Socrates: ‘Well then, and Socrates,’ perhaps our writer will say, ‘do you agree (Ti/ dh\ ou]n; fh/sei i1swj o9 suggrafeu/j, w} Fai=dre/ te kai\ Sw&kratej, dokei= ou3twj), or should we accept it if the science of speaking is stated in some other way (h2 a1llwj pwj a0podekte/on legome/nhj lo/gwn te/xnhj;)?’
Phaedrus: It’s impossible, I think (A0du/nato/n pou),
Socrates, to accept any other description (w}
Sw&kratej, a1llwj); yet it seems
no light business (kai/toi ou0
smikro/n ge fai/netai e1rgon).
Socrates: You’re right (A0lhqh= le/geij).
It is just for this reason (tou/tou toi
e3neka) that we must turn all our arguments upside
down (xrh\ pa/ntaj tou\j lo/gouj a1nw kai\
ka/tw metastre/fonta) and look to see
(e0piskopei=n) whether any easier (ei1 ti/j ph| r9a/|wn)
and shorter (kai\ braxute/ra) route to it appears anywhere (fai/netai e0p’ au0th\n o9do/j),
so that someone doesn’t waste his time going off on a long (i3na mh\ ma/thn pollh\n a0pi/h|) and rough road (kai\ traxei=an)
when he could take a short (e0co\n o0li/ghn
te) and smooth one (kai\ lei/an). But if
you have any help to give (a0ll’ ei1 tina/ ph| boh/qeian e1xeij) from what you have heard from Lysias (e0pakhkow_j Lusi/ou)
or anyone else (h1 tinoj a1llou), try to remember and tell me (peirw~ le/gein a0namimnh|sko/menoj).
Phaedrus: If it depended on trying (E#neka me\n pei/raj),
I would (e1xoim’ a1n); but as things
are I’m just not in a position to help (a0ll’ ou1ti nu=n g’ ou3twj e1xw).
Socrates: Then would you like me to
say something (Bou/lei ou]n
e0gw& tin’ ei1pw lo/gon) I’ve heard from some of those who make these
things their business (o4n tw~n peri\ tau=ta/
tinwn a0kh/koa;)?
Phaedrus: Of course (Ti/ mh/n;).
Socrates: The saying goes (Le/getai gou=n),
Phaedrus (w} Fai=dre), that it’s right (di/kaion ei]nai)
to give the wolf’s side of the case as well (kai\
to\ tou= lu/kou ei0pei=n).
Phaedrus: Then you do just that (Kai\ su/ ge ou3tw poi/ei).
Socrates: Well then, they say (Fasi\ toi/nun)
that there is no need to treat these things so portentously (ou0de\n ou3tw tau=ta dei=n semnu/nein), or carry them back to general principles (ou0d’
a0na/gein a1nw), going the long way round (makra\n periba/llome/nouj);
for it’s just what we said at the very beginning of this discussion (panta/pasi ga/r, o4 kai\ kat’ a0rxa\j ei1pomen tou=de tou= lo/gou) – that the man who is going to be competent at
rhetoric need have nothing to do with the truth about just or good things, or
indeed about people who are such by nature or upbringing (o3ti ou0de\n a0lhqei/aj mete/xein de/oi dikai/wn h2 a0gaqw~n
pe/ri pragma/twn, h2 kai\ a0nqrw&pwn ge toiou/twn fu/sei o1ntwn h2 trofh=|,
to\n me/llonta i9kanw~j r9htoriko\n e1sesqai).
For they say that in the law-courts no one cares in the slightest for the truth
about these things (to\ para/pan ga\r
ou0de\n e0n toi=j dikasthri/oij tou/twn a0lhqei/aj me/lein ou0deni/), but only for what is convincing (a0lla\ tou= piqanou=);
and this is (tou=to d’ ei]nai) what is
probable (to\ ei0ko/j),
which is what the man who is going to speak scientifically must pay attention
to (w{| dei= prose1xein to\n me/llonta te/xnh|
e0rei=n). For they go on to say that
sometimes one should not even say what was actually done (ou0de\ ga\r au] ta\ pra\xqe/nta dei=n le/gein e0ni/ote), if it is improbable (e0a\n mh\ ei0ko/twj h]| pepragme/na), but rather what is probable (a0lla\ ta\ ei0ko/ta),
both when accusing (e1n te kathgori/a|) and when defending (kai\ a0pologi/a|),
and whatever one’s purpose when speaking, the probable is what must be pursued
(kai\ pa/ntwj le/gonta to\ dh\ ei0ko\j
diwkte/on ei]nai), which means
frequently saying goodbye to the truth (polla\
ei0po/nta xai/rein tw~| a0lhqei=);
when this happens throughout one’s speech (tou=to
ga\r dia\ panto\j tou= lo/gou gigno/menon),
it gives us the entire science (th\n
a3pasan te/xnhn pori/zein).
