Socrates: And what about the matter of its being fine or shameful to give speeches and write them (Ti/ d’ au] peri\ tou= kalo\n h2 ai0sxro\n ei]nai to\ lo/gouj le/gein te kai\ gra/fein), and the circumstances under which it would rightly be called a disgrace or not (kai\ o3ph| gigno/menon e0n di/kh| a2n le/goito o1neidoj h2 mh//)? Hasn’t what we said a little earlier shown (a]ra ou0 dedh/lwken ta\ lexqe/nta o0li/gon e1mprosqen) –
Phaedrus: What are you referring to (Ta\ poi=a;)?
Socrates: Hasn’t it shown that whether
Lysias or someone else ever wrote or writes in the future either for private
purposes, or publicly (W(j ei1te Lusi/aj h1 tij a1lloj pw&pote e1grayen h2
gra/yei i0di/a| h2 dhmosi/a|), in the
course of proposing laws (no/mouj tiqei/j),
so writing a political composition (su/ggramma politiko\n gra/fwn), and thinks there is any great certainty or
clarity in it (kai\ mega/lhn tina\ e0n au0tw~| bebaio/thta h9gou/menoj
kai\ safh/neian), then it is a
reproach to its writer (ou3tw me\n o1neidoj tw~| grafo/nti) whether anyone says so (ei1te ti/j fhsin) or not (ei1te mh/);
for to be ignorant (to\ ga\r a0gnoei=n),
whether awake or asleep, (u3par te kai\ o1nar)
about what is just and unjust and bad and good (dikai/wn kai\ a0di/kwn pe/ri kai\
kakw~n kai\ a0gaqw~n) cannot truly
escape being a matter of reproach (ou0k e0kfeu/gei th=| a0lhqei/a| mh\ ou0k
e0ponei/diston ei]nai), even if the
whole mass of people applauds it (ou0de\ a2n o9 pa=j o1xloj au0to\
e0paine/sh|).
Phaedrus: No indeed (Ou0 ga\r ou]n).
Socrates:
But the man who thinks that there is necessarily much that is merely for
amusement in a written speech on any subject (O( de/ ge e0n me\n tw~|
gegramme/nw| lo/gw| peri\ e9ka/stou paidia/n te h9gou/menoj pollh\n a0nagkai=on
ei]nai), and that none has ever yet been
written, whether in verse or in prose, which is worth much serious attention –
or indeed spoken (kai\ ou0de/na pw&pote lo/gon e0n me/trw| ou0d’ a1neu me/trou
mega/lhj a1cion spoudh=j grafh=nai ou0de\ lexqh=nai), in the way that rhapsodes produce theirs,
to produce conviction without questioning or teaching (w(j oi9 r9ayw|dou/menoi
a1neu a9nakri/sewj kai\ didaxh=j peiqou=j e3neka e/le/xqhsan), but that the best of them have really been
a way of reminding people who know (a0lla\ tw~| o1nti au0tw~n tou\j
belti/stouj ei0do/twn u9po/mnhsin gegone/nai);
who thinks that clearness and completeness and seriousness exist only in those
things that are taught about what is just and fine and good, and are said for
the purpose of someone’s learning from them, and genuinely written in the soul
(e0n
de\ toi=j didaskome/noij kai\ maqh/sewj xa/rin legome/noij kai\ tw~| o1nti
grafome/noij e0n yuxh=| peri\ dikai/wn te kai\ kalw~n kai\ a0gaqw~n mo/noij
h9gou/menoj to/ te e0narge\j ei]nai kai\ te/leon kai\ a1cion spoudh=j); who thinks that the speeches of that kind
should be said to be as it were his legitimate sons (dei=n de\ tou\j
toiou/touj lo/gouj au9tou= le/gesqai oi[on u9ei=j gnhsi/ouj ei]nai), first of all the one written in him (prw~ton me\n to\n
e0n au9tw~|), if it is found there (e0a\n eu9reqei\j
e0nh=|), and in second place any offsprings
and brothers of this one which have sprung out simultaneously, as they should,
in other souls, in other men (e1peita ei1 tinej tou/tou e1kgonoi/ te kai\ a0delfoi\
a3ma e0n a1llaisin a1llwn yuxai=j kat’ a0ci/an
e0ne/fusan) ; and who says goodbye to the other
kinds (tou\j
de a1llouj xai/rein e0w~n) – this is
likely to be the sort man, Phaedrus (ou[toj de\ o9 toiou=toj a0nh\r
kinduneu/ei, w} Fai=dre, ei]nai), that you
and I would pray that we both might come to be (oi[on e0gw& te kai\ su\
eu0cai/meq a2n se/ te kai\ e0me\ gene/sqai).
Phaedrus: Quite definitely (Panta/pasi me\n
ou]n) I wish and pray for what you say (e1gwge boulomai/
te kai\ eu1xomai a4 le/geij).
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