In my present entry I shall investigate the relationship
between Plato’s Parmenides and
Parmenides’ poem On nature. Allen
says that ‘Neither the historical Parmenides nor the historical Socrates could
have spoken as they will here [i. e. in the Parmenides]
be made do speak.’ (Plato’s Parmenides,
Translated with Comment by R. E. Allen, p. 74) Allen’s claim concerning
Socrates I discussed in the previous entry. Concerning Parmenides Allen claims
that in the dialogue ‘he accepts the theory against which he states
perplexities, and its attendant pluralism (135b-c) … To draw a Parmenides
converted to the pluralism of the theory of Ideas is, according to the
testimony of the Parmenides itself,
to contradict one of the most striking features of his known thought.’ (p. 75) I
shall argue that in the dialogue Parmenides does not ‘accept’ the theory of
Forms. He views it as a theory well known to him, a theory which he had discussed
with Zeno long before the two met Socrates. Far from being converted to the
pluralism of the theory of Ideas, in the second part of the dialogue, in which he
discusses the one, he comprehensively destroys the plurality of being and thus
defends the oneness of Being against the challenge with which Socrates confronted
him in the first part.
Let me begin with a summary account of Socrates’ challenge
to Parmenides and Zeno. Socrates says to Parmenides: ‘In the poem (en tois poiêmasin)
you say that All is one (hen phêis einai to pan) and provide proofs
of it (kai toutȏn
tekmêria parechêi) beautifully and well (kalȏs
te kai eu), and Zeno says in turn that many are not (hode de au ou polla phêsin
einai), and he too provides very many proofs and of great magnitude (tekmêria
de kai autos pampolla kai pammegethê
parechetai). When you say that only one is and Zeno says that many are not,
although you appear to be saying different things, it seems that you in fact
maintain the same thing (dokein schedon
ti legontas t’auta)’. (128a8-b3). Zeno then himself confirms Socrates’ view
that his ‘treatise is in truth a defence of Parmenides’ arguments’ (to ge alêthes
boêtheia tis tauta ta grammata tȏi Parmenidou logȏi, 128c6-7).
Proofs that Parmenides presented in his poem are not
discussed in the dialogue; Socrates focuses his attention on Zeno’s proof: ‘Don’t
you say, Zeno, that if things that are, are many (ei polla esti ta onta), they must be both like and unlike (hȏs
ara dei auta homoia te einai kai anomoia), which is quite impossible (touto de dê
adunaton); for neither can the unlike be like nor the like unlike (oute gar ta anomoia homoia oute ta homia
anomoia hoion te einai)? Isn’t this your claim?’ (127e1-4). ‘Just so,’ Zeno
replies.
Socrates shares Zeno’s assumption that contradictory things
cannot be. On this basis he challenges him to show that like and unlike and other
Forms (eidê)
are themselves in themselves contradictory; only thus would Parmenides’ thesis
that ‘All is one’ be properly defended. He asks Zeno: ‘Do you not think that
there is (einai) a Form in itself of
likeness (auto kath’ hauto eidos ti
homoiotêtos), and another Form, which
is opposite to it, which is (estin) unlike
(anomoion); and that of these two (toutoin de duoin ontoin), you and I and
the other things, which we call many, get a share (metalambanein)? (128e6-129a3) … If all things get a share (metalambanein) of these contradictory Forms
and by participating in both of them (tȏi metechein amphoin) become both
like and unlike themselves to themselves (auta
hautois), where is the wonder (ti
thaumaston; 129a6-b1)? … If someone shows that that which is one (ho estin hen), this itself (auto touto) is many (polla), and the many is actually one (ta polla dê
hen), I should be amazed (touto êdê
thaumasaimi)’ (129b6-c1). And so concerning everything else; if the Kinds
and Forms in themselves (ei auta ta genê kai ta eidê
en hautois) someone showed to be affected by these contradictory affections
(apophainoi t’anantia tauta pathê paschonta), that would be worthy
of wonder (axion thaumazein)
(129b6-c3).’
