Plato’s birth in 434 B.C. – the Charmides, Greek in Greek

Born in 434 B.C., Plato was about 30, or almost 30, in 404 B.C., when the democracy was overthrown by the aristocrats, who at once (eu0qu/j) asked him to join them as something to which he had a claim (w(j e0pi\ prosh/konta pra/gmata). Because of his youth (u9po\ neo/thtoj) he thought (w|)h/qhn) that they would (ga\r au0tou/j) manage the State so as to bring men out of a bad way of life into a good one (e1k tinoj a0di/kou bi/ou e0pi\ di/kaion tro/pon a1gontaj dioikh/sein dh\ th\n po/lin), and so he gave his mind to them very diligently (w/(ste au0toi=j sfo/dra prosei=xon to\n nou=n), to see what they would do (ti/ pra/coien). And seeing (kai\ o9rw~n), as he did (dh/pou), that these men (tou\j a1ndraj) in quite a short time (e0n xro/nw| o0li/g|w|) made seem (a0podei/cantaj) the previous constitution [i.e. the democracy] (th\n e1mprosqen politei/an) something precious as gold (xruso/n), he became indignant (e0dusxe/rana/ te) and withdrew himself (kai\ e0mauto\n e0panh/gagon) from the evils of those days (a0po\ tw~n to/te kakw~n). (Plato, Seventh Letter 324d-325a)

Plato’s kai\ e0mauto\n e0panh/gagon a0po/, translated ‘and withdrew myself from’, actually says ‘I rose myself (h1gagon) to (e0pi/) up (a0na/) from (a0po/)’; it thus points to the region above the heavens (to\n u9peroura/nion to/pon) of the Phaedran Palinode, i.e. to the region of the Platonic Forms, the region of the truth (to\ a0lhqe/j, a0lh/qeia), of being which really is (ou0si/a o1ntwj ou]sa), which is without colour (a0xrw&matoj) or shape (a0sxhma/tistoj), intangible (a0nafh/j), observable only by intellect (mo/nw| qeath\ nw~|) (Phaedrus 247c3-8). In the Seventh Letter Plato gives us the actual circumstance that led to his rising up from the evils of those days: The Thirty ‘tried to send Socrates (e1pempon Swkra/th), along with others (meq’ e9te/rwn), after one of the citizens (e0pi/ tina tw~n politw~n), to fetch him by force (bi/a| a1conta) that he might be put to death (w(j a0poqanou/menon); he, however did not obey (o9 d’ ou0k e0pei/qeto) and risked the utmost penalties (pa=n de\ parekindu/neusen paqei=n) rather than be a partaker in their unholy deeds (pri\n a0nosi/wn au0toi=j e!rgwn gene/sqai koinwno/j)’. This brings us to the Charmides, which Plato must have written before the Thirty gave Socrates this order, the order which he did not obey.

What leads me to this dating of the Charmides?

The Charmides is devoted to the discussion of swfrosu/nh, which, as Liddell & Scott’s Greek-English informs us, is rendered as ‘soundness of mind’, ‘prudence’, ‘discretion’, ‘sanity in opposition to mani/a’, ‘self-control’, but which in the Charmides is discussed as an all-embracing intellectual virtue, as wisdom. The framework within which it is discussed is practical: Charmides, a youngster in his early teens, has morning headaches, and his uncle Critias introduces him to Socrates – who has returned to Athens after taking part in the siege of Potidaea for three years – as a physician who has a cure.

The dialogue is narrated by Socrates:

“‘And what is it?’ Charmides said (Ti/ ou]n, h] d’ o3j, e1stin;). I replied (Kai\ e0gw_ ei]pon) that it was a kind of leaf (o3ti au0to\ me\n ei1h fu/llon ti), which required to be accompanied by a charm (e0pw|dh\ de/ tij e0pi\ tw|_ farma/kw| ei1h), and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used the cure (h4n ei0 me/n tij e0pa/|doi a3ma kai\ xrw|~to au0tw|~), he would be made whole (panta/pasin u9gia~ poioi= to fa/rmakon); but that without the charm (a1neu de\ th=j e0pw|dh=j) the leaf would be of no avail (ou0de\n o1feloj ei1h tou= fu/llou).” (155e; in quoting from the Charmides I use Jowett’s translation.)

