A note on Lucretius

I’ve just watched an ICE Dartmouth video presenting a conversation on Lucretius with Margaret Graver, Professor of Classics, Dartmouth College. The inquirer opens the conversation: ‘We’re going to talk about Lucretius, the very famous Lucretius, although, I gather, he wasn’t very famous in his time, or was he?’ M.G: ‘Well we don’t know a great deal about Lucretius and his life. We know that he had a very high standing in his society, for he had a very fine education …’

Professor Graver did not answer the question.

What came to my mind as I listened to the introductory question was what Ovid says on Lucretius: ‘carmina sublimis tunc sunt peritura Lucreti’ exitio terras cum dabit una dies’ (‘The poems of majestic Lucretius will then perish when one day will give the earth to destruction’).

I quote from Ovid, ‘The Immortality of Verse’, Cavin Betts and Daniel Franklin Beginning Latin Poetry Reader, verse 23-4, p. 129. The translation is given by the authors, p. 286. What I find really great are their comments: ‘sublīmis … Lucrētī of majestic Lucretius; sunt peritūra (fut. pple of pereō -īre = perībunt will perish; cum is postponed; exitiō dat. after dabit will give to destruction (exitium –(i)ī N.), i.e. will see the destruction of; terrās here the earth – Ovid is stating a theory of Lucretius.’

Enters Anytus

The Meno ends with Socrates’ request addressed to Meno: ‘It is time now for me to go my way (nun d’ emoi  men hȏra poi ienai), but do you persuade our host Anytus of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded (su de tauta haper autos pepeisai peithe kai ton xenon tonde Anyton), so as to put him in a gentler mood (hina praioteros ȇi); for if you can persuade him (hȏs ean peisȇis auton), you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also (estin hoti kai Athȇnaious onȇseis).’ (100b2-c2)

What was Meno persuaded of?

Trying to find the answer to this question, in the preceding two posts I surveyed the Meno up to the entry of Anytus, focussing attention on Meno’s responses to Socrates. With the entry of Anytus, I must focus attention to Anytus’ responses to Socrates – without losing Meno out of sight.

Anytus enters the dialogue when Socrates and Meno begin to discuss the question whether there are any teachers of virtue. Meno: ‘Do you think there are no teachers of virtue (all’ aretȇs didaskaloi ou dokousi soi einai)?’ – Socrates: ‘I must say I have often inquired whether there were any (Pollakis oun zȇtȏn ei tines eien autȇs didaskaloi), but for all my pains (panta poiȏn) I cannot find one (ou dunamai heurein). And yet many have shared the search with me (kaitoi meta pollȏn ge zȇtȏ), and particularly those persons (kai toutȏn malista) whom I regard (hous an oiȏmai) best qualified for the task (empeirotatous tou pragmatos). But look, Meno: here, at the very moment when he was wanted, we have Anytus sitting down beside us (kai dȇ kai nun, ȏ Menȏn, eis kalon hȇmin Anutos hode parekathezeto), to take his share in our quest (hȏi metadȏmen tȇs zȇtȇseȏs). And we may well ask his assistance (eikotȏs d’an metadoimen); for Anytus, in the first place (Anutos gar hode prȏton men), is a son of a wise and wealthy father (esti patros plousiou te kai sophou), Anthemion (Anthemiȏnos), who became rich (hos egeneto plousios) not by a fluke (ouk apo tou automatou) or a gift (oude dontos tinos) – like that man the other day, Ismenias the Theban [Lamb notes: ‘A democratic leader of Thebes who assisted Anytus and the other exiled Athenian democrats in 403 B.C., shortly before their return to Athens and the supposed time of this dialogue, about 402 B.C.’], who has come into the fortune of a Polycrates [Lamb: ‘Tyrant of Samos about 530 B.C.] (hȏsper ho nun neȏsti eilȇphȏs ta Polukratous chrȇmata Ismȇnias ho Thȇbaios) – but as the product of his own wisdom (alla tȇi hautou sophiai [Lamb: ‘skill’] ktȇsamenos) and industry [Lamb: ‘As a tanner.’] (kai epimeleiai) … and further (epeita), he gave his son a good upbringing (touton eu ethrepse) and education (kai epaideusen), as the Athenian people think (hȏs dokei Athȇnaiȏn tȏi plȇthei), for they choose him for the highest offices (hairountai g’oun auton epi tas megistas archas). This is a sort of man to whom one may look for help in the inquiry as to whether there are teachers of virtue or not (dikaion dȇ meta toioutȏn zȇtein aretȇs peri didaskalous, eit’ eisin ȇ mȇ), and who they may be (kai hoitines). So please, Anytus, join with me and your family-friend Meno in our inquiry (su oun hȇmin, ȏ Anute, suzȇtȇson emoi te kai tȏi sautou xenȏi Menȏni tȏide) about this matter (peri toutou tou pragmatos) – who can be the teachers (tines an eien didaskaloi). (89e4-90b6, translation from the Meno in this post W.R.M. Lamb, with minor changes.)

