Questions: 2 Rhetoric in the Phaedrus and in the Gorgias – with reference to Plato’s Seventh Letter

Socrates says in the Phaedrus that in his two speeches on love ‘two forms’ (eidê) were involved, and ‘that it would be very agreeable if we could seize their significance in a scientific fashion’ (ei autoin tên dunamin technê̢ labein dunaito tis, ouk achari, 265c9-d1; translations from the Phaedrus in this entry are R. Hackforth’s, unless stated otherwise):

1. ‘The first is that in which we bring the dispersed plurality under a single form, seeing it all together (Eis mian te idean sunorônta agein ta pollachê̢ diesparmena): the purpose being to define so-and-so (hina hekaston horizomenos), and thus to make plain (dêlon poiê̢) whatever may be chosen as the topic for exposition (peri hou an hekastote didaskein ethelê̢). For example, take the definition given just now of love (hôsper ta nundê peri Erôtos), about what it is when defined (ho estin horisthen): whether it was right or wrong (eit’ eu eite kakôs elechthê), at all events it was that which enabled our discourse to achieve lucidity and consistency (to g’oun saphes kai to auto hautô̢ homologoumenon dia tauta eschen eipein ho logos, 265d3-7).’

2. ‘Being able to cut it up again, form by form (To palin kat’eidê dunasthai diatemnein), according to its natural joints (kath’ arthra hê̢ pephuken), and not try to break any part into pieces (kai mê epicheirein katagnunai meros mêden), like an inexpert butcher (kakou mageirou tropô̢ chrômenon, tr. of this sentence C. J. Rowe); but to take example from our two recent speeches (all’ hôsper arti tô logô). The single general form which they postulated was irrationality (to men aphron tês dianoias hen ti koinê̢ eidos elabetên); next, on the analogy of a single natural body (hôsper de sômatos ex henos) with its pairs of like-named members (dipla kai homônuma pephuke), right arm or leg, as we say, and left (skaia, ta de dexia klêthenta), they conceived of madness as a single objective form existing in human beings (houtô kai to tês paranoias hôs hen en hêmin pephukos eidos hêgêsamenô tô logô): wherefore the first speech divided off a part on the left (ho men to ep’ aristera temnomenos meros), and continued to make divisions (palin touto temnôn), never desisting (ouk epanêken) until it discovered one particular part bearing the name of “sinister” love (prin en autois epheurôn onomazomenon skaion tina erôta), on which it very properly poured abuse (eloidorêsen mal’ en dikê̢). The other speech conducted us to the forms of madness which lay on the right-hand side (ho d’ eis ta en dexia̢ tês manias agagôn hêmas), and upon discovering a type of love that shared its name with the other but was divine (homônumon men ekeinô̢, theion d’ au tina erôta epheurôn), displayed it to our view (kai proteinamenos) and extolled it (epê̢nesen) as the source of the greatest goods that can befall us (hôs megistôn aition hêmin agathôn) (265e1-266b1).

Hackforth remarks: ‘There are serious difficulties in this paragraph. Socrates speaks as though the generic concept of madness (to aphron, paranoia, mania) had been common to his two speeches, and there had been a formal divisional procedure followed in both of them. Neither of these things is true. In the first speech Socrates starts by bringing erôs [‘love’] under the genus epithumia [‘desire’, 237d3] but this is superceded by hubris [‘wantonness’, 238a2], which is declared to be polumeles kai polueides [‘it has many branches and forms’, 238a3]; it is then shown that erôs [‘love’] is a species of hubris [‘wantonness’], but this is done not by successive dichotomies, but by an informal discrimination from an indefinite number of other species, of which only two are named [gastrimargia ‘gluttony’, 238b1, and hubris … peri methas turanneusasa ‘wantonness … dominating in the matter of drinking’, 238b2]. It is only in the second speech that Socrates starts with a clear concept of “madness”; but here again there is no scheme of successive divisions, whether dichotomous or other: there is merely the single step of fourfold division.

It must therefore be admitted that Socrates’ account of the dialectical procedure followed in his speeches is far from exact. Nevertheless it may be said to be substantially true: for it is true to the spirit and implication of what has happened: it describes how the two speeches might naturally be schematized when taken together as part of a design which has gradually unfolded itself. A writer with more concern for exact statement than Plato had, would have made Socrates say something to the following effect: “I can illustrate these two procedures, Collection and Division, by reference to my two speeches; if you think of them together, you will agree that I was in fact, though not explicitly, operating with a generic concept, mania [‘madness’], under which I contrived to subsume two sorts of erôs [‘love’]: though I grant you that my actual procedure was very informal, and in particular that I tended to leap from genus to infima species [‘the lowest species’], without any clear indication of intermediate species.”