Socrates went on to say that he acquired both the leaf and the charm from a Thracian physician ‘who declared that all good and evil originates in the soul, and overflows from thence to the body and to the whole man (pa/nta ga\r e1fh e0k th=j yuxh=j w(rmh=sqai kai\ ta\ kaka\ kai\ ta\ a0gaqa\ tw|~ sw&mati kai\ panti\ tw|~ a0nqrw&pw|), as if from the head into the eyes (w#sper e0k th=j kefalh=j e0pi\ ta\ o1mmata). And, therefore, one must (dei=n ou]n) cure first and foremost the soul (e0kei=no kai\ prw~ton kai\ ma/lista qerapeu/ein), if the head and the body are to be well (ei0 me/llei kai\ ta\ th=j kefalh=j kai\ ta\ tou= a1llou sw&matoj kalw~j e1xein). And the soul is cured (qerapeu/esqai de\ th\n yuxh/n), he said (e1fh), by certain charms (e0pw|dai=j tisin), and these charms are fair words (ta\j de\ e0pw|da\j tau/taj tou\j lo/gouj ei]nai tou\j kalou/j) by which temperance is implanted in the souls (e0k de\ tw~n toiou/twn lo/gwn e0n tai=j yuxai=j swfrosu/nhn e0ggi/gnesqai). When this is implanted (h[j e0ggenome/nhj), and present (kai\ parou/shj), the health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole body (ra|&dion h1dh ei]nai th\n u9gi/eian kai\ th|= kefalh=| kai\ tw~| a1llw| sw&mati pori/zein).” (156e6-157b1).

Critias, when he heard me saying this (A)kou/saj ou]n mou o9 Kriti/aj tau=t’ ei0po/ntoj), said (e1fh): ‘And I can tell you (le/gw me/ntoi soi), that Charmides is not only preeminent in beauty among his equals (o3ti Xarmi/dhj tw~n h9likiwtw~n ou0 mo/non th=| i0de/a| dokei= diafe/rein), but also in that quality (a0lla\ kai\ au0tw~| tou/tw|) for which, as you say, you have the charm (ou[ su\ fh|\j th\n e0pw|dh\n e1xein); and this, as you say, is temperance (fh|\j de\ swfrosu/nhj;)?’ ‘Yes (Pa/nu ge),’ I said (h]n d’ e0gw&). ‘Then let me tell you (Eu] toi/nun i1sqi) that he is the most temperate of human beings (o3ti pa/nu polu\ dokei= swfrone/statoj ei]nai tw~n nuni/), and for his age inferior to none in any quality (kai\ ta]lla pa/nta, ei0j o3son h9liki/an e1xei, ou0deno\j xei/rwn w!~n).’ (157c-d).