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Lamb’s ‘skill’ for Socrates’ wisdom loses the irony with which Socrates is speaking about Anytus’ father. Presumably, Lamb didn’t view as ironic Socrates’ praise of the education he gave to Anytus.

In his ‘Introduction to  the Meno’ Lamb wrote on Anytus: ‘Finally, we should notice the suddenness of Anytus’ appearance on the scene, and his abrupt exit: remembering that he was afterwards the accuser of Socrates, and observing the language and tone of his warning to that reckless critic of the democracy [i.e. to Socrates, see Anytus’ last entry, 94e3-95a1], we must conclude that Plato contrived the episode with the deliberate purpose of showing that he did not blame any single person for his beloved Master’s death, but cherished a nobler grudge against a world that was politically and intellectually out of joint.’ (Plato II, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, the Loeb Classical Library.)

I date the Meno in 402, i.e. three years prior to Socrates’ death; my view of Anytus’ part in the dialogue is very different. (For my dating of the Meno see ‘Digression 2, the Meno’, and ‘Digression 4, Plato’s Meno and Xenophon’ Meno’ published on my Blog on March 23 and April 21, 2020.)

The period in which I date the Meno is the time in which – after his disappointment with the oligarchs and his corresponding withdrawal from politics – Plato's desire to get engaged in politics revived: ‘then once again (palin de), though more slowly (braduteron men), I was carried by a desire to take part in public and political affairs (heilken de me homȏs hȇ peri to prattein ta koina kai politika epithumia, Plato, Seventh Letter 325a7-b1)’; for the victorious democrats, ‘exercised great moderation’ (pollȇi echrȇsanto epieikeiai, S.L. 325b4-5).

In the Meno we learn a very important thing about Plato’s desire and determination to be engaged in politics within the framework of the Athenian democracy. He aims at bringing about the state in which the general population would be so well educated that they would elect into the highest offices those who would be best educated for the task of governing the city.

Did Meno get the irony with which Socrates spoke of Anytus and his father, as the former sat beside them? I believe he did, if not immediately then retrospectively, for Socrates in his address to Anytus that followed suggested that the teachers of virtue were the sophists. Yet just prior to Anytus’ entry he said to Meno that he often inquired whether there were any teachers of virtue but could not find any. He clearly wanted to bring to light Anytus’ blinkered views, incompatible with being well educated for the highest offices in the city of Athens.

