In my preceding post I argued that Plato wrote the first part
of the Phaedrus independently, and circulated it among his friends as
such. In the enthusiasm with which he wrote Socrates’ second speech, the
Palinode, he included in it passages for which he, and Socrates, might be
accused for introducing new deities. This compelled him to write the second
part, in which Socrates downplayed the Palinode as a childish play, maintaining
that the only important thing in it was the application of the two principles
of dialectic in composing it. In this post I shall discuss the second part, and
begin with its beginning. But this means that I must start with the end of the
first part.
Socrates’ second
speech ends with his prayer to Eros: ‘Turn Lysias to philosophy (Lusian …
epi philosophian … trepson), so that his lover here (hina kai ho erastȇs hode autou) may no longer waver as he does now between the two choices
(mȇketi epamphoterizȇi kathaper nun), but live for Love in singleness of
purpose with the aid of philosophic discourse (all’ haplȏs pros Erȏta meta philosophȏn logȏn ton bion poiȇtai)’.
The first part ends, in my view, with Phaedrus’ immediate response to it: ‘I
join in your prayer (Suneuchomai soi), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), if indeed it is better for us (eiper
ameinon tauth’ hȇmin einai), that it becomes so (tauta
gignesthai).’ (257b2-c1; translations from the Phaedrus are C.J.
Rowe’s)
The second
part begins with what Phaedrus says next: ‘For some time I have been amazed at
how much finer you managed to make your speech than the one before (ton
logon de sou palai thaumasas echȏ,
hosȏi kalliȏ tou proterou apȇrgasȏ); so that I’m afraid (hȏste oknȏ) Lysias will appear wretched to me
in comparison (mȇ moi ho Lusias tapeinos phanȇi),
if he really does consent (ean ara kai ethelȇsȇi) to put up another in competition with it (pros
auton allon parateinai, 256c1-4).’
What makes me think that the second part begins with the
words of Phaedrus that appear to follow seamlessly the words with which he
joined Socrates’ prayer? What Phaedrus says next brings in quite a new point: ‘For
the fact is, my remarkable fellow, that just recently one of our politicians
was railing at him and reproaching him on this very score (kai gar tis
auton, ȏ thaumasie, enanchos tȏn politikȏn tout’ auto loidorȏn ȏneidize), constantly calling him a
speech-writer (kai dia pasȇs tȇs loidorias ekalei logographon); so possibly we shall find him
desisting from further composition to preserve his reputation (tach’ oun an
hupo philotimias epischoi hȇmin tou graphein, 257c1-7).’ The words that follow Phaedrus’ joining in
Socrates’ prayer were needed to connect with the first part of the Phaedrus
this new point, with which the theme of rhetoric, i.e. the main theme of the
second part, actually begins. That the second part begins at this point is
indicated in the closing section of the dialogue, where Socrates says: ‘Then
now, Phaedrus, we can decide those other issues (Nun dȇ ekeina ȇdȇ, ȏ Phaidre, dunametha krinein), since we have agreed about these (toutȏn hȏmologȇmenȏn, 277a6-7).’
‘Since we have agreed about these’ signify the issues
concerning ‘the propriety and impropriety of writing’ (To euprepeias graphȇs peri kai aprepeias, 274b6), discussed in 274b6-277a5, i.e. the section that
begins with Socrates’ ‘Egyptian myth’ on the invention of writing and ends by
contrasting the written speeches ‘which are incapable of speaking in their own
support (adunatȏn men hautois logȏi boȇthein), and incapable of adequately
teaching what is true (adunatȏn de hikanȏs t’alȇthȇ didaxai)’, with the spoken ‘words accompanied by knowledge (met’ epistȇmȇs logous), which are able to help themselves
and the man who planted them (hoi heautois tȏi te phuteusanti boȇthein hikanoi), and are not without fruit (kai
ouchi akarpoi) but contain a seed (alla echontes sperma) … and
making the one who has it as happy as it is possible for a man to be (kai
ton echonta eudaimonein poiountes eis hoson anthrȏpȏi dunaton malista, 276e7-277a4)’.
