Euthyphro 4

Socrates: Come then (Fe/re dh/), let us examine (e0piskeyw&meqa) our words (ti/ le/gomen). The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy (to\ me\n qeofile/j te kai\ o9 qeofilh\j a1nqrwpoj o3sioj), and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy (to\ de\ qeomise\j kai\ o9 qeomish\j a0no/sioj); and the two are not the same (ou0 tau0to\n d’ e0sti/n), but the holy and the unholy are the exact opposite of each other (a0lla\ to\ e0nantiw&taton to\ o3sion tw~| a0nosi/w|). Is not this what we have said (ou0x ou3twj;)?

Euthyphro: Yes, just this (Ou3tw me\n ou]n).

Socrates: And it seems to be correct (Kai\ eu] ge fai/netai ei0rh=sqai;)?

Euthyphro: I think so, Socrates (Dokw~, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: Well then (Ou0kou=n), have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them (kai\ o3ti stasia/zousin oi9 qeoi/ w} Eu0qu/fron, kai\ diafe/rontai a0llh/loij kai\ e1xqra e0sti\n e0n a0llh/loij, kai\ tou=to ei1rhtai;)?

Euthyphro: Yes, we have said that (Ei1rhtai ga/r).

Socrates: But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger (E!xqran de\ kai\ o0rga/j, w} a1riste, h9 peri\ ti/nwn diafora\ poiei=;)? Let us look at it this way (w{|de de\ skopw~men). If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance (a]r’ a2n ei0 diaferoi/meqa e0gw& te kai\ su\ peri\ a0riqmou=), which of two numbers were the greater (o9po/tera plei/w), would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies (h9 peri\ tou/twn diafora\ e0xqrou\j a2n h9ma=j poioi=) and make us angry with each other (kai\ o0rgi/zesqai a0llh/loij), or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic (h2 e0pi\ logismo\n e0lqo/ntej peri/ ge tw~n toiou/twn taxu\ a2n a0pallagei=men;)?

Euthyphro: Of course we should (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: Then, too (Ou0kou=n kai/), if we were to disagree about the relative size of things (peri\ tou= mei/zonoj kai\ e0la/ttonoj ei0 diaferoi/meqa), we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring (e0pi\ to\ me/tron e0lqo/ntej taxu\ pausai/meq’ a2n th=j diafora=j;)?

Euthyphro: Yes (E!sti tau=ta).

Socrates: And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing (Kai\ e0pi/ ge to\ i9sta/nai e0lqontej, w(j e0gw}|mai, peri\ tou= barute/rou te kai\ koufote/rou diakriqei=men a1n)?

Euthyphro: Of course (Pw~j ga\r ou1).

Socrates: But about what would a disagreement be (Peri\ ti/noj de\ dh\ dienexqe/ntej), which we could not settle (kai\ e0pi\ ti/na kri/sin ou0 duna/menoi a0fike/sqai) and which would cause us to be enemies (e0xqroi/ ge a2n a0llh/loij ei]men) and be angry with each other (kai\ o0rgizoi/meqa;)? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand (i1swj ou0 pro/xeiro/n soi/ e0stin); but let me suggest it (a0ll’ e0mou= le/gontoj). Is it not about right and wrong (sko/pei ei0 ta/de e0sti\ to/ te di/kaion kai\ to\ a1dikon), and noble and disgraceful (kai\ kalo\n kai\ ai0sxro/n), and good (kai\ a0gaqo/n) and bad (kai\ kako/n)? Are not those the questions (a]ra ou0 tau=ta/ e0stin) about which you and I and other people become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement (w{n dienexqe/ntej kai\ ou0 duna/menoi e0pi\ i9kanh\n kri/sin au0tw~n e0lqei=n e0xqroi\ a0llh/loij gigno/meqa, o3tan gignw&meqa, kai\ e0gw_ kai\ su\ kai\ oi9 a1lloi a1nqrwpoi pa/ntej;)?

Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies (A0ll’ e1stin au3th h9 diafora/, w} Sw&kratej, kai\ peri\ tou/twn).

Socrates: And how about the gods Euthyphro (Ti/ de/; oi9 qeoi/, w} Eu0qu/fron)? If they disagree (ou0k ei1per ti diafe/rontai), would not they disagree about these questions (dia\ tau=ta diafe/roint’ a1n;)?

Euthyphro: Necessarily (Pollh\ a0na/gkh).

