Socrates on collections and divisions

Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions and collections (Tou/twn dh\ e1gwge au0to\j te e0rasth/j, w} Fai=dre, tw~n diaire/sewn kai\ sunagwgw~n), so that I may be able both to speak and think (i3na oi[o/j te w} le/gein te kai\ fronei=n); and if I think anyone else has the natural capacity to look to one and to many (e0a/n te/ tin’ a1llon h9gh/swmai dunato\n ei0j e4n kai\ e0pi\ polla\ pefuko/q’ o9ra=n), I pursue him (tou=ton diw&kw) ‘in his footsteps, behind him (katopi/sqe met’ i1xnion), as if he were a god (w#ste qeoi=o)’.

***

On the margin of my Oxford edition of Plato I wrote a note: ‘Th(ompson). the nearest is Hom. Od. 193 o9 d’ e1peita met’ i1xnia bai=ne qeoi=o.’ It is a sloppy note of mine; I did not write the book number. Hoping that the quotation is from the first book, I looked there, and was disappointed. So I just hoped that I noted correctly the No 193. I looked at ii. 193; no luck. I looked at iii. 193, iv. 193, no luck. Finally, at v. 193 I found it. Let me give the context, in which the quotation stands in the Odyssey. Book v. opens with a council of gods at Olympus. Athena complains that no one is caring about Odysseus, imprisoned in the house of the Nymph Kalypso. Kalypso holds him as her reluctant lover. Zeus rebukes Athena; how could she think that he forgot Odysseus. He sends Hermes to Kalypso ordering her to let Odysseus build a raft, on which he is to sail to the island of Phaeacians, who will treat him like a god, and with great treasures bring him home. When Kalypso tells Odysseus that he is to build a raft on which he is to leave her island, Odysseus thinks she wants to revenge herself on him for his being a very reluctant lover to her, but in the end she persuades him that it’s to be done on Zeus’ order, and that it is all to end well. In line 190-191 Kalypso says “ou0de/ moi au0th=| qumo\j e0ni\ sthqe/ssi sidh/reoj ((‘the spirit in my breast is not of steel), a0ll e0leh/mwn (it is moved by pity)”. In the next two lines, 192-3, Homer says W4j a1ra fwnh/sas’ (with these words) h9gh/sato di=a qea/wn karpali/mwj (the goddess quickly led the way): o9 d’ e1peita met’ i1xnia bai=ne qeoi=o (and he then walked in the footsteps of the goddess).

The question is, whom is Plato talking about, who, like Socrates, is by nature (pefuko/q’) able to look to one and to many, whom he pursues in his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a god. The only sophist we might think of is Prodicos. To disabuse us of this thought, Socrates promptly mentions him. The context is indicative; Socrates and Phaedrus are discussing the books on rhetoric, which do not deserve to be viewed as scientific, as will be shown throughout the discussion. Socrates: ‘And shall we leave Tisias and Gorgias to their sleep (Teisi/an de\ Gorgi/an te e0a/somen eu3dein) … who discovered conciseness of speech and of infinite length on every subject (oi4 suntomi/an te lo/gwn kai\ a1peira mh/kh peri\ pa/ntwn a0neu=ron)? When once Prodicus heard me saying this (tau=ta de\ a0kou/wn pote/ mou Pro/dikoj), he laughed (e0ge/lasen), and said that he alone had discovered what kind of speeches are needed (kai\ mo/noj au0to\j e9urhke/nai e1fh w{n dei= lo/gwn te/xnhn): what are needed are neither long speeches (dei=n de\ ou1te makrw~n) nor short ones (ou1te braxe/wn), but ones of a fitting length (a0lla\ metri/wn).’

Socrates is pointing at Plato.

***

Socrates continues: And furthermore (kai\ me/ntoi), those who can do this (kai\ tou\j duname/nouj au0to\ dra=n) – whether I give them the right name or not (ei0 me\n o0rqw~j h2 mh\ prosagoreu/w), god knows (qeo\j oi]de), but at any rate up till now I have called them experts in dialectic (kalw~ de\ ou]n me/xri tou=de dialektikou/j). But now tell me what we should have to call them if we learned from you and Lysias (ta\ de\ nu=n para\ sou= te kai\ Lusi/ou maqo/nta ei0pe\ ti/ xrh= kalei=n); or is this that very thing, the science of speaking (h2 tou=to e0kei=no/ e0stin h9 lo/gwn te/xnh), by means of which (h[|) Thrasymachus and the rest have become clever at speaking themselves (Qrasu/maxo/j te kai\ oi9 a1lloi xrw&menoi sofoi\ me\n au0toi\ le/gein gago/nasin), and make others the same (a1llouj te poiou=sin), if they are willing to give them gifts as if they were kings (oi4 a2n dwroforei=n au0toi=j w(j basileu=sin e0qe/lwsin)?

