In my preceding post I suggested that the Phaedrus can be seen as Plato’s answer to the expectations concerning his entry into the political arena, expectations voiced in Aristophanes’ Frogs. I argued that the song – in which the chorus in the strophe celebrates Aeschylus for ‘his keen intelligent mind’ (echȏn xunesin ȇkribȏmenȇn, 1482-3), returning home to save his city ’because of his keen intelligent mind’ (dia to sunetos einai, 1490), and in the antistrophe deprecates Socrates for activities in which nothing is done, nothing achieved – is aimed at Plato: Plato must shake Socrates off (the antistrophe), becoming fully aware of his powers and of his destiny (the strophe).
Plato in the Phaedrus entered the
political arena with Socrates’ opening words ‘My dear Phaedrus (Ō phile
Phaidre), where is it you’re going (poi dȇ)?’ Phaedrus was in exile;
introducing him as Socrates’ dear friend, Plato presented the return of the
emigrants as a political imperative.
Phaedrus replied: ‘I’m going for a walk outside the city-wall (poreuomai pros peripaton exȏ teichous) … I’m taking my walks along the country roads (kata tas hodous poioumai tous peripatous) … walking here is more refreshing than in the colonnades (akopȏterous einai tȏn en tois dromois).’
Phaedrus could take his walks along the
country roads only in the dialogue dramatically dated in time of peace, prior
to his being accused of profaning the Eleusinian mysteries and fleeing into
exile, and thus prior to the Athenian’s invasion of Sicily.
In 405 B.C., when Aristophanes’ Frogs were written and staged, Aristophanes could present the annual solemn procession to Eleusis only in the Underworld. For since the fortification of Deceleia by the Spartans, the procession had been compelled to travel by sea, except when Alcibiades, restored to Athens in 407 B.C. led out his army to protect the overland route (Xen. Hellenica, I. iv.,20,21), ‘so guarding the Mysteries which himself was accused of profaning, and neutralizing the garrison in Deceleia which he had himself recommended to Sparta. And whilst the procession had to travel by sea, says Plutarch, it was shorn of its accustomed solemnities – Alcibiades 34.’ (B.B. Rogers’ comment on Frogs 326).
Aristophanes in the Frogs, and Plato in the Phaedrus, thus emphasised the conclusion of peace with Sparta as a political imperative.
In the Frogs, in the parabasis
the chorus advises the citizens to re-enfranchise those who were
disenfranchised for their connection with the oligarchic revolution of the Four
Hundred (in 411 B.C.):
Well it suits the holy Chorus evermore with counsel wise
To exhort and teach the city: this we therefore now advise –
ton hieron choron dikaion esti chrȇsta tȇi polei
xumparainein kai didaskein. prȏton oun hȇmin dokei
End the townsmen’s apprehensions;
equalize the rights of all;
exisȏsai tous politas k’aphelein ta deimata. (686-688, tr. B.B. Rogers)
Scholiast says that ‘the play (to
drama) … was so admired because of its Parabasis (houtȏ ethaumasthȇ dia tȇn en autȏi Parabasin), in which the author reconciles (kath’ hȇn diallattei) those who enjoyed their
citizen-rights (tous entimous) with those who were deprived of all their
rights of citizenship (tois atimois) … that it was acted a second time (hȏste kai anedidachthȇ), as says
Dicaearchus (hȏs phȇsi Dikaiarchos).’ (III. THŌMA TOU MAGISTROU).
***
Dicaearchus was a distinguished
disciple of Aristotle. Diogenes Laertius refers to him in corroboration of the
ancient tradition according to which the Phaedrus was Plato’s first
dialogue (III. 38).
***
Aristophanes in the Frogs pleaded
for disenfranchised citizens who lived in Athens. Plato went further: he turned
the reader’s mind to citizens who were in exile.
***
When Aristophanes wrote the Frogs,
the political situation in Athens was dominated by the aftermath of the naval
victory of Arginusae. The Spartans offered to evacuate Deceleia and conclude a
general peace, on the terms that each side should retain what it held. The
wiser citizens were anxious to embrace the offer, but the Athenian Assembly,
inflamed by the demagog Cleophon with deleterious patriotism, rejected the
offer. If Athens were to be saved, Cleophon’s hold on the People’s Assembly had
to end. In the Frogs, in the introductory song of the parabasis
Aristophanes points to his semi-Thracian origin: ‘upon whose double-speaking
lips (eph’ hou dȇ cheilesin
amphilalois) the Thracian swallow is terribly
roaring (deinon epibremetai Thrȇikia chelidȏn), as it sits perched on that barbarian leafage (epi barbaron hezomenȇ petalon).’