‘As Socrates was saying all this, Pythodorus said that he thought
that Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed at every word;’ (130a3-5) he was
clearly well aware that if Parmenides’ poem could not be defended against
Socrates’ challenge, its tenability would be seriously undermined. To his
surprise, Zeno and Parmenides paid close attention to everything that Socrates
had to say, and ‘often (thama)
glanced at each other and smiled as if in admiration (130a5-7)’; the ‘theory of
Forms’ was presumably nothing new to them. – Plato’s Parmenides
should prompt us to rethink Burnet’s view that the theory of Forms ‘was not
originated by Plato, or even by Socrates, but is essentially Pythagorean’ (Plato’s Phaedo, Edited with Introduction
and notes by John Burnet, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1911, p. xliii) Let me just note
that the ancients viewed Parmenides as an associate of the Pythagoreans (DK I.
Fr. A 4, pp. 218-9; A 12, p. 220; A 40a p. 225; A44 p. 225).
Parmenides opened his questioning of Socrates by asking him whether
he himself thus distinguished ‘certain Forms separately by themselves (chȏris
men eidê auta atta), and
separately again the things that have a share in them (chȏris de ta toutȏn au metechonta, 130b1-3)?' Without
waiting for Socrates’ answer, he asked further: ‘And likeness itself, does it seem to
you to be something separate from the likeness which we have, and one of course
(kai hen dê)
and many (kai polla) and all those
things (kai panta) that you just
heard from Zeno?’ Socrates answered: ‘It seems so to me (Emoige).’ (130b3-5)
I shall skip Parmenides’ critical questioning of Socrates’
‘theory of Forms’ for I have discussed it in the entry of November 14 ‘Plato as
a critic of Aristotle’.
Parmenides closed his criticism with the words:
‘Nevertheless, if someone will not allow Forms of things to be (mê easei eidê tȏn
ontȏn einai), in view of these
and similar difficulties, nor define some
Form of each thing (mêde ti horieitai eidos henos hekastou),
he won’t even have whither to turn his mind (oude hopoi trepsei tên
dianoian hexei), not allowing a Form
of each thing to be ever the same (mê eȏn
idean tȏn ontȏn
hekastou tên autên
aei einai); and so he will utterly destroy the power of discourse (kai houtȏs
tên tou dialegesthai dunamin
pantapasi diaphtherei). I think you
are only too aware of that sort of consequence.’ – ‘True,’ Socrates replied. –
Parmenides: ‘What then will you do about philosophy? (Ti oun poiêseis
philosophias peri;) Not knowing these things, which way will you turn? (Pêi
trepsêi agnooumenȏn toutȏn;)’
– Socrates: ‘I can’t really see at the present moment.’ – Parmenides: ‘For too
early (Prȏi
gar), before being trained (prin
gumnasthênai), you endeavour to
define (horizesthai epicheireis) something
beautiful, and just, and good (kalon te
ti kai dikaion kai agathon) and each one of the Forms (kai hen hekaston tȏn
eidȏn) (135b5-d1).’ Socrates
asked: ‘What sort of training?’ Parmenides replied: ‘This (Houtos), which you heard from Zeno (honper êkousas
Zênȏnos).
But I admired this, which you said to him, that you did not allow to subject
the wandering (tên
planên) among the things we see
nor concerning them to inspection, but concerning those things (alla peri ekeina), which one would most
especially grasp by rational account (logȏi) and consider to be Forms (kai eidê
an hêgêsaito einai). (135d7-e4)
***
In Parmenides' poem, the contentious scrutiny concerning the
truth must be decided by rational account (logȏi, fr. B 7, 5).