After thus narrating what Critias said in high praise about Charmides, Socrates went on to enlarge on Critias’ eulogy by eulogising Charmides’ progeny: ‘Yes’, I said, ‘Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel (Kai\ ga\r, h]n d’ e0gw&, kai\ di/kaion w} Xarmi/dh, diafe/rein se) others in all good qualities (tw~n a1llwn pa~sin toi=j toiou/toij); for if I am not mistaken (ou0 ga\r oi]mai) there is no one present (a1llon ou0de/na tw~n e0nqa/de) who could easily point out (r9a|di/wj a)n e1xein e0pidei=cai) two Athenian houses, whose union (poi=ai du/o oi0ki/ai sunelqou=sai ei0j tau0to\n tw~n A)qh/nhsin) would be likely (e0k tw~n ei0ko/twn) to produce a better or nobler scion (kalli/w a4n kai\ a0mei/nw gennh/seian) than the two from which you are sprung (h2 e0c w{n su\ ge/gonaj). There is your father’s house (h3 te ga\r patrw|&a u9mi=n oi0ki/a), which is descended from Critias the son of Dropidas (h9 Kriti/ou tou= Drwpi/dou), whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrical verses of Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets (kai\ u9po\ Anakre/ontoj kai\ u9po\ So/lwnoj kai\ u9p’ a1llwn pollw~n poihtw~n e0gkekwmiasme/nh parade/dotai h9mi=n), as famous for beauty (w(j diaferou/sa ka/llei te) and virtue (kai\ a0reth=|) and all other high fortune (kai\ th=| a1llh| legome/nh| eu0daimoni/a|): and your mother’s house is equally distinguished (kai\ au] h9 pro\j mhtro\j w(sau/twj) … Having such ancestors, you ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son of Glaucon, your outward form is no dishonour to any of them (ta\ me\n ou]n o9rw&mena th=j i0de/aj, w} fi/le pai= Glau/kwnoj, dokei=j moi ou0de/na tw~n pro\ sou= e0n ou0deni\ u9pobebhke/nai) If to beauty you add temperance (ei0 de\ dh\ kai\ pro\j swfrosu/nhn), and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to be (kai\ pro\j ta]lla kata\ to\n tou=de lo/gon i9kanw~j pe/fukaj) … And here lies the point (e1xei d’ ou]n ou3twj); for if, as he declares, you have the gift of temperance already (ei0 me/n soi h1dh pa/restin, w{j le/gei Kri/tiaj o3de swfrosu/nh), and are temperate enough (kai\ ei] sw&frwn i9kanw~j), in that case you have no need of any charms (ou0de\n e1ti soi e1dei e0pw|dw~n), and I may as well let you have the cure of the head at once (a0ll’ au0to/ soi a2n h1dh dote/on ei1h to th=j kefalh=j fa/rmakon); but if you have not yet acquired this quality (ei0 d’ e1ti tou/twn e0pideh\j ei]nai dokei=j), I must use the charm (e0pa|ste/on) before I give you the medicine (pro\ th=j tou= farma/kou do/sewj). Please, therefore, to inform me (au0to\j ou]n moi ei0pe/) whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying (po/teron o9mologei=j tw~|de kai\ fh|\j); – have you or have you not this quality of temperance (i9kanw~j h1dh swfrosu/nhj mete/xein h2 e0ndeh\j ei]nai;)?’

Charmides blushed (A)neruqria/saj ou]n o9 Xarmi/dhj), and the blush heightened his beauty (prw~ton me\n e1ti kalli/wn e0fa/nh), for modesty is becoming in youth (kai\ ga\r to\ ai0sxunthlo\n au0tou= th=| h9liki/a| e1preyen); he then said very ingeniously (e1peita kai\ ou0k a0gennw~j a0pekri/nato), that he really could not at once answer, either yes (o3ti ou0 r9a\dion ei1h e0n tw~| paro/nti ou0q’ o9mologei=n), or no, to the question which I had asked (ou1te eca/rnw| ei]nai ta\ e0rwtw&mena): ‘For if (e0a\n me\n ga/r)’ said he (h] d’ o3j), ‘I affirm that I am not temperate (mh\ fw~ ei]nai sw&frwn), that would be a strange thing for me to say of myself (a3ma ga\r a1topon au0to\n kaq’ e9autou) toiau)ta le/gein), and also I should give a lie to Critias (a3ma ga\r kai\ Kriti/an to/nde yeudh= e0pidei/cw), and many others (kai\ a1llouj pollou/j) who think that I am temperate (oi[j dokw~ ei]nai sw&frwn), as he tells you (w( o9 tou/tou lo/goj): but, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself (e0a\n d’ au] fw~ kai\ e0mauto\n e0painw~), which would be ill manners (i1swj e0paxqe\j fanei=tai); and therefore I do not know (w#ste ou0k e1xw) how to answer you (o3ti soi a)pokri/nwmai).’

I said to him (Kai\ e0gw_ ei]pon o3ti): ‘That is a natural reply (moi ei0ko/ta fai/nh| le/gein), Charmides (w} Xarmi/dh), and I think (kai\ moi dokei=)’ I said (h]n d’ e0gw&), ‘that you and I ought together to enquire (koi/nh| a2n ei1h skepte/on) whether you have this quality about which I am asking or not (ei1te ke/kthsai ei1te mh\ o9 punqa/nomai); and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not like (i3na mh/te su\ a)nagka/zh| le/gein a4 mh\ bou/lei); neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine (mh/t’ au] e0gw_ a)ske/ptwj e0pi\ th\n i0atrikh\n tre/pwmai): therefore, if you please (ei0 ou]n soi fi/lon), I will share the enquiry with you (e0qe/lw skopei=n meta\ sou=), but I will not press you if you would rather not (ei0 de\ mh/, e0a~n).’ ‘There is nothing which I would like better,’ he said (A0lla\ pa/ntwn ma/lista, e1fh, fi/lon); ‘and as far as I am concerned (w#ste tou/tou ge e3neka) you may proceed in the way which you think best (o3ph| au0to\j oi1ei be/ltion ske/yasqai tau/th| sko/pei).’