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Socrates: ‘So please, Anytus, join with me and your family-friend Meno in our inquiry (su oun hȇmin, ȏ Anute, suzȇtȇson emoi te kai tȏi sautou xenȏi Menȏni tȏide) about this matter (peri toutou tou pragmatos) – who can be the teachers (tines an eien didaskaloi). Consider it thus (hȏde de skepsai): if we wanted (ei bouloimetha) Meno here (Menȏna tonde) to be a good doctor (agathon iatron genesthai), to whom should we send him for instruction (para tinas an auton pempoimen didaskalous;)? Would it not be to the doctors (ar’ ou para tous iatrous;)?’ – Anytos: ‘Certainly (Panu ge).’ … Socrates:’ We should be right, we say, in sending him to the doctors (para tous iatrous, phamen, pempontes tonde kalȏs an epempomen) if we wanted him to be a doctor (boulomenoi iatron genesthai). When we say this (Ar’ hotan touto legȏmen), do we mean (tode legomen) that we would be wise in sending him to those (hoti para toutous pempontes auton sȏphronoimen an) who profess the art (tous antipoioumenous te tȇs technȇs) rather than those who do not (mallon ȇ tous mȇ), and to those who charge a fee (kai tous misthon prattomenous) for the particular thing they do (ep’ autȏi toutȏi), as avowed teachers (apophȇnantas hautous didaskalous) of anyone who wishes to come (tou boulomenou ienai) and learn from them (kai manthanein;)? If these were our reasons (ar’ ou pros tauta blepsantes), should we not be right in sending him (kalȏs an pempoimen;)?’ – Anytus: ‘Yes (Nai).’ – Socrates: ‘And the same would hold in the case of flute-playing, and so with the rest (Oukoun kai peri aulȇseȏs kai tȏn allȏn ta auta tauta;)? What folly, when we wanted to make someone a flute-player (pollȇ anoia esti boulomenous aulȇtȇn tina poiȇsai), to refuse to send him to the professed teachers of the art, who charge a regular fee (para men tous hupischnoumenous didaxein tȇn technȇn kai misthon prattomenous mȇ ethelein pempein), and to bother with requests for instruction other people (allois de tisi pragmata parechein, zȇtounta manthanein para toutȏn) who neither set up to be teachers (hoi mȇte prospoiountai didaskaloi einai) nor have a single pupil in that sort of study (mȇt’ estin autȏn mathȇtȇs mȇdeis toutou tou mathȇmatos) which we expect him, when sent, to pursue (ho hȇmeis axioumen manthanein par’ autȏn hon an pempȏmen)! Do you not consider this would be grossly unreasonable (ou pollȇ soi dokei alogia einai;)?’ – Anytus: ‘Yes, on my word, I do (Nai ma Dia emoige), and stupid to boot (kai amathia ge pros).’ – Socrates: ‘Quite right (Kalȏs legeis). And now there is an opportunity of your joining me (nun toinun exesti se met’ emou koinȇi) in a consultation on my friend Meno here (bouleuesthai peri tou xenou toutouï Menȏnos).’ (90b4-91a1)

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Lamb’s ‘and now there is an opportunity of your joining me’ for Socrates’ nun toinun exesti se met’ emou koinȇi bouleuesthai gives a wrong twist to Socrates’ address. Jowett translates correctly: ‘and now you are in a position to advise me’. With his preliminary questioning Socrates was enabling Anytus to join him in the enquiry. Lamb mistakenly translated Socrates’ tou xenou toutouï Menȏnos as ‘my friend Meno here’, instead of ‘Meno, this guest of yours’; Socrates is appealing to Anytus as Meno’s host.

***

Socrates continues: ‘He has been declaring to me ever so long, Anytus (houtos gar, ȏ Anute, palai legei pros me), that he desires to have that wisdom (hoti epithumei tautȇs tȇs sophias) and virtue (kai aretȇs) whereby men keep their house or their city in good order (hȇi hoi anthrȏpoi tas te oikias kai tas poleis kalȏs dioikousi), and honour their parents (kai tous goneas tous hautȏn therapeuousi), and know when to welcome and when to speed citizens and strangers (kai politas kai xenous hupodexasthai te kai apopempsai [‘send away’] epistantai) as befits a good man (axiȏs andros agathou). (91a1-6)

It is worth noting that Socrates puts here into Meno’s mouth words that the latter never said. Without any prior understanding, Meno is happy to play his role in Socrates’ provoking Anytus to lay bare his prejudices.

Socrates continues: ‘Now tell me, to whom ought we properly to send him for lessons in this virtue (tautȇn oun tȇn aretȇn mathȇsomenon skopei [‘consider’] para tinas an pempontes auton orthȏs an pempoimen)? Or is it clear enough (ȇ dȇlon dȇ), from our argument just now (kata ton arti logon), that he should go to these men who profess to be teachers of virtue (hoti para toutous tous hupischnoumenous aretȇs didaskalous einai) and advertise themselves as the common teachers to the Greeks, and are ready to instruct anyone who chooses (kai apophȇnantas hautous koinous tȏn Hellȇnȏn tȏi boulomenȏi manthanein) in return for fees charged on a fixed scale (misthon toutou taxamenous kai prattomenous;)?’ – Anytus: ‘To whom are you referring (Kai tinas legeis toutous), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates;)?’ – Socrates: ‘Surely you know as well as anyone (Oistha dȇpou kai su); they are the men (hoti houtoi eisin) whom people (hous hoi anthrȏpoi) call sophists (kalousi sophistas).’ – Anytus: ‘For heaven’s sake (Hȇrakleis) hold your tongue (euphȇmei), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates)! May no kinsman or friend of mine (mȇdena tȏn g’ emȏn), whether of this city or another (mȇte oikeiȏn mȇte philȏn), be seized with such madness (toiautȇ mania laboi) as to let himself be infected with the company of those men (hȏste para toutous elthonta lȏbȇthȇnai); for they are manifest plague (epei houtoi ge phanera esti lȏbȇ te) and corruption (kai diaphtora) to those who frequent them (tȏn sungignomenȏn).’ (91a6-c5)