***
What wandering (tên planên)
does Parmenides have in mind? He says that one must examine not only what
follows if like is and if unlike is, as Socrates has insisted, but one must examine
furthermore what follows if like is not and if unlike is not (135e5-136a2):
‘Take, for example, the hypothesis that Zeno hypothesized, if many is, one must
ask what must be the consequences for the many themselves relative to
themselves and relative to the one, and for the one relative to itself and
relative to the many. And in turn, if many is not, again consider what will be
the consequences for the one and for the many relative to themselves and
relative to each other.’ (136a4-b1)
Socrates saw that the task that Parmenides suggested was enormous
and he did not quite understand it; he asked Parmenides ‘to hypothesize
something and go through it’ (ti ou diêlthes autos hupothemenos ti), so
that he could understand it better (136c6-8). When Parmenides said he was too
old for such a great task, Socrates turned to Zeno: ‘Why don’t you go through
it for us?’ – Zeno laughed and said: ‘Let’s ask Parmenides himself, for what he
proposed is not an ordinary thing. Or don’t you see how great request you are
making? … Without this going through and wandering through everything (aneu tautês
tês dia pantȏn diexodou te kai planês) it is impossible to meet with
truth (entuchonta tȏi alêthei)
and gain intelligence (noun schein).
Parmenides, I join Socrates in his request, so that I too may hear it all again
(hina kai autos diakousȏ) after a long time (dia chronou).’ (136d4-e4)
***
The definite article with which Parmenides qualifies the wandering
(tên planên) at 135e2 suggests that
he points to something definite. Parmenides says that Zeno exemplified it in
his treatise, and outlines task of wandering in among the Forms. Zeno refers to
it as ‘this going through and wandering through everything’. Socrates
mentioned Parmenides’ poem, which he obviously knew well; does ‘the wandering’
have anything to do with the poem? The training to which both Parmenides and
Zeno refer as ‘wandering’ is a preparatory, propaedeutic wandering; as such it
corresponds to the proem: ‘Divine beings (daimones)
brought me on the many-voiced road (es hodon
bêsan poluphêmon) that carries a knowing man through all towns’ (hê kata pant’ astê pherei eidota phȏta)
(fr. 1, 1-3) … the road which is outside the path trodden by men (hê gar ap’ anthrȏpȏn patou estin, fr. 1,
27)’. On this road he came to the house of Night, where the Goddess revealed to
him ‘the unshakable heart of the well rounded Truth’ (Alêtheiês eukukleos atremes êtor, fr. 1, 29), to which the ‘Way of
Truth’ is then devoted (DK I. Fr. 1, 1-29, pp. 228-230).
***
Parmenides in the end gave in to the entreaties of Socrates, Zeno,
Pythodorus, Aristoteles, and the unnamed other participants: ‘Do you wish,
since I am to play this laborious game, that I begin with myself and my own
hypothesis, hypothesizing about the one itself, if one is and if one is not (eite hen estin eite mê) (137b2-4), what
must follow?’ As his interlocutor Parmenides proposed ‘the youngest, for he is
the least likely to make difficulties, and would most likely answer what he
thinks’ (137b6-7); this happened to be Aristoteles. Parmenides begins: ‘If one
is (ei hen estin), the one would not
be many (ouk an eiê polla to hen),
would it? – Aristotle answers: ‘How could it be many?’ - ‘So it cannot have parts nor be a whole’
(137c4-6) ... ‘it can have neither beginning, middle, nor end (137d4-5) … it
has no shape, for it does not have a share of straight or round (137d8-e1) … it
has no share of time, nor is it at any time (141d4-5) … it never was, has
become, was becoming, will be, will become, will have become, is, nor is
becoming, for all these expressions appear to signify sharing of time (chronou methexin dokei sêmainein,
141d7-8), the one therefore has no share whatsoever in being (oudamȏs ara to hen ousias metechei,
141e9) … the one is neither one nor is (to
hen oute hen estin oute estin, 141e12) … so it is neither named nor spoken
of, it cannot be an object of opinion, it cannot be known, it cannot be
perceived by senses’ (142a4-6) … ‘Can all this be the case concerning the one?’
