In ‘The
argument and structure of Plato’s Phaedrus’ Christopher Rowe comments on
what Socrates says about his second speech ‘or, more strictly, about both his
speeches at 265c-d: “to me it seems that the rest really was playfully done;
but by chance two principles of method were expressed”. The message is that in
so far as the speeches were based on these principles, they were axia spoudȇs
[axion spoudȇs, ‘worth serious attention, 277e7-8]; the rest was paidia
[‘merely for amusement’, 277e6].’ (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological
Society, 1986, p. 113).
In the last
paragraph of his article Rowe reflects ‘on the close resemblance between some
of the main ideas contained in Socrates’ [second] speech and those of the Republic,
the Symposium, and the Phaedo [the ‘middle-period’ dialogues]:
including, most notably, the idea of separated Forms’: ‘in general, the Phaedrus
seems to expound middle-period ideas only to recommend them for scrutiny. If
so, it has more in common with the critical musings of the Parmenides
than with the optimistic constructions of the middle dialogues themselves.’ (Op.
cit. pp. 120-121)
Let me for a
moment forget about my arguments against Rowe’s late dating of the Phaedrus,
and ask: If Plato wrote Socrates’ second
speech with the intention to expose it to criticism in the second part of the
dialogue, and thus to expose to criticism the main ideas contained in the Republic,
the Symposium, and the Phaedo, why did he introduce these ideas with
the words ‘The region above the heavens (Ton huperouranion topon) has never yet
been celebrated as it deserves … (oute
tis humnȇse pȏ … kat’ axian). But it is like this (echei de hȏde)
– for one must be bold enough to say what is true (tolmȇteon gar oun to ge alȇthes eipein), especially when speaking about
truth (allȏs te kai peri alȇtheias legonta). This region is occupied by being which really is, which is
without colour or shape, intangible, observable by the steersman of the soul
alone, by intellect, and to which the class of true knowledge relates (hȇ gar achrȏmatos te kai aschȇmatistos kai anaphȇs ousia ontȏs ousa, psuchȇs kubernȇtȇi monȏi theatȇ nȏi, peri hȇn to tȇs alȇthous epistȇmȇs genos, touton echei ton topon)’ (247c3- d1, translations from the Phaedrus
C.J. Rowe)?
And let me
for a moment forget my views on the Parmenides as well, and ask: If
Plato in the Parmenides recommended his theory of Forms (contained in
the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedo) to scrutiny,
why did he give it into the mouth of ‘a very young Socrates’ (Sȏkratȇ de einai tote sphodra neon, 127c4-5)? Furthermore, why did he
ascertain the authenticity of the discussion by his two brothers Adeimantus and
Glaucon (126a2)? When Cephalus tells the two brothers that he came with his
friends from Clazomenae (in Asia Minor) to hear from their half-brother the
discussion (tous logous) that was once held by Socrates, Zeno, and
Parmenides (hous pote Sȏkratȇs kai Zȇnȏn kai Parmenidȇs dielechthȇsan),
for having often heard them from Pythodorus he can relate them from memory (pollakis
akousas tou Puthodȏrou apomnȇmoneuei, 126c1-3), Adeimantus says: ‘True (Alȇthȇ legeis). When Antiphon was young, he used
to rehearse them diligently (meirakion gar ȏn autous eu mala diemeletȇsen,
126c6-7, translation R.E. Allen)’?
***
In my
present post I shall discuss Socrates’ reflection on the two methodical
principles he has just announced: ‘Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions
and collections (Toutȏn dȇ egȏge autos te erastȇs, ȏ Phaidre, tȏn diaireseȏn kai sunagȏgȏn), so that I may be able both to speak and to think (hina
hoios te ȏ legein te kai phronein); and if I think anyone else has
the natural capacity to look to one and the many (ean te tin’ allon hȇgȇsȏmai dunaton eis hen kai epi polla pephukoth’ horan), I pursue him “in his footsteps,
behind him, as if he were a god” (touton diȏkȏ “katopisthe met’ ichnion hȏste theoio”).’ (266b2-7)
Whom could
Socrates consider to be better than himself in having ‘the natural capacity to look to one
and the many’ but Plato? If so, then Plato transforms here the relationship between
himself and Socrates from the one generally accepted. In Aristophanes’ Frogs,
Plato [without being named] is viewed as a man who ‘threw away the art’ (apobalonta
mousikȇn) for the sake of ‘sitting with Socrates in empty talk’ (Sȏkratei parakathȇmenon lalein, 1491-3). It is from this supposed
fascination by Socrates that Aristophanes in the comic song wants to liberate
Plato with his image of Aischylus ascending from Hades to save Athens with his
‘keen intelligent mind’ (echȏn sunesin ȇkribȏmenȇn,
1482-3). Plato wants to correct this image; it is not he who is looking up to
Socrates; Socrates is looking up to Plato.