Phaedrus: They are kingly enough (Basilikoi\ me\n a[ndrej), but they certainly do not possess knowledge of the things you ask about (ou0 me\n dh\ e0pisth/mone/j ge w{n e0rwta=|j). But you seem to me to call this kind of thing by the right name (a0lla\ tou=to me\n to\ ei]doj o0rqw~j e1moige dokei=j kalei=n), when you call it dialectical (dialektiko\n kalw~n); the rhetorical kind seems to me still to elude us (to\ de\ r9htoriko\n dokei= moi diafeu/gein e1q’ h9ma=j).

Socrates: What do you mean (Pw~j fh/|j;)? Could there be anything fine, anywhere (kalo/n pou/ ti a2n ei1h), which is divorced from these things (o4 tou/twn a0poleifqe/n) and is nonetheless grasped in a scientific way (o3mwj te/xnh| lamba/netai;)? We must certainly not treat it without proper respect (pa/ntwj d’ ou0k a0timaste/on au0to/), you and I (soi/ te kai\ e0moi/), and we must say just what that part of rhetoric is which is being left out (lekte/on de\ ti/ me/ntoi kai\ e1sti to\ leipo/menon th=j r9htorikh=j).

Phaedrus: there are a great many things left, I think (Kai\ ma/la pou suxna/), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej): the things in the books (ta/ g’ e0n toi=j bibli/oij) which have been written on the science of speaking (toi=j peri\ lo/gwn te/xnhj gegramme/noij).

Socrates: A timely reminder (Kai\ kalw~j ge u9pe/mnhsaj). First of all, I think, there’s the point that a ‘preamble’ must begiven at the beginning of a speech (prooi/mion me\n oi]mai prw~ton w(j dei= tou= lo/gou lege/sqai e0n a0rxh=|); these are the things you mean (tau=ta le/geij), aren’t they (h2 ga/r;) – the refinements of the science (ta\ komya\ th=j te/xnhj;)?

Phaedrus: Yes (Nai/).
Socrates: In second place (Deu/teron de\ dh/) there is to be something called ‘an exposition’ (dih/ghsi/n tina), with ‘testimonies’ hard on its heels (marturi/aj t’ e0p’ au0th=|); thirdly ‘proofs’ (tri/ton tekmh/ria), fourthly probabilities (te/tarton ei0ko/ta); and I think ‘confirmation’ (kai\ pi/stwsin oi]mai) and ‘further confirmation’ (kai\ e0pipi/stwsin) are mentioned (le/gein) at least by that excellent Byzantine artist in speeches (to/n ge be/ltiston logodai/dalon Buza/ntion a1ndra).

Phaedrus: You mean the worthy Theodorus 

(To\n xrhsto\n le/geij Qeo/dwron;)?

Socrates: Of course (Ti/ mh/n;); and he tells us we must put in a ‘refutation’ and ‘further refutation’ (kai\ e1legxo/n ge kai\ e0pece/legxon w(j poihte/on) both when prosecuting (e0n kathgori/a| te) and when defending (kai\ a0pologi/a|). And must we not give recognition to that most admirable Parian, Evenus (to\n de\ ka/lliston Pa/rion Eu0hno\n e0j me/son ou0k a1gomen), for being the first to discover ‘covert allusion’ (o4j u9podh/lwsi/n te prw~toj hu[ren) and ‘indirect praise’ (kai\ parepai/nouj)? Some say also that he utters ‘indirect censures’ in verse (oi9 d’ au0to\n kai\ parayo/gouj fasi\n e0n me/trw| le/gein) as an aide to memory (mnh/mhj xa/rin); he’s a clever one (sofo\j ga\r a9nh/r). And shall we leave Tisias and Gorgias to their sleep (Tisi/an de\ Gorgi/an te e0a/somen eu3dein), when they saw that probabilities were to be given precedence over truths (oi9 pro\ tw~n a0lhqw~n ta\ ei0ko/ta ei]don w(j timhte/a ma=llon), and when they make small things appear large and large things small (ta\ te au] smikra\ mega/la  kai\ ta\ mega/la smikra\ fai/nesqai poiou=sin) by the power of speech (dia\ r9w&mhn lo/gou), and put new things in an old way (kaina/ te a0rxai/wj) and things of the opposite sort in a new way (ta/ t’ e0nanti/a kainw~j), and discovered conciseness of speech and infinite length on every subject (suntomi/an te lo/gwn kai\ a1peira mh/kh peri\ pa/ntwn a0neu=ron;)? When once Prodicus heard me saying this (tau=ta de\ a0kou/wn mou Pro/dikoj), he laughed (e0ge/lasen), and said that he alone had discovered what kind of speeches are needed (kai\ mo/noj au0to\j hu9rhke/nai e1fh w{n dei= lo/gwn te\xnhn): what are needed are neither long speeches (dei=n de\ ou1te makrw~n) nor short ones (ou1te braxe/wn), but ones of a fitting length (a0lla\ metri/wn).

