Plato in the Phaedrus and
Isocrates in Against the Sophists reflect on the preoccupation of the
past masters with lawsuits. They both are critical of them, but their criticism
is very different.
Plato in the Phaedrus accepted as
given the involvement of the rhetoricians in lawsuits. He criticised them for their
failure to realise that the knowledge of truth was necessary if one was to
achieve the desired outcome in any given lawsuit with certainty: ‘They say (Phasi)
… that the man who is going to be
competent at rhetoric need have nothing to do with the truth about just or good
things, or indeed about people who are such by nature or upbringing (hoti
ouden alȇtheias metechein deoi dikaiȏn ȇ agathȏn peri pragmatȏn, ȇ kai
anthrȏpȏn ge toioutȏn phusei ontȏn ȇ trophȇi, ton mellonta hikanȏs rȇtorikon
esesthai). For they say that in the law-courts no one cares in the
slightest for the truth about these things (to parapan gar ouden en tois
dikastȇriois toutȏn alȇtheias melein oudeni), but only for what is
convincing (alla tou pithanou); and this is what is probable (touto
d’ einai to eikos), which is what the would-be master of the art of
speech must pay attention to (hȏi dei prosechein ton mellonta technȇi
erein). (Phaedrus 272d2-e2)
***
The translation is C.J. Rowe’s with
the exception of the expression ton mellonta technȇi erein, which
he translated ‘the man who is going to speak scientifically’, which I have
replaced by Hackforth’s ‘the would-be master of the art of speech’. Row consistently
translates technȇ as ‘science’ and technȇi (instrumental dative
of technȇ) as ‘scientifically’, but when the past masters of rhetoric
used these expressions, they had nothing approaching to ‘science’ or ‘scientifically’
in mind, as the given text clearly shows. Hackforth on the other hand usually translates
technȇ as ‘art’, and technȇi by such expressions as ‘he has the
art’. See e.g. 272 a 7-b1, a passage in which Socrates outlines rhetoric based
on dialectic. Rowe translates: ‘… then his grasp of the science will be
well and completely finished (kalȏs te kai teleȏs estin hȇ technȇ
apeirgasmenȇ), but not before that (proteron d’ ou). But in whichever
of these things someone is lacking (all’ hoti an autȏn tis elleipȇi)
when he speaks (legȏn) or teaches (ȇ didaskȏn) or writes (ȇ
graphȏn), and says he speaks scientifically (phȇi de technȇi
legein), the person who disbelieves him (ho mȇ peithomenos) is in
the stronger position (kratei).’ Since in these lines Plato uses the
terms technȇ and technȇi in his outline of rhetoric, Rowe’s
translation is as good as one can get. Hackforth translates: ‘… then and not
till then has he well and truly achieved the art (kalȏs te kai teleȏs
estin hȇ technȇ apeirgasmenȇ). But if in his speaking or teaching or
writing he fails in any of these requirements (all’ hoti an autȏn tis
elleipȇi legȏn ȇ didaskȏn ȇ graphȏn), he may tell you that he has the
art of speech (phȇi de technȇi legein), but one mustn’t
believe all one is told (ho mȇ peithomenos kratei).’ Hackforth’s
translation does not do justice to Plato’s use of the terms technȇ and technȇi
in his project of rhetoric, but it suits better the rhetoricians of the past
when they present their view of rhetoric as technȇ. In the following I
use Rowe’s translation, taking recourse to Hackforth’s versions wherever they
correspond better to the original and putting technȇ and the related
expressions with their English translations in bold.
***
Socrates goes on: ‘For they go on to
say that sometimes one should not even say what was actually done (oude gar
au ta prachthenta dein legein eniote), if it is improbable (ean mȇ
eikotȏs ȇi pepragmena), but rather what is probable (alla ta eikota),
both when accusing (en te katȇgoriai) and when defending (kai
apologiai), and whatever one’s purpose when speaking (kai pantȏs legonta),
the probable is what must be pursued (to dȇ eikos diȏkteon einai), which
means frequently saying goodbye to the truth (polla eiponta chairein tȏi
alȇthei); for when this happens throughout one’s speech (touto gar dia
pantos tou logou gignomenon), it gives us the art complete (tȇn
hapasan technȇn porizein).’ (272e2-273a1)
Phaedrus remarked: ‘You have stated
just (Auta ge, ȏ Sȏkrates, dielȇluthas) what those who profess to be experts
in speaking say (ha legousin hoi peri tous logous technikoi
prospoioumenoi einai).’ – Socrates: ‘But you’ve gone over the man Tisias
himself carefully (Alla mȇn ton ge Teisian auton pepatȇkas akribȏs); so
let Tisias tell us this too (eipetȏ toinun kai tode hȇmin ho Teisias):
he says, doesn’t he, that the probable is just what most people think to be the
case (mȇ ti allo legei to eikos ȇ to plȇthei dokoun)?’ – Phaedrus: ‘Just
that (Ti gar allo;).’ – Socrates: ‘I suppose it was on making just this
clever, and scientific, discovery (Touto dȇ sophon heurȏn hama kai technikon)
that he wrote (egrapsen) to the effect (hȏs) that if a weak but
brave man (ean tis asthenȇs kai andrikos) beats up a strong coward (ischuron
kai deilon sunkopsas) and steals his cloak or something else of his (himation
ȇ ti allo aphelomenos), and is taken to court for it (eis dikastȇrion
agȇtai), then neither party should speak the truth (dei dȇ t’alȇthes
mȇdeteron legein); the coward should say that he wasn’t beaten up by the
brave man single-handed (alla ton men deilon mȇ hupo monou phanai tou
andrikou sunkekophthai), while the other man should establish that they
were on their own together (ton de touto men elenchein hȏs monȏ ȇstȇn),
and should resort to the well-known
argument (ekeinȏi de katachrȇsasthai tȏi), “how could a man like me (Pȏs
d’an egȏ toiosde) have assaulted a man like him (toiȏide epecheirȇsa;)?”
