Forms as paradigms
After giving up on his abortive attempt to view the Forms as
mere thoughts, Socrates made one more attempt to save the Forms: ‘Above all it
appears to me like this (Malista emoige
kataphainetai hȏde
echein): these Forms (ta men eidê tauta) stand in the nature as
paradigms (hȏsper
paradeigmata hestanai en têi
phusei), the other things (ta de alla)
resemble them (toutois eoikenai) and
are likenesses of them (kai einai homoiȏmata) and this participation (kai hê
methexis hautê) of other things in the
Forms (tois allois gignesthai tȏn eidȏn)
is nothing other than their becoming a resemblance of them (ouk allê
tis ê eikasthênai autois).’ In response, Parmenides
asks: ‘Then, if something resembles the Form (Ei oun ti eoiken tȏi
eidei), can that Form fail to be similar to that which has come to resemble
it (hoion te ekeino to eidos mê homoion einai tȏi eikasthenti), in so far as that became
similar to it (kath hoson autȏi aphȏmoiȏthê)?
Or is there any way (ê
esti tis mêchanê)
by which the similar can be similar to not similar (to homoion mê
homoiȏi homoion einai)?’ Socrates
replies: ‘There isn’t (Ouk esti).’
Parmenides: ‘And that which is similar to similar (To de homoion tȏi
homoiȏi), must it not of
necessity (ou megalê anankê)
participate in the same Form (henos tou
autou eidous metechein)?’ Socrates: ‘Necessarily (Anankê).’ Parmenides: ‘That, by
participating in which the similar things are similar (Hou d’ an ta homoia metechonta homoia êi),
will not that be the Form itself (ouk
ekeino estai auto to eidos)?’ Socrates: ‘By all means (Pantapasi men oun).’ Parmenides: ‘So it is not possible for
anything (Ouk ara hoion te ti) to be
similar to the Form (tȏi eidei homoion einai), nor the
Form (oude to eidos) to anything (allȏi);
for otherwise (ei de mê), side by side with the Form (para to eidos) another Form will always show
itself forth (aei allo anaphanêsetai eidos), and if that were
similar to anything (kai an ekeino tȏi homoion êi),
another again (heteron au), and thus
a new Form will never cease to come to being (kai oudepote pausetai aei kainon eidos gignomenon), if the Form (ean to eidos) becomes similar to that
which participates in it (tȏi heautou metechonti homoion gignêtai).’ Socrates: ‘It is very true
what you say (Alêthestata
legeis).’ Parmenides: ‘So it is not by similarity that other things (ouk ara homoiotêti
t’alla) participate in the Forms (tȏn eidȏn
metalambanei), but one must look for something else (alla ti allo dei zêtein)
by which they participate (hȏi metalambanei).’ Socrates: ‘It
seems so (Eoike).’ Parmenides: ‘Do
you see then (Horais oun) how great
is the difficulty (hosê hê
aporia) if someone distinguishes as Forms beings in themselves (ean tis hȏs
eidê onta auta kath’ hauta diorizêtai)?’ Socrates: ‘I do indeed (Kai mala). (132c12-133a10)
***
Aristotle writes in Metaphysics
A, 991a19-23: ‘But, further (alla mên), all other things cannot come
from the Forms (oud ek tȏn eidȏn
esti t’alla) in any of the usual senses of “from” (kat’ outhena tropon tȏn
eiȏthotȏn
legesthai). And to say that they are patterns (to de legein paradeigmata auta einai) and the other things share in
them (kai metechein autȏn t’alla) is to use empty words (kenologein esti) and poetical metaphors
(kai metaphoras legein poiêtikas). For what is it that works
(ti gar esti to ergazomenon), looking
to the Ideas (pros tas ideas apoblepon)?’
(Tr. W. D. Ross)
***
Ross remarks on Aristotle’s last sentence (l. 991a22):
‘Aristotle ignores the account ([of Plato in] Tim. 28C, 29A) of the Demiurgus as making the world with “the
eternal” for his pattern. Even if he were entitled to regard this as “poetical
metaphor”, there is still the Reason which is the aitia tês
mixeȏs (Phil. 23 D) – though there indeed there is no distinct reference to
the Ideas and no use of the notion of a “pattern”.’ (Aristotle, Metaphysics, vol. I, Oxford University
Press 1924 (1997), Commentary by W. D. Ross, p. 198-9)
***
Had Aristotle regarded the creation of the world by the
Demiurge in the Timaeus as a poetical
metaphor, his misrepresentation of Plato would be very grave indeed. For Plato
opens his account of the creation of the world with the words that cannot be
dismissed as a poetical metaphor: ‘Now everything that is in the process of
becoming (pan de au to gignomenon)
must of necessity come into being by some cause (hup’ aitiou tinos ex anankês
gignesthai), for without cause nothing can come into being (panti gar adunaton chȏris aitiou genesin schein) … Now
the whole heaven (ho dê pas ouranos) – or cosmos (ê kosmos) … we must first enquire concerning
it (skepteon d’ oun peri autou prȏton) what has to be enquired at
the beginning about anything (hoper
hupokeitai peri pantos en archêi
dei skopein), whether it was always in existence (poteron ên
aei), having no beginning of its becoming (geneseȏs archên
echȏn oudemian), or did it come
into being (ê gegonen), having begun from
some primary cause (ap’ archês tinos arxamenos)? It came into
being (gegonen), for it is visible (horatos gar) and tangible (haptos te)
and it has a body (kai sȏma echȏn),
and all such things (panta de ta toiauta)
are perceptible by senses (aisthêta); and sensible things (ta d’ aisthêta),
apprehended by opinion and sense perception (doxêi perilêpta met’ aisthêseȏs), have appeared to be in the
process of becoming and subjected to being generated (gignomena kai gennêta
ephanê). Now that which has come
into being must of necessity, we affirm, have come to being by a cause (tȏi
d’ au genomenȏi phamen hup’ aitiou tinos
anankên einai genesthai).’ (Tim. 28a4-c3)
Plato introduces the cosmic paradigm as follows: ‘In the
likeness of what living being did the composer composed the world (tini tȏn
zȏiȏn
auton es homoiotêta
ho synistas sunestêken)?
