When Socrates ended his narrative,
Crito said to him: ‘I may appear ridiculous in venturing to advise you (geloion
men moi dokei einai to nouthetein se), but still (homȏs de), what I was told (ha d’ ȇkouon), I want to tell you (ethelȏ soi apangeilai). Of those who were dispersing from
your group (tȏn aph’ humȏn apiontȏn), you may as well know (isth’ hoti), one came to me as I was
walking up and down (proselthȏn tis moi peripatounti), a man of very high opinion of his
wisdom (anȇr oiomenos
panu einai sophos), one of those (toutȏn tis) who are formidably good at speeches
for the lawcourts (tȏn peri tous
logous tous eis ta dikastȇria deinȏn). “Crito (Ō Kritȏn),” he said (ephȇ), “are you not
listening to these wise men (ouden akroai tȏnde tȏn sophȏn)?” “No, indeed (Ou ma ton Dia),”
I said (ȇn d’ egȏ); “I could not get within hearing of them (ou gar hoios t’ ȇ prosstas katakouein) – there was such a crowd (hupo
tou ochlou).” “Well (Kai mȇn), he said, “it was worth listening
to (axion g’ ȇn akousai).” “Why (Ti de;)?” I asked. “To have heard (Hina ȇkousas) men debating (andrȏn dialegomenȏn) who have at present the greatest wisdom (hoi nun sophȏtatoi eisi) of those devoted to such
discussions (tȏn peri tous
toioutous logous).” And I said (K’agȏ eipon) “How did they strike you (Ti oun
ephainonto soi;)?” “How else (Ti de allo),” he said (ȇ d’ hos), “than as the sort of nonsense one
can always hear from such people (ȇ hoiaper aei
an tis tȏn toioutȏn akousai lȇrountȏn), when they devote themselves
pointlessly to pointless matters (kai peri oudenos axiȏn anaxian spoudȇn poioumenȏn);” these were almost his exact words
(houtȏsi gar pȏs kai eipen tois onomasin). (304d2-e6)
Crito
emphasizes the closing words of the unnamed critic – kai peri oudenos axiȏn // anaxian spoudȇn poioumenȏn
– for they represent Isocrates’ style. Isocrates’ criticism of Socrates and of
philosophers thus precedes Socrates’ criticism of him, which is to follow, as
indeed Isocrates’ criticism of Plato and other contemporary philosophers in Against
the Sophists preceded Plato’s criticism of him in the Euthydemus. Moreover,
the jingle reported by Crito recalls an Isocratean jingle coming from Hippias’
mouth in the Hippias Major: eulaboumenos men phthonon tȏn zȏntȏn
// phoboumenos de mȇnin tȏn teteleutȇkotȏn
(‘I’m trying to avoid the envy of the living, and the wrath of the dead I’m
fearing’, 282a6-8).
***
But why
should Plato want to link Isocrates to the Hippias Major? To get the
answer to this question, we must begin with the Phaedrus, where
Socrates’ second speech on love culminated with the assertion that if the lover
and his beloved live a well ordered life, devoted to philosophy, ‘their days on
earth will be blessed with happiness and concord’ (makarion men kai homonoȇtikon ton enthade bion diagousin, 256a8-b1). Socrates then ends the
speech by a prayer to Eros: ‘… turn Lysias to philosophy, as his brother
Polemarchus has been turned to it (Lusian epi philosophian de, hȏsper h’adelphos autou Polemarchos tetraptai, trepson), so that his lover here [i.e.
Phaedrus] (hina kai ho erastȇs hode autou) may no longer waver between the two
choices (mȇketi epamphoterizȇi),
as now he does (kathaper nun), but live for Love in singleness of
purpose with the aid of philosophic discourse (all’ haplȏs pros Erȏta meta philosophȏn logȏn ton bion poiȇtai,
257b2-6).
