The reproach Lysias suffered from a politician

 

Socrates: Then now, Phaedrus, we can decide those other issues (Nu=n dh\ e0kei=na h1dh, w} Fai=dre, duna/meqa kri/nein), since we have agreed about these (tou/twn w(mologhme/nwn).

Phaedrus: What are they (Ta\ poi=a)?

Socrates: The ones we wanted to look into, which brought us to our present conclusion (W{n dh\ pe/ri boulhqe/ntej i0dei=n a0fiko/meqa ei0j to/de): how we are to weigh up the reproach aimed at Lysias about his writing of speeches (o3pwj to\ Lusi/ou te o1neidoj e0ceta/saimen th=j tw~n lo/gwn grafh=j te pe/ri), and speeches themselves (kai\ au0tou\j tou\j lo/gouj), which were written scientifically and which not (oi4 te/xnh| kai\ a1neu te/xnhj gra/fointo). Well then, what is scientific and what is unscientific (to\ me\n ou]n e1ntexnon  kai\ mh/) seems to me to have been demonstrated in fair measure (dokei= moi dedhlw~sqai metri/wj).

Phaedrus: I thought so (E!doce/ ge dh/); but remind me again now (pa/lin de\ u9po/mnhso/n me pw~j).

 

We don’t need to be reminded of Socrates’ criteria for scientific and unscientific writing. What we need to be reminded of is the reproach concerning writing that Lysias had suffered.

Socrates appended to the palinode a prayer to Eros: ‘turn Lysias to philosophy (e0pi\ filosofi/an tre/yon), so that Phaedrus, his lover (o9 e0rasth\j o3de au0tou=), may simply turn his life towards love accompanied by philosophic discussions (a9plw~j pro\j E!rwta meta\ filoso/fwn lo/gwn to\n bi/on poih=tai).’ Phaedrus joins the prayer, and expresses his admiration of Socrates’ palinode: ‘I’m afraid Lysias will appear wretched to me in comparison (o0knw~ mh/ moi o0 Lusi/aj ta/peinoj fanh=|) if he does consent to put up another logos in competition with it (e0a\n a1ra kai\ e0qelh/sh| pro\j au0to\n a1llon paratei=nai).’ From doubting Lysias’ ability to compete with Socrates, Phaedrus turns to the reproach Lysias suffered in the hands of an Athenian politician: ‘Indeed, my fine fellow (kai\ ga/r tij au0to\n, w} qauma/sie), just recently one of the politicians was abusing him with this very charge (e1nagxoj tw~n politikw~n tou=t’ au0to\ loidorw~n w)nei/dize), and throughout all his abuse (kai\ dia\ pa/shj th=j loidori/aj) kept calling him a ‘speech-writer’ (e0ka/lei logo/grafon); so perhaps we shall find him refraining from writing out of concern for his reputation (ta/x’ ou]n u9po\ filotimi/aj e0pi/sxoi h9mi=n a2n tou= gra/fein).’

I won’t repeat here Socrates’ rebukes addressed to Phaedrus – ‘you much mistake your friend, if you think him so frightened of mere noise …’. What I want to point out is that at 277a Plato limits his censure of writing to the discussion that followed the rebuke of Lysias for his speech-writing. Untouched by that discussion, the palinode stands there as Socrates’ living spoken word in contrast to Lysias’ written speech. In other words, Plato leaves the palinode untouched by the discussion of writing, discussion that follows the rebuke to Lysias as speech-writer at 257c, and leads to Socrates’ ‘which brought us to the present discussion’ at 277a.

Socrates continues

At 276d Socrates compared the amusement provided by writing to amusements provided to others by symposia (drinking-parties). Phaedrus enthusiastically concurred: ‘A very fine form of amusement it is you’re talking of, Socrates, in contrast to the mean one’. Socrates agreed: Yes, Phaedrus, just so; but!!!

But I think it is far finer if one is in earnest about them (Polu\ d’ oi]mai kalli/wn spoudh\ peri\ au0ta\ gi/gnetai); when a man makes use of the science of dialectic (o3tan tij th=| dialektikh=| te\xnh| xrw&menoj), and taking a fitting soul (labw_n yuxh\n prosh/kousan) plants (futeu/h| te) and sows in it (kai\ spei/rh|) words accompanied by knowledge (met’ e0pisth/mhj lo/gouj), which are able to help themselves and the man who planted them (oi4 e9autoi=j tw~| te futeu/santi bohqei=n i9kanoi/), and are not without fruit (kai\ ou0xi\ a1karpoi) but contain a seed (a1lla\ e1xontej spe/rma), from which others grow in other soils (o3qen a1lloi e0n a1lloij h1qesi fuo/menoi), capable of rendering it for ever immortal (tou=t’ a1ei\ a0qa/naton pare/xein i9kanoi/), and making the one who has it as happy (kai\ to\n e1xonta eu0daimonei=n poiou=ntej) as it is possible for a man to be (ei0j o3son a0nqrw&pw| dunato\n ma/lista).

