Socrates: Until a man knows the truth Pri\n a1n tij to/ te a0lhqe\j e9ka/stwn ei0dh=| about each of the things about which he speaks or writes (pe/ri w{n le/gei h2 gra/fei), and becomes capable of defining the whole by itself (kat’ au0to/ te pa=n o9ri/zesqai dunato\j ge/nhtai), and having defined it (o9risa/meno/j te), knows how to cut it again according to its forms until it can no longer be cut (pa/lin kat’ ei1dh me/xri tou= a0tmh/tou te/mnein e0pisthqh=|); and until he has reached an understanding of the nature of soul along the same lines (peri/ te yuxh=j fu/sewj diidw_n kata\ tau0ta/), discovering the form which fits each nature (to\ prosarmo/tton e9ka/sth| fu/sei ei]doj a0neuri/skwn), and so arranges and orders his speech (ou3tw tiqh=| kai\ diakosmh=| to\n lo/gon), offering a complex soul complex speeches containing all the modes (poiki/lh| me\n poiki/louj yuxh|= kai\ panarmoni/ouj didou\j lo/gouj), and simple speeches (a9plou=j de\) to a simple soul (a9plh=|) – not before then will he be capable of pursuing the making of speeches as a whole in a scientific way, to the degree that its nature allows (ou0 pro/teron dunato\n te/xnh| e1sesqai kaq’ o3son pe/fuke metaxeirisqh=nai to\ lo/gwn ge/noj), whether for the purpose of teaching (ou1te ti pro\j to\ dida/cai) or persuading (ou1te ti pro\j to\ pei=sai), as the whole of our previous argument has indicated (w(j o9 e1mprosqen pa=j memh/nuken h9mi=n lo/goj).
Phaedrus: Absolutely
(Panta/pasi
me\n ou]n); that was
just about how it appeared to us (touto/ ge ou3tw pw~j e0fa/nh).
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