… of that of which all other living beings are parts both individually and as
kinds (hou d’ an estin t’alla zȏia kath’ hen kai kata genê moria); let us state that the
world is most similar to that (toutȏi pantȏn
homoiotaton auton einai tithȏmen).
For that contains in itself all intelligible beings (ta gar dê
noêta zȏia
panta ekeino en heautȏi
perilabon echei), just as this world (kathaper
hode ho kosmos) contains us and all other creatures that are composed so as
to be visible (hêmas
hosa te alla thremmata sunestêken
horata). For the God, intending to make this world as similar as possible
to the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings (tȏi gar tȏn nooumenȏn
kallistȏi kai kata panta teleȏi malista auton ho theos homoiȏsai boulêtheis),
composed one visible living being comprehending within itself all other living
beings that are kindred by nature (panth’
hosa autou kata phusin sungenê zȏia entos echon autou sunestêse). (30c3-31a1)
Plato then conceives the paradigm so as to preclude the
infinite regress, Aristotle’s ‘third man’ argument: ‘Was it right when we said
that there is one world (poteron oun orthȏs hena ouranon proseirêkamen), or would it be more
correct to say that they are many and infinite (ê
pollous kai apeirous legein ên
orthoteron)? One (hena), if it is
constructed according to the paradigm (eiper
kata to paradeigma dedêmiourgêmenos estai). For that which
encompasses all intelligible living beings (to
gar periechon panta hoposa noêta
zȏia [i. e. the Forms, cf. Soph. 248e-249a]) can never be a second one
side by side another (meth’ heterou
deuteron ouk an pot’ eiê);
for there would have to be again another living being respecting both of them (palin gar an heteron einai to peri ekeinȏ deoi zȏion),
of which they would be a part (hou meros
an eitên ekeinȏ), and this world would be more
truly said to resemble not them, but that which encompassed them (kai ouk an eti ekeinoin all’ ekeinȏi tȏi
periechonti tod’ an aphomoiȏmenon
legoito orthoteron). In order then that this world might be like the
perfect living being in respect of solitariness (hina oun tode kata tên
monȏsin homoion êi tȏi
pantelei zȏiȏi),
for this reason the creator did not make two or an infinite number of worlds (dia tauta oute duo out’ apeirous epoiêsen ho poiȏn
kosmous); but being one, begotten one, this heaven came into being and will
be (all’ heis hode monogenês ouranos gegonȏs estin kai et estai).’ (31a2-b3)
***
In the post of Oct. 16, 2014 ‘A note on the 3rd
book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics’ I
argued that Plato wrote the Parmenides
prior to his 3rd travel to Sicily and that Aristotle wrote the 1st
book of the Metaphysics after Plato
left Athens and before he returned from Sicily. That dating exonerates Aristotle
from an incomprehensible misrepresentation of Plato, in which the traditional
dating of these two works has implicated him.
In Metaphysics A
Aristotle writes: ‘In the Phaedo (en de tȏi
Phaidȏni) the case is stated in
this way (houtȏ
legetai) – that the Forms are causes both of being and of becoming (hȏs
kai tou einai kai tou gignesthai aitia ta eidê
estin); yet when the Forms exist (kaitoi
tȏn eidȏn
ontȏn), still the things that
share in them do not come into being (homȏs ou gignetai ta metechonta),
unless there is something to originate movement (an mê êi
to kinêson).’ (991b3-5, tr. W. D.
Ross)
Indeed, in the Phaedo
Socrates maintains that to answer the
difficulty raised by Cebes ‘on the whole it is necessary to work out the cause
of generation and corruption’ (holȏs gar dei peri geneseȏs kai phthoras tên aitian diapragmateuesthai,
95e9-96a1)’, but the only cause that Socrates comes up with are the Forms: ‘I’m
going to set about showing to you (erchomai
dê epicheirȏn soi epideixasthai) the kind of
cause (tês
aitias to eidos) I’ve been dealing with (ho pepragmateumai); and I’ll go back to those much discussed
entities (kai eimi palin ep’ ekeina ta
poluthrulêta), and start from them (kai archomai ap’ ekeinȏn), positing (hupothemenos) that a beautiful, itself by itself, is something (einai ti kalon auto kath’ hauto), and so
are a good and a large and all the rest (kai
agathon kai mega kai t’alla panta).’ (100b3-7)
Earlier on in Met.
A Aristotle maintains that ‘those who posit the Forms (hoi ta eidê
tithentes, 988a35-b1) say that these are causes rather of immobility and of
being at rest (akinêsias gar aitia mallon kai tou en erêmiai einai phasi, 988b3-4). In the
Phaedo, prior to Cebes’ last
objection that compelled Socrates ‘to work out the cause of generation and
corruption’, Socrates derived the immortality of the soul from its similarity and
its being akin to the Forms the being of which never changes and is eternally
in the same state (aei kata t’auta echon,
79a9).
When Aristotle wrote the 1st book of the Metaphysics, he had in front of his eyes
the Phaedo, not the Timaeus.
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