It should further be remembered that the word mania [‘madness’] did occur in Socrates’s first speech, although more or less casually: the lover whose passion was spent was described as metabalôn allon archonta en hautô̢ kai prostatên [‘having changed in himself and adopted a different ruler and master’], noun [‘sense’] kai sôphrosunên [‘and sanity’] ant’ erôtos kai manias [‘in place of love and madness’] (241A2-4). Moreover, when introducing his palinode Socrates had said ouk est’ etumos logos [‘Fals is the tale’] hos an parontos erastou tô̢ mê erônti mallon phê̢ dein charizesthai [‘that when a lover is at hand favour ought rather to be accorded to one who does not love’], dioti [‘on the ground’] ho men mainetai [‘that the former is mad’], ho de sôphronei [‘and the latter sound of mind’] (244A3-5). These passages, taken in conjunction with our present passage, will justify a belief that the conception of mania [‘madness’] as the genus of erôs [‘love’] was present in Plato’s mind from the outset of the dialogue.’ (R. Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedrus, Cambridge at the University Press, 1972, p. 133.)

Hackforth’s insight that the two procedures, Collection and Division, were ‘present in Plato’s mind from the outset of the dialogue’ gets the importance it deserves if we consider it within the framework of our viewing the Phaedrus as Plato’s first dialogue. For if we subject any dialogue of Plato to analysis similar to the one to which Hackforth subjected Socrates’ two speeches in the Phaedrus, we shall find that ‘the two procedures’ underlie every dialogue of Plato. Particularly instructive is the Gorgias, in which Socrates opposed rhetoric to dialectic.

In the Gorgias, Polus, a teacher of rhetoric, asks Socrates ‘What do you think rhetoric is (ti soi dokei hê rêtorikê einai; 462b10)?’ Socrates answers that rhetoric is ‘a knack’ (empeiria, 462c3). Polus asks: ‘A knack of what (Tinos empeiria;)?’ Socrates answers: ‘Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure (Charitos tinos kai hêdonês apergasias).’ – Polus: ‘Then don’t you think rhetoric is a fine thing (Oukoun kalon soi dokei hê rêtorikê einai), the ability to gratify people (charizesthai hoion te einai anthrôpous;)?’ – Socrates: ‘What’s that (Ti de;), Polus (ô Pôle;)? Have you already found out from me (êdê pepusai par’ emou) what I say it is (hoti phêmi autên einai), so that you ask the next question (hôste to meta touto erôta̢s), if I don’t think it’s fine (ei ou kalê moi dokei einai;)? (462c6-d2, the translation of the passages from the Gorgias in this post is by T. Irwin.)

As can be seen, the definition of rhetoric is in Socrates’ mind at the outset of the discussion – he had time to accomplish the preliminary ‘Collection’ in his encounters with sophists and rhetoricians – and it is instructive to see how he compels Polus to participate in a dialectic enquiry.

Polus: ‘Haven’t I found out that you say it’s a certain knack (Ou gar pepusmai hoti empeirian tina autên phê̢s einai;)?’ – S.: ‘Well then, since you admire gratification, would you like to gratify me a small thing (Boulei oun, epeidê tima̢s to charizesthai, smikron ti moi charisasthai;)? … Ask me now (Erou nun me) what craft I think cookery is (opsopoia hêtis moi dokei technê einai).’ – P.: ‘What craft is cookery (tis technê opsopoia;)?’ – S.: ‘No craft (Oudemia), Polus (ô Pôle).’ – P.: ‘Then what (Alla ti;)? Tell me (phathi).’ – S.: ‘I tell you (Phêmi dê) it’s a certain knack (empeiria tis).’ – P.: ‘What knack (Tis;)?’ – S.: ‘A knack of producing pleasure and gratification (charitos kai hêdonês apergasias).’ – P.: ‘Then is cookery the same as rhetoric (T’auton ara estin opsopoia kai rêtorikê;)?’ – S.: ‘No, not at all (Oudamôs ge); but it’s a part of the same practice (Alla tês autês men epitêdeuseôs morion).’ – P.: ‘What practice is this you’re speaking of (Tinos legeis tautês;)?’ (462d3-e5) Socrates hesitates ‘for fear Gorgias may think I’m ridiculing his own practice’ (mê oiêtai me diakômô̢dein to heautou epitêdeuma, 462e7-8).