Phaedrus: This is indeed still finer (Polu\ ga\r tou=t’ e1ti ka/llion le/geij).

Gardening for pleasure, writing for pleasure

Socrates continues: Then tell me this (to/de dh/ moi ei0pe/): the sensible farmer (o9 nou=n e1xwn gewrgo/j) who had some seeds he cared about (w{n sperma/twn kh/doito) and wanted to bear fruit (kai\ e1gkarpa bou/loito gene/sqai) – would he sow them with serious purpose during the summer in some garden of Adonis (po/tera spoudh=| a2n qe/rouj ei0j A0dw&nidoj kh/pouj a0rw~n),

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Hackfoth remarks on ‘garden of Adonis’: ‘A pot or window-box for forcing plants at the festival of Adonis‘. Adonis was a beautiful youth beloved by Aphrodite; while hunting he was killed by a boar, a jealous Hephaestus or a jealous Ares disguised as a boar.

***

and delight watching it becoming beautiful within eight days (xai/roi qewrw~n kalou\j e0n h9me/raisin o0ktw_ gignome/nouj), or would he do that for the sake of amusement on a feast-day (h2 tau=ta me\n dh\ paidia=j te kai\ e9orth=j xa/rin drw|&h a1n), when he did it at all (o3te kai\ poioi=); whereas for the purposes about which he was in earnest (e0f’ oi[j de\ e0spou/daken), he would make use of the science of farming (th=| gewrgikh=| xrw&menoj a2n te/xnh|) and sow them in appropriate soil (spei/raj ei0j to\ prosh=kon), being content (a0gapw&|h a1n) if what he sowed reached maturity in the eighth month (e0n o0gdo/w| mhni\ o3sa e1speiren te/loj labo/nta;)?

Phaedrus: Just so, I think (Ou3tw pou), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej): he would do the one sort of thing in earnest (ta\ me\n spoudh=|), the other in the other way (ta\ de\ w(j e9te/rwj a1n), the way you say (h[| le/geij poioi=).

Socrates: And are we to say that the man who has pieces of knowledge about what is just, fine and good has a less sensible attitude towards his seeds than the farmer (To\n de\ dikai/wn te kai\ kalw~n kai\ a0gaqw~n e0pisth/maj e1xonta tou= gewrgou= fw~men h[tton nou=n e1xein ei0j ta\ e9autou= spe/rmata;)?

Phaedrus: Certainly not (H#kista/ ge).

Socrates: In that case he will not be in earnest about writing them in water – black water (Ou0k a1ra spoudh|= au0ta\ e0n u3dati gra/yei me/lani), sowing them through a pen (spei/rwn dia\ kala/mou) with words which are incapable of speaking in their own support (meta\ lo/gwn a0duna/twn me\n au9toi=j lo/gw| bohqei=n), and incapable of adequately teaching what is true (a0duna/twn de\ i9kanw~j ta0lhqh= dida/cai).

Phaedrus: It certainly isn’t likely (Ou1koun dh\ to/ g’ ei0ko/j).

Socrates: No, it isn’t (Ou0 ga/r); but his gardens of letters (a0lla\ tou\j me\n e0n gra\mmasi kh/pouj), it seems (w(j e1oike), he will sow and write for amusement (paidia=j xa/rin sperei= te kai\ gra/yei), when he does write (o3tan de\ gra/fh|), laying up a store of reminders both for himself (e9autw~| te u9pomnh/mata qhsaurizo/menoj), when he ‘reaches a forgetful old age’ (ei0j to\ lh/qhj gh=raj e0a\n i3khtai), and for anyone who is following the same track (kai\ panti\ tw~| tau0to\n i1xnoj metio/nti), and he will be pleased as he watches their tender growth (h9sqh/setai/ te au0tou\j qewrw~n fuome/nouj a9palou/j); and when others resort to other sorts of amusements (o3tan d’ a1lloi paidiai=j a1llaij xrw~ntai), watering themselves with drinking-parties (sumposi/oij te a1rdontej au9tou/j) and the other things which go along with these (e9te/roij te o3sa tou/twn a0delfa/), then he (to/t’ e0kei=noj), it seems (w(j e1oiken), will spend his time amusing himself with the things I say, instead of these (a0nti\ tou&twn oi[j le/gw pai/zwn dia/cei).