‘In this way (Th=|de) then (toi/nun),’ I said (e1fhn e0gw&), ‘it seems (dokei=) to me (moi), the investigation is the best (belti/sth ei]nai h9 ske/yij) about (peri\) this (au0tou=). For it is clear (dh=lon ga/r) that (o3ti) if temperance abides in you (ei1 soi pa/restin swfrosu/nh), you have an opinion about her (e1xeij ti peri\ au0th=j doca/zein). Tell me (ei0pe/),’ I said (h]n d’ e0gw&), ‘what (ti/) you say (fh|/j) is temperance (ei]nai swfrosu/nhn) in your opinion (kata\ th\n sh\n do/can),’

And he (Kai\ o3j) at first (to\ me\n prw~ton) hesitated (w!knei te), and was very unwilling to answer (kai\ ou0 pa/nu h1qelen a0pokri/nasqai): then he said (e1peita me/ntoi ei]pen) that he thought (o3ti oi[ dokoi=) temperance was (swfrosu/nh ei]nai) doing things orderly (to\ kosmi/wj pa/nta pra/ttein) and quietly (kai\ h9suxh=|): in the streets (e1n te tai=j o9doi=j) to walk (badi/zein), and talk (kai\ diale/gesqai), and everything else (kai\ ta\ a1lla pa/nta) thus (w(sau/twj) to do (poiei=n). ‘And (kai\) it seems to me (moi dokei=)’, he said (e1fh), ‘all in all (sullh/bdhn), it is a quietness (h9suxio/thj tij ei]nai), what you ask (o4 e0rwta|~j).’

‘Are you (A)r’ ou]n),’ I said (h]n d’ e0gw&), ‘right saying this (eu] le/geij;)?’. ‘For tell me (ei0pe\ ga/r moi), isn’t temperance of the class of the noble and good (ou0 tw~n kalw~n me/ntoi h9 swfrosu/nh e0sti/n;)?’ ‘Very much so (Pa/nu ge)’ ‘But which is best (Po/teron ou]n ka/lliston) at the wring-master’s (e0n grammatistou=), the same letters (ta\ o3moia gra/mmata) to write (gra/fein) quickly (taxu/) or (h1) slowly (h9suxh|=?’ ‘Quickly (Taxu/).’ ‘And what (Ti/ d’), to read (a0nagignw&skein) quickly (taxe/wj) or (h1) slowly (brade/wj;)?’ ‘Quickly (Taxe/wj).’ (159c5) … ‘Then all things (Ou0kou=n pa/nta)’, I said (h]n d’ e0gw&), ‘Charmides (w} Xarmi/dh), both those (kai\ ta/) that consider the soul (peri\ th\n yuxh/n), and those (kai\ ta/) that consider the body (peri\ to\ sw~ma), those of swiftness (ta\ tou= ta/xouj) and of quickness (kai\ th=j o0cu/thtoj) are clearly more admirable (kalli/w| fai/netai) than those of slowness (h2 ta\ th=j braduth=to/j te) and of quietness (kai\ h9suxio/thtoj;)?’ ‘Clearly they are (Kinduneu/ei),’ he said (e1fh). (160b6)

In his next attempt Charmides defines temperance (swfrosu/nh) as modesty (ai0dw&j, 160e4-5). Socrates asks Charmides whether he still views temperance as something admirable and good, something that makes men good. When Charmides says that he does, Socrates quotes against him Homer: ‘Modesty is not good for a needy man (ai0dw_j d’ ou0k a0gaqh\ kexrhme/nw| a0ndri\ parei=nai, Odyssea XVII, 347).’

