Problems concerning participation
Parmenides asks Socrates: ‘Do you think (dokei soi), as you say (hȏs
phêis), that there are
certain Forms (einai eidê atta) by partaking of which these
other things have got their names (hȏn tade ta alla metalambanonta tas epȏnumias autȏn
ischein)? As for example (hoion)
having partaken of similarity (homiotêtos men metalabonta) they become (gignesthai) similar (homoia), and of largeness (megethous de) large (megala), and of beauty and justice (kallous de kai dikaiosunês) just and beautiful (dikaia te kai kala)?’ Socrates answers:
‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge)’.
Parmenides asks: ‘Then (Oukoun) each
participating thing (hekaston to metalambanon)
partakes (metalambanei) either of the
whole of the Form (êtoi
holou tou eidous) or of a part of it (ê
merous). Or could there be any other participation apart from these (ê allê
tis an metalêpsis chȏris toutȏn
genoito)?’ Socrates: ‘How could there be (Kai pȏs an)?’ Parmenides: ‘Does
it seem to you, then (Poteron oun dokei
soi), that in each of the many is the whole Form (holon to eidos en hekastȏi
einai tȏn pollȏn),
being one (hen on), or how (ê pȏs)?’
Socrates: ‘For what prevents it (Ti gar kȏluei) to be one (hen einai)?’ Parmenides: ‘So being one
and the same (Hen ara on kai tauton),
it will be as a whole at the same time in many things (holon hama enestai en pollois) that are separate (chȏris
ousin), and thus (kai houtȏs) it would be separate from
itself (auto hautou chȏris an eiê).’
(130e5 – 131b2)
Socrates reposts: ‘No, it would not (Ouk an), if like the day being one and the same (hoion hêmera
mia kai hê autê
ousa) is in many places simultaneously (pollachou
hama esti), and yet is not separate from itself in any way (kai ouden ti mallon autê hautês
chȏris estin), if so (ei houtȏ)
each of the Forms as well (kai hekaston tȏn eidȏn)
would be (eiê)
in all things (en pasin)
simultaneously (hama) one and the
same (hen t’auton).’ Parmenides:
‘Very pleasantly, I’m sure (Hêdeȏs
ge), you make (poieis) one and
the same (hen t’auton) in many
different places (pollachou)
simultaneously (hama), as if
spreading out a sail over a number of men (hoion
ei histiȏi katapetasas pollous anthrȏpous) you would claim (phaiês)
that a whole one was over many (hen epi
pollois einai holon). Or don’t you think (ê
ou hêgêi)
that you are saying something like this (to
toiouton legein)?’ Socrates: ‘Perhaps (Isȏs)’. Parmenides: ‘Would the whole
sail be over each man (Ȇ
oun holon eph’ hekastȏi
to histion eiê an), or a part of it (ê meros autou), a different part in
each (allo ep allȏi)?’
Socrates: ‘A part (Meros)’.
Parmenides: ‘So the Forms themselves are divisible (Merista ara estin auta ta eidê),
and the things which participate in them (kai
ta metechonta autȏn)
would participate only in a part of them (merous
an metechoi), and in each thing would not be a whole Form any more (kai ouketi en hekastȏi
holon an eiê), but a part of each (alla meros hekastou).’ (131b3 – 131c7)
Socrates: ‘It appears so (Phainetai)’.
Parmenides: ‘Will you then want to say (Ȇ
oun ethelêseis phanai) that the one
Form is in truth divided into parts (to
hen eidos hêmin têi alêtheiai merizesthai), and
will still be one (kai eti
hen einai)?’ Socrates: ‘No way (Oudamȏs)’ (131b3-c11)
Parmenides: ‘For look (Hora
gar), if you divide the largeness itself into parts (ei auto to megethos merieis) and each of the many large things (kai hekaston tȏn
pollȏn megalȏn) will be large by virtue of a part
of largeness smaller than the largeness itself (megethous merei smikroterȏi
autou tou megethous mega estai), will it not appear absurd (ara ouk alogon phaneitai)?’ Socrates:
‘Of course (Panu ge)’. Parmenides:
‘And what about this (Ti de)? Each
thing having received a small part of the equal (tou isou meros hekaston apolabon ti), can it be equal to anything
by virtue of a smaller part of the equal itself (hexei hȏi
elattoni onti autou tou isou to echon ison tȏi
estai)? Socrates: ‘Impossible (Adunaton)’.
Parmenides: ‘But one of us will have a part of the small (Alla tou smikroterou meros tis hêmȏn hexei); the small itself will be
bigger than this part (toutou de autou to
smikron meizon estai), for it is part of itself (hate merous heautou ontos), and thus (kai houtȏ dê) the small itself will be bigger
(auto to smikron meizon estai). But
that to which the part taken away is added (hȏi d’ an prostethêi to aphairethen) will be smaller
and not bigger than before (touto
smikroteron estai all ou meizon ê
prin).’ Socrates: ‘That could not happen (Ouk an genoito)’. Parmenides: ‘In what way then (Tina oun tropon) will the other things partake
of the Forms (tȏn
eidȏn soi ta alla metalêpsetai), when they cannot partake
either of parts of them or of the whole of each (mête kata merê mête
kata hola metalambanein dunamena)? Socrates: ‘No by Zeus (Ou ma ton Dia), it does not seem to me
easy (ou moi dokei eukolon einai) to
determine (diorisasthai) in any way (oudamȏs)
such a problem (to toiouton).’