Next we must
turn to Xenophon’s Hellenica: ‘They [i.e. the Thirty tyrants] resolved (edoxe
d’ autois), in order to get money to pay their guardsmen (hopȏs echoien kai tois phrourois chrȇmata didonai), that each of their number should seize one of the aliens
residing in the city (tȏn metoikȏn hena hekaston labein), and put them to death (kai autous men apokteinai)
and confiscate their property (ta de chrȇmata autȏn aposȇmȇnasthai, II.iii.21)
Polemarchos
was the richest of the resident aliens. Eratosthenes, one of the Thirty,
arrested him, and he was ordered to drink hemlock without a trial, as we learn
from Lysias’ Against Eratothenes 16-17. This cast a shadow on Plato’s Phaedrus;
for Solon’s dictum, that no one can be considered happy ‘before he ends his
life well’ (prin teleutȇsai kalȏs ton aiȏna, Herodotus I.32,15), must have been strongly invoked
by the fate of Polemarchus, especially when viewed against the background of
the Phaedrus. In the Hippias Major Plato shielded his dialogue by
transforming Solon’s dictum into Hippias’ third attempt at defining ‘the
beautiful itself’: ‘Listen, then (Akoue dȇ). I assure you that if any objection is raised against what
I have to say (pros gar touto isthi, ean tis echȇi hoti anteipȇi), you may count me a complete ignoramus (phanai eme
mȇd’ hotioun epaïein) … My view is (Legȏ toinun) everlastingly (aei) and universally (kai panti)
applicable everywhere (kai pantachou): the finest accomplishment is for
a wealthy, healthy man (kalliston einai andri, ploutounti, hugiainonti),
who has gained respect among the Greeks (timȏmenȏi hupo tȏn Hellȇnȏn)
and attained old age (aphikomenȏi eis gȇras),
and has given his parents fine funerals on their deaths (tous hautou goneas
teleutȇsantas kalȏs peristeilanti), to be given by his own children a
grand and fine burial (hupo tȏn hautou ekgonȏn kalȏs kai megaloprepȏs taphȇnai) .’ (291d9-e2, translation R. Waterfield)
As I am
reading these lines, Lysias’ Against Eratosthenes stands in front of my
mind: ‘And when he was being brought away dead from the prison (Kai epeidȇ apephereto ek tou desmȏtȇriou tethneȏs), although we had three houses amongst us (triȏn hȇmin oikiȏn ousȏn), they did not permit his funeral to be conducted
from any of them (ex oudemias eiasan exenechthȇnai),
but they hired a small hut in which to lay him out (alla kleision misthȏsamenoi prouthento auton). We had plenty of cloaks (kai pollȏn ontȏn himatiȏn),
yet they refused our request for one for the funeral (aitousin ouden edosan
eis tȇn taphȇn); but our friends gave either a cloak (alla tȏn philȏn ho men himation), or a pillow (ho de
proskephalaion), or whatever each had to spare, for his internment (ho
de ho ti hekastos etuchen edȏken eis tȇn taphȇn autou).’ (18, tr. W.R.M. Lamb)
Plato’s
gesturing at Isocrates through the mask of Hippias suggests that Isocrates was
one of those who contemned Plato’s Phaedrus for maintaining that a man
living an orderly life and devoting himself to philosophy will live his days on
earth in happiness, and for linking this prediction to Polemarchus. Indeed, Isocrates
had a special ground for being aggrieved by it, for it cast a shadow over
Socrates’ prophecy concerning him in the Phaedrus: ‘Isocrates is still
young, Phaedrus (Neos eti, ȏ Phaidre, Isokratȇs),
but I don’t mind telling you the future I prophecy for him (ho mentoi
manteuomai kat’ autou, legein ethelȏ). It seems to me that his natural powers
give him a superiority over anything that Lysias has achieved in literature (Dokei
moi ameinȏn einai ȇ kata tous peri Lusian einai logous ta tȇs phuseȏs), and also that in point of character he is of nobler
composition (eti te ȇthei gennikȏterȏi kekrasthai); hence it would not surprise me (hȏste ouden an genoito thaumaston) if with advancing years (proïousȇs tȇs hȇlikias) he made all his literary
predecessors look like very small fry; that is, supposing him to persist in the
actual type of writing in which he engages at present (ei peri autous te
tous logous, hois nun epicheirei, pleon ȇ paidȏn dienenkoi tȏn pȏpote hapsamenȏn logȏn);
still more so (eti te), if he should become dissatisfied with such work
(ei autȏi mȇ apochrȇsai tauta), and a sublime impulse lead him to
do greater things (epi meizȏ de tis auton agoi hormȇ theiotera). For that mind of his, Phaedrus, contains an innate
tincture of philosophy (phusei gar, ȏ phile, enesti tis philosophia tȇi tou andros dianoiai).’ (278e10-279b1, tr. R. Hackforth)
***
Crito
continues: ‘And I said “But surely, philosophy is a charming thing (Kai egȏ, Alla menoti, ephȇn, charien ge ti pragma estin hȇ philosophia).” “Charming?” said he (Poion, ephȇ, charien). “My blessed man (ȏ makarie), it is worthless (oudenos men
oun axion); and if you had ben present (alla kai ei nun paregenou),
I think you would have been ashamed (panu an se oimai aischunthȇnai)
of your friend (huper tou seautou hetairou) – his conduct was so very strange
(houtȏs ȇn atopos) in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say (ethelȏn heauton parechein anthrȏpois hois ouden melei hoti an legȏsin),
