As I have
argued, Plato wrote the Parmenides
after returning from his journey to Sicily in 366 and before he went to Sicily
in 361 to help his disciples in the Academy to protect the theory of Forms
against arguments that had been or might be raised against it; the introduction
to the dialogue points to the Republic,
so that the Parmenides and the Republic were designated to work jointly
as a protective shield against any hostile questioning of the theory, and as
the road leading to the Forms. Then I noted that the introductory scene in the Symposium is dramatically linked to the
introductory scenes in the Parmenides
and in the Republic. In 'The Parmenides and the Symposium - their dating’ I suggested that Plato wrote the Symposium after the Parmenides
to present the ascent to the Forms in a concise and appealing manner, so that
these three dialogues could represent Plato in the Academy after his leaving
it. The question is whether Plato’s Letters,
which are related to this period, can shed any light on this trio of dialogues, especially the Seventh Letter, in which Plato explains why he undertook his
journeys to Sicily, and the Second Letter,
which he wrote to Dionysius after he returned from Sicily, in 364.
In the Seventh Letter Plato explains that from
his youth he wanted to do politics in Athens, but that as he looked at all the
States which then existed, he ‘was compelled to declare’: ‘The classes of
mankind will have no cessation from evils until either the class of those who
are right and true philosophers attains political supremacy, or else the class
of those who hold power in the States becomes, by some dispensation of Heaven,
really philosophic.’ (326a5-b4, tr. Bury). In the Republic, Socrates tells Glaucon: ‘Until philosophers are kings in
their cities, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power
of philosophy, and political greatness (dunamis
politikê) and wisdom (philosophia) meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue
either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will
never have rest of their evils.’ (Rep.
473c11-d5, tr. B. Jowett)
In the Parmenides we meet Glaucon and his
brother Adeimantus in the opening sentence of the dialogue: ‘When we arrived at
Athens from our home in Clazomenae, we met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora’
(126a1-2, tr. Allen). In the Republic
these two brothers compel Socrates to transcend his philosophic ignorance (Republic 357a-368c) and construct the state
ruled by philosophers.
The thought
that human society can be properly governed only if philosophers become kings
or kings become philosophers profoundly influenced Plato’s subsequent life. In
the Seventh Letter he says: ‘With
this thought in mind I came to Italy and Sicily on my first visit’ (326b5-6),
‘being then about forty years old’ (324a6). This thought he implanted in the
soul of Dion, brother-in-law and son-in-law of Dionysius I. When Dionysius died
in 367, Dion believed that under the guidance of Plato the young Dionysius
might become the philosopher-king of Plato’s ideal state; he urged Plato to
come to Syracuse ‘by all means with all speed (327d8-e1) … And these were the
terms in which his request was couched: “What opportunities are we to wait for
that could be better than those that have now been presented by a stroke of
divine good fortune?” And he dwelt in detail on the extent of the empire in
Italy and Sicily and his own power therein, and the youth of Dionysius,
mentioning also how great a desire he had for philosophy and education, and he
spoke of his own nephews and connections, and how they would be not only easily
converted themselves to the doctrines and the life I always taught, but also
most useful in helping to influence Dionysius; so that now, if ever (he
concluded), all our hopes will be fulfilled of seeing the same persons at once
philosophers and rulers of mighty states (327e8-328b1) … what plausible answer
should I have had to such pleadings? There is none. Well then, I came for good
and just reasons so far as it is possible for men to do so; and it was because
of such motives that I left my own occupations, which were anything but
ignoble.’ (329a5-b2, tr. Bury)
Clearly,
Plato had no time to prepare his disciples for the Academy after his departure,
the Academy without him.