(131c12-e7)
***
Aristotle writes in Metaphysics
A: ‘The Pythagoreans (Hoi Puthagoreioi)
say (phasin) that things exist by
“imitation” of numbers (mimêsei ta onta einai tȏn arithmȏn),
and Plato says they exist by participation (Platȏn de methexei), changing the name
(t’ounoma metabalȏn).
But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be (tên
mentoi ge methexin ê tên mimêsin
hêtis an eiê tȏn
eidȏn) they left an open
question (apheisan en koinȏi zêtein).’
(987b11-14, tr. W. D. Ross)
Aristotle’s remark that the Pythagoreans and Plato left open
the question of ‘what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be’
has a direct bearing on our understanding of the Parmenides. Let me refer to the relevant passages from my last post,
from which I quote:
Socrates did not find it surprising that things apprehended
by our senses are affected by many contradictions, but said he would be
surprized, if Zeno distinguished and set apart the Forms of things alone by
themselves and show that these in themselves can both mix together and separate
one from another, getting entangled in exactly the same perplexity as the
things which we can see and of which Zeno was speaking’. Pythodorus and the
other members in the audience thought that Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed
at every word of Socrates; Socrates’ suggestion that there is a plurality of
things free of contradictions threatened Parmenides’ ‘All is one’ thesis. To their surprise, the two listened to
Socrates with admiration. Parmenides asked Socrates: ‘Did you yourself thus
distinguish, as you say, some ideas apart in themselves, and apart the things
that partake in them?
When Plato makes the point that Parmenides and Zeno listened
to Socrates’ proposal of Forms as something well known to both of them, he is
telling us something important. In the light of Aristotle’s remark that the
Pythagoreans and Plato left open the question of ‘what the participation or the
imitation of the Forms could be’ we can infer that Parmenides was acquainted with
the Pythagorean theory. In his Poem,
on his way to the Goddess that is to reveal to him that ‘All is one’, Parmenides
is driven on the road (es hodon) that
is much spoken of (poluphêmon), that carries a man who knows
through all towns (hê kata pant’ astê pherei eidota phȏta, lines 3-4). On that road he undoubtedly
encountered the Pythagoreans. And then the Goddess herself insisted that he
must learn everything (chreȏ de se panta puthesthai), both the
well-rounded unshakable heart of truth (êmen
alêtheiês
eukukleos atremes êtor),
and human opinions (êde
brotȏn doxas), which don’t have
true certainty (tais ouk eni pistis alêthês,
lines 28-30).
***
Aristotle reflects on the Forms in Ch. 14 of Metaphysics Z as follows: ‘If the Forms
exist (ei gar esti ta eidê) and “animal” (kai to zȏion) is present in “man” and “horse (en tȏi
anthrȏpȏi
kai hippȏi) … If then there is a “man-in-himself” (ei oun esti tis anthrȏps autos kath’ hauton) who is
“this” and exists apart (tode ti kai kechȏrismenon), the parts also of which
he consists (anankê kai ex hȏn),
e. g. “animal” and “two-footed” (hoion to
zȏion kai to dipoun), must
indicate “thises” (tode ti sêmainein), and be capable of
separate existence (kai einai chȏrista), and substances (kai ousias); therefore “animal”, as well
as “man”, must be of this sort (hȏste kai to zȏion).
Now if the “animal” in the “horse” and in “man” is one and the same (ei men oun to auto kai hen to en tȏi hippȏi
kai tȏi anthrȏpȏi),
as you are with yourself (hȏsper su sautȏi),
how will the one in things that exist
apart be one (pȏs to on en tois ousi chȏris hen estai), and how will this “animal” escape being
divided even from itself (kai dia ti
ou kai chȏris hautou estai to zȏion touto, b1)? … In the case of
sensible things (eti d’ epi tȏn aisthêtȏn) both these consequences and
others still more absurd follow (tauta te
sumbainei kai toutȏn
atopȏtera). If, then, these
consequences are impossible (ei dê adunaton houtȏs
echein), clearly there are not Forms of sensible things (dêlon
hoti ouk estin eidê
autȏn) in the sense some
maintain their existence (hȏs tines phasin).’ (1039a26-b19,
tr. W. D. Ross.)
Ross says in his ‘Commentary’: ‘1039a26-b19 is very similar
to Pl. Parm. 131A-E, and in
particular the language in b1 recalls that in 131 B hen ara on kai t’auton en pollois kai chȏris
ousin holon hama enestai, kai houtȏs
auto hautou chȏris an eiê (So being one and the same, it
will be as a whole at the same time in many things that are separate, and thus it
would be separate from itself) … Aristotle
is pressing the difficulties raised by Parmenides in the dialogue (my emphasis, J. T.).’
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