(Ê dunaton oun peri to hen tauta houtȏs
echein)? - Aristotle answers: ‘I don’t think so.’ (142a6-8)
Parmenides starts again: ‘Look (hora) from the beginning. If one is (hen ei estin), is it possible for it to be (ara hoion te auto einai men) but not have a share of being (ousias de mê metechein)?’ – Aristoteles:
‘Impossible.’(142b5-7)
The Greek terms eidos
and idea are derived from the aorist
stem of the verb horaȏ ‘see’, ‘look’. Jowett’s rendering of
Parmenides’ ‘Look from the beginning ‘ (hora
dê ex archês) ‘Then we will begin at the beginning’ and Allen’s ‘Then
examine from the beginning’ obfuscate the fact that Parmenides is going to view
‘the one’ as a Form in terms of Socrates’ challenge to Zeno and Parmenides: ‘I
would admire it much more, if someone could prove (epideixai) in the Forms themselves (en autois tois eidesi) this same perplexity (tên autên tautên aporian) interwoven in all kinds of ways; as you
went through it concerning things we can see (hȏsper en tois horȏmenois diêlthete), so in those that are grasped
by rational account (houtȏs kai en tois
logismȏi lambanomenois, 129e6-130a1)’. The terms metechein, metalambanein,
which signify ‘getting a share’, and ‘having a share’ in Forms, and which as
such became central to Parmenides’ criticism of Socrates’ ‘Theory of Forms’
(130e5-133a6), become central to Parmenides’ discourse concerning ‘the one’.
Parmenides continues: ‘Then the being (hê ousia) of the one (tou
henos) will not be the same as the one (eiê
an ou t’auton ousa tȏi heni) … so when one says together that one is (epeidan tis syllêbdên eipêi hoti hen estin),
this would mean (tout’ an eiê to
legomenon) that the one partakes of being (hoti ousias metechei to hen) … the being and the one (hê te ousia kai to hen) are not the same
(esti ou to auto) … the one must be a
whole (holon) of which the one and the
being become parts (toutou de gignesthai
moria to te hen kai to einai) … each of these parts, the one and the being,
both is, and is one, each is a whole with parts, each becomes two and never one
(du’ aei gignomenon oudepote hen einai)
… the one that is (to hen on) thus
would turn to be unlimited in multitude (apeiron
an to plêthos houtȏs eiê) (142b7-143a2) … one and two make three, three is
odd, two is even (143d) … so if one is, there must be number (ei ara estin hen, anangkê kai arithmon einai,
144a4)’.
Parmenides begins to show that the perplexity – ‘if things
that are, are many, they must be both like and unlike (hȏs ara dei auta homoia te einai
kai anomoia), which is quite impossible (touto de dê
adunaton); for neither can the unlike be like nor the like unlike (oute gar ta anomoia homoia oute ta homia
anomoia hoion te einai, 127e1-4)’ – is interwoven in things that are grasped by
rational account (logismȏi), as Zeno
had shown them interwoven in things we can see. The assumption that
contradictory things are impossible, they cannot be, which formed the basis of
Zeno’s defence of Parmenides’ thesis that ‘All is one’, forms now the basis of
Parmenides’ discourse on the one.
***
On the same principle Parmenides rejected the multiplicity
of things in his poem, describing as deaf and blind (kȏphoi homȏs tuphloi te) those ‘for whom (hois) to be and not to be (to pelein te kai ouk einai) is
considered to be one and the same (t’auton
nenomistai) and not one and the same (k’ou
tauton, fr. B 6 7-9).’