This is Rogers’ prosaic translation of
lines 679-682, which he gives in his note on Frogs 678, commenting: ‘It
was far from Aristophanes’ intention to attribute to the demagogue the musical
notes of the swallow, and therefore the bird on Cleophon’s lips does not warble
but deinon epibremetai, “makes a terrible roaring”. It is Cleophon’s
voice, and not her own, that issues from the swallow’s throat.’
In his poetic rendering of the Frogs
Rogers translates:
‘On the lips of that foreigner base,
of Athens the bane and disgrace,
There is shrieking, his kinsman by
race,
The garrulous swallow of Thrace.’
Having thus initiated his attack on
Cleophon in the parabasis, Aristophanes turns it into a veritable onslaught in
the scenes with which the Frogs culminate. Sending Aeschylus ‘back home’
(palin oikad’, 1486), Pluto says to him:
‘save our state (sȏze polin tȇn hȇmeteran) … and give this to Cleophon
(kai dos touti Kleophȏnti), and this to the
revenue-raising crew (kai touti toisi poristais), to Nicomachus
and Myrmex, together (Murmȇki th’ homou
kai Nikomachȏi).
The Scholiast says that ‘this’ means
a halter; Aeschylus is asked by Pluto ‘to be carrying’ (pherȏn) three halters, one for each of the
three to hang themselves. Pluto continues:
‘And bid them all that without delay,
To my realm of the dead they hasten
away.
kai phraz’ autois tacheȏs hȇkein
hȏs eme deuri kai mȇ melleinˑ
For if they loiter above, I swear
I’ll come myself and arrest them
there.
And branded and fettered the slaves
shall go
Down, down to the darkness below.
k’an mȇ tacheȏs hȇkȏsin, egȏ
nȇ ton Apollȏ stixas autous
kai sumpodisas
kata gȇs tacheȏs apopempsȏ.
Rogers notes on Pluto’s ‘save our state’: ‘In this last solemn scene – for solemn scene it is,
although it occurs in comedy – Pluto is paying a compliment to Athens, by
identifying himself with her citizens.’
***
The reader of Plato will be reminded
of the closing scene of Plato’s Symposium, in which Socrates ‘compels
Agathon [a tragedian] and Aristophanes to acknowledge (prosanankazein ton Sȏkratȇ homologein
autous) that the true artist in tragedy is
an artist in comedy also (tou autou andros einai kȏmȏidian kai tragȏidian epistasthai poiein, 223c-d).’
***
In the closing song of the Chorus the
desire for peace is paramount, and the rejection of Cleophon definitive:
First, as the poet triumphant is
passing away to the light,
Grant him success on his journey, ye
powers that are ruling below.
prȏta men euodian agathȇn apionti poiȇtȇi
es phaos ornumenȏi dote, daimones hoi kata gaias,
Grant that he find for the city good
counsels to guide her aright;
tȇi te polei megalȏn agathȏn agathas epinoias.
So we at last shall be freed from the
anguish, the fear, and the woe,
Freed from the onset of war. Let
Cleophon and his band
Battle, if battle they must, far away
in their own fatherland.
pangchu gar ek megalȏn acheȏn pausaimeth’
an houtȏs
argaleȏn t’ en hoplois sunodȏn. Kleophȏn de machesthȏ
k’allos ho boulomenos toutȏn patriois en arourais.
Although Aristophanes does not
mention the Spartan offer of peace directly, he clearly alludes to it in this
closing song of the Chorus. For the Athenians can be ‘freed from the anguish,
the fear, and the woe, freed from the onset of war’ only if they conclude a
lasting peace with Sparta.
Plato in the Phaedrus does not
name Cleophon. But when he speaks of ‘a rhetorician (ho rȇtorikos) who is ignorant of good and evil (agnoȏn agathon kai kakon), who employs his power of
persuasion on a community as ignorant as himself (labȏn polin hȏsautȏs echousan peithȇi), and by studying the beliefs of the masses (doxas de plȇthous memeletȇkȏs) he persuades them to do evil
instead of good (peisȇi kaka
prattein ant’ agathȏn, 260c), who else can he be speaking about but Cleophon?
Cleophon was invincible in the
People’s Assembly. Aristophanes could allow himself to attack him as he did
because he directed at him his wit, in which his audience delighted. Had Plato
merely stated that Cleophon, being ignorant of good and evil, persuaded the Athenians
to do what was bad for them instead of good, his statement would be counterproductive.
Socrates asked: ‘Well then, for
things that are to be said well and acceptably, at least, mustn’t there be
knowledge in the mind of the speaker of the truth (Ar’ oun ouch huparchein
dei tois eu ge kai kalȏs rȇthȇsomenois tȇn tou legontos dianoian eiduian to alȇhes) about whatever he intends to speak
about (hȏn an erein
peri mellȇi;)?’