In my view,
the comic song of the chorus of the Frogs authenticates the story
concerning Plato’s and Socrates’ first philosophic encounter: ‘When Plato was about
to compete for the prise with tragedy (mellȏn agȏnieisthai tragȏidiai), he then listened to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysus (pro
tou Dionusiakou theatrou Sȏkratous akousas), and then consigned his poems to
the flames (katephlexe ta poiȇmata), with the words (eipȏn):
“Come hither, O fire-god (Hȇphaiste, promol’ hȏde),
Plato now has need of thee (Platȏn nu ti seio chatizei).” From that time onward, having
reached his twentieth year, so it is said, (t’ounteuthen dȇ gegonȏs, phasin, eikosin etȇ) he was the pupil of Socrates (diȇkouse Sȏkratous).’ (Diog. Laert. III. 5-6, tr. R.D.
Hicks)
As can be
seen, the ancient tradition preserved in Diogenes Laertius agrees with
Aristophanes’ comic song. But Aristotle’s testimony in his Metaphysics gives
us a picture of the first philosophic encounter between Plato and Socrates, which
appears to give substance to Socrates’ ‘if I think anyone else has the natural
capacity to look to one and the many, I pursue him “in his footsteps, behind
him, as if he were a god”’. For Aristotle says that when Plato was young, ‘he
embraced the Heraclitean doctrines (sunȇthȇs genomenos tais Hȇraklȇteiois doxais) according to which everything we can perceive with our
senses is in constant flux (hȏs hapantȏn tȏn aisthȇtȏn aei reontȏn),
and there is no science concerning them (kai epistȇmȇs peri autȏn ouk ousȇs); these things (tauta men, i.e. the many
things as opposed to the Forms) he viewed in this way even afterwards (kai
husteron houtȏs hupelaben [i.e. after his encounter with
Socrates and his concomitant discovery of Forms]). As Socrates was discussing
ethical problems (Sȏkratous
peri ta ȇthika pragmateuomenou)
with his mind brought
to a standstill on definitions (peri
horismȏn epistȇsantos tȇn dianoian), Plato held (hupelaben)
that this [i.e. Socrates’ fixation of mind] was taking place in relation to
other entities (hȏs peri heterȏn touto gignomenon) and not the perceptible
things (kai ou tȏn aisthȇtȏn), for there can be no common definition of
any perceptible thing (adunaton gar einai ton koinon horon tȏn aisthȇtȏn tinos)
as they are always changing (aei ge metaballontȏn). Beings of this sort
he called Forms (houtos oun ta men toiauta tȏn ontȏn ideas
prosȇgoreuse), and said that the things that are perceived by our senses (ta
d’ aisthȇta) are all named after these and in virtue of a relation to these
(para tauta kai kata tauta legesthai panta).’ (987a32-b9, in translating these lines I consulted W.D.
Ross’s translation).
What fascinated Plato primarily was
not Socrates but the Forms to which the firm fixation of Socrates’ mind on
moral terms pointed him.
***
In the Parmenides the young Socrates asks Zeno: ‘Do
you not believe that there is (ou nomizeis einai), alone by itself (auto
kath’ hauto), a certain form of likeness (eidos
ti homoiotȇtos), and again, another opposite to it (kai tȏi toioutȏi
allo ti enantion), what it is to be unlike (ho estin anomion); and
that in these two (toutoin de duo ontoin) you and I and the other things
we call many participate (kai eme kai se kai t’alla ha dȇ polla kaloumen
metalambanein; 128e6-129a3)?’
Parmenides then indicated how Socrates
came to his theory of forms: ‘I suppose you think that
each form is one for some such reason as this (Oimai se ek tou
toioude hen hekaston eidos oiesthai einai): when a number of things
(hotan poll’ atta) seems to be to you large (megala soi doxȇi einai),
there perhaps seems to be some one form that is the same (mia tis
isȏs dokei idea hȇ autȇ einai) when you look over them all (epi
panta idonti), whence you believe that the large is one (hothen hen
to mega hȇgȇi einai,132a1-4).’