When Gorgias insists, Socrates answers: ‘I think it is a practice (Dokei toinun moi einai ti epitêdeuma), not of a craftsman (technikon men ou), but of a guessing (psuchês de stochastikês), brave soul (kai andreias), naturally clever at approaching people (kai phusei deinês prosomilein anthrôpois); and I call the sum of it flattery (kalô de autou egô to kephalaion kolakeian).’ (463a6-b1)

Irwin’s ‘the sum of it’ does not adequately express to kephalaion, for which it stands. Kephalê means ‘head’, to kephalaion ‘summum genus’; Socrates’ to kephalaion corresponds to the concept that we get as a result of ‘Collection’, the first dialectic procedure, which Plato expressed in the Phaedrus as ‘that in which we bring the dispersed plurality under a single form (eis mian idean), seeing it all together: the purpose being to define so-and-so, and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen as the topic for exposition (265d3-5).’

In the Gorgias the corresponding procedure, the ‘Division’, follows, as Socrates goes on: ‘I think this practice has many other parts too (tautês moi dokei tês epitêdeuseôs polla men kai alla moria einai), and cookery is also one of them (hen de kai hê opsopoiikê); it seems to be a craft (ho dokei men einai technê), but on my account (hôs de ho emos logos) it isn’t a craft (ouk estin technê), but a knack (all’ empeiria) and procedure (kai tribê, literally ‘rubbing’; in this case: ‘getting experienced by rubbing elbows with many people, in crowds, meetings and assemblies’). I call rhetoric a part of this too (tautês morion kai tên rêtorikên egô kalô), and also cosmetics (kai tên ge kommôtikên) and sophistry (kai tên sophistikên) – these four parts (tettara tauta moria) set over four things (epi tettarsin pragmasin). And so if Polus wants to find out (ei oun bouletai Pôlus punthanesthai), he should find out (punthanesthô); for he hasn’t yet found out (ou gar pô pepustai) what sort of part of flattery I say rhetoric is (hopoion phêmi egô tês kolakeias morion einai tên rêtorikên).’ (463b1-c2)

Socrates explains what he thinks rhetoric is in a discussion with Gorgias; his explanation can be seen as a model application of ‘Collection’ and ‘Division’, the two dialectic procedures introduced in the Phaedrus. The explanation is preceded by a brief preliminary discussion.

Socrates: ‘I’ll try to explain (egô peirasomai phrasai) what I think rhetoric is (ho ge moi phainetai einai hê rêtorikê) … You call something body (sôma pou kaleis su) and soul (kai psuchên;)?’ – Gorgias: ‘Of course (Pôs gar ou;).’ – S.: ‘And don’t you also think there is a good condition of each of them (Oukoun kai toutôn oiei tina einai hekaterou euexian;)?’ – G.: ‘Of course (Egôge).’- S.: ‘Well then (Ti de;), is there also an apparent good condition (dokousan men euexian) which isn’t one (ousan d’ ou;)? For instance, I’m talking about this sort of thing (hoion toionde legô): – Many people appear to have their bodies in good condition (polloi dokousin eu echein ta sômata), and no one would easily notice (hous ouk an ra̢diôs aisthoito tis) that they are not (hoti ouk eu echousin), except a doctor (all’ ê iatros te) or a gymnastic trainer (kai tôn gumnastikôn tis).’ – G. ‘You are right (Alêthê legeis).’ – S.: ‘I say there is this sort of thing both for the body (To toiouton legô kai en sômati einai) and for the soul (kai en psuchê̢). It makes the body or the soul appear to be in good condition (ho poiei men dokein eu echein to sôma kai tên psuchên), but it’s still in no better condition (echei de ouden mallon).’ – G.: ‘That’s right (Esti tauta).’ (463e5-b1)

Since Gorgias had accepted all these preliminary points, Socrates can explain: ‘Come then, I’ll try to display more clearly to you what I’m saying, if I can (Phere dê soi, ean dunômai, saphesteron epideixô ho legô). For these two things (duoin ontoin toin pragmatoin) I say there are two crafts (duo legô technas); the one set over the soul (tên men epi tê̢ psuchê̢) I call the political craft (politikên kalô); I can’t off-hand find a single name for the single craft set over the body (tên de epi sômati mian men houtôs onomasai ouk echô soi), but still body-care is one craft (mias de ousês tês tou sômatos therapeias), and I say there are two parts of it (duo moria legô), the gymnastic (tên men gumnastikên) and the medical crafts (tên de iatrikên). The part of politics corresponding to gymnastics is legislation (tês de politikês anti men tês gumnastikês tên nomothetikên), and the part corresponding to medicine (antistrophon de tê̢ iatrikê̢) is justice (tên dikaiosunên) … Here are four crafts (tettarôn dê toutôn ousôn), taking care of either body or soul, aiming at the best (kai aei pros to beltiston therapeuousôn tôn men to sôma, tôn de tên psuchên). Flattery noticed them (hê kolakeutikê aisthomenê) – I don’t say it knew (ou gnousa legô), but it guessed (alla stochasamenê) – and divided itself into four (tetrarcha heautên dianeimasa) impersonating each of these parts (hupodusa hupo hekaston tôn moriôn), and pretends to be (prospoieitai einai touto) what it impersonates (hoper hupedu); it does not care a bit for the best (kai tou men beltistou ouden phrontizei), but lures and deceives foolishness with what is pleasantest at the moment (tô̢ de aei hêdistô̢ thêreuetai tên anoian kai exapata̢), making itself seem (hôste dokei) to be worth most (pleistou axia einai). Cookery impersonates medicine, then (hupo men oun tên iatrikên hê opsopoiikê hupodeduken), and pretends (kai prospoieitai) to know the best foods for the body (ta beltista sitia tô̢ sômati eidenai).’ (464b2-d5)