Socrates: Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree (Kai\ tw~n qew~n a1ra, w} gennai=e Eu0qu/fron, a1lloi a1lla di/kaia kai\ a1dika h9gou=ntai kata\ to\n so\n lo/gon, kai\ kala\ kai\ ai0sxra\ kai\ a0gaqa\ kai\ kaka/); for they would not quarrel with each other (ou0 ga\r a1n pou e0stasi/azon a0llh/loij) if they did not disagree about these matters (ei0 mh\ peri\ tou/twn diefe/ronto). Is that the case (h] ga/r;)?

Euthyphro: You are right (O0rqw~j le/geij).

Socrates: Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things (Ou0kou=n a3per kala\ h9gou=ntai e3kastoi kai\ a0gaqa\ kai\ di/kaia, tau=ta kai\ filou/sin, ta\ de\ e0nanti/a tou/twn misou=sin;)?

Euthyphro: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: But you say that the same things (Tau0ta\ de/ ge, w(j su\ fh/|j) are considered right by some of them (oi9 me\n di/kaia h9gou=ntai,) and wrong by others (oi9 de\ a1dika); and it is because they disagree about these things (peri\ a4 kai\ a0mfisbhtou=ntej) that they quarrel (stasia/zousi/ te) and wage war with each other (kai\ polemou=sin a0llh/loij). Is not this what you said (a]ra ou0x ou3tw;)?

Euthyphro: It is (Ou3tw).

Socrates: Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods (Tau1t’ a1ra, w(j e1oiken, misei=tai u9po\ tw~n qew~n kai\ filei=tai, kai\ qeomish= te kai\ qeofilh= tau1t’ a2n ei1h.).

Euthyphro: So it seems (E!oiken).

Socrates: And then the same things would be both holy and unholy (Kai\ o3sia a1ra kai\ a0no/sia ta\ au0ta\ a2n ei1h), Euthyphro (w} Eu0qu/fron), according to this statement (tou/tw| tw~| lo/gw|).

Euthyphro: I suppose so (Kinduneu/ei).

Socrates: Then you did not answer my question (ou0k a1ra o4 h0ro/mhn a0pekri/nw), my friend (w} qauma/sie). For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy (ou0 ga\r tou=to/ ge h0rw&twn, o4 tugxa/nei tau0to\n o2n o3sio/n te kai\ a0no/sion); but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods (o4 d’ a2n qeofile/j h]|, kai\ qeomise/j e0stin, w(j e1oiken). And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus (w#ste, w} Eu0qu/fron, o4 su\ nu=n poiei=j to\n pate/ra kola/zwn, ou0de\n qaumasto/n, ei0 tou=to drw~n tw~| me\n Dii\ prosfile\j poiei=j), but hateful to Cronus and Uranus (tw~| de\ Kro/nw| kai\ Ou0ranw~| e0xqro/n), and pleasing to Hephaestus (kai\ tw~| me\n H(fai/stw| fi/lon), but hateful to Hera (th=| de\ H!ra| e0xqro/n), and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it (kai\ ei1 tij a1lloj tw~n qew~n e3teroj e9te/rw| diafe/retai peri\ au0tou=, kai\ e0kei/noij kata\ ta\ au0ta/).

***

Burnet notes on tw~| me\n H(fai/stw| fi/lon (‘pleasing to Hephaestus’): ‘This is an allusion to the H#raj desmou\ju9po\ u9e/oj (Rep. 378d3).’ Rep. 378d takes us away from the story in Euthyphro 8b, but it concurs with Socrates’ broader sentiments about such stories about the gods, expressed by him in the Euthyphro: ‘Hera’s fetterings (H#raj de\ desmou/j) by her son (u9po\ ui9e/oj) and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father (kai\ H(fai/stou r9i/yeij u9po\ patro/j) when he was trying to save his mother from a beating (Ilias I. 586-594) (mello/ntoj th=| mhtri\ tuptome/nh| a0mu/nein), and the battles of the gods in Homer’s verse (Il. Xx. 1-74, xxi. 385-513) (kai\ qeomaxi/aj o3saj O!mhroj pepoi/hken) are things that we must not admit into our city (ou0 paradekte/on ei0j th\n po/lin).’

But let me return to Burnet’s note on our story in the Euthyphro: ‘The story was that, when Hera had thrown Hephaestus out of heaven, he took his revenge by sending her a golden thrown with invisible bonds, so that, when she sat upon it, she was fast bound. At last Dionysus reconciled Hephaestus to his mother. Having made him drunk he brought him back to heaven against his will on a donkey.’