Plato’s birth in 434 B.C. – the Charmides

Born in 434 B.C., Plato was about 30, or almost 30, in 404 B.C., when the democracy was overthrown by the aristocrats, who at once (euthus) asked him to join them as something to which he had a claim (hȏs epi prosȇkonta pragmata). Because of his youth (hupo neotȇtos) he thought (ȏiȇthȇn) that they would (gar autous) manage the State so as to bring men out of a bad way of life into a good one (ek tinos adikou biou epi dikaion tropon agontas dioikȇsein dȇ tȇn polin), and so he gave his mind to them very diligently (hȏste autois sphodra proseichon ton noun), to see what they would do (ti praxoien). And seeing (kai horȏn), as he did (dȇpou), that these men (tous andras) in quite a short time (en chronȏi oligȏi) made seem (apodeixantas) the previous constitution [i.e. the democracy] (tȇn emprosthen politeian) something precious as gold (chruson), he became indignant (eduscherana te) and withdrew himself (kai emauton epanȇgagon) from the evils of those days (apo tȏn tote kakȏn). (Plato, Seventh Letter 324d-325a)

Plato’s kai emauton epanȇgagon apo, translated ‘and withdrew myself from’, actually says ‘I rose myself (ȇgagon) to (epi) up (ana) from (apo)’; it thus points to the region above the heavens (ton huperouranion topon) of the Phaedran Palinode, i.e. to the region of the Platonic Forms, the region of the truth (to alȇthes, alȇtheia), of being which really is (ousia ontȏs ousa), which is without colour (achrȏmatos) or shape (aschȇmatistos), intangible (anaphȇs), observable only by intellect (monȏi theatȇ nȏi) (Phaedrus 247c3-8). In the Seventh Letter Plato gives us the actual circumstance that led to his rising up from the evils of those days: The Thirty ‘tried to send Socrates (epempon Sȏkratȇ), along with others (meth’ heterȏn), after one of the citizens (epi tina tȏn politȏn), to fetch him by force (biai axonta) that he might be put to death (hȏs apothanoumenon); he, however did not obey (ho d’ ouk epeitheto) and risked the utmost penalties (pan de parekinduneusen pathein) rather than be a partaker in their unholy deeds (prin anosiȏn autois ergȏn genesthai koinȏnos)’. This brings us to the Charmides, which Plato must have written before the Thirty gave Socrates this order, the order which he did not obey.

What leads me to this dating of the Charmides?

The Charmides is devoted to the discussion of sȏphrosunȇ, which, as Liddell & Scott’s Greek-English informs us, is rendered as ‘soundness of mind’, ‘prudence’, ‘discretion’, ‘sanity in opposition to mania’, ‘self-control’, but which in the Charmides is discussed as an all-embracing intellectual virtue, as wisdom. The framework within which it is discussed is practical: Charmides, a youngster in his early teens, has morning headaches, and his uncle Critias introduces him to Socrates – who has returned to Athens after taking part in the siege of Potidaea for three years – as a physician who has a cure.

The dialogue is narrated by Socrates:

“‘And what is it?’ Charmides said (Ti oun, ȇ d’ hos, estin;). I replied (Kai egȏ eipon) that it was a kind of leaf (hoti auto men eiȇ phullon ti), which required to be accompanied by a charm (epȏidȇ de tis epi tȏi pharmakȏi eiȇ), and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used the cure (hȇn ei men tis epaidoi hama kai chrȏito autȏi), he would be made whole (pantapasin hugia poioi to pharmakon); but that without the charm (aneu de tȇs epȏidȇs) the leaf would be of no avail (ouden ophelos eiȇ tou phullou).” (155e; in quoting from the Charmides I use Jowett’s translation.)

Socrates went on to say that he acquired both the leaf and the charm from a Thracian physician ‘who declared that all good and evil originates in the soul, and overflows from thence to the body and to the whole man (panta gar ephȇ ek tȇs psuchȇs hȏrmȇsthai kai ta kaka kai ta agatha tȏi sȏmati kai panti tȏi anthrȏpȏi), as if from the head into the eyes (hȏsper ek tȇs kephalȇs epi ta ommata). And, therefore, one must (dein oun) cure first and foremost the soul (ekeino kai prȏton kai malista therapeuein), if the head and the body are to be well (ei mellei kai ta tȇs kephalȇs kai ta tou allou sȏmatos kalȏs echein). And the soul is cured (therapeuesthai de tȇn psuchȇn), he said (ephȇ), by certain charms (epȏidais tisin), and these charms are fair words (tas d’ epȏidas tautas tous logous einai tous kalous) by which temperance is implanted in the souls (ek de tȏn toioutȏn logȏn en tais psuchais sȏphrosunȇn engignesthai). When this is implanted (hȇs engenomenȇs), and present (kai parousȇs), the health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole body (raidion ȇdȇ einai tȇn hugieian kai tȇi kaphalȇi kai tȏi allȏi sȏmati porizein).” (156e6-157b1).