Phaedrus: You have stated just what
those who profess to be experts in speaking say (Au0ta\
ge, w} Sw&kratej, dielh/luqaj a4 le/gousin oi9 peri\ tou\j lo/gouj texnikoi\
prospoiou/menoi ei]nai); for I
remember, now you say it (a0nemnh/sqhn ga/r), that we did touch briefly on this sort of
thing before (o3ti e0n tw~| pro/sqen braxe/wj
tou= toiou/tou e0fhya/meqa), and it
seems something of great importance (dokei=
de\ tou=to pa/mmega ei]nai) to those
concerned with these things (toi=j peri\
tau=ta).
Socrates: But you’ve gone over the man
Tisias himself carefully (A0lla\ mh\n
to/n ge Teisi/an au0to\n pepa/thkaj a0kribw~j);
so let Tisias say us this too (ei0pe/tw toi/nun
kai\ to/de h9mi=n o9 Teisi/aj): he says,
doesn’t he, that the probable is just what most people think to be the case (mh/ ti a1llo le/gei to\ ei0ko\j h2 to\ tw~| plh/qei dokou=n)?
Phaedrus: Just that (Ti/ ga\r a1llo;).
Socrates: I suppose it was on making
just this clever, and scientific, discovery (Tou=to
dh/, w(j e1oike, sofo\n eu9rw_n a3ma kai\ texniko\n) that he wrote to the effect (e1grayen) that (w(j) if a weak but
brave man beats up a strong coward (e0a\n
tij a0sqenh\j kai\ a0ndriko\j i0sxuro\n kai\ deilo\n sugko/yaj) and steals his cloak or something else of his
(i9ma/tion h1 ti a1llo a0felo/menoj), and is taken in court for it (ei0j dikasth/rion a1ghtai),
then neither party should speak the truth (dei=
dh\ ta0lhqe\j mhde/teron le/gein);
the coward should say that he wasn’t beaten up by the brave man single-handed (a0lla\ to\n me\n deilo\n mh\ u9po\ mo/nou fa/nai tou=
a0ndrikou= sugkeko/fqai), while the other
man should establish that they were on their own together (to\n de\ tou=to me\n e0le/gxein w(j mo/nw h1sthn), and should resort to the well-known
argument (e0kei/nw| de\ kataxrh/sasqai
tw~|), ‘how could a man like me have
assaulted a man like him (Pw~j d’ a2n e0gw_ toio/sde toiw~|de e0pexei/rhsa;)?’ The coward will certainly not admit his
cowardice (o9 d’ ou0k e0rei= dh\ th\n e9autou= ka/khn), but will try to invent some other lie (a0lla/ ti a1llo yeu/desqai e0pixeirw~n) and so perhaps offer an opening for his
opponent to refute him (ta/x’ a2n e1legxo/n ph| paradoi/h tw~| a0ntidi/kw|). And in all other cases too (kai\ peri\ ta]lla dh/)
the way to speak ‘scientifically’ will be something like this (toiau=t’ a1tta e0sti\ ta\ te/xnh| lego/mena). True (ou0
ga/r), Phaedrus (w} Fai=dre;)?
Phaedrus: Of course (Ti/ mh/n;).
Socrates: Hey (Feu=)! How cleverly
hidden a science Tisias seems to have discovered (deinw~j g’
e1oiken a0pokekrumme/nhn te/xnhn a0neurei=n o9 Teisi/aj), or someone else (h2 a1lloj), whoever
he may happen to be (o3stij dh/ pot’ w@n tugxa/nei),
and wherever he rejoices to be named from (kai\
o9po/qen xai/rei o0nomazo/menoj). Still (a0ta/r), my friend (w} e9tai=re), should we
or should we not say to him (tou/tw|
h9mei=j po/teron le/gwmen h2 mh/)
–
Phaedrus: What (To\ poi=on;)?