But the
things did not go as Dion and Plato expected: ‘On my
arrival I found Dionysius’ kingdom all full of civil strife and of slanderous
stories brought to the court concerning Dion. So I defended him, so far as I
was able, though it was little I could do; but about three months later,
charging Dion with plotting against tyranny, Dionysius sent him aboard a small
vessel and drove him out with ignominy. After that all of us who were Dion’s
friends were in alarm lest he should punish any of us on a charge of being
accomplices in Dion’s plot; and regarding me a report actually went abroad in
Syracuse that I had been put to death by Dionysius as being responsible for all
the events of that time. But when Dionysius perceived us all in this state of
mind, he was alarmed lest our fears should bring about some worse result; so he
was for receiving us all back in a friendly manner; and, moreover, he kept
consoling me and bidding me be of good courage and begging me by all means to
remain.’ (329b7-d5, tr. Bury)
Plato stayed with Dionysius for a year and left Sicily in 366, agreeing to
return: ‘At that time there was a state of war in Sicily. Dionysius said that,
when he had put the affairs of his empire in a position of greater safety for
himself, he would send for Dion and me again … I agreed to come again on these
conditions.’ (Seventh Letter,
338a4-b2, tr. J. Harward). He had thus five years to prepare his disciples for his
ultimate departure, for life in the Academy without him; he returned to Sicily
in 361.
***
In the Second Letter, in which Plato responds to a letter he received
from Dionysius, he reflects on his first attempt to transform him into a
philosopher: ‘You say you have not had a sufficient demonstration of the
doctrine concerning the nature of “the First” (peri tês tou prȏtou phuseȏs) … The matter
stands thus: Related to the King of All (peri
ton pantȏn basilea) are all things (pant’
esti), and for his sake they are (kai
ekeinou heneka panta), and of all things fair he is the cause (kai ekeino aition hapantȏn tȏn kalȏn) … About
these (peri auta), then, the human
soul (hê oun anthrȏpinê psuchê)
strives to learn (oregetai mathein poi’
atta esti ), looking to the things that are akin to itself (blepousa eis ta hautês sungenê), whereof
none is fully perfect (hȏn ouden hikanȏs
echei). But as to the King and the objects I have mentioned, they are of
quite different quality. In the first place the soul inquires (to dê meta touto hê psuchê phêsi)– “Well
then, what quality have they (alla poion
ti mên)?” But the cause of all the mischief lies in this very question (tout’ esti to erȏtêma ho pantȏn aition esti
kakȏn), or rather in the travail this question creates in the soul (mallon de hê peri toutou ȏdis en têi psuchêi
engignomenê); and unless a man delivers himself from this (hên ei mê tis exairethêsetai) he will
never really attain the truth (tês
alêtheias ontȏs ou mê pote tuchêi). You, however, declared to me in the
garden, under the laurels, that you had formed this notion yourself and that it
was a discovery of your own; and I made answer that if it was plain to you that
this was so, you would have saved me from a long discourse (pollȏn an logȏn eiês eme apolelukȏs).
(312d5-313b2, tr. Bury).
***
Bury remarks
on the words ’if it was plain to you that this was so, you would
have saved me from a long discourse’: “This phrase echoes Theaet. 188c.” The reference is
wrong; František Novotný in his Latin commentary correctly refers to Theaet. 185e, where Socrates says to
Theaetetus: ‘you’ve done me a favour: you’ve let me off a very long argument’ (eu epoiêsas me mala suchnou logou apallaxas,
185e5-6, tr. McDowell). It appears that Bury was led astray by the Theaetetus version, where the logos is in the singular, for in the Second Letter pollȏn an logȏn is in the plural. We realize the significance of
the plural, if we remember that ‘the King of All’ of the Second Letter, to whom all things are related, for whose sake they
all are, and who is the cause of all fair things, can be identified with the
Good of the Republic, where Plato
says: ‘The Good not only infuses the power of being known into all things
known, but also bestows upon them their being and existence, and yet the good
is not existence, but lies far beyond it in dignity and power (159b6-10, tr. B.