‘Those other issues’ signify the discussion of rhetoric that
began with the reproach aimed at Lysias and ended with Socrates’ discussion on
rhetoric with Tisias, conjured up from the dead, at 274a5. Phaedrus asks ‘What
are they (i.e. what are ‘those other issues‘ referred to by Socrates),’ (Ta
poia; 277a8), and Socrates answers: ‘The ones we wanted to look into (Hȏn dȇ peri boulȇthentes idein), which brought us to our present conclusion (aphikometha
eis tode): how we were to weigh up the reproach aimed at Lysias (hopȏs to Lusiou te oneidos exetasaimen) about the writing of speeches (tȇs tȏn logȏn graphȇs peri), and speeches themselves (kai
autous tous logous), which were written scientifically and which not (hoi
technȇi kai aneu technȇs graphointo).’ (277a9-b2)
There are
some additional reasons for seeing the Phaedrus divided – and interconnected –
in this manner. In the discussion that preceded Socrates’ second speech there
was no mentioning of any reproach raised against Lysias’ engagement in writing
of speeches. Socrates: ‘… and I advise Lysias too (sumbouleuȏ de kai Lusiai) to put in writing as quickly as possible (hoti tachista
grapsai) that one should grant favours to the lover rather than to the man
who is not in love, in return for favours received (hȏs chrȇ erastȇi
mallon ȇ mȇ erȏnti ek tȏn homoiȏn charizesthai).’ – Phaedrus: ‘You can be sure (All’ eu isthi) that
that’s how it will be (hoti hexei touth’ houtȏ): once you have given your praise of the lover (sou gar
eipontos ton tou erastou epainon), there will be every necessity (pasa
anankȇ) for Lysias to be compelled (Lusian hup’ emou
anankasthȇnai) to write a speech in his turn on the same subject (grapsai
au peri tou autou logon).’ (243d5-e1)
Phaedrus’
words at 256c1-4 – ‘For some time I have been amazed at how much finer you
managed to make your speech than the one before; so that I’m afraid Lysias will
appear wretched to me in comparison, if he really does consent to put up
another in competition with it’ – appear to be directly responding to the
discussion that preceded Socrates’ second speech. Why don’t I view the first
part as ending with these words of Phaedrus? As an addition to Phaedrus’
joining in Socrates’ prayer to Eros these words would have made a very poor
ending to the first part. Furthermore, after adding the second part, Plato ends
the whole dialogue similarly. Socrates prays: ‘Dear Pan (Ō phile Pan te) and all you gods of this place (kai alloi hosoi tȇide theoi), grant me that I may become beautiful within (doiȇte moi kalȏi genesthai t’andothen); and that what is in my possession
outside me (exȏthen de hosa echȏ) may be in friendly accord with what is inside (tois
entos moi einai phila). And may I count the wise man as rich (plousion
de nomizoimi ton sophon); and may my pile of gold be (to de chrusou plȇthos eiȇ moi) of a size which only a man of moderate
desires could bear or carry (hoson mȇte pherein mȇte agein dunaito allos ȇ ho sȏphrȏn). Do we still need anything else (Et’ allou
deometha), Phaedrus (ȏ Phaidre;)? For me that prayer is enough (emoi
men gar metriȏs ȇuktai).’ Phaedrus joins in: ‘Make the prayer for me too (Kai emoi tauta
suneuchou); for what friends have they share (koina gar ta tȏn philȏn).’ – Socrates adds just one word: Iȏmen
(‘Let’s go).’