Phaedrus: A very fine form of amusement it is you’re talking of, Socrates, in contrast with a mean one  (Pagka/lhn le/geij para\ fau/lhn paidia/n, w} Sw&kratej) – that of the man who is able to amuse himself with words (tou= e0n lo/goij duname/nou pai/zein), telling stories about justice and the other subjects you speak of (dikaiosu/nhj te kai\ a1llwn w{n le/geij pe/ri muqologou=nta).

Socrates: Yes, Phaedrus, just so (E!sti ga/r, w} fi/le Fai=dre, ou3tw);

Speech of the man who knows

Having compared writing to painting – the offspring of painting stand there as if alive, but if you ask them something, they preserve quite a solemn silence. Similarly with written words – Socrates asks:

Well then (Ti/ d’;), do we see another way of speaking (a1llon o9rw~men lo/gon), a legitimate brother of this one (tou/tou a0delfo\n gnh/sion)? Do we see both how it comes into being (tw~| tro/pw| te gi/gnetai) and how much better (kai\ o3sw| a0mei/nwn) and more capable it is from its birth (kai\ dunatw&teroj tou/tou fu/etai;)?

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Rowe translates Plato’s lo/goj (lo/gon is accusative, lo/goj is nominative) as way of speaking, which can’t be right, for the English language has two different words for the Greek logos, which can be either written (gegramme/noj), or spoken. When spoken, then it is simply logos; the quality of ‘being spoken’, in contrast to ‘being written’, then can be emphasized by such epithets as ‘living’ (zw~n), and ‘having soul’ (e1myuxoj).

***

Phaedrus: Which is this (Ti/na tou=ton), and how does it come into being, as you put it (kai\ pw~j le/geij gigno/menon;)?

Socrates: The one that is written together with knowledge in the soul of the learner (O#j met’ e0pisth/mhj gra/fetai e0n th|= tou= manqa/nontoj yuxh=|), capable of defending itself (dunato\j me\n a0mu/nai e9autw~|), and knowing how to speak (e0pisth/mwn de\ le/gein te) and keep silent (kai\ siga=n) in relation to the people it should (pro\j ou3j dei=).

Phaedrus: You mean the living and animate speech of the man who knows (To\n tou= ei0do/toj lo/gon le/geij zw~nta kai\ e1myuxon), of which written speech (ou[ o9 gegramme/noj) would rightly be called a kind of phantom (ei1dwlon a1n ti le/goito dikai/wj).

Socrates: Absolutely (Panta/pasi me\n ou]n).

Writing, painting

Phaedrus: Socrates, you easily make up stories from Egypt or from anywhere else you like (W} Sw&kratej, r(a|di/wj su\ Ai0gupti/ouj kai\ o9podapou\j a2n e0qe/lh|j lo/gouj poiei=j).

Socrates: Well, my friend, those (Oi9 de/ g’, w} fi/le) at the sanctuary of Zeus of Dodona (e0n tw~| tou= Dio\j tou= Dwdwnai/ou i9erw~|) said that words of an oak were the first prophetic utterances (druo\j lo/gouj e1fhsan mantikou\j prw&touj gene/sqai). So the men of those days (toi=j me\n ou]n to/te), because they were not wise like you moderns (a3te ou0k ou]si sofoi=j w#sper u9mei=j oi9 ne/oi), were content because of their simplicity to listen to oak and rock (a0pe/xrh druo\j kai\ pe/traj a0kou/ein u9p’ eu0hqei/aj), provided only they said what was true (ei0 mo/non a0lhqh= le/goien); but for you, Phaedrus, perhaps it makes a difference (soi\ d’ i1swj diafe/rei) who the speaker is (ti/j o9 le/gwn) and where he comes from (kai\ podapo/j): you don’t just consider whether what he says is right or not (ou0 ga\r e0kei=no mo/non skopei=j, ei1te ou3twj ei1te a1llwj e1xei).

Phaedrus: You rightly rebuke me (O0rqw~j e0pe/plhcaj), and it seems to me to be as the Theban says about letters (kai/ moi dokei= peri\ gramma/twn e1xein h[|per o9 Qhbai=oj le/gei).