Jowett).’ In the ascent to the Idea of the Good in the Republic Plato’s philosophy culminates. Had Dionysius reached the
Good on his own, had he really seen it, he would have saved Plato from all
discourses leading towards it; they could simply contemplate it together. But
the very fact that Dionysius was puzzled about it (aporoumenos) and asked Archedemus to tell Plato that he did not
sufficiently demonstrate it to him (ouch
hikanȏs apodedeichthai soi, 312d5-6) clearly shows that Dionysius was far
from getting it. And so Plato writes to him:
‘You fancied you had a firm grip on the proofs of
it, and so you omitted to make them fast; thus your view of the truth sways now
this way, now that, round about the apparent object; whereas the true object is
wholly different. Nor are you alone in this experience; on the contrary, there
has never yet been anyone, I assure you, who has not suffered the same
confusion at the beginning, when he first learnt this doctrine from me; and
they all overcome it with difficulty, one man having more trouble and another
less, but scarcely a single one of them escapes with but a little.’ (313b6-c5,
tr. Bury)
***
While
Plato’s image of the ‘King of All’ in the Second
Letter points to the Republic, the
subsequent lines recall the Theaetetus,
beginning with the line ‘the travail this
question creates in the soul (mallon de
hê peri toutou ȏdis en têi psuchêi engignomenê); and unless a man delivers
himself from this (hên ei mê tis
exairethêsetai) he will never really attain the truth (tês alêtheias ontȏs uou mê pote tuchêi)’ (313a4-6), which recalls Theaet. 151a-c, where Socrates says to
Theaetetus: ‘There’s another experience which the people who associate with me
have in common with women in childbirth: they feel pain (ȏdinousi gar), and they’re full of difficulties (kai aporias empimplantai) … I suspect
you’re suffering pain – as indeed you think yourself – because you’re pregnant
with something inside you. So put yourself in my hands … and do your best to
answer whatever I ask you as well as you can. And if, when I inspect the things
you say, I take one of them to be an imitation, not something true (hêgêsomai eidȏlon kai mê alêthes), and
so ease it out (eita hupexairȏmai)
and throw it away, you mustn’t be angry with me.’
It appears that Plato presupposes that Dionysius
knows the Theaetetus, for if he does,
Plato’s related words in the Second Letter obtain much greater pregnancy. Plato’s following words in the
Second Letter indicate that Dionysius was well versed in Plato’s dialogues:
‘Seeing that you are testing my doctrines (epei
gar basanizeis auta) both by attending the lectures of other teachers (sungignomenos te allois) and by
examining my teaching side by side with theirs (kai paratheȏmenos para ta tȏn allȏn), as well as by itself (kai auta kath’ hauta), then, if the test
you make is a true one (ei alêthês ho
basanos), not only will these doctrines implant themselves now in your mind
(nun soi tauta te prosphusetai), but
you also will be devoted both to them and to us (kai oikeios toutois te kai hêmin esêi).’ (313c7-d3, tr. Bury) Let
me add here the testimony of Plato’s Thirteenth
Letter, which Plato wrote shortly after return from Sicily in 366. Plato
asks Dionysius to send three tunics as a gift for the daughters of Cebes: ‘You
know well the name of Cebes (epieikȏs de
gignȏskeis t’ounoma Kebêtos), for he is depicted in the Socratic discourses
conversing with Socrates, in company of Simmias, in the discourse on the soul (en tȏi peri psuchês logȏi, i.e. in the Phaedo) (363a3-7).
This means that the Parmenides and the Symposium,
which I have dated as written after Plato’s return from Sicily in 366 and before
his leaving Athens for Sicily in 360, were written not only to protect his
disciples against the hostile questioning of the theory of Forms after his
leaving the Academy, but to prepare Dionysius for Plato’s promised return to
Syracuse as well. If so, these two dialogues were written with special urgency,
for they were of vital importance to Plato himself; I believe that Plato’s Letters can corroborate this hypothesis.
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