Anytus’ outburst of hostility towards the sophists is followed by Socrates’ striking defence of them: ‘What is this (Pȏs legeis), Anytus (ȏ Anute;)? Of all the people who set up to understand how to do us good, do you mean to single out these as conveying not merely no benefit, such as the rest can give, but actually corruption to anyone placed in their hands (houtoi ara monoi tȏn antipoioumenȏn ti [‘something’, ‘anything’] epistasthai euergetein tosouton tȏn allȏn diapherousin, hoson ou monon ouk ȏphelousin, hȏsper hoi alloi, ho ti [‘something’, ‘anything’] an tis autois paradȏi, alla kai to enantion diaphtheirousi;)? And is it for doing this (kai toutȏn) that they openly claim the payment of fees (phanerȏs chrȇmata axiousi prattesthai;)? For my part I cannot bring myself to believe you (egȏ men oun ouk echȏ hopȏs soi pisteusȏ); for I know of one man (oida gar andra hena), Protagoras (Prȏtagoran), who amassed more money (pleiȏ chrȇmata ktȇsamenon) by his craft (apo tautȇs tȇs sophias) than Pheidias  (ȇ Pheidian te) – so famous for the noble works he produced (hos houtȏ periphanȏs kala erga eirgazeto) – or any ten other sculptors (kai allous deka tȏn andriantopoiȏn). And yet how surprising (kaitoi teras legeis ‘what you say is a monstrosity’) that menders of old shoes (ei hoi ta hupodȇmata ergazomenoi ta palaia) and furbishers of clothes (kai ta himatia exakoumenoi) should not be able to go undetected thirty days (ouk an dunainto lathein triakonth’ hȇmeras) if they should return their clothes or shoes in worse condition than they received them (mochthȇrotera apodidontes ȇ parelabon ta himatia te kai hupodȇmata), and that such doings on their part (all’ ei toiauta poioien) would quickly starve them to death (tachu an tȏi limȏi apothanoien), while for more than forty years all Greece failed to notice that Protagoras was corrupting his classes and sending his pupils away in a worse state than when he took charge of them (Prȏtagoras de ara holȇn tȇn Hellada elanthane diaphtheirȏn tous sungignomenous kai mochthȇroterous apopempȏn ȇ parelambane pleon ȇ tettarakonta etȇ). For I believe he died about seventy years old (oimai gar auton apothanein engus kai hebdomȇkonta etȇ gegonota), forty of which he spent in the practice of his art (tettarakonta de en tȇi technȇi gegonota); and he retains undiminished to this day the high reputation he has enjoyed all that time (kai en hapanti tȏi chronȏi toutȏi eti eis tȇn hȇmeran tautȇni eudokimȏn ouden pepautai) – and not only Protagoras (kai ou monon Prȏtagoras), but a multitude of others too (alla kai alloi pampolloi): some who lived before him (hoi men proteron gegonotes ekeinou), and others still living (hoi de kai nun eti ontes). Now are we to take it (poteron dȇ oun phȏmen), according to you (kata ton son logon), that they wittingly (eidotas autous) deceived (exapatan) and corrupted the youth (kai lȏbasthai tous neous), or that they were themselves unconscious of it (ȇ lelȇthenai kai autous;)? Are we to conclude those who are frequently termed the wisest of mankind to have been so demented as that (kai houtȏ mainesthai axiȏsomen toutous, hous enioi phasi sophȏtatous anthrȏpȏn einai;)?’ (91a1-92a6)

Note that Socrates’ defence of the sophists is based on generally accepted view of them. When he invited Anytus to discuss the sophists as he did, he obviously did not expect any serious discussion on that matter. He just wanted to bring to light his prejudices. The discussion between the two that follows should be seen in the light of Socrates’ introductory ironic praise of Anytus’ father for ‘giving his son a good upbringing and education, as the Athenian people think, for they choose him for the highest offices’ (90b1-3).