***
In ‘The
argument and structure of Plato’s Phaedrus’ Rowe critically evaluates
‘the short but excellent introduction to Thompson’s edition of the Phaedrus,
published in 1868’, ‘which provides for the proper integration of Socrates’
second speech into the structure of the whole’: ‘The key point of Thompson’s
interpretation is that Socrates’ second speech is to be understood as an
example of the kind of oratory which is described in the Politicus:
“that part of oratory which persuades people of what is right, and so helps to
guide behaviour in cities in partnership with the art of kingship”, and which
“persuades the mass of people, the crowd, through muthologia rather than
teaching” … This rhetoric, as understood by the Politicus and the Phaedrus,
“was to be the handmaid at once of Philosophy and Political, or what in the
ancient view was the same thing, of Ethical Science”.’ (pp. 107-8)
Let me
confront this Rowe & Thompson’s view with Plato’s own view on rhetoric as
expressed in the Phaedrus and in the Politicus. Concerning the
former, Plato’s view on rhetoric comes to the fore in the opening section of
the second part of the dialogue. In response to Phaedrus’ statement that ‘one
of our politicians was railing at Lysias and reproaching him on the score of
writing speeches, constantly calling him a speech-writer’ Socrates replied: ‘An
absurd idea, young man (Geloion g’, ȏ neania, to dogma legeis); you much mistake your friend (kai
tou hetairou suchnon diamartaneis), if you think him so frightened of mere
noise (ei auton houtȏs hȇgȇi tina psophodea). But perhaps you really think that
the man who was abusing Lysias meant what he said (isȏs de kai ton loidoroumenon autȏi oiei oneidizonta legein ha elegen).’ Phaedrus replied: ‘He seemed to (Ephaineto
gar), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates); and I think you know yourself (kai
sunoistha pou kai autos) that the men with the most power (hoti hoi
megista dunamenoi) and dignity (kai semnotatoi) in our cities (en
tais polesin) are ashamed to write speeches (aischunontai logous te
graphein) and leave compositions of theirs behind them (kai kataleipein
sungrammata heautȏn), for fear of what posterity will think of them (doxan
phoboumenoi tou epeita chronou) – they’re afraid they’ll be called sophists
(mȇ sophistai kalȏntai).’ (257c8-d8)
----
Hackforth notes: ‘The implication is that most prose works
hitherto had come from the pens of Sophists; and a glance at the relevant
testimonia in Diels-Kranz, Vors. II, makes this easy to believe.’ Dating
the Phaedrus after the Republic, Hackforth does not realise the
chronological implications of Phaedrus’ words.
It might be argued that Phaedrus’ statement must be taken as
referring to the dramatic date; Phaedrus fled into exile in 415, having been
accused of sacrilege by profaning the mysteries (Debra Nails, The People of
Plato, p. 232). But this does not explain Socrates’ emphatic rebuttal of
Phaedrus’ suggestion. Was it not Plato himself who on account of the first part
of the Phaedrus became exposed to the reproach of having become a writer
of speeches instead of devoting himself to his desired political career? On the
dating I have proposed for the Phaedrus Plato wrote it in 405, at the
time when his desire to ‘enter into public life’ (epi ta koina tȇs poleȏs ienai, Letter VII, 324b9-c1) was
the strongest.
----
Socrates: ‘You
are unaware (lanthanei se) that the proudest of politicians (hoti hoi
megiston phronountes tȏn politikȏn)
have the strongest desire to write speeches (malista erȏsi logographias te) and bequeath compositions (kai kataleipseȏs sungrammatȏn); why, whenever they write a speech (hoi ge kai
epeidan tina graphȏsi logon), they are so pleased to have
admirers (houtȏs agapȏsi tous epainetas) that they put in a special clause at the beginning with the
names of the persons who admire the speech in question (hȏste prosparagraphousi prȏtous hoi an hekastachou epainȏsin autous).’ – Phaedrus: ‘What do you mean (pȏs legeis touto;)? I don’t understand (ou gar manthanȏ).’ – Socrates: ‘You don’t understand (Ou manthaneis)
that when a politician begins a composition the first thing he writes is the
name of his admirer (hoti en archȇi andros politikou sungrammatos prȏtos ho epainetȇs gegraptai). – Ph.: ’Is it (Pȏs;)?’