The coward will certainly not admit his cowardice (ho d’ ouk erei tȇn
heautou kakȇn), but will try to invent some other lie (alla ti allo
pseudesthai epicheirȏn) and so perhaps offer an opening for his opponent to
refute him (tach’ an elenchon pȇi paradoiȇ tȏi antidikȏi). And similar “scientific”
rules are given for other cases of the kind (kai peri t’alla dȇ toiaut’ atta
esti ta technȇi legomena). Isn’t that so, Phaedrus (ou gar, ȏ
Phaidre;)?’ – Phaedrus: ‘Of course (Ti mȇn;).’ – Socrates: ‘Hey! (Pheu)
How cleverly hidden a science Tisias seems to have discovered (deinȏs
g’ eoiken apokekrummenȇn technȇn aneurein Teisias), or someone else
(ȇ allos), whoever he may happen to be (hostis dȇ pot’ ȏn tunchanei),
and wherever he rejoices in being named from (kai hopothen chairei
onomazomenos)’. (273a2-c9)
***
C.J. Rowe notes: ‘”Plato perhaps hints
that the real discoverer was Corax, the reputed teacher of Tisias, who ‘was
pleased’ to be called after a bird of prey (the crow korax)”, Hackforth;
or, as de Vries maintains, the meaning is genuinely indefinite: “or whoever the
inventor is, and wherever (i.e. whatever city) he boasts of belonging to – I
don’t know and I don’t care”’.
In P. Couvreur’s edition of Hermeiae
Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum Scholia (1901) we can find the following
remark: ‘He said this (touto eipen) presumably (isȏs) because of
Corax (dia ton Koraka) for Corax was said to be Tisias’ pupil [perhaps
teacher] (epeidȇ elegeto ho Korax Tisiou mathȇtȇs [pot. didaskalos]
einai).’
***
Socrates continues: ‘Still (atar),
my friend (ȏ hetaire), should we or should we not say to him (toutȏi
hȇmeis poteron legȏmen ȇ mȇ) – ‘ – Phaedrus: ‘What (To poion;)?’ (273c9-d1)
***
One might expect a criticism of Tisias
and his fellow rhetoricians, which would be made on moral grounds. In the
preamble to his Defence speech Socrates will ask the jury: ‘Think only of the
justice of my words, and give heed to that (auto touto skopein kai toutȏi
ton noun prosechein, ei dikaia legȏ ȇ mȇ), for in this consists the
virtue of the juror (dikastou men gar hautȇ aretȇ); that of
the orator consists in telling the truth (rȇtoros de t’alȇthȇ legein,
Pl. Apology 18a3-6).’ Instead, in the Phaedrus Socrates contends
that only rhetoric based on dialectic could achieve the desired result
scientifically, so as to do justice to the concept of technȇ.