Socrates: So the man who thinks that he has left behind him a science in writing (Ou0kou=n o9 te/xnhn oi0o/menoj e0n gra/mmasi katalipei=n), and in his turn the man who receives it from him in the belief that anything clear or certain will result from what is written down (kai\ au] o9 paradexo/menoj w#j ti safe\j kai\ be/baion e0k gramma/twn e0so/menon), would be full of simplicity (pollh=j a2n eu0hqei/aj ge/moi) and would be really ignorant of Ammon’s prophetic utterance (kai\ tw~| o1nti th\n A1mmwnoj mantei/an a0gnooi=), in thinking that written words were anything more (ple/on ti oi0o/menoj ei]nai lo/gouj gegramme/nouj) than a reminder to the man who knows (tou= to\n ei0do/ta u9pomnh=sai) the subjects to which the things written relate (peri\ w{n a2n h2| ta\ gegramme/na).

Phaedrus: Quite right (O0rqo/tata).

Socrates: Yes, Phaedrus, because I think writing has this strange feature (Deino\n ga/r pou, w} Fai=dre, tou=t e1xei grafh/), which makes it like painting (kai\ w(j a0lhqw~j o3moion zwgrafi/a|). The offspring of painting stand there as if alive (kai\ ga\r ta\ e0kei/nhj e1kgona e3sthke me\n w(j zw#nta), but if you ask them something (e0a\n d’ a0ne/rh| ti), they preserve a quite solemn silence (semnw~j pa/nu siga|=). Similarly with written words (tau0to\n de\ kai\ oi9 lo/goi): you might think that they spoke as if they had some thought in their heads (do/caij me\n a2n w#j ti fronou=ntaj au0tou\j le/gein), but if you ever ask them about any of the things they say (e0a\n de/ ti e1rh| tw~n legome/nwn) out of a desire to learn (boulo/menoj maqei=n), they point to just one thing (e3n ti shmai/nei mo/non), the same each time (tau0to\n a0ei/). And when once it is written (o3tan de\ a3pac grafh|=), every composition is trundled about everywhere (kulindei=tai me\n pantaxou= pa=j lo/goj) in the same way (o9moi/wj), in the presence both of those who know about the subject (para\ toi=j e0pai+/ousin) and of those who have nothing at all to do with it (w(j d’ au3twj par’ oi[j ou0de\n prosh/kei), and it does not know how to address those it should address and not those it should not (kai\ ou0k e0pi/statai le/gein oi[j dei= ge kai\ mh/). When it is ill-treated (plhmmelou/menoj me/n) and unjustly abused (kai\ ou0k e0n di/kh|  loidorhqei/j), it always needs its father to help it (tou= patro\j a0ei\ dei=tai bohqou=); for it is incapable of defending or helping itself (au0to\j ga\r ou1t’ a0mu/nasqai ou1te bohqh=sai dunato\j au9tw~|).

Phaedrus: You’re quite right about that too (Kai\ tau=ta/ soi o0rqo/tata ei1rhtai).

 

Propriety and impropriety in writing, the myth of Theuth and Thamous

Socrates: So let that be enough on the subject of the scientific and unscientific aspects of speaking (Ou0kou=n to\ me\n te/xnhj te kai\ a1texni/aj lo/gwn pe/ri i9kanw~j e0xe/tw).

Phaedrus: By all means (Ti/ mh/n;)

Socrates: What we have left is the subject of propriety and impropriety in writing: in what way, when it is done, it will be done acceptably, and in what way improperly (To\ d’ eu0prepei/aj dh\ grafh=j pe/ri kai\ a0prepei/aj, ph=| gigno/menon kalw~j a2n e1xoi kai\ o3ph| a0prepw~j, loipo/n). True (h] ga/r;)?

Phaedrus: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: So do you know (Oi]sq’ ou]n) how you will most gratify god (o3ph| ma/lista qew~| xarih|=) in relation to speaking, whether actually speaking, or talking about it (lo/gwn pe/ri pra/ttwn h2 le/gwn;)?

Phaedrus: Not at all (Ou0damw~j); do you (su\ de/;)?

Socrates: I can tell you, at least (A0koh/n g’ e1xw le/gein), something I have heard from those who came before us (tw~n prote/rwn); they alone know the truth of it (to\ d’ a0lhqe\j au0toi\ i1sasin). But if we were to find it out for ourselves (ei0 de\ tou=to eu3roimen au0toi/), would we care any longer at all (a]ra/ g’ a2n e1q’ h9mi=n me/loi ti) about what mere men happen to think (tw~n a0nqrwpi/nwn docasma/twn;)?

