In my last entry I questioned Allen’s claim that the
narrative scheme of Plato’s Parmenides
‘is designed to produce a sense of remoteness from the conversation’ and thus
indicate that ‘the conversation that follows is a fiction’ which ‘could not
have occurred’ (Plato’s Parmenides,
Translated with Comment by R. E. Allen, p. 69). Plato’s brother Adeimantus
confirms as true (alêthê) that
Antiphon can relate from memory the arguments that once were discussed by
Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides, having often heard them from Pythodorus.
Furthermore, Adeimantus says that when Antiphon was young he used to rehearse
the arguments diligently.
Next, I queried Allen’s claim that ‘neither the historical
Parmenides nor the historical Socrates could have spoken as they will here be
made to speak. Their chief topic of discussion is the Theory of Ideas, a theory
which, if the historical Socrates held a version of it, he came to entertain in
middle life (Phaedo 96a-100a)’ (Allen,
p.74). There is nothing in the Phaedo
that suggests that Socrates came to entertain the Theory of Ideas in middle
life.
Furthermore, I maintained that there is nothing in the Phaedo that should compel us to reject
off hand the possibility that the very young Socrates became disappointed with the
theories of philosophers on nature prior to his encounter with Zeno and
Parmenides. ‘And yet’, I ended the entry, ‘reading the Parmenides and the Phaedo
against the background of Parmenides’ poem On
nature, I am compelled to see Socrates differently.’ I had in mind a
passage in the Phaedo in which
Socrates describes the state of mind in which he found himself after abandoning
his search for ‘wisdom known as natural science’ (peri phuseȏs
historian), his desire to discover or learn the reasons (tas aitias) for each thing, why each
thing comes to be, why it perishes, and why it exists’ (Phd. 96a8-10):
‘Then I no longer understand nor can I recognize those other
wise reasons; but if anyone gives me as the reason why a given thing is
beautiful either its having a blooming colour, or its shape, or something else
like that, I dismiss those other things – because all those other confuse me –
but in a plain, artless, and possibly simple-minded way, I hold this close to
myself: nothing else makes it beautiful except that beautiful itself, whether
by its presence or communion or whatever the manner and nature of the relation
may be, as I don’t go so far as to affirm that, but only that it is by the
beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful.’ (Phd. 100c9-d8, tr. D. Gallop)
In the light of this passage, the theory of Forms that
Socrates adopted after his disenchantment with the philosophy of nature is not
a newly invented theory; it is a theory deeply marked by Parmenides’ criticism
of the young Socrates’ theory. (To Parmenides’ questioning of Socrates’
original theory of Forms is devoted my entry ‘Plato as a critic of Aristotle’,
November 14.) Parmenides did not end his criticism of Socrates’ theory by
rejecting the Forms, but by affirming them: ‘Only a man of considerable natural
gifts will be able to learn that there is a kind of each thing (genos ti hekastou), a substance alone
by itself (ousia autê kath’ hautên),
and even more remarkable will discover this and will be able to teach it to
someone who has examined all these difficulties with sufficient care.’ (Parm. 134e9-135b2) But he did not
provide any reason for his affirmation of it, nor did he offer any solution for
the objections he had raised against it. The state in which Parmenides thus
left the young Socrates was a state of profound philosophic ignorance. But was
not the state of philosophic ignorance a state too difficult to bear by a young
man?
***
Allen determines Socrates’ age at that time as follows:
‘Since Socrates died at seventy in 399, the dramatic date of the conversation
probably falls between 452 and 449 B.C. Granting those limits, it is possible
to be more precise. The occasion of the meeting is the Great Panathenaea, the
chief civic festival of Athens, which was celebrated, like the Olympic Games,
at intervals of four years. That festival fell in 450.’ (p. 72)
***
Parmenides ended his criticism of Socrates’ theory of Forms by
addressing him with the words: ‘Your impulse toward argument is noble and
indeed divine. But train yourself more thoroughly while you are still young;
drag yourself through what is generally regarded as useless, and condemned by
the multitude as idle talk. Otherwise, the truth will escape you.’ (135d2-6,
tr. Allen) What kind of training Parmenides had in mind? ‘To examine the
consequences that follow from the hypothesis, not only if each thing is
hypothesized to be, but also if that same thing is hypothesized not to be, if
you wish to be better trained … Take, if you like, Zeno’s hypothesis, if many
is. What must follow for the many themselves relative to themselves and
relative to the one, and for the one relative to itself and relative to the
many? If, on the other hand, many is not, consider again what will follow both
for the one and for the many, relative to themselves and relative to each
other. Still again, should you hypothesize if likeness is, or if it is not,
what will follow on each hypothesis both for the very things hypothesized and
for the others, relative to themselves and relative to each other. The same
account holds concerning unlikeness, and about motion, and about rest, and
about coming to be and ceasing to be, and about being itself and not being. In
short, concerning whatever may be hypothesized as being and as not being and as
undergoing any other affection whatever, it is necessary to examine the
consequences relative to itself and relative to each one of the others,
whichever you may choose, and relative to more than one and relative to all in
like manner. And the others, again, must be examined both relative to
themselves and relative to any other you may choose, whether you hypothesize what
you hypothesize as being or as not being, if you are to be finally trained
accurately to discern the truth.’ (135e9-136c5, tr. Allen)
This was not the road that could possibly lead Socrates to a
theory of Forms immune to Parmenides’ critical objections. An attempt to find
truth by pursuing ‘wisdom known as natural science’ (peri phuseȏs
historian) was the most natural course for him to pursue next. Especially
since Parmenides at the beginning of their discussion rebuked him as immature
for leaving out of consideration the Form of man, fire, water, hair, mud and
dirt: ‘You are still young, Socrates, and philosophy has not yet taken hold of
you as I think it one day will. You will despise none of these things then’
(130a1-3, tr. Allen).
Along these lines, the entry I intended to write on December
5 was to be devoted to viewing the Parmenides
against the background of the Phaedo.
But on December 5 I realized that I had to do more work before making the
attempt. For to accept the conversation of Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides as
essentially true means to change radically the view of Plato developed by
Platonic scholars in the last two centuries. As Cornford puts it: ‘To suppose
that anything remotely resembling the conversation in this dialogue [in the Parmenides, J. T.] could have occurred …
would make nonsense of the whole history of philosophy in the fifth and fourth
centuries.’ (Quoted by Allen as an argument ‘decisive by itself’, p. 74.)
Before venturing to go any further, I decided to read the Phaedo against the background of the Parmenides, which I finished yesterday. This
confirmed me in my view that the Parmenides
should be read as Plato presents it with reference to his brother Adeimantus,
that is as essentially true (for which see my previous entry on ‘The narrative
scheme of the Parmenides’).
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