If temperance (swfrosu/nh) is always (de/ ge) good (a0gaqo/n) since (ei1per) she makes good (a0gaqou\j poiei=) those in whom she is present (oi1j a2n parh=|), definition of temperance as modesty cannot stand, for modesty is good for some, not good for others, as Socrates argues, and Charmides admits: ‘All that, Socrates, appears to me to be (A)lla\ mh\n ou3tw ge dokei= moi e1xein) as you say (w(j su\ le/geij, 161a10), but consider this (to/de de\ ske/yai), what you think of it (ti/ soi dokei= ei]nai) in relation to temperance (peri\ swfrosu/nhj) – for I just now remember (a1rti ga\r a0nemnh/sqhn) what I have heard from someone (o9 h1dh tou h1kousa le/gontoj), “that temperance is doing one’s own business” (o3ti swfrosu/nh a2n ei1h to\ ta\ e9autou= pra/ttein). Consider then (sko/pei ou]n), whether he appears to you to be right who says that (tou=to ei0 o0rqw~j soi dokei= le/gein o9 le/gwn;)?’

And I ‘You monster (W) miare/),’ I said (e1fhn), ‘You heard this from this here Kritias (Kriti/ou tou=de a0kh/koaj au0to/), or from another of the wise men (h2 a1llou tou tw~n sofw~n). (161b4-c1)

***

I shall leave the discussion of temperance, which follows, for my next entry, and turn to the last section of the dialogue, in which Socrates ends his discussion with Critias bewailing his inability to investigate anything worthwhile concerning temperance (o3ti ou0de\n xrhsto\n peri\ swfrosu/nhj skopw~, 175a 10-11}, and that, worst of all, after doing their best to obtain a definition of temperance, temperance thus defined appeared to them to be useless (tou=to h9mi=n a0nwfele\j e0fa/nh, 175b1).

Socrates says: ‘As far as I am concerned (to\ me\n ou]n e0mo/n), I lament it less (kai\ h3tton a0ganaktw~), but concerning you (u9pe\r de\ sou=), Charmides (w} Xarmi/dh), I lament it very much (pa/nu a0ganaktw~), if you (ei0 su/), having such beauty (toiou=toj w@n th=n i0de/an) and furthermore (kai\ pro\j tou/tw|), being most temperate of soul (th\n yuxh\n swfrone/statoj), should have no profit or good in life from this temperance (mhde\n o0nh/sh| a0po\ tau/thj th=j swfrosu/nhj). And still more I lament (e1ti de\ ma~llon a0ganaktw~) about the charm (u9pe\r th=j e0pw|dh=j) which I learned from the Thracian (h4n para\ tou= Qra|ko\j e1maqon), if for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth (ei0 mhdeno\j a0ci/ou pra/gmatoj ou]san) I was learning it with much effort (au0th\n meta\ pollh=j spoudh=j e0ma/nqanon). This then (tau=t’ ou]n) I really do not think (pa/nu me\n ou0k oi1omai) to be like this (ou3twj e1xein), but I think that I am a bad enquierer (a0ll’ e0me\ fau=lon ei]nai zhthth/n); for temperance (e0pei\ th/n ge swfrosu/nhn) is a great good (me/ga ti a0gaqo\n ei]nai), and if you have it (kai\ ei1per ge e1xeij au0to/), you are a blessed man (maka/rion ei]nai/ se). But see (a0ll’ o3ra) if you have it (ei0 e1xeij te) and have no need of the charm (kai\ mhde\n de/h| th=j e0pw|dh=j); for if you do (ei0 ga\r e1xeij), I would rather advise you (ma~llon a2n e1gwge/ soi sumbouleu/saimi) to regard me simply as a fool (e0me\ me\n lh=ron h9gei=sqai ei]nai) who is never able to reason out anything (kai\ a0du/naton lo/gw| o9tiou=n zhtei=n); but that you yourself (seauto\n de/), the more wise and temperate you are (o3sw|per swfrone/steroj ei]), the happier you are (tosou/tw| ei]nai kai\ eu0daimone/steron).’ (175d5-176a5)