Phaedrus: An absurd question (Geloi=on h1rou); tell me what you said you have heard (a0ll’ a4 fh\|j a0khkoe/nai le/ge).

Socrates: Well then, what I heard was that there was at Naukratis in Egypt one of the ancient gods of that country (H!kousa toi/nun peri\ Nau/kratin th=j Ai0gu/ptou gene/sqai tw~n e0kei= palaiw~n tina qew~n), the one to whom the sacred bird they call the ibis belongs (ou[ kai to\ o1rneon i9ero\n o4 dh\ kalou=sin I}bin); the divinity’s own name was Theuth (au0tw~| de\ o1noma tw~| dai/moni ei]nai Qeu/q). The story was that he was the first to discover number and calculation (tou=ton dh\ prw~ton a0riqmo/n te kai\ logismo\n eu9rei=n), and geometry (kai\ gewmetri/an) and astronomy (kai\ a0stronomi/an), and also games of draughts (e1ti de\ pettei/aj te) and dice (kai\ kubei/aj); and, to cap it all, letters (kai\ dh\ kai\ gra/mmata). King of all Egypt at that time was Thamus (basile/wj d’ au] to/te o1ntoj Ai0gu/ptou o3lhj Qamou=) – all of it, that is, that surrounds the great city of the upper region which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; Thamus they call Ammon (peri\ th\n mega/lhn po/lin tou= a1nw to/pou h4n oi9 E3llhnej A0gupti/aj Qh/baj kalou=si, kai\ to\n qeo\n A1mmwna). Theuth came to him (para\ tou=ton e0lqw_n o9 Qeu\q) and displayed his technical inventions (ta\j te/xnaj e0pe/deicen), saying that they should be passed on to the rest of the Egyptians (kai\ e1fh dei=n diadoqh/nai toi=j a1lloij Ai0gupti/oij); and Thamus asked what benefit each brought (o9 de\ h1reto h3ntina e9ka/sth e1xoi w)feli/an). As Theuth went through them (die/cio/ntoj de/), Thamus criticised or praised whatever he seemed to be getting right or wrong (o3ti kalw~j h2 mh\ kalw~j dokoi= le/gein, to\ me\n e1yegen, to\ d’ e0ph/|nei). The story goes that Thamus expressed many views to Theuth about each science, both for and against (polla\ me\n dh\ peri\ e9ka/sthj th=j te/xnhj e0p’ a0mfo/tera Qamou=n tw~| Qeu\q le/getai a0pofh/nasqai); it would take a long time to go through them in detail (a4 lo/goj polu\j a2n ei1h dielqei=n), but when it came to the subject of letters (e0peidh\ de\ e0pi\ toi=j gra/mmasi h]n), Theuth said ‘But this study, King Thamus, will make the Egyptians wiser and improve their memory (Tou=to de/, w} basileu=, to\ ma/qhma,” e1fh Qeu/q, “sofwte/rouj Ai0gupti/ouj kai\ mnhmonikwte/rouj pare/cei); what I have discovered is an elixir of memory and wisdom (mnh/mhj te ga\r kai\ sofi/aj fa/rmakon hu9re/qh).’ Thamus replied (o9 d’ ei]pen) ‘Most scientific Theuth (W} texnikw&tate Qeu/q), one man has the ability to beget the elements of a science (a1lloj me\n tekei=n dunato\j ta\ te/xnhj), but it belongs to a different person to be able to judge what measure of harm and benefit it contains for those who are going to make use of it (a1lloj de\ kri=nai ti/n’ e1xei moi=ran bla/bhj te kai\ w)feli/aj toi=j me/llousi xrh=sqai); so now you (kai\ nu=n su/), as the father of letters (path\r w@n gramma/twn), have been led by your affection for them to describe them as having the opposite of their real effect (di’ eu1noian tou0nanti/on ei]pej h2 du/natai). For your invention will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it (Tou=to ga\r tw~n maqo/ntwn lh/qhn me\n e0n yuxai=j pare/cei), through lack of practice at using their memory (mnh/mhj a0melethsi/a|), as through reliance on writing (a3te dia\ pi/stin grafh=j) they are reminded from outside by alien marks, not from inside, themselves by themselves (e1cwqen u9p’ a0llotri/wn tu/pwn, ou0k e1ndoqen au0tou\j u9f’ au9tw~n a0namimnh|skome/nouj): you have discovered an elixir not of memory but of reminding (ou1koun mnh/mhj a0lla\ u9pomnh/sewj fa/rmakon hu[rej). To your students you give an appearance of wisdom, not the reality of it (sofi/aj de\ toi=j maqhtai=j do/can, ou0k a0lh/qeian pori/zeij); having heard much (poluh/kooi ga/r soi geno/menoi), in the absence of teaching (a1neu didaxh=j) they will appear to know much (polugnw&monej ei]nai do/cousin) when for the most part they know nothing (a0gnw&monej w(j e0pi\ to\ plh=qoj o1ntej), and they will be difficult to get along with (kai\ xalepoi\ sunei=nai), because they have acquired the appearance of wisdom (doco/sofoi gegono/tej) instead of wisdom itself (a0nti\ sofw~n).