***
Parmenides continues: ‘Being a whole, the one must be limited (peperasmenon, 144e8) … the one that is (to hen ara on) is one and many, a whole
and parts, limited and unlimited in multitude (145a2-3) … if the one is a
whole, it has extremes (eschata), and
it also has beginning (archên), middle
(meson), and end (teleutên), and as such it would have a
share (metechoi) of some shape
(schêmatos tinos), straight, or round, or a mixture of both (145a4-b5) … it is
in itself and in something different, it must always be both moved and in rest
(146a6-7) … it is different from the others and from itself, and the same as
the others and itself (147b6-8) … in like manner it is the same to itself and
different from itself, like (homoion)
and unlike (anomoion) itself (148d2-4)
… it touches itself and the others and it does not touch itself nor the others
… it occupies a space (chȏran, 148e9)
… it has a share of time (metechei
chronou, 152a2-3) … and there would be knowledge (epistêmê) and opinion (doxa)
about it and perception (aisthêsis)
of it, since just now we perform all these things regarding it (eiper kai nun hêmeis peri autou panta tauta
prattomen, 155d6-7).’
Parmenides does not finish off the enquiry concerning ‘the one if
it is’ on this positive-sounding note: ‘Yet once more and for the third time,
let us consider: If the one is as we have described, must it not, being one and
many and neither one nor many and taking share in time, in as far as it is one
(hoti men estin hen), partake of being
at some time (ousias metechein pote),
and as far as it is not (hoti d’ ouk esti),
at some time in turn not partake of being (mê
metechein au pote ousias)? … then at a different time it partakes and at a
different time it does not partake … then, isn’t there a time at which it assumes
being (hote metalambanei tou einai) and
at which it leaves off from it (kai hote
apallattetai autou)? … “to assume being” (ousias metalambanein), wouldn’t you call it “to become” (gignesthai)? … and “to leave off from being”
(apallattesthai ousias), wouldn’t you
call it “to perish” (apollusthai)? … then
the one, it seems, taking being and letting go of being (lambanon te kai aphien ousian), becomes and perishes (gignetai te kai apollutai).’ (155e4-156b1)
Parmenides goes on to review other kinds of change, such as
changing from like to unlike and from unlike to like … from being in motion (hotan de kinoumenon) to standing still (histêtai) and from standing still (kai hotan hestos) to moving (epi to kineisthai metaballêi, 156c1-2). He
argues that ‘there is no time (chronos de
ge oudeis estin), at which anything can at once neither move nor stand
still (en hȏi ti hoion te hama mête
kineisthai mête hestanai), yet the one cannot change (all’ oude mên metaballei) without changing (aneu tou metaballein). When does it then change (Pot’ oun metaballei)? … Is this that
strange thing (to atopon touto), in
which it would be (en hȏi an eiê) when
it changes (hote metaballei)?’ –
Aristoteles: ‘What thing?’ – Parmenides: ‘The instant (To exaiphnês) … this strange nature (phusis atopos) sits in between movement and standing still (engkathêtai metaxu tês kinêseȏs kai staseȏs),
being in no time at all (en oudeni
chronȏi ousa), and into it and from it (kai
eis tautên dê kai ek tautês) that which moves changes into standing still (to te kinoumenon metaballei epi to hestanai)
and that which is standing still into moving (kai to hestos epi to kineisthai) … And the one too, since it stands
still and moves, changes to each – for only thus it could do both – but
changing it changes at an instant, and when it changes, it would be in no time
at all, it would neither move nor stand still … On the same principle, in
passing from one to many (ex henos epi
polla ion) and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, it is neither in
the process of separation nor in the process of aggregation. And in passing
from like to unlike and unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither
becoming like nor becoming unlike; and in passing from small to large and to
equal, and in the opposite way, it is neither large nor small nor equal,
neither grows nor diminishes nor becomes equal … By all these affection the one
would be affected, if it is.’ (156c6-157b4) Parmenides then goes on to
investigate how the others would be affected (ti de tois allois prosêkoi an paschein) if one is (157b6-160b4).