Anytus: ‘Demented! Not they, Socrates (Pollou ge deousi mainesthai, ȏ Sȏkrates): rather the young men who pay them money (alla polu mallon hoi toutois didontes argurion tȏn neȏn), and still more (toutȏn d’ eti mallon) the relations who let the young men have their way (hoi toutois epitrepontes, hoi prosȇkontes); and most of all the cities (polu de malista pantȏn hai poleis) that allow them to enter (eȏsai autous eisaphikneisthai), and do not expel them (kai ouk exelaunousai), whether such attempt be made by stranger (eite tis xenos epicheirei toiouton ti poiein) or citizen (eite astos).’ – Socrates: ‘Tell me (Poteron de), Anytus (ȏ Anute), has any of the sophists wronged you (ȇdikȇke tis se tȏn sophistȏn;)? What makes you so hard on them (ȇ ti houtȏs autois chalepos ei;)?’ – Anytus: ‘No, heaven knows I have never in my life had dealings with any of them (Oude ma Dia egȏge sungegona pȏpote autȏn oudeni), nor would I let any of my people have to do with them either (oud’ an allon easaimi tȏn emȏn oudena).’ – Socrates: ‘Then you have absolutely no experience (Apeiros ar’ ei pantapasi) of those persons (tȏn andrȏn;)?’ – Anytus: ‘And trust I never may (Kai eiȇn ge).’ – Socrates: ‘How then (Pȏs oun an), my good sir (ȏ daimonie), can you tell whether a thing  has any good or evil in it (eideiȇs peri toutou tou pragmatos, eite ti agathon echei en heautȏi eite phlauron), if you are quite without experience of it (hou pantapasi apeiros eiȇs;)?’ – Anytus: ‘Easily (Raidiȏs): the fact is, I know what these people are (toutous g’oun oida hoi eisin), whether I have experience of them or not (eit’ oun apeiros autȏn eimi eite mȇ).’ (92a7-c5)

In response to Anytus’ proclamation that he knew what the sophists were without having any experience of them Socrates remarked: ‘You are a wizard (Mantis ei), perhaps (isȏs), Anytus (ȏ Anute); for I really cannot see, from what you say yourself, how else you can know anything about them (epei hopȏs ge allȏs oistha toutȏn peri, ex hȏn autos legeis thaumazoim’ an).  Then he turned to what he wanted to hear from Anytus next: ‘But we are not inquiring now who the teachers are (alla gar ou toutous epizȇtoumen tines eisi) whose lessons would make Meno wicked (par’ hous an Menȏn aphikomenos mochthȇros genoito); let us grant, if you will, that they are the sophists (houtoi men gar, ei su boulei, estȏn hoi sophistai): I only ask you to tell us, and do Meno service as a friend of your family by letting him know, to whom in all this great city he should apply in order to become eminent in the virtue which I have described just now (alla dȇ ekeinous eipe hȇmin, kai ton patrikon tonde hetairon euergetȇson, phrasas autȏi, para tinas aphikomenos en tosautȇi polei tȇn aretȇn hȇn nundȇ egȏ diȇlthon genoit’ an axios logou).’ – Anytus: ‘Why not tell him yourself (Ti de autȏi ou su ephrasas;)?’ – Socrates: ‘I did mention to him the men whom I supposed to be the teachers of these things (All’ hous men egȏ ȏimȇn didaskalous toutȏn einai, eipon); but I find, from what you say, that I am quite off the track (alla tunchanȏ ouden legȏn, hȏs su phȇis), and I daresay you are on it (kai isȏs ti legeis). Now you take your turn, and tell him to whom of the Athenians he is to go (alla su dȇ en tȏi merei autȏi eipe para tinas elthȇi Athȇnaiȏn). Give us a name – anyone you please (eipe onoma hotou boulei).’ –  Anytus: ‘Why mention a particular one (Ti de henos anthrȏpou onoma dei akousai;)? Any Athenian gentleman he comes across (hotȏi gar an entuchȇi Athȇnaiȏn tȏn kalȏn k’agathȏn), without exception, will do him more good, if he will do as he bids, than the sophists (oudeis estin hos ou beltiȏ auton poiȇsei ȇ hoi sophistai, eanper ethelȇi peithesthai).’ (92c6-e6)