Critias, when he heard me saying this (Akousas oun mou ho Kritias taut’ eipontos), said (ephȇ): ‘And I can tell you (legȏ mentoi soi), that Charmides is not only preeminent in beauty among his equals (hoti Charmidȇs tȏn hȇlikiȏtȏn ou monon tȇi ideai dokei diapherein), but also in that quality (alla kai autȏi toutȏi) for which, as you say, you have the charm (hou su phȇis tȇn epȏidȇn echein); and this, as you say, is temperance (phȇis de sȏphrosunȇs)?’ ‘Yes (Panu ge),’ I said (ȇn d’ egȏ). ‘Then let me tell you (Eu toinun isthi) that he is the most temperate of human beings (hoti panu polu dokei sȏphronestatos einai tȏn nuni), and for his age inferior to none in any quality (kai t’alla panta, eis hoson hȇlikian echei, oudenos cheirȏn ȏn).’ (157c-d).

After thus narrating what Critias said in high praise about Charmides, Socrates went on to enlarge on Critias’ eulogy by eulogising Charmides’ progeny: ‘Yes’, I said, ‘Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel (Kai gar, ȇn d’ egȏ, kai dikaion ȏ Charmidȇ, diapherein se) others in all good qualities (tȏn allȏn pasin tois toioutois); for if I am not mistaken (ou gar oimai) there is no one present (allon oudena tȏn enthade) who could easily point out (raidiȏs an echein epideixai) two Athenian houses, whose union (poiai duo oikiai sunelthousai eis t’auton tȏn Athȇnesin) would be likely (ek tȏn eikotȏn) to produce a better or nobler scion (kalliȏ an kai ameinȏ gennȇseian) than the two from which you are sprung (ȇ ex hȏn su gegonas). There is your father’s house (hȇ te gar patrȏia humin oikia), which is descended from Critias the son of Dropidas (hȇ Kritiou tou Dropidou), whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrical verses of Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets (kai hupo Anakreontos kai hupo Solȏnos kai hup’ allȏn pollȏn poiȇtȏn enkekȏmiasmenȇ paradedotai hȇmin), as famous for beauty (hȏs diapherousa kallei te) and virtue (kai aretȇi) and all other high fortune (kai tȇi allȇi legomenȇi eudaimoniai): and your mother’s house is equally distinguished (kai au hȇ pros mȇtros hȏsautȏs) … Having such ancestors, you ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son of Glaucon, your outward form is no dishonour to any of them (ta men oun horȏmena tȇs ideas, ȏ phile pai Glaukȏnos, dokeis moi oudena tȏn pro sou en oudeni hupobebȇkenai) If to beauty you add temperance (ei de dȇ kai pros sȏphrosunȇn), and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to be (kai pros t’alla kata ton toude logon hikanȏs pephukas) … And here lies the point (echei d’oun houtȏs); for if, as he declares, you have the gift of temperance already (ei men soi ȇdȇ parestin, hȏs legei Kritias hode sȏphrosunȇ), and are temperate enough (kai ei sȏphrȏn hikanȏs), in that case you have no need of any charms (ouden eti soi edei epȏidȏn), and I may as well let you have the cure of the head at once (all’ auto soi an ȇdȇ doteon eiȇ to tȇs kephalȇs pharmakon); but if you have not yet acquired this quality (ei d’eti toutȏn epideȇs einai dokeis), I must use the charm (epaisteon) before I give you the medicine (pro tȇs tou pharmakou doseȏs). Please, therefore, to inform me (autos oun moi eipe) whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying (poteron homologeis tȏide kai phȇis); – have you or have you not this quality of temperance (hikanȏs ȇdȇ sȏphrosunȇs metechein ȇ endeȇs einai)?’

Charmides blushed (Aneruthriasas oun ho Charmides), and the blush heightened his beauty (prȏton men eti kalliȏn ephanȇ), for modesty is becoming in youth (kai gar to aischuntȇlon autou tȇi hȇlikiai eprepen); he then said very ingeniously (epeita ouk agennȏs apekrinato), that he really could not at once answer, either yes (hoti ou raidion eiȇ en tȏi paronti outh’ homologein), or no, to the question which I had asked (oute exarnȏi einai ta erȏtȏmena): ‘For if (ean men gar)’ said he (ȇ d’ hos), ‘I affirm that I am not temperate (mȇ phȏ einai sȏphrȏn), that would be a strange thing for me to say of myself (hama gar atopon auton kath’ heautou toiauta legein), and also I should give a lie to Critias (hama gar Kritian tonde pseudȇ epideixȏ), and many others (kai allous pollous) who think that I am temperate (hois dokȏ einai sȏphrȏn), as he tells you (hȏs ho toutou logos): but, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself (ean d’ au phȏ kai emauton epainȏ), which would be ill manners (isȏs epachthes phaneitai); and therefore I do not know (hȏste ouk echȏ) how to answer you (hoti soi apokrinȏmai).’