***
Answering Phaedrus’ ‘What’ question, Socrates
says: ‘This (Hoti): “Tisias (ȏ Teisia), we have for some time
been saying, before you came along (palai hȇmeis, prin kai se parelthein,
tunchanomen legontes), that (hȏs ara) this probability (touto to
eikos) comes about in the minds of the ordinary people because of a
resemblance to the truth (tois pollois di’ homoiotȇta tou alȇthous tunchanei
engignomenon); and we showed only a few moments ago that in every case it
is the man who knows the truth who knows best how to discover these
resemblances (tas de homoiotȇtas arti diȇlthomen hoti pantachou ho tȇn
alȇtheian eidȏs kallista epistatai heuriskein). So if you have anything
else to say on the subject of a science of speaking (hȏst’ ei men
allo ti peri technȇs logȏn legeis), we’ll gladly hear it (akouoimen
an); if not (ei de mȇ), we’ll believe what we showed just now (hois
nundȇ diȇlthomen peisometha), that unless someone counts up various natures
of those who are going to listen to him (hȏs ean mȇ tis tȏn akousomenȏn tas
phuseis diarithmȇsȇtai), and is capable of dividing up the things that are
according to their forms and embrace each thing one by one under one kind (kai
kat’ eidȇ te diaireisthai ta onta kai miai ideai dunatos ȇi kath’ hen hekaston
perilambanein), he will never be an expert in the science of
speaking to the degree possible for mankind (ou pot’ estai technikos
logȏn peri kath’ hoson dunaton anthrȏpȏi).’ (273d2-e4, tr. Rowe)
In contrast to Plato, Isocrates does
not criticise the past masters of rhetoric for their lack of science, he is
appalled by their professing ‘to teach how to conduct law-suits’: ‘There remain
to be considered those who lived before our time (loipoi d’ hȇmin eisin hoi
pro hȇmȏn genomenoi) and did not scruple to write the so-called arts of
oratory (kai tas kaloumenas technas grapsai tolmȇsantes), who must not
be dismissed without rebuke (hous ouk apheteon anepitimȇtous).’ [Norlin
remarks: ‘technȇ, like ars in Latin, was the accepted term for a
treatise on rhetoric.] ‘They professed to teach how to conduct law-suits (hoi
tines hupeschonto dikazesthai didaxein), picking out the most discredited
of terms (eklexamenoi to duscherestaton tȏn onomatȏn), which the enemies
might have been expected to employ (ho tȏn phthonountȏn ergon ȇn legein),
but not the leading figures in this educational discipline (all ou tȏn
proestȏtȏn tȇs toiautȇs paideuseȏs) – and that too although this faculty (kai
tauta tou pragmatos), in so far as it can be taught (kath’ hoson esti
didakton), is of no greater aid to forensic speeches than to all other
discourse (ouden mallon pros tous dikanikous logous ȇ pros tous allous
hapantas ȏphelein dunamenou). But they were much worse than those who
double in disputation (tosoutȏi de cheirous egenonto tȏn peri tas eridas
kalindoumenȏn)’ – [in the opening paragraph Isocrates characterised the
contemporary philosophers as ‘devoted to disputations’ (peri tas eridas
diatribontȏn)] – ‘for although the latter expounded such captious theories
(hoson houtoi men toiauta logidia diexiontes) that were anyone to cleave
to them in practice (hois ei tis epi tȏn praxeȏn emmeineien) he would at
once be in all manner of trouble (euthus an en pasin eiȇ kakois), they
did, at any rate, make professions of virtue (homȏs aretȇn epȇngeilanto)
and sobriety in their teaching (kai sȏphrosunȇn peri autȏn), whereas the
former (ekeinoi d’), although exhorting others to study political
discourse (epi tous politikous logous parakalountes), neglected all the
good things which this study affords (amelȇsantes tȏn allȏn tȏn prosontȏn
autois agathȏn), and became nothing more than professors of meddlesomeness
and greed (polupragmosunȇs kai pleonexias hupestȇsan einai didaskaloi, 19-20,
tr. G. Norlin, with minor changes).’
G. Norlin comments on Isocrates’
‘picking out the most discredited of terms’ in § 19: ‘Again and again Isocrates expresses his
repugnance to this kind of oratory, and in general it was in bad odour. The
precepts of Corax (Crow), for example, were called “the bad eggs of the bad
Corax”.’
In Plato’s Phaedrus there is no
sign of this kind of repugnance to the oratory
preoccupied with lawsuits. The question is, what happened in the years that
separate the Phaedrus (for its dating in 405 B.C. see ‘Plato’s first two
dialogues’ on my website) from Isocrates’ Against the Sophists (dated
presumably in 392)? The most important thing, I believe, was the determination
of the democrats, after their victory over the Thirty and the restoration of
full democracy (in 403 B.C.), to prevent reprisals and lawsuits. Plato says in
the Seventh Letter: ‘The exiles who then returned exercised no little
moderation’ (pollȇi ge echrȇsanto hoi tote katelthontes epieikeiai, 324b4-5,
tr. R.G. Bury). Andocides addresses the Athenian jury in 399 B.C. : ‘When you
came up from Piraeus (epeidȇ epanȇlthete ek Peiraieȏs), when it was in
your power to take revenge (genomenon eph’ humin timȏreisthai) you
decided to let bygones be bygones (egnȏte ean ta gegenȇmena), and you
made it more important to save the city (kai peri pleionos epoiȇsasthe
sȏizein tȇn polin) than to take personal revenge (ȇ tas idias timȏrias).’
(De Mysteriis 81). It was in the same year, in 399, when the repugnance
to the oratory preoccupied with lawsuits was set aside at the trial of Socrates;
his accusers had won the day and Socrates was executed. But by refusing to
escape from prison and deciding to die rather than transgress the laws of
Athens, as Plato immortalised it in the Crito, Socrates reinforced the aversion
to such rhetoric.
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