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Lamb translates Anytus’ kalȏn k’agathȏn as ‘gentlemen’, avoiding the term ‘aristocrats’, by which the term is usually translated. He had a reason for doing so, for Anytus was a leading politician in the renewed democracy. Still, there are reasons for understanding it as ‘the aristocrats’ understood it. Anytus’ reference to and his view of the kaloi k’agathoi stands in sharp contrast to Socrates’ questioning of Meno’s boy, through which Socrates showed, by implication, that any citizen of Athens could acquire knowledge that was prerequisite for governing the city well, ‘if he were courageous and faint not in the search’ (81d3-4). Socrates and Plato did their best to promote true democracy, not Anytus and his ilk.

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Socrates: ‘And did those gentlemen grow spontaneously into what they are (Poteron de houtoi hoi kaloi k’agathoi apo tou automatou egenonto toioutoi), and without learning from anybody are they able, nevertheless, to teach others (par’ oudenos mathontes homȏs mentoi allous didaskein hoioi te ontes tauta) what they did not learn themselves (ha autoi ouk emathon;)? – Anytus: ‘I expect they must have learnt in their turn from the older generation (Kai toutous egȏge axiȏ para tȏn proterȏn mathein), who were gentlemen (ontȏn kalȏn k’agathȏn): or does it not seem to you (ȇ ou dokousi soi) that we have had many good men in this city (polloi kai agathoi gegonenai en tȇide tȇi polei andres;)?’ – Socrates: ‘Yes, I agree Anytus (Emoige, ȏ Anute); we have many who are good in politics (kai einai dokousin enthade agathoi ta politika), and we have had them in the past as well as now (kai gegonenai eti ouch hȇtton ȇ einai). (92e7-93a6)

Socrates’ assertion ‘we have many who are good in politics’ is worth noting. For from now on the virtue in question is a political virtue. Notably, he accepts Anytus’ kaloi k’agathoi, but he views them in a very different light from him, as will be seen.

Socrates continues: ‘But I want to know whether they have proved good teachers besides of their own virtue (alla mȏn kai didaskaloi agathoi gegonasi tȇs hautȏn aretȇs;): that is the question with which our discussion is actually concerned (touto gar esti peri hou ho logos hȇmin tunchanei ȏn) … Did the good men (ara hoi agathoi andres) of our own and of the former times (kai tȏn nun kai tȏn proterȏn) know how to transmit to another man the virtue in respect of which they were good (tautȇn tȇn aretȇn, hȇn autoi agathoi ȇsan, ȇpistanto kai allȏi paradounai), or is it something not to be transmitted or taken over from one human being to another (ȇ ou paradoton touto anthrȏpȏi oude paralȇpton allȏi par’ allou)? … just consider it in your own way of speaking (hȏde oun skopei ek tou sautou logou): would you not say that Themistocles was a good man (Themistoklea ouk agathon an phaiȇs andra gegonenai;)?’ – Anytus: ‘I would (Egȏge), particularly so (pantȏn ge malista).’ … Socrates: ‘Did you ever hear anybody, older or young, say that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, had the same goodness and accomplishments as his father (hȏs Kleophantos ho Themistokleous anȇr agathos kai sophos egeneto haper ho patȇr autou, ȇdȇ tou akȇkoas ȇ neȏterou ȇ presbuterou;)? – Anytus: ‘Certainly not (Ou dȇta).’ (93a6--e5)

Socrates goes on to ask similar questions concerning other famous Athenian politicians, Aristeides, Pericles, and Thucydides. He ends the discussion on Thucydides and his two sons with the words: ‘He, who was of a great house (kai oikias megalȇs ȇn) and had much influence in our city (kai edunato mega en tȇi polei) and all over Greece (kai en tois allois Hellȇsin), so that if virtue were to be taught (hȏste eiper ȇn touto didakton) he would have found out the man who was likely to make his sons good (exeurein an hostis emellen autou tous hueis agathous poiȇsein), whether one of our own people (ȇ tȏn epichȏriȏn tis) or a foreigner (ȇ tȏn xenȏn), were he himself too busy (ei autos mȇ escholaze) owing to the cares of the state (dia tȇn tȇs poleȏs epimeleian)! Ah no, my dear Anytus (alla gar, ȏ hetaire Anute), it looks as though virtue were not a teachable thing (mȇ ouk ȇi didakton aretȇ).’ – Anytus: ‘Socrates (Ō Sȏkrates), I consider you are too apt to speak ill of people (raidiȏs moi dokeis kakȏs legein anthrȏpous). I for one, if you will take my advice, would warn you to be careful (egȏ men oun an soi sumbouleusaimi, ei etheleis moi peithesthai, eulabeisthai): in most cities it is probably easier to do people harm than good (hȏs isȏs men kai en allȇi polei raion esti kakȏs poiein anthrȏpous ȇ eu), and particularly in this one (en tȇide de kai panu); I think you know that yourself (oimai de se kai auton eidenai).’ (94d5-95a1)