– S.: ‘Yes, he says may be “Resolved by the Council” (“Edoxe” pou phȇsin “tȇi boulȇi”)
or “by the People” (ȇ “tȏi dȇmȏi)
or both (ȇ amphoterois): and then “Proposed by so-and-so” (kai hos eipen) –
a pompous piece of self-advertisement on the part of the author (ton hauton
dȇ legȏn mala semnȏs kai enkȏmiazȏn ho sungrapheus); after which he proceeds with what he has to say (epeita
legei dȇ to meta touto), showing off his own wisdom to his admirers (epideiknumenos
tois epainetais tȇn heautou sophian), sometimes in a very lengthy
composition (eniote panu makron poiȇsamenos sungramma); or does such a thing seem to you to
differ from a written speech (ȇ soi allo ti phainetai to toiouton ȇ logos sungegrammenos;)?’ – Ph.: ‘Not to me (Ouk emoige).’ – S.: ‘Then (Oukoun)
if the speech holds its ground (ean men houtos emmenȇi),
the author leaves the ground rejoicing (gegȇthȏs aperchetai ek tou theatrou ho poiȇtȇs); but if it is blotted out (ean de exaleiphthȇi),
and he loses his status as a recognised speech-writer (kai amoiros genȇtai logographias te kai tou axios einai sungraphein), he goes into mourning (penthei
autos te), and his friends with him (kai hoi hetairoi).’ – Ph.:
‘Quite so (Kai mala).’ – S.: ‘Which clearly implies (Dȇlon ge) that their attitude to the profession is not one of disdain (hoti
ouch hȏs huperphronountes tou epitȇdeumatos), but of admiration (all’ hȏs tethaumakotes).’ – P.: ‘To be sure (Panu men
oun).’ (257e2-258b9)
At the
beginning of the second part of the Phaedrus, in his defence of writing
within the framework of rhetoric and politics, Plato brings us into the midst
of the Athenian political life. Let us see what he says on politics and on
rhetoric in the Politicus. Towards the end of it the Eleatic stranger
says that ‘all alien (eoike … ta men hetera) and uncongenial matter (kai
hoposa allotria kai ta mȇ phila) has been separated from political
science (politikȇs epistȇmȇs apokechȏristhai), and what is precious and of a kindred nature has been left (leipesthai
de ta timia kai sungenȇ); there remain the nobler arts of
the general (toutȏn d’esti pou stratȇgia)
and the judge (kai dikastikȇ), and the higher sort of oratory
which is an ally of the royal art (kai hosȇ basilikȇi koinȏnousa rȇtoreia), and persuades men to do justice (peithousa
to dikaion), and assists in guiding the helm of States (sundiakubernai
tas en tais polesi praxeis, 303e8-304a2, tr. B. Jowett).’
The Stranger
undertakes to clear away these three arts from the science of the statesman,
beginning with the oratory. He asks: ‘To what science do we assign the power of
persuading (tini to peistikon oun apodȏsomen epistȇmȇi) a multitude (plȇthous te kai ochlou) by pleasing tale (dia muthologias) and not by
teaching (alla mȇ dia didachȇs;)?’
– His interlocutor, the younger Socrates answers: ‘That power, I think, must
clearly be assigned to rhetoric (Phaneron oimai kai touto rȇtorikȇi doteon on).’ – Stranger: ‘And to what science
do we give the power of determining whether we are to employ persuasion or
force towards any one, or to refrain altogether (To d’ eite dia peithous
eite kai dia tinos bias dei prattein pros tinas hotioun ȇ kai to parapan hȇsuchian echein, tout’ au poiai prosthȇsomen epistȇmȇi;)?’