            Phaedrus: Masterly (Sofw&tata/ ge), Prodicus (w} Pro/dike).

Socrates: And must we not mention Hippias (I!ppi/an de\ ou0 le/gomen;)? I think our friend from Elis would cast his vote with Prodicus (oi]mai ga\r a2n su/myhfon au9tw|~ kai\ to\n H)lei=on ce/non gene/sqai).

            Phaedrus: Certainly (Ti/ d’ ou1;).

Socrates: And how then are we to tell of what Polus has enshrined (Ta\ de\ Pw&lou pw~j fra/swmwn au] mousei=a lo/gwn) – ‘terms like speaking with reduplication’ (w(j diplasiologi/an) and ‘speaking with maxims’ (kai\ gnwmologi/an) and ‘speaking with images’ (kai\ ei0konologi/an) – and the names Licymnius gave as a present to him for the production of fine diction (o0noma/twn te Likumni/wn a4 e0kei&nw| e0dwrh/sato pro\j poi/hsin eu0epei/aj;)?

Phaedrus: But weren’t there some such things of Protagoras (Prwtago/reia de/, w} Sw&kratej, ou0k h]n me/ntoi toiau=t’ a1tta;)?

Socrates: Yes, my boy, there was a ‘correctness of diction (O0rqoe/peia/ ge/ tij, w} pai=), and many other fine things (kai\ a1lla polla\ kai\ kala/). Then again, the scientific mastery of wailing speeches dragged out in connection with old age and poverty (tw~n ge mh\n oi0trogo/wn e0pi\ gh/raj kai\ peni/an e9lkome/nwn lo/gwn) seems to me to belong to the might of the Chalcedonian (Thrasymachus of Chalcedon) (kekrathke/nai te/xnh| moi fai/netai to\ tou= Xalkedoni/ou sqe/noj), and the man has also become clever at rousing anger in large numbers of people all at once (o0rgi/sai te au] pollou\j a3ma deino\j a9nh\r ge/gonen), and again (kai\ pa/lin), when once they are angry (w)rgisme/noij), at charming them with incantations (e0pa=|dwn khlei=n), as he put it (w(j e1fh); and at both devising an refuting calumnies, from whatever source (diaba/llein te kai\ a0polu/sasqai diabola/j), he is unbeatable (o9qendh\ kra/tistoj). As for the ending of speeches, everyone seems to be in complete agreement (to\ de\ dh\ te/loj tw~n lo/gwn koinh=| pa=sin e1oike sundedogme/non ei]nai); some call it ‘recapitulation’ (w{| tinej me\n e0pa/nodon), while others call it by other names (a1lloi d’ a1llo ti/qentai o1noma).

Phaedrus: You mean summarising the points at the end, and so reminding the audience of what has been said (To\ d’ e0n kefalai/w| e3kasta le/geij u9pomnh=sai e0pi\ teleuth=j tou\j a0kou/ontaj peri\ tw~n ei0rhme/nwn;)?

Socrates: That’s what I mean (Tau=ta le/gw) – and anything else you can add on the subject of speaking scientifically (kai\ ei1 ti su\ a1llo e1xeij ei0pei=n lo/gwn te/xnhj pe/ri).

Phaedrus: Only small things (Smikra/ ge) and not worth mentioning (kai\ ou0k a1cia le/gein).