Then Parmenides explores what follows ‘if one is not’ (ei hen mê estin) (160b5-164b4), and then
again how the others would be affected (t’alla
ti chrê peponthenai) if one is not (164b5-166c2). The whole investigation,
and thus the whole dialogue he ends with the words: ‘Whether one is or is not (hen eite estin eite mê estin), it and
the others (auto te kai t’alla), in
relation to themselves and to each other (kai
pros hauta kai pros allêla), all in every way are and are not (panta pantȏs esti te kai ouk esti), and
appear and do not appear (kai phainetai
te kai ou phainetai). (166c3-5).’
Parmenides’ discussion of the hypothesis if one is and if one is
not, what follows, does not arrive at the truth of All is one; it ends in the
realization that ‘many’ are implicated in contradictions in every way. The
discussion in the dialogue thus corresponds to the proem in Parmenides’ poem On nature, in which the knowing man (eidota phȏta) is carried through
everything that can be perceived by the senses to the gate of Night. – The truth that ‘being is and that not being
is not’ (hopȏs esti te kai hȏs ouk esti
mê einai, fr. B 2, 3) is the result of divine revelation (fr. B 1, 22-32),
which forms the main part of the poem.
What is the ontological status of ‘the one and the others’
discussed in the Parmenides in the
light of Parmenides’ poem? It cannot be discarded as not-being, which is ‘utterly
inscrutable (panapeuthês), for the
not-being cannot be known (oute gar an
gnoiês to mê eon), for it cannot be accomplished (ou gar anuston), it cannot be expressed (oute phrasais, fr. B 2, 6-8). In the light of fr. B, 3, their ontological
status consists in being thought: ‘for being and thinking is the same’ (to gar auto noein esti te kai einai). Thinking
identified in the poem with being and being identified with thinking transcends
the subjective thinking that goes on in our minds. In the Parmenides, when Socrates tries to avoid the difficulties
concerning the Forms by identifying them with thoughts in our souls (132b3-6),
Parmenides rejects this attempt by pointing out that thoughts in our souls must
be of something, namely of the Forms. The one and the many, and all the Forms
derived from these in the course of his propaedeutic exercise are not the
thoughts in his head or in the head of Aristoteles, his interlocutor, or in the
heads of those around them; they are the Forms to which Parmenides points with
his words and which he makes vivid to Aristotle, his interlocutor, and thus to Socrates,
Pythodorus, and the rest of the audience.
The largest preserved fragment of Parmenides’ poem is devoted to
the ‘being which is ungenerated and imperishable (agenêton eon kai anȏlethron estin), whole (oulomeles) and unshakable (atremes),
and without aim (ateleston), which never
was nor will be (oude pot’ ên oud’ estai),
for it is all together now (epei nun
estin homou pan), one (hen), continuous
(suneches)’ (B 8, 3-6). Within the
framework of ‘being that truly is’ (pelein
kai etêtumon einai, B 8, 18) Parmenides locates all thought; its purpose is
nothing but thinking: ‘Thinking and what thought is for is one and the same (t’auton d’ esti noein te kai houneken esti
noêma), for you will not find thinking without being, in which it is
expressed’ (ou gar aneu tou eontos, en
hȏi pephatismenon estin, heurêseis to
noein). For nothing is or ever will be other than being (ouden gar estin ê estai allo parex tou
eontos), since the Fate has bound it (epei
to ge Moir’ epedêsen) to be whole and unmoved (oulon akinêton t’ emenai). Because of this (tȏi), everything will be a name (pant’ onom’ estai), everything that the mortals have posited (hossa brotoi katethento) believing to be
true (pepoithotes einai alêthê), to
come to be and to perish (gignesthai te
kai ollusthai), to be and not to be (einai
te kai ouchi), to change place (kai
topon allassein) and alter the shining colour (dia te chroa phanon ameibein).’ (B 8, 34-41)