Charmides said (Kai\ o9 Xarmi/dhj): ‘But, dear God (A)lla\ ma\ Di/’)’, said he (h] d’ o3j), I myself (e1gwge), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), do not know (ou0k oi]da) whether I have (ou0t’ ei0 e1xw) or do not have it (ou0t’ ei0 mh\ e1xw); for how could I know (pw~j ga\r a2n ei0dei/hn), that which even you and Critias are (o3 ge mhd’ u9mei=j) unable to discover (oi[oi/ te/ e0ste e0ceurei=n) what it is (o3ti pot’ e1stin), as you say (w#j fh|\j su/)? But I do not really believe you (e0gw_ me/ntoi ou0 pa/nu soi pei/qomai), and I think that I (kai\ e0mauto/n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), am very much in need of the charm (pa/nu oi]mai dei=sqai th=j e0pw|dh=j), and as far as I am concerned (kai\ to/ g’ e0mo/n), nothing stands in the way (ou0de\n kwlu/ei) of my being charmed by you (e0pa/|desqai u3po sou=) daily (o3sai h9me/rai), until you say (e3wj a2n fh|=j su/) that I have had enough (i9kanw~j e1xein).’ (176a6-b4)

‘Very good (Ei]en)’ said Critias (e1fh o9 Kriti/aj), ‘Charmides (w} Xarmi/dh), if you do this (h2n dra=|j tou=to) I shall have a proof (e1moig’ e1stai tou=to tekmh/rion) of your temperance (o3ti swfronei=j), that is if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates (h2n e0pa/|dein pare/xh|j Swkra/tei), and never desert him (kai\ mh\ a0polei/ph| tou/tou) at all (mh/te me/ga mh/te smikro/n).’

‘You may depend on my following and not deserting him (w3j a0kolouqh/sontoj kai\ mh\ a0poleipome/nou),’ said Charmides (e1fh) ‘for I should be very wrong (deina\ ga\r a2n poioi/hn) not to obey you (ei0 mh\ peiqoi/mhn soi/) who are my guardian (tw~| e0pitro/pw|), and if I didn’t do (kai\ mh\ poioi/hn) what you command me to do (a4 keleu/eij).’

‘And I do command you,’ he said (A)lla\ mh\n, e1fh, keleu/w e1gwge).

‘Then I will do as you say (Poih/sw toi/nun),’ said Charmides (e1fh), ‘and begin this very day (a0po\ tauthji\ th=j h9me/raj a0rca/menoj).’ (176b5-c4)

‘You sirs (Ou[toi),’ I said (h]n d’ e0gw&), ‘what are you conspiring about (ti/ bouleu/esqon poiei=n;)?’

‘We are not conspiring (Oude/n)’, said Charmides (e1fh o9 Xarmi/dhj), ‘we have conspired already (a0lla\ bebouleu/meqa).’

‘Are you about to use violence (Bia/sh| a1ra),’ said I (h]n d’ e0gw&), ‘without even going through the forms of justice (kai\ ou0d’ a0na/krisi/n moi dw&seij;)?’

‘Yes, I shall use violence (W(j biasome/nou),’ he replied (e1fh), ‘since Critias here (e0peidh/per o3de ge) orders me (e0pita/ttei); and you had better consider well (pro\j tau=ta su\ au] bouleu/ou o3ti poih/seij).’

‘But the time for consideration had passed,’ I said (A)ll’ ou0demi/a, e1fhn e0gw&, lei/petai boulh/), ‘when you are intent on doing something (soi\ ga\r e0pixeirou=nti pra/ttein o9tiou=n), and are taking recourse to violence (kai\ biazome/nw|), no man will be able to resist you (ou0dei\j oi[o/j t’ e1stai e0nantiou=sqai a0nqrw&pwn).’

‘Do not you resist me then,’ he said (Mh\ toi/nun, h] d’ o3j, mhde\ su\ e0nantiou=).

‘I will not resist you then,’ I replied (Ou0 toi/nun e0nantiw&somai).

With Socrates’ words Ou0 toi/nun e0nantiw&somai (‘I will not resist you then’) the dialog ends.

***

How could Plato have written the Charmides, as he did, after the Thirty had ordered Socrates and four other Athenians to go to Salamis, arrest Leon the Salaminian, and bring him to death; the four did as they were commanded, but Socrates went home (see Epistle VII, 324e-325a, Apology 32c4-32d7)?