Tutning to Polus, Socrates goes on to say: ‘Well then, I call it flattery (kolakeian men oun auto kalô) … And I say it is not a craft (technên de autên ou phêmi einai), but a knack (all’ empeirian), because it has no rational account (hoti ouk echei logon oudena) by which it applies (hô̢ prospherei) the things it applies (ha prospherei), to say what they are by nature (hopoi’ atta tên phusin estin), so that it cannot say what is the explanation of each thing (hôste tên aitian hekastou mê echein eipein); and I don’t call anything a craft (egô de technên ou kalô) which is unreasoning (ho an ê̢ alogon pragma) … and cosmetics is disguised as gymnastics in the same way (tê̢ de gumnastikê̢ kata ton auton tropon touton hê kommôtikê [hupokeitai]) … as cosmetics (ho kommôtikê) is to gymnastics (pros gumnastikên), so is sophistry (touto sophistikê) to legislation (pros nomothetikên), and as cookery (kai hoti ho opsopoiikê) is to medicine (pros iatrikên), so is rhetoric (touto rêtorikê) to justice (pros dikaiosunên) … What I say rhetoric is, then (ho men oun egô phêmi tên rêtorikên einai) – you’ve heard it (akêkoas). It corresponds to cookery, doing in the soul what cookery does in the body (antistrophon opsopoias en psuchê̢, hôs ekeino en sômati).’ (464e2-465e1)

***

As I have argued, if the Phaedrus was written as Plato’s first dialogue, as the ancient biographic tradition suggests, it must have been written prior to the Charmides. The Charmides must have been written in the early days of the Thirty, that is in 404, and Phaedrus in the latter days of the Athenian democracy, in 405. This means that Plato wrote the Phaedrus in the days when his desire to become engaged in politics was most ardent, as we can learn from his Seventh Letter (324b8-325a5). Doing politics in Athens without applying oneself to rhetoric was unthinkable. Plato’s attempt to conceive rhetoric as technê‘ in the Phaedrus – that is as ‘craft’ (Irwin), as ‘science’ (Rowe), as ‘art’ (Hackforth) – gives us an insight into his thoughts and hopes of that time.

Plato’s rejection of rhetoric in the Gorgias indicates that it must have been written at the time when Plato realised that there was no place for him in the politics of Athens. The date of its provenance can be only conjectured on the basis of the Seventh Letter, for there is no reference in the Seventh Letter to the period in which Plato had given up on his desire to become engaged in politics of his native city. For in it Plato proceeds from the days in which he vacillated between despair and hope concerning his engagement in the Athenian politics straight into the days when he conceived the state in which the philosophers become rulers, to which he devoted the Republic (see Seventh Letter 325b5-326b4). The Gorgias nevertheless clearly indicates that there must have been such a period – the days in which the Gorgias was written – for the way in which Socrates discusses rhetoric in this dialogue clearly indicates that he had given up on any hope of becoming engaged in the politics of Athens, yet there is no inkling in it of his realization that ‘the classes of mankind will have no cessation from evils (kakôn oun ou lêxein ta anthrôpina genê) until either the class of those who are right and true philosophers attains political supremacy (prin an ê to tôn philosophountôn orthôs ge kai alêthôs genos eis archas elthê̢ tas politikas), or else the class of those who hold power in the State (ê to tôn dunasteuontôn en tais polesin) becomes, by some dispensation of Heaven, really philosophic (ek tinos moiras theias ontôs philosophêsê̢, Seventh Letter 326a7-b4, tr. R. G. Bury).’

Questions

Saturday, February 17, 2018

2 Rhetoric in the Phaedrus and in the Gorgias – with reference to Plato’s Seventh Letter

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