Phaedrus: ‘What I have heard about
this (Houtȏsi peri toutou
akȇkoa), my dear Socrates (ȏ phile Sȏkrates), is that there is no necessity for
the man who intends to be an orator (ouk einai anankȇn tȏi mellonti rȇtori esesthai) to understand what is really just (ta
tȏi onti dikaia
manthanein), but only what would appear so to
the majority of those who will give judgement (alla ta doxant’ an plȇthei hoiper dikasousin), and not what is really good (oude
ta ontȏs agatha) or fine (ȇ kala) but whatever will appear so (all’ hosa doxei); because
persuasion comes from that (ek gar toutȏn einai to peithein) and not from the truth (all’ ouk
ek tȇs alȇtheias).’
Socrates: ‘Not to be cast aside,
Phaedrus, must apply to whatever wise people say, and we should perhaps look to
see whether they may not be right (Outoi apoblȇton epos einai dei, ȏ Phaidre, ho
an eipȏsi sophoi,
alla skopein mȇ ti legȏsi); what has just been said,
particularly (kai dȇ kai to nun
lechthen), must not be dismissed (ouk
apheteon).’ – Phaedrus: ‘Quite right (Orthȏs legeis)’. – Socrates: ‘Let us consider it
like this (Hȏde dȇ skopȏmen auto). –
Phaedrus: ‘How (Pȏs;)’
Socrates: ‘If I were persuading you (ei se peithoimi
egȏ) to defend yourself against the enemy (polemious amunein) by
getting a horse (ktȇsamenon hippon), and neither of us knew what a horse
was (amphȏ de hippon agnooimen), but I happened to know just so much
about you (tosonde mentoi tunchanoimi eidȏs peri sou), that Phaedrus
thinks a horse is that tame animal (hoti Phaidros hippon hȇgeitai to tȏn
hȇmerȏn zȏiȏn) which has the largest ears – (megista echon ȏta)’ –
Phaedrus stepped in: ‘It would be ridiculous, Socrates (Geloion g’ an, ȏ
Sȏkrates, eiȇ).’ – Socrates: ‘Not yet (Oupȏ ge); but it would be
when I tried earnestly to persuade you (all’ hote dȇ spoudȇ se peithoimi)
by putting together a speech in praise of the donkey (suntitheis logon
epainon kata tou onou), labelling it a horse (hippon eponomazȏn) and
saying (kai legȏn) that the beast would be an invaluable acquisition
both at home (hȏs pantos axion to thremma oikoi te kektȇsthai) and on
active service (kai epi stratias), useful to fight from (apopolemein
te chrȇsimon) and capable too of carrying baggage (kai pros g’ enenkein
dunaton skeuȇ), and good for many other purposes (kai alla polla
ȏphelimon).’ – Phaedrus: ‘Then it would be thoroughly ridiculous (Pangeloion
g’ an ȇdȇ eiȇ).’
Socrates: ‘Well then (Ar’ oun),
isn’t ridiculous and friendly better than clever and hateful (ou
kreitton geloion kai philon ȇ deinon te kai echthron einai; 260c3-4)?’
– Phaedrus: ‘It seems so’ (Phainetai). – Socrates: ‘So when an expert in
rhetoric (Hotan oun ho rȇtorikos) who is ignorant of good and evil (agnoȏn
agathon kai kakon) employs his power of persuasion on a city as ignorant as
himself (labȏn polin hȏsautȏs echousan peithȇi), not by extolling a
miserable donkey as being really a horse (mȇ peri onou skias hȏs hippou ton
epainon poioumenos), but by extolling evil as being really good (alla
peri kakou hȏs agathou): and when by studying the beliefs of the masses (doxas
de plȇthous memeletȏkȏs) he persuades them to do evil instead of good (peisȇi
kaka prattein ant’ agathȏn), what kind of crop his oratory is likely to
reap from the seed thus sown (poion tina oiei meta tauta tȇn rȇtorikȇn
karpon hȏn espeire therizein;)?’ (259e4-260d1)
***
Hackforth and Rowe translate 260c3-4
differently. Hackforth: ‘Well, isn’t it better to be a ridiculous friend than a
clever enemy?’ Rowe: ‘Well then, isn’t it better to be ridiculous and
well-intentioned than to be clever and full of hostile intentions?’ But Socrates’
question – ‘isn’t ridiculous and friendly better than clever and hateful’ – refers
to the rhetorician’s pronouncements, not to his intentions. Cleophon wanted the
best for the people of Athens, he just did not know what was good.
