned his poems to the flames, with the words ‘Come hither, O
fire-god, Plato now has need of thee.’ From that time onward, having reached
his twentieth year (so it is said), he was the pupil of Socrates.’ This does
not mean ‘that Plato knew Socrates only from the age of twenty’; it means that
at the age of twenty Plato had a dramatic philosophic encounter with Socrates
as a result of which he not only burnt the tragedy with which he was about to
compete, but ceased to be a follower of Heraclitus and became a disciple of
Socrates.
Aristotle
informs us that Plato, who in his youth became a Heraclitean, believing that
all sensible things are in constant flux and there is no knowledge about them,
encountered Socrates who fixed his mind (brought his mind to a standstill) on
definitions of moral concepts (peri
horismȏn epistêsantos tên dianoian),
and that because of this – that is because he saw that Socrates brought his mind
to a standstill, fixed on the definitions of moral concepts – he conceived (hupelaben) that this must have been
happening concerning different things (hȏs peri heterȏn touto gignomenon), things that are different from
sensible things (ou tȏn aisthêtȏn): ‘this kind
of beings he called Forms’ (ta men
toiauta tȏn ontȏn ideas prosêgoreuse). (Arist. Met. A, 987a32-b8).
***
In the Parmenides 128e6-129a6 Socrates
challenges Zeno and Parmenides with a theory of Forms: ‘Do you not acknowledge
that there exists, alone by itself, a certain Form of similarity, and another
which is opposite to it, which is dissimilar; and that you and I and the other
things we call many get a share of these two things. And that things that get a
share of similarity become similar in the respect and to the degree that they
get a share; things that get a share of dissimilarity become dissimilar, and
that things that get a share of both become both?’ – Socrates’ eyes are
directed at things that have a similar form, which leads him to suppose that
there must be a single Form, in which they all get a share. It is this
derivation of the Forms from things around on which Parmenides bases his
criticism: ‘I think that the reason why you think that each Form is one is like
this: When many things appear to you to be large, there perhaps seems to be
some Form, which is one and the same, as you look on them all; whence you
believe the large is one’. Socrates: ‘True’. (132a1-5)
As Aristotle
indicates, Plato arrived at the Forms in a very different way, by conceiving
the Forms to which Socrates’ fixation of mind on definitions pointed. Republic V, where Plato introduces the
Forms, corroborates Aristotle’s testimony. At 473c-e Socrates proclaims that
only philosophers can govern a state properly. Challenged by Glaucon to justify
his pronouncement, Socrates defines philosophers as those who can see the truth
and love seeing it (tous tês alêtheias philotheamonas). When Glaucon asks, what he means
by it, Socrates explains: ‘Since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are
two? – And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one? – And of just and
unjust, good and evil, and of every other Form, the same mark holds: taken
singly, each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with
actions and bodies and with one another (têi de tȏn praxeȏn kai sȏmatȏn kai allêlȏn koinȏniai), they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many (pantachou phantazomena polla phainesthai
hekaston)? – And this is the distinction which I draw between the
sight-loving (philotheamonas),
art-loving (philotechnous), practical
class (praktikous) which you have
mentioned, and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the
name of philosophers. – The lovers of sounds and sights are fond of fine tones
and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of
them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty (autou de tou kalou adunatos autȏn hê dianoia tên phusin idein te kai aspasasthai). – Few are they who are able to attain to this ideal beauty
and contemplate it.’ (475e4-476b11, tr. Jowett)
***
In the Parmenides, after finishing his
exposition of the greatest difficulty concerning the Forms, Parmenides reflects
on the whole preceding discussion concerning the Forms: ‘These, and many other
difficulties on top of these, necessarily pertain to the Forms, if these Forms
of beings exist (ei eisin hautai hai
ideai tȏn ontȏn), and if one is going to define each
Form itself. The result is that the hearer is perplexed and contends that they
do not exist, and that even if their existence is conceded, they are
necessarily unknowable by human nature. In saying this, he seems to be saying
something (dokein te ti legein) and,
as we just remarked, it’s astonishingly hard to convince him to the contrary.