 

Tisias enters the stage

Socrates: ‘Well then, and Socrates,’ perhaps our writer will say, ‘do you agree (Ti/ dh\ ou]n; fh/sei i1swj o9 suggrafeu/j, w} Fai=dre/ te kai\ Sw&kratej, dokei= ou3twj), or should we accept it if the science of speaking is stated in some other way (h2 a1llwj pwj a0podekte/on legome/nhj lo/gwn te/xnhj;)?’

Phaedrus: It’s impossible, I think (A0du/nato/n pou), Socrates, to accept any other description (w} Sw&kratej, a1llwj); yet it seems no light business (kai/toi ou0 smikro/n ge fai/netai e1rgon).

Socrates: You’re right (A0lhqh= le/geij). It is just for this reason (tou/tou toi e3neka) that we must turn all our arguments upside down (xrh\ pa/ntaj tou\j lo/gouj a1nw kai\ ka/tw metastre/fonta) and look to see (e0piskopei=n) whether any easier (ei1 ti/j ph| r9a/|wn) and shorter (kai\ braxute/ra) route to it appears anywhere (fai/netai e0p’ au0th\n o9do/j), so that someone doesn’t waste his time going off on a long (i3na mh\ ma/thn pollh\n a0pi/h|) and rough road (kai\ traxei=an) when he could take a short (e0co\n o0li/ghn te) and smooth one (kai\ lei/an). But if you have any help to give (a0ll’ ei1 tina/ ph| boh/qeian e1xeij) from what you have heard from Lysias (e0pakhkow_j Lusi/ou) or anyone else (h1 tinoj a1llou), try to remember and tell me (peirw~ le/gein a0namimnh|sko/menoj).

Phaedrus: If it depended on trying (E#neka me\n pei/raj), I would (e1xoim’ a1n); but as things are I’m just not in a position to help (a0ll’ ou1ti nu=n g’ ou3twj e1xw).

Socrates: Then would you like me to say something (Bou/lei ou]n e0gw& tin’ ei1pw lo/gon) I’ve heard from some of those who make these things their business (o4n tw~n peri\ tau=ta/ tinwn a0kh/koa;)?

Phaedrus: Of course (Ti/ mh/n;).

Socrates: The saying goes (Le/getai gou=n), Phaedrus (w} Fai=dre), that it’s right (di/kaion ei]nai) to give the wolf’s side of the case as well (kai\ to\ tou= lu/kou ei0pei=n).

Phaedrus: Then you do just that (Kai\ su/ ge ou3tw poi/ei).