Socrates: This (O#ti): ‘Tisias (w} Teisi/a), we have
for some time (pa/lai h9mei=j) been saying, before you came along (pri\n kai\ se\ parelqei=n, tugxa/nomen le/gontej), that this “probability” (w(j a1ra tou=to to\ ei0ko/j)
comes about in the minds of ordinary people because of a resemblance to the
truth (toi=j polloi=j di’ o9moio/thta tou= a0lhqou=j tugxa/nei e0ggigno/menon); and we showed only a few moments ago that
in every case it is the man who knows the truth who knows best how to discover
these resemblances (ta\j de\
o9moio/thtaj a1rti dih/lqomen o3ti pantaxou= o9 th\n a0lh/qeian ei0dw_j
ka/llista e0pi/statai eu9ri/skein).
So if you have anything else to say on the subject of a science of speaking (w#st’
ei0 me\n a1llo ti peri\ te\xnhj lo/gwn le/geij),
we’ll gladly hear it (a0kou/oimen a1n); if not (ei0
de\ mh/), we’ll believe what we showed just
now (oi[j nundh\ dih/lqomen peiso/meqa), that unless someone counts up the various
natures of those who are going to listen to him (w(j
e0a\n mh/ tij tw~n te a0kousome/nwn ta\j fu/seij diariqmh/shtai), and is capable of dividing up the things that
are according to their forms (kai\ kat’ ei1dh te diairei=sqai ta\ o1nta) and embrace each thing one by one under one
kind (kai\ mia|= i0de/a| du/natoj h=| kaq’ e4n e3kaston perilamba/nein),
he will never be an expert in the science of speaking to the degree possible
for mankind (ou1 pot’ e1stai texniko\j lo/gwn pe/ri kaq’ o3son dunato\n a0nqrw&pw).
This ability he will never acquire without a great deal of diligent study (tau=ta de\ ou0 mh/ pote kth/shtai a1neu pollh=j pragmatei/aj), which the sensible man ought to work
through not for the purpose of speaking and acting in relation to men (h4n oux e3neka tou= le/gein kai\ pra/ttein pro\j
a0nqrw&pouj dei= diaponei=n to\n sw&frona),
but in order to be able both to say what is gratifying to the gods, and to act
in everything, as far as he can, in a way which is gratifying to them (a0lla\ tou= qeoi=j kexarisme/na me\n le/gein du/nasqai, kexarisme/nwj
de\ pra/ttein to pa=n ei0j du/namin).
For you see (ou0 ga\r dh\ a1ra), Tisias (w}
Teisi/a), - so say wiser men than us (fasi\n oi9 sofw&teroi h9mw~n) – the man who is in his right mind should
not practice at the gratification of his fellow-slaves (o9modou/loij dei= xari/zesqai meleta=n to\n nou=n e1xonta), except as a secondary consideration (o3ti mh\ pa/rergon),
but rather at that of good and noble masters (a0lla\
despo/taij a0gaqoi=j te kai\ e0c a0gaqw~n).
So if the way round is a long one (w#st’ ei0 makra\ h9 peri/odoj),
don’t be surprised (mh\ qauma/sh|j); for it is for the sake of great things that
the journey is to be made (mega/lwn ga\r e3neka
periite/on), not for those you have in mind (ou0x w(j su\ dokei=j).
Yet these too, as our argument asserts (e1stai
mh/n, w(j o9 lo/goj fhsi/n), if that
is what one wants, will best come about as a result of the others, if one so wishes
(e0a/n tij e0qe/lh|, kai\ tau=ta
ka/llista e0c e0kei/nwn gigno/mena).’
Phaedrus: I think that what you say is
very fine (Pagka/lwj e1moige dokei= le/gesqai), Socrates (w}
Sw&kratej), if only one had the capacity for it
(ei1per oi[o/j te/ tij ei1h).
Socrates: But for a man who even
attempts what is fine (A0lla\ kai\
e0pixeirou=nti/ toi=j a0gaqoi=j), it will
be fine too to endure (kalo\n kai\
pa/sxein) whatever turns out for him (o3ti a1n tw| sumbh=| paqei=n).
Phaedrus: Indeed (Kai\ ma/la).
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