***
Let me end this post with Cleophon as Lysias saw
him:
‘You all know that Cleophon had all the
affairs of the State in his hands for many years (Kleophȏnta de pantes iste
hoti polla etȇ diecheirise ta tȇs poleȏs panta), and was expected to have
got a great deal by his office (kai prosedokato panu polla ek tȇs archȇs
echein); but when he died (apothanontos d’ autou) this money was
nowhere to be found (oudamou dȇla ta chrȇmata), and moreover his
relatives both by blood and by marriage (alla kai hoi prosȇkontes kai hoi
kȇdestai), in whose hands he would have left it (par’ hois an katelipen),
are admittedly poor people (homologoumenȏs penȇtes eisi).’ (Lysias XIX,
48-49, tr. W.R.M. Lamb)
After the disastrous battle at Aegospotami,
Cleophon once again damaged the city with his well intentioned rhetoric: ‘They
[ie. the oligarchs] began with an attack on Cleophon in the following matter (prȏton
men oun Kleophȏnti epethento ek tropou toioutou). When the first Assembly
was held on the question of peace (hote gar hȇ prȏtȇ ekklȇsia peri tȇs
eirȇnȇs egigneto), and the emissaries of the Spartans (kai hoi para
Lakedaimoniȏn hȇkontes) stated the terms on which the Spartans were
prepared to make peace (elegon eph’ hois hetoimoi eien tȇn eirȇnȇn
poieisthai hoi Lakedaimonioi) – on condition that the Long Walls were
demolished, each to the extent of ten stades (ei kataskapheiȇ tȏn technȏn
tȏn makrȏn epi deka stadia hekaterou), – you then refused, men of Athens,
to stomach what you had heard as to the demolition of the walls (tote humeis
te, ȏ andres Athȇnaioi, ouk ȇneschesthe akousantes peri tȏn teichȏn tȇs
kataskaphȇs), and Cleophon arose and protested on behalf of you all (Kleophȏn
te huper humȏn pantȏn anastas anteipen) that by no means could the thing be
done (hȏs oudeni tropȏi hoion te eiȇ poiein tauta).’ (Lysias XIII, 8,
tr. W.R.M. Lamb)
Cleophon prevailed: ‘After that Theramenes (meta
de tauta Thȇramenȇs), who was plotting against democracy (epibouleuȏn
tȏi plȇthei tȏi humeterȏi) arose and said that (anastas legei hoti),
if you would appoint him (ean auton helȇsthe) an ambassador to treat for
peace with a free hand (peri tȇs eirȇnȇs presbeutȇn autokratora), he
would arrange (poiȇsei) that there should be neither a breach made in
the walls (hȏste mȇte tȏn teichȏn dielein) nor any other abasement of
the city (mȇte allo tȇn polin elattȏsthai mȇden); and that he thought (oioito
de kai) he would contrive even to get from the Spartans some additional
boon for the city (allo ti agathon para Lakedaimoniȏn tȇi polei heurȇsesthai)
… Well, he went to Sparta (ekeinos men oun elthȏn eis Lakedaimona) and
stayed there a long time (emenen ekei polun chronon), though he had left
you here in a state of siege (katalipȏn humas poliorkoumenous), and knew
that your population was in desperate straits (eidȏs to humeteron plȇthos en
aporiai echomenon), as owing to the war (kai dia ton polemon) and
its distresses (kai ta kaka) the majority must be in want of the
necessities of life (tous pollous tȏn epitȇdeiȏn endeeis ontas). But he
thought that (nomizȏn), if he should reduce you to the condition (ei
diatheiȇ humas) to which he in fact reduced you (hȏsper diethȇke),
you would be only too glad to make peace on any terms (hopoiantinoun
ethelȇsai an eirȇnȇn poiȇsasthai). The others remained here (hoi d’
enthade hupomenontes), with the design of subverting the democracy (kai
epibouleuontes katalusai tȇn dȇmokratian); they brought Cleophon to trial (eis
agȏna Kleophȏnta kathistasi), on the pretext (prophasin men) that he
did not go to the camp (hoti ouk ȇlthen eis ta hopla) for his night’s
rest (anapausomenos), but really (to d’ alȇthes) because he had
spoken on your behalf against the destruction of the walls (hoti anteipen
huper humȏn mȇ kathairein ta teichȇ). So they packed a jury for his trial,
and these promoters of oligarchy appeared before the court and had him put to
death (ekeinȏi men oun dikastȇrion paraskeuasantes kai eiselthontes hoi
boulomenoi oligarchian katastȇsasthai apekteinan) on that pretext (en tȇi
prophasei tautȇi). Theramenes arrived later from Sparta (Thȇramenȇs de
husteron aphikneitai ek Lakedaimonos) … He came bringing a peace (pherȏn
eirȇnȇn) … its terms required (enȇn gar) … the razing of the Long
walls in their entirety (hola ta makra teichȇ diaskapsai); and instead
of his contriving to get some additional boon for the city (anti de tou allo
ti agathon tȇi polei heuresthai): surrender of our ships (tas te naus
paradounai) and dismantling of the wall around Piraeus (kai to peri ton
Peiraia teichos perielein).’
(Lysias XIII, 9-14, tr. W.R.M. Lamb)
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