– Y. Socr.: ‘To that science which governs the arts of speech and persuasion (Tȇi tȇs peistikȇs archousȇi kai lektikȇs).’
– Str.: ‘Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics (Eiȇ d’ an ouk allȇ tis, hȏs oimai, plȇn hȇ tou politikou dunamis).’ – Y. Socr.: ‘Very good (Kallist’ eirȇkas).’
– Str.: ‘Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics (Kai touto
men eoike tachu kechȏristhai politikȇs to rȇtorikon), being a different species (hȏs heteron eidos on), yet ministering to it (hupȇretoun mȇn tautȇi).’
– Y. Socr.: ‘Yes (Nai).’ (304c10-e2, tr. B. Jowett)
As can be
seen, ‘rhetoric, as understood by the Politicus and the Phaedrus,’
as Rowe puts it when quoting Thompson, derives from and corresponds to Plato’s
view of rhetoric in the Politicus, but it has nothing in common with the
Phaedrus, in which politics, the art of the judge, of the lawgiver, and
rhetoric are not separated. Socrates goes on to say: ‘Well then (Ti de;)
– when he becomes an orator or king (hotan hikanos genȇtai rȇtȏr ȇ basileus) capable of acquiring the power of a
Lycurgus, a Solon, or a Darius, and achieving immortality as a speech-writer in
a city (hȏste labȏn tȇn Lukourgou ȇ Solȏnos ȇ Dareiou dunamin athanatos genesthai logographos en polei), doesn’t he think himself equal to
the gods even while he is alive (ar’ ouk isotheon hȇgeitai autos te hauton eti zȏn),
and don’t those who come later (kai hoi epeita gignomenoi) think the
same of him (t’auta tauta peri autou nomizousi), when they observe his
compositions (theȏmenoi autou ta sungrammata;)?’ – P.: ‘Indeed so (Kai mala).’
(258b10-c6)
***
The discussion of the reproach against Lysias on account of
his being a speech-writer ends by its rejection. Socrates asked: ‘So do you think
that anyone of that kind (Oiei oun tina tȏn toioutȏn), whoever he is (hostis), and however ill-disposed
towards Lysias (kai hopȏstioun dusnous Lusiai), reproaches him on this count (oneidizein
auto touto) – that he is a writer (hoti sungraphei)?’ – Phaedrus
replied: ‘It is not very likely (Oukoun eikos ge), from what you say (ex
hȏn su legeis); if he did, it seems he would be reproaching what he
himself desires (kai gar an tȇi heautou epithumiai, hȏs eoiken, oneidizoi).’ – Socrates concluded: ‘This much, then, is clear to
everyone (Touto men ara panti dȇlon), that in itself, at least, writing
of speeches is not something shameful (hoti ouk aischron auto ge to graphein
logous).’ (258c7-d2)
This straightforward rejection of the reproach chimes
strangely with the closing section of the dialogue, in which the question of
the reproach is renewed, and can be resolved only thanks to the section devoted
to the devaluation of writing.
It seems that when Plato wrote the opening section of the
second part of the Phaedrus, his view on writing differed from the view
he expressed in the closing section. I can’t help conjecturing that the second
part originally ended, and thus the whole dialogue in its second edition, with
Plato’s exposition of rhetoric founded on the principles of dialectic. What
compelled him to add the part devoted to the criticism of writing was, I believe,
the dramatic change of circumstances brought about by the disastrous battle at
Aigos Potamoi, later in 405, which brought about the military collapse of
Athens. In the ensuing months of the Spartan siege it became clear that the
democracy could not survive and the only hope of the survival of the city was
for aristocracy to be installed under the protection of Sparta. The question of
writing, presumably viewed with misgivings in aristocratic circles interested
in politics, became acute, and what is more, the section devoted to rhetoric,
which was written in democracy and was profoundly marked by it, needed a
drastic and credible downplaying as a mere play, just for amusement, which the
closing section of the Phaedrus provided.
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