Socrates: Well then, they say (Fasi\ toi/nun) that there is no need to treat these things so portentously (ou0de\n ou3tw tau=ta dei=n semnu/nein), or carry them back to general principles (ou0d’ a0na/gein a1nw), going the long way round (makra\n periba/llome/nouj); for it’s just what we said at the very beginning of this discussion (panta/pasi ga/r, o4 kai\ kat’ a0rxa\j ei1pomen tou=de tou= lo/gou) – that the man who is going to be competent at rhetoric need have nothing to do with the truth about just or good things, or indeed about people who are such by nature or upbringing (o3ti ou0de\n a0lhqei/aj mete/xein de/oi dikai/wn h2 a0gaqw~n pe/ri pragma/twn, h2 kai\ a0nqrw&pwn ge toiou/twn fu/sei o1ntwn h2 trofh=|, to\n me/llonta i9kanw~j r9htoriko\n e1sesqai). For they say that in the law-courts no one cares in the slightest for the truth about these things (to\ para/pan ga\r ou0de\n e0n toi=j dikasthri/oij tou/twn a0lhqei/aj me/lein ou0deni/), but only for what is convincing (a0lla\ tou= piqanou=); and this is (tou=to d’ ei]nai) what is probable (to\  ei0ko/j), which is what the man who is going to speak scientifically must pay attention to (w{| dei= prose1xein to\n me/llonta te/xnh| e0rei=n). For they go on to say that sometimes one should not even say what was actually done (ou0de\ ga\r au] ta\ pra\xqe/nta dei=n le/gein e0ni/ote), if it is improbable (e0a\n mh\ ei0ko/twj h]| pepragme/na), but rather what is probable (a0lla\ ta\ ei0ko/ta), both when accusing (e1n te kathgori/a|) and when defending (kai\ a0pologi/a|), and whatever one’s purpose when speaking, the probable is what must be pursued (kai\ pa/ntwj le/gonta to\ dh\ ei0ko\j diwkte/on ei]nai), which means frequently saying goodbye to the truth (polla\ ei0po/nta xai/rein tw~| a0lhqei=); when this happens throughout one’s speech (tou=to ga\r dia\ panto\j tou= lo/gou gigno/menon), it gives us the entire science (th\n a3pasan te/xnhn pori/zein).

Phaedrus: You have stated just what those who profess to be experts in speaking say (Au0ta\ ge, w} Sw&kratej, dielh/luqaj a4 le/gousin oi9 peri\ tou\j lo/gouj texnikoi\ prospoiou/menoi ei]nai); for I remember, now you say it (a0nemnh/sqhn ga/r), that we did touch briefly on this sort of thing before (o3ti e0n tw~| pro/sqen braxe/wj tou= toiou/tou e0fhya/meqa), and it seems something of great importance (dokei= de\ tou=to pa/mmega ei]nai) to those concerned with these things (toi=j peri\ tau=ta).

Socrates: But you’ve gone over the man Tisias himself carefully (A0lla\ mh\n to/n ge Teisi/an au0to\n pepa/thkaj a0kribw~j); so let Tisias say us this too (ei0pe/tw toi/nun kai\ to/de h9mi=n o9 Teisi/aj): he says, doesn’t he, that the probable is just what most people think to be the case (mh/ ti a1llo le/gei to\ ei0ko\j h2 to\ tw~| plh/qei dokou=n)?

Phaedrus: Just that (Ti/ ga\r a1llo;).

Socrates: I suppose it was on making just this clever, and scientific, discovery (Tou=to dh/, w(j e1oike, sofo\n eu9rw_n a3ma kai\ texniko\n) that he wrote to the effect (e1grayen) that (w(j) if a weak but brave man beats up a strong coward (e0a\n tij a0sqenh\j kai\ a0ndriko\j i0sxuro\n kai\ deilo\n sugko/yaj) and steals his cloak or something else of his (i9ma/tion h1 ti a1llo a0felo/menoj), and is taken in court for it (ei0j dikasth/rion a1ghtai), then neither party should speak the truth (dei= dh\ ta0lhqe\j mhde/teron le/gein); the coward should say that he wasn’t beaten up by the brave man single-handed (a0lla\ to\n me\n deilo\n mh\ u9po\ mo/nou fa/nai tou= a0ndrikou= sugkeko/fqai), while the other man should establish that they were on their own together (to\n de\ tou=to me\n e0le/gxein w(j mo/nw h1sthn), and should resort to the well-known argument (e0kei/nw| de\ kataxrh/sasqai tw~|), ‘how could a man like me have assaulted a man like him (Pw~j d’ a2n e0gw_ toio/sde toiw~|de e0pexei/rhsa;)?’ The coward will certainly not admit his cowardice (o9 d’ ou0k e0rei= dh\ th\n e9autou= ka/khn), but will try to invent some other lie (a0lla/ ti a1llo yeu/desqai e0pixeirw~n) and so perhaps offer an opening for his opponent to refute him (ta/x’ a2n e1legxo/n ph| paradoi/h tw~| a0ntidi/kw|). And in all other cases too (kai\ peri\ ta]lla dh/) the way to speak ‘scientifically’ will be something like this (toiau=t’ a1tta  e0sti\ ta\ te/xnh| lego/mena). True (ou0 ga/r), Phaedrus (w} Fai=dre;)?

Phaedrus: Of course (Ti/ mh/n;).