and fasten upon every word (pantos de rȇmatos antechontai). And these (kai houtoi), as
I was just saying (hoper arti elegon), are among the leading lights
nowadays (en tois kratistois eisi tȏn nun). But the truth is (alla gar),
Crito (ȏ Kritȏn), that this pursuit itself (to pragma auto) and
the men (kai hoi anthrȏpoi) who spend their time on it (hoi epi tȏi pragmati diatribontes) are inept (phauloi eisin) and utterly
ridiculous (kai katagelastoi).” He was wrong, in my opinion, to censure
the pursuit, and so is anyone else who does so, but I think he was right to
criticize being prepared to have a discussion with such men in front of many
people.’ (304e6-305b3)
Socrates: ‘O
Crito (Ō Kritȏn), such men are marvellous (thaumasioi hoi toioutoi
andres), but I don’t yet know (atar oupȏ oida) what I’m going to say (hoti mellȏ erein). To which category does the man belong (poterȏn ȇn) who approached you (ho proselthȏn soi) and criticized philosophy (kai memphomenos tȇn philosophian;)? Is he one of those (poteron tȏn)
that are formidable at fighting (agȏnisasthai deinȏn)
in the lawcourts (en tois dikastȇriois), an orator (rȇtȏr tis), or an instructor of orators (ȇ tȏn tous toioutous eispempontȏn),
who makes the speeches (poiȇtȇs tȏn logȏn)
with which the orators do their fighting (hois hoi rȇtores agȏnizontai;)?’ (305b4-9)
***
At 304e the
identity of the critic appeared to be quite clear when he embroidered his words
with an Isocratean jingle, which Crito emphasized: ‘these were almost his exact
words’. How did it happen that Socrates became unsure to which category he
belongs? Critic’s censuring philosophy – in response to Crito’s ‘But surely,
philosophy is a charming thing’ – cast the critic’s identity in doubt, for in Against
the Sophists Isocrates does not censure philosophy as such; he criticizes
the contemporary philosophers for bringing philosophy in disrepute: ‘Vaunting
their powers with utter disregard of the truth (hoi tolmȏntes lian aperiskeptȏs alanzoneuesthai) have created a situation (pepoiȇkasin) in which those who choose a life of careless indolence appear to have
made a better choice (hȏste dokein ameinon bouleuesthai tous
raithumein hairoumenous) than those who devote their time to philosophy (tȏn peri tȇn philosophian diatribontȏn,
1).’
***
Crito: ‘He’s
certainly no orator at all (Hȇkista nȇ ton Dia rȇtȏr);
in fact, I don’t think he’s ever come before the court (oude oimai pȏpot’ auton epi dikastȇrion anabebȇkenai). But he is reputed to understand the business (all’ epaïein auton phasi peri tou pragmatos), by Jove (nȇ ton Dia), and to be formidable (kai deinon einai), and to compose
formidable speeches (kai deinous logous suntithenai, 305c1-4).’
(Watterfields
comments appositely: ‘Thus he falls foul of the Socratic criticism of Section I
[289d-290a]: he cannot put his speeches to use.’)
Socrates:
‘Now I understand (Ȇdȇ manthanȏ). About these (peri toutȏn)
I myself (kai autos) was now on the point of speaking (nundȇ emellon legein, 305c5-6).’ – Socrates clearly refers to the Isocratean
jingle at 304e with Crito’s ‘these were almost his exact words’. Plato
carefully constructs the dialogue, so as to make it clear to the reader that
Socrates’ forthcoming criticism is directed at Isocrates’ Against the
Sophists.
Socrates continues:
‘They are the ones (houtoi gar eisi men), Crito (ȏ Kritȏn), whom Prodicus described (hous ephȇ Prodikos) as on the border-ground between philosophers and politicians (methoria
philosophou te andros kai politikou). They think that they are (oiontai
d’ einai) the wisest of all men (pantȏn sophȏtatoi anthrȏpȏn), and that on top of their being the wisest they are
thought to be so (pros de tȏi einai kai dokein) by very many people (panu para
pollois); so that the only impediment to this acclaim being universal
constitute those (hȏste para pasin eudokimein empodȏn sphisin einai oudenas allous) men who are around philosophy (ȇ tous peri philosophian anthrȏpous). And they think (hȇgountai oun) that if they engineer a reputation
of worthlessness for these men (ean toutous eis doxan katastȇsȏsin mȇdenos dokein axious einai), no one will dispute their title to the palm of
wisdom (anamphisbȇtȇtȏs ȇdȇ para pasin ta nikȇtȇria eis doxan oisesthai sophias peri). For they think that they are really
the wisest (einai men gar tȇi alȇtheiai sphas sophȏtatous), but when they get entangled in
conversation (en de tois idiois logois hotan apolȇphthȏsin), they are cut short by people around Euthydemus (hupo
tȏn amphi Euthudȇmon kolouesthai). (305c6-d7)
Much of what
Socrates said about ‘these men’ so far can be seen as based on the Euthydemus
itself, that is on the eristic performance of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus and the
critic’s reflection on it reported by Crito. But the opening remark ‘they are
on the border-ground between philosophers and politicians’, and the remark that
‘they think that if they engineer a reputation of worthlessness for these men,
no one will dispute their title to the palm of wisdom’, transcend the Euthydemus.