Lamb notes: ‘Anytus goes away.‘ But there is no indication that Anytus went away; in my view he stays to the end of the dialogue. When he came, he just sat down beside them, listening to what they were talking about. Socrates indicated his presence: ‘But look, Meno: here, at the very moment when he was wanted, we have Anytus sitting down beside us, to take his share in our quest.’ I presume that his going away would be indicated as well.

Lamb presumably can’t see how Socrates could speak so freely about Anytus, as he does in response to Anytus’ last words: ‘Meno (Ō Menȏn), I think Anytus is angry (Anutos men moi dokei chalepainein), and I am not at all surprised (kai ouden thaumazȏ) for he conceives, in the first place, that I am speaking ill of these gentlemen (oietai gar me prȏton men kakȇgorein toutous tous andras); and in the second place (epeita), he considers that he is one of them himself (hȇgeitai kai autos einai heis toutȏn).’ But Socrates spoke similarly freely about him – after he came and sat beside them – explaining to Meno why they should involve him in their discussion (89e9-b4). On that occasion he referred to him as Anutos hode ‘Anytus here’ (at 89e10, and 90a1), which Lamb left untranslated.

In the discussion that follows his ‘departure’ Socrates refers to him in the same manner: ‘It was not by any wisdom (Ouk ara sophiai tini), nor because they were wise (oude sophoi ontes), that the sort of men we spoke of controlled their state (hoi toioutoi andres hȇgounto tais polesin) – Themistocles and the rest of them, to whom our friend Anytus was referring a moment ago (hoi amphi Themistoklea te kai hous arti Anutos hode elege, 99b5-7).’ Lamb translates Socrates’ Anutos hode as ‘our friend Anytus’, but Socrates’ hode means ‘this here’ – Anutos hode ‘Anytus here’ – as it did when Socrates said to Meno that ‘Anytus here sat down beside us’ (hȇmin Anutos hode parekathezeto, 89e10). The same reference to Anytus comes up again, used by Meno (90e2).

Socrates: ‘And we may, Meno, rightly call those men divine (Oukoun, ȏ Menȏn, axion toutous theious kalein tous andras) who, having no understanding (hoitines noun ouk echontes), yet succeed in many a great deed and word (polla kai megala katorthousin hȏn prattousi kai legousin;)? … and especially we may say of the statesmen that they are divine and enraptured (kai tous politikous ouch hȇkista toutȏn phaimen an theious te einai kai enthousiazein), as being inspired (epipnous ontas) and possessed of God (kai katechomenous ek tou theou) when they succeed (hotan katorthȏsi) in speaking many great things (legontes polla kai megala pragmata), while knowing nought of what they say (mȇden eidotes hȏn legousin).’ – Meno: ’Certainly (Panu ge)’. – Socrates: ‘And the women too (Kai hai ge gunaikes), I presume (dȇpou), Meno (ȏ Menȏn), call good men divine (tous agathous andras theious kalousi); and the Spartans (kai hoi Lakȏnes), when they eulogize a good man (hotan tina enkȏmiazȏsin agathon andra), say – “He is a divine person” (theios anȇr, phasin, houtos).’ – Meno: ‘And to all appearance (Kai phainontai ge), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), they are right (orthȏs legein); though (kaitoi) perhaps (isȏs) our friend Anytus (Anutos hode, ‘Anytus here’) may be annoyed at your statement (soi achthetai legonti ‘is annoyed as you say this’;  Meno appears to be saying this as he looks at Anytus’ expression).’ (99c7-e2)