Socrates: Hey (Feu=)! How cleverly hidden a science Tisias seems to have discovered (deinw~j g’ e1oiken a0pokekrumme/nhn te/xnhn a0neurei=n o9 Teisi/aj), or someone else (h2 a1lloj), whoever he may happen to be (o3stij dh/ pot’ w@n tugxa/nei), and wherever he rejoices to be named from (kai\ o9po/qen xai/rei o0nomazo/menoj). Still (a0ta/r), my friend (w} e9tai=re), should we or should we not say to him (tou/tw| h9mei=j po/teron le/gwmen h2 mh/) –

Phaedrus: What (To\ poi=on;)?

Socrates: This (O#ti): ‘Tisias (w} Teisi/a), we have for some time (pa/lai h9mei=j) been saying, before you came along (pri\n kai\ se\ parelqei=n, tugxa/nomen le/gontej), that this “probability” (w(j a1ra tou=to to\ ei0ko/j) comes about in the minds of ordinary people because of a resemblance to the truth (toi=j polloi=j di’ o9moio/thta tou= a0lhqou=j tugxa/nei e0ggigno/menon); and we showed only a few moments ago that in every case it is the man who knows the truth who knows best how to discover these resemblances (ta\j de\ o9moio/thtaj a1rti dih/lqomen o3ti pantaxou= o9 th\n a0lh/qeian ei0dw_j ka/llista e0pi/statai eu9ri/skein). So if you have anything else to say on the subject of a science of speaking (w#st’ ei0 me\n a1llo ti peri\ te\xnhj lo/gwn le/geij), we’ll gladly hear it (a0kou/oimen a1n); if not (ei0 de\ mh/), we’ll believe what we showed just now (oi[j nundh\ dih/lqomen peiso/meqa), that unless someone counts up the various natures of those who are going to listen to him (w(j e0a\n mh/ tij tw~n te a0kousome/nwn ta\j fu/seij diariqmh/shtai), and is capable of dividing up the things that are according to their forms (kai\  kat’ ei1dh te diairei=sqai ta\ o1nta) and embrace each thing one by one under one kind (kai\ mia|= i0de/a| du/natoj h=| kaq’ e4n e3kaston perilamba/nein), he will never be an expert in the science of speaking to the degree possible for mankind (ou1 pot’ e1stai texniko\j lo/gwn pe/ri kaq’ o3son dunato\n a0nqrw&pw). This ability he will never acquire without a great deal of diligent study (tau=ta de\ ou0 mh/ pote kth/shtai a1neu pollh=j pragmatei/aj), which the sensible man ought to work through not for the purpose of speaking and acting in relation to men (h4n oux e3neka tou= le/gein kai\ pra/ttein pro\j a0nqrw&pouj dei= diaponei=n to\n sw&frona), but in order to be able both to say what is gratifying to the gods, and to act in everything, as far as he can, in a way which is gratifying to them (a0lla\ tou= qeoi=j kexarisme/na me\n le/gein du/nasqai, kexarisme/nwj de\ pra/ttein to pa=n ei0j du/namin). For you see (ou0 ga\r dh\ a1ra), Tisias (w} Teisi/a),  - so say wiser men than us (fasi\n oi9 sofw&teroi h9mw~n) – the man who is in his right mind should not practice at the gratification of his fellow-slaves (o9modou/loij dei= xari/zesqai meleta=n to\n nou=n e1xonta), except as a secondary consideration (o3ti mh\ pa/rergon), but rather at that of good and noble masters (a0lla\ despo/taij a0gaqoi=j te kai\ e0c a0gaqw~n). So if the way round is a long one (w#st’ ei0 makra\ h9 peri/odoj), don’t be surprised (mh\ qauma/sh|j); for it is for the sake of great things that the journey is to be made (mega/lwn ga\r e3neka periite/on), not for those you have in mind (ou0x w(j su\ dokei=j). Yet these too, as our argument asserts (e1stai mh/n, w(j o9 lo/goj fhsi/n), if that is what one wants, will best come about as a result of the others, if one so wishes (e0a/n tij e0qe/lh|, kai\ tau=ta ka/llista e0c e0kei/nwn gigno/mena).’

Phaedrus: I think that what you say is very fine (Pagka/lwj e1moige dokei= le/gesqai), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), if only one had the capacity for it (ei1per oi[o/j te/ tij ei1h).

Socrates: But for a man who even attempts what is fine (A0lla\ kai\ e0pixeirou=nti/ toi=j a0gaqoi=j), it will be fine too to endure (kalo\n kai\ pa/sxein) whatever turns out for him (o3ti a1n tw| sumbh=| paqei=n).

Phaedrus: Indeed (Kai\ ma/la).