Socrates thus points to Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, the first 8
paragraphs of which are devoted to Isocrates’ criticism of contemporary
teachers of philosophy, and paragraphs 9 and 10 to his criticism of
‘those who profess to teach political discourse' (tois tous politikous logous
hupischnoumenois, 9).
Socrates closes
his verdict on ‘these men’ by enlarging upon his opening remark: ‘They think
they are very wise (sophoi de hȇgountai panu) – quite naturally (eikotȏs),
for they think they have a moderate amount of philosophy (metriȏs men gar philosophias echein), and a moderate amount of political
wisdom (metriȏs de politikȏn),
and there is reason in what they say (panu ex eikotos logou) – for they
say that they have as much of both as is right (metechein gar amphoterȏn hoson edei) and so they keep out of the way of all risks (ektos de
ontes kindunȏn) and conflicts (kai agȏnȏn) and reap the fruits of their wisdom (karpousthai tȇn sophian).’ (305d7-e2)
***
Isocrates in
Against the Sophists ends his own program with the words: ‘Now as for
the sophists who have lately sprung up (Hoi men oun arti tȏn sophistȏn anaphuomenoi) and have very recently embraced
these pretensions (kai neȏsti prospeptȏkotes tais alazoneiais), even though they flourish at the moment (ei kai nun
pleonazousin), they will all, I am sure, come round to this position (eu
oid’ hoti pantes epi tautȇn katenechthȇsontai tȇn hupothesin, 19) … those who desire to follow
the precepts of this philosophy (tous boulomenous peitharchein tois hupo tȇs philosophias tautȇs prostattomenois) may, if they will, be helped more
speedily towards the honesty of character than towards the felicity in oratory
(polu an thatton pros epieikeian ȇ pros rȇtoreian ȏphelȇseien). And let no one suppose (kai mȇdeis oiesthȏ) that I claim (me legein)
that justice can be taught (hȏs esti dikaiosunȇ didakton); for in a word (holȏs men gar), I hold that there does not exist
an art of the kind (oudemian toiautȇn einai technȇn)
which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures (hȇtis tois kakȏs pephukosi pros aretȇn sȏphrosunȇn te kai dikaiosunȇn empoiȇseien). Nevertheless (ou mȇn alla), I do think that the study of
political discourse can help more than any other thing to stimulate and form
such qualities of character (sumparakeleusasthai ge kai sunaskȇsai malist’ an oimai tȇn tȏn logȏn tȏn politikȏn epimeleian’. (21)
***
Crito: ‘And
do you think there’s any sense in these thoughts of theirs, Socrates (Ti oun;
dokousi soi ti, ȏ Sȏkrates, legein;)? I mean, their argument definitely has a certain
plausibility (Ou gar toi alla ho ge logos echei tina euprepeian tȏn andrȏn).’ – Socrates: ‘Yes, that’s right, Crito –
plausibility rather than truth (Kai gar echei ontȏs, ȏ Kritȏn, euprepeian mallon ȇ alȇtheian) … if philosophy and statesmanship are both good (ei men oun hȇ philosophia agathon estin kai hȇ politikȇ praxis), but for different purposes (pros
allo de hekatera), and they (houtoi d’), participating in both (amphoterȏn metechontes), lie in between them (toutȏn en mesȏi eisin), then they are talking nonsense (ouden
legousin), for they are worse than either (amphoterȏn gar eisi phauloteroi) … they actually come in third (kai tritoi ontes tȇi alȇtheiai), but want to be thought first (zȇtousi prȏtoi dokein einai). However, this desire of theirs is
excusable (sungignȏskein oun autois chrȇ tȇs epithumias) and nothing to get indignant about
(kai mȇ chalepainein). But we must see them as they
really are (hȇgeisthai mentoi toioutous einai hoioi
eisin). For every
man ought to be appreciated (panta gar andra chrȇ agapan) who says anything which is at all like wisdom (hostis kai hotioun
legei echomenon phronȇseȏs pragma), manfully pursues it (kai andreiȏs epexiȏn), and works hard at it (diaponeitai).’
(305e3-306d1)
With the
words ‘manfully pursues it (kai andreiȏs epexiȏn),
and works hard at it (diaponeitai)’ Plato echoes what Isocrates says his
educational program requires: ‘These things require much study (tauta de
pollȇs epimeleias deisthai) and are the task of a manful soul (kai
psuchȇs andrikȇs einai, 17)’