Only a man of considerable natural gifts will be able to learn that there is a
certain kind of each thing (hȏs esti ti genos hekastou), being that is alone by itself (ousia autê kath’ hautên), and it
will take a man more remarkable still to discover it (eti de thaumastoterou tou heurêsontos) and be able to instruct someone
else (kai allon dunêsomenou didaxai)
who has examined all these difficulties with sufficient care (tauta panta hikanȏs dieukrinêsamenon).’ (134e9-135b2)
Allen
remarks: ‘It will be observed that Parmenides does not suppose that the
arguments against participation cannot be solved. He rather supposes they can
be solved, but that it will take a man of remarkable gifts to solve them. It is
evident from this single passage that Parmenides does not suppose that his
criticisms of the theory of Ideas are a mere tissue of fallacies. On the
contrary, they are deep and serious, and raise difficulties that must be
thought through if the theory of Ideas is to be sustained. Socrates, young and
inexperienced, has not yet thought them through with sufficient care.’ (R. E.
Allen, ‘Comment’, in Plato’s Parmenides,
Yale University Press, 1997, p. 203)
As I have
noted in ‘Allen’s misrepresentation of Plato’s Parmenides’ (posted on November 12, 2015), nothing in what
Parmenides said suggests that he supposes ‘that his criticisms, and many other
difficulties on top of these’ (134e9-135a1) can be solved. On the contrary, he
maintains that these difficulties ‘necessarily pertain to the Forms’ (135a1),
and yet he views all these criticisms of the theory of Ideas as false. When he
says that a man who voices such criticisms ‘seems to be saying something’ (dokein ti legein), he implies that ‘he
is saying nothing’ (ouden legei).
In the Parmenides itself the criticisms that
Parmenides had raised against the Forms are thus viewed as irrelevant to a
person who finds the Forms. But Parmenides’ words ‘as we just remarked’ (135a6)
refer to his words ‘one could not
show to the objector that he is saying a falsity (hoti pseudetai), unless he happened to be a man of great
experience and natural ability, willing to follow a man who would show him the
Forms in the course of a copious and lengthy undertaking .’ (133b6-9)
The words ‘willing to follow a man who would show him the Forms in the course
of a copious and lengthy undertaking’ take us to the Republic.
In Republic
II to IV Socrates constructs a proto-ideal state and by inspecting its
composition consisting of three main classes, labourers, soldiers, and the wise
guardians, he discovers the four cardinal virtues, courage, wisdom, temperance
and justice. He then finds analogous three parts in the human soul and in it
the corresponding virtues. On that occasion he remarks: ‘I must impress upon
you, Glaucon, that in my opinion our present methods of argument are not at all
adequate to the accurate solution of this question: the true method is another
and longer one (435c9-d3).’ It is only in Book VI that Socrates gets to the
point at which he can outline the true method; he tells Adeimantus: ‘You may
remember that we divided the soul into three parts; and by relating them to
each other, distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage,
and wisdom? … We were saying that he who
wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more
circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear … the guardian of the State
must be required to take the longer circuit or he will never arrive at the
highest knowledge which most belongs to him.’ (504a4-d3, tr. Jowett)
This longer road leads to the Form of the
Good (tên tou agathou idean) ‘which
imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower’ (to tên alêtheian parechon tois
gignȏskomenois kai tȏi gignȏskonti tên dunamin parechon, 508e1-3). ‘The
good not only infuses the power of being known into all things known, but also
bestow upon them their being and existence, and yet the good is not existence,
but lies far beyond it in dignity and power.’ (509b6-10) ‘All things known’ are
here the Forms, for only the Forms can be known. All things perceived by our
senses are the province of mere opinion, they have no true being, they belong
to the sphere that is intermediary between being and not-being: ‘The many
notions which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other
things are tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and
pure not-being’ (479d3-5, tr. Jowett). It is from within this region that for
Plato of the Republic all objections
against the Forms are derived; this is why they merely ‘appear to say
something’ from the point of view of Plato in the Parmenides (135a6).
When we
realize that Plato dramatically staged the Parmenides
so as to direct the reader’s mind towards the Republic, we can appreciate the significance of Adeimantus’ brief
characterization of Antiphon ‘when Antiphon was young, he diligently and thoroughly
rehearsed (eu mala diemeletêse) the
arguments, though now, like his grandfather of the same name, he spends most of
his time on horses’. As a youngster, Antiphon delighted in arguments against
the Forms: ‘Youngsters, when they first get the taste for arguments, they argue
for amusement, always using arguments to effect contradiction (aei eis antilogian chrȏmenoi)’,
Socrates points out to Glaucon in Republic
539b2-5. Such spiritual nourishment could not generate in Antiphon a lasting
commitment to philosophy; those, whose mind is turned to real philosophy,
become committed to it and delight in it the more the older they get.
No comments:
Post a Comment