Anytus’ displeasure does not worry Socrates: ‘For my part, I care not (Ouden melei emoige). With him (toutȏi men), Meno (ȏ Menȏn), we will converse some other time (kai authis dialexometha). At the moment, if through all this discussion our queries and statements have been correct (ei de nun hȇmeis en panti tȏi logȏi toutȏi kalȏs ezȇtȇsamen te kai elegomen), virtue is found to be neither natural (aretȇ an eiȇ oute phusei) nor taught (oute didakton), but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation (alla theiai moirai paragignomenȇ) without understanding (aneu nou) in those who receive it (hois an paragignȇtai), unless there should be somebody among the statesmen (ei mȇ tis eiȇ toioutos tȏn politikȏn andrȏn) capable of making a statesman of another (hoios kai allon poiȇsai politikon). And if there should be any such (ei de eiȇ), he might fairly be said to be among living (schedon an ti houtos legoito toioutos en tois zȏsin) what Homer says (hoion ephȇ Homȇros) Teiresias was among the dead (en tois tethneȏsi ton Teiresian einai) – “He alone has comprehension; the rest are flitting shades” (legȏn peri autou, hoti oios pepnutai tȏn en Haidou, hai de skiai aïssousi). In the same way he on earth (t’auton an kai enthade ho toioutos), in respect of virtue, will be a real substance among shadows (hȏsper para skias alȇthes an pragma eiȇ pros aretȇn, 99e3-100a7).’

With this picture of the true statesman, whose statesmanship is based on knowledge, Socrates recalls the enthusiasm with which he in the Phaedran Palinode presented the realm of true being to the reader’s eye (Phaedrus 247c3-e2)

Meno: ‘I think you put it excellently (Kallista dokeis moi legein), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates, 100b1).’

These are Meno’s last words in the dialogue. They may be seen as Meno’s reply to what immediately preceded, i.e. to Socrates’ description of the statesman capable to teach his political wisdom to another man – undoubtedly Plato. But they at the same time express Meno’s appreciation of all that Socrates said in their preceding discussion. It is in this way that Socrates takes it, for he ends the dialogue by appealing to Meno: ‘It is time now for me to go my way (nun d’ emoi  men hȏra poi ienai), but do you persuade our friend Anytus of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded (su de tauta haper autos pepeisai peithe kai ton xenon tonde Anyton), so as to put him in a gentler mood (hina praioteros ȇi); for if you can persuade him (hȏs ean peisȇis auton), you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also (estin hoti kai Athȇnaious onȇseis).’ (100b2-c2)

Socrates’ wish that Meno puts Anytus in a gentler mood refers primarily to Anytus’ irrational condemnation of the sophists. Then there are two instances of Anytus’ displeasure with Socrates. Firstly, in his last entrance in the dialogue Anytus says to Socrates: ‘I consider you are two apt to speak ill of people’ (94e3-4). Socrates remarks that Anytus is angry, for he thinks that Socrates speaks ill of the prominent Athenians whom he calls kaloi k’agathoi ‘beautiful and good’, considering himself to be one of them (95a). Secondly, towards the very end of the dialogue Meno remarks that ‘perhaps (isȏs) Anytus here (Anutos hode) is annoyed with what you are saying (soi achthetai legonti, 99e2)’. At that point Socrates brushes Anytus’ displeasure aside: ‘For my part, I care not (Ouden melei emoige). With him (toutȏi men), Meno (ȏ Menȏn), we will converse some other time (kai authis dialexometha, 99e3-4).

These two instances of Anytus’ displeasure with Socrates are important. They underline the fact that Socrates is not disparaging the Athenians viewed by Anytus as the kaloi k’agathoi. He agrees with Anytus that the prominent and successful politicians, such as Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, and Thucydides deserve to be viewed as such, but he indicates that they are only second rate kaloi k’agathoi, for their political acumen is not based on political wisdom, it is confined within the framework of eudoxia, good opinion (99b-c). Truly kalos k’agathos politician can be only the statesman who has the corresponding knowledge, ‘capable of making a statesman of another’ (hoios kai allon poiȇsai politikon, 100a2).

And here we come to the main political message that Plato conveys to the Athenians with his dialogue. As Socrates’ discussion with Meno revealed, any man could acquire the required knowledge, and thus become truly kalos k’agathos, ‘if he has courage and faint not in the search’ (81d3-4). In the Meno – in the freshly restored democracy of 402 B.C. – Plato presented his political program of radical democracy, which was by the same token true aristocracy, the rule of the best.