When Socrates affirmed this to have
been the case, Parmenides raised a series of objections against Socrates’
theory, beginning with what became known as infinite regress: ‘What about the
large itself (Ti d’ auto to mega) and the other thigs that are large (kai
t’alla ta megala), if with your soul you should look at them all in the
same way (ean hȏsautȏs tȇi psuchȇi epi panta idȇis), will not some one
large again appear (ouchi hen ti au mega phaneitai), by which they all
appear to be large (hȏi tauta panta megala phainesthai;)?’ – Socrates:
‘It seems so (Eoiken).’ – Parmenides: ‘So another form of largeness will
have made its appearance (Allo ara eidos megethous anaphanȇsetai), that
came to being alongside largeness itself (par’ auto te to megethos gegonos)
and the things which have a share of it (kai ta metechonta autou); and
over and above all those, again, a different one (kai epi toutois au pasin
heteron), by which they will all be large (hȏi tauta panta megala estai).
And then each of the forms will no longer be one for you (kai ouketi
dȇ hen hekaston soi tȏn eidȏn estai), but unlimited in multitude (alla
apeira to plȇthos).’ (132a6-b2)
After expounding some more objections,
Parmenides concluded: ‘These difficulties (Tauta mentoi) and many more
still in addition (kai eti alla pros toutois panu polla) necessarily
hold of the forms (anankaion echein ta eidȇ), if these forms
of things that are exist (ei eisin hautai hai ideai tȏn ontȏn),
and one is to distinguish (kai horieitai tis) each form as something by
itself (auto ti hekaston eidos). The result is that the hearer is
perplexed (hȏste aporein te ton akouonta) and contends that they do not
exist (kai amphisbȇtein hȏs oute esti tauta), and that even if their
existence is conceded (ei te hoti malista eiȇ), they are necessarily
unknowable by human nature (pollȇ anankȇ auta einai tȇi anthrȏpinȇi phusei
agnȏsta). In saying this (kai tauta legonta), he thinks he is saying
something significant and (dokein te ti legein kai), as we just remarked
(ho arti elegomen), it’s astonishingly hard to convince him to the
contrary (thaumastȏs hȏs dusanapeiston einai). Only a man of considerable
natural gifts (kai andros panu men euphuous) will be able to
understand (tou dunȇsomenou mathein) that there is a certain kind
of each thing (hȏs esti genos ti hekastou), a nature and reality
alone by itself (kai ousia autȇ kath’ hautȇn), and it will take a
man more remarkable still (eti de thaumastoterou) to discover it
(tou heurȇsontos) and be able to instruct someone else who has
examined all these things with sufficient care (kai allon dunȇsomenou
didaxai tauta panta hikanȏs dieukrinȇsamenon).’ – Socrates: ‘I agree with
you (Sunchȏrȏ soi). You’re saying very much what I think too (panu
gar moi kata noun legeis).’ – Parmenides: ‘Nevertheless (Alla mentoi),
if in light of all the present difficulties and others like them, Socrates, one
will not allow that there are forms of things that are (ei ge tis dȇ,
ȏ Sȏkrates, au mȇ easei eidȇ tȏn ontȏn einai, eis panta ta nundȇ kai
alla toiauta apoblepsas), and will not define as something a form of
each single thing (mȇde ti horieitai eidos henos hekastou), he
will not even have anything to which to turn his mind (oude hopoi trepsei
tȇn dianoian hexei), since he will not allow that there is a form,
ever the same, of each of the things that are (mȇ eȏn idean tȏn ontȏn
hekastou tȇn autȇn einai); and so he will utterly destroy the power of discourse
(kai houtȏs tȇn tou dialegesthai dunamin pantapasi diaphtherei). I think
you are only too aware of that sort of consequence (tou toioutou men oun moi
dokeis kai mallon ȇisthȇsthai).’ – Socrates: ‘What you say is true (Alȇthȇ
legeis).’ – Parmenides: ‘What will you do about philosophy, then (Ti oun
poiȇseis philosophias peri)? Which way will you turn (Pȇi trepsȇi) while
these things are unknown (agnooumenȏn toutȏn;)? – Socrates: ‘For the
moment, at least, I am not really sure I see (Ou panu moi dokȏ kathoran en
ge tȏi paronti).’ (134e9-135c7)
From Plato’s point of view there was
nothing to be solved concerning the Forms; it was their derivation from the way
the many things appear to be that was to be abandoned. If one succeeds in seeing
the Forms with one’s mind’s eye, one cannot doubt their existence.
***
The question is, why Plato avoided the
term Forms when he introduced ‘the entities that truly are’ (ta onta ontȏs)
in the Phaedrus? The answer can be found, I believe, in the Parmenides;
Plato did not want to contaminate his presentation of the truth (alȇtheia,
Phaedrus 247c) with the difficulties that Parmenides raised against the
forms.
***
Having discovered the Forms, Plato had
every reason to take Socrates’ ‘if I think anyone else has the natural capacity to look to
one and the many, I pursue him in his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a
god’, directed at himself, seriously. But how seriously are we to take it? I
shall try to answer this question in my next post.