I said to him (Kai egȏ eipon hoti): ‘That is a natural reply (moi eikota phainȇi legein), Charmides (ȏ Charmidȇ), and I think (kai moi dokei)’ I said (ȇn d’ egȏ), ‘that you and I ought together to enquire (koinȇi an eiȇ skepteon) whether you have this quality about which I am asking or not (eite kektȇsai eite mȇ ho punthanomai); and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not like (hina mȇte su anankazȇi legein ha mȇ boulei); neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine (mȇt’ au egȏ askeptȏs epi tȇn iatrikȇn trepȏmai): therefore, if you please (ei oun soi philon), I will share the enquiry with you (ethelȏ skopein meta sou), but I will not press you if you would rather not (ei de mȇ, ean).’ ‘There is nothing which I would like better (Alla pantȏn malista philon),’ he said (ephȇ); ‘and as far as I am concerned (hȏste toutou ge heneka) you may proceed in the way which you think best (hopȇi autos oiei beltion skepsasthai, tautȇi skopei).’

‘In this way (Tȇide) then (toinun),’ I said (ephȇn egȏ), ‘it seems (dokei) to me (moi), the investigation is the best (beltistȇ einai hȇ skepsis) about (peri) this (autou). For it is clear (dȇlon gar) that (hoti) if temperance abides in you (ei soi parestin sȏphrosunȇ), you have an opinion about her (echeis ti peri autȇs doxazein). Tell me (eipe),’ I said (ȇn d’ egȏ), ‘what (ti) you say (phȇis) is temperance (einai sȏphrosunȇn) in your opinion (kata tȇn sȇn doxan),’

And he (Kai hos) at first (to men prȏton) hesitated (ȏknei te), and was very unwilling to answer (kai ou panu ȇthelen apokrinesthai): then he said (epeita mentoi eipen) that he thought (hoti hoi dokoi) temperance was (sȏphrosunȇ einai) doing things orderly (to kosmiȏs panta prattein) and quietly (kai hȇsuchȇi): in the streets (en te tais hodois) to walk (badizein), and talk (kai dialegesthai), and everything else (kai ta alla panta) thus (hȏsautȏs) to do (poiein). ‘And (kai) it seems to me (moi dokei)’, he said (ephȇ), ‘all in all (sullȇbdȇn), it is a quietness (hȇsuchiotȇs tis einai), what you ask (ho erȏtais).’

‘Are you (Ar’ oun),’ I said (ȇn d’ egȏ), ‘right saying this (eu legeis)?’. ‘For tell me (eipe gar moi), isn’t temperance of the class of the noble and good (ou tȏn kalȏn mentoi hȇ sȏphrosunȇ estin)?’ ‘Very much so (Panu ge)’ ‘But which is best (Poteron oun kalliston) at the wring-master’s (en grammatistou), the same letters (ta homoia grammata) to write (graphein) quickly (tachu) or (ȇ) slowly (hȇsuchȇi)?’ ‘Quickly (Tachu).’ ‘And what (Ti d’), to read (anagignȏskein) quickly (tacheȏs) or (ȇ) slowly (bradeȏs)?’ ‘Quickly (Tacheȏs).’ (159c5) … ‘Then all things (Oukoun panta)’, I said (ȇn egȏ), ‘Charmides (ȏ Charmidȇ), both those (kai ta) that consider the soul (peri tȇn psuchȇn), and those (kai ta) that consider the body (peri to sȏma), those of swiftness (ta tou tachous) and of quickness (kai tȇs oxutȇtos) are clearly more admirable (kalliȏ phainetai) than those of slowness (ȇ ta tȇs bradutȇtos te) and of quietness (kai hȇsuchiotȇtos)?’ ‘Clearly they are (Kinduneuei),’ he said (ephȇ). (160b6)

In his next attempt Charmides defines temperance (sȏphrosunȇ) as modesty (aidȏs, 160e4-5). Socrates asks Charmides whether he still views temperance as something admirable and good, something that makes men good. When Charmides says that he does, Socrates quotes against him Homer: ‘Modesty is not good for a needy man (aidȏs ouk agathȇ kechrȇmenȏi andri pareinai, Odyssea XVII, 347).’

If temperance (sȏphrosunȇ) is always (de ge) good (agathon) since (eiper) she makes good (agathous poiei) those in whom she is present (hois an parȇi), definition of temperance as modesty cannot stand, for modesty is good for some, not good for others, as Socrates argues, and Charmides admits: ‘All that, Socrates, appears to me to be (Alla mȇn houtȏ ge dokei moi echein) as you say (hȏs su legeis, 161a10), but consider this (tode de skepsai), what you think of it (ti soi dokei einai) in relation to temperance (peri sȏphrosunȇs) – for I just now remember (arti gar anemnȇsthȇn) what I have heard from someone (ho ȇdȇ tou ȇkousa legontos), “that temperance is doing one’s own business” (hoti sȏphrosunȇ an eiȇ to ta heautou prattein). Consider then (skopei oun), whether he appears to you to be right who says that (touto ei orthȏs soi dokei legein ho legȏn)?’

And I ‘You monster (O miare),’ I said (ephȇn), ‘You heard this from this here Kritias (Kritiou toude akȇkoas auto), or from another of the wise men (ȇ allou tou tȏn sophȏn). (161b4-c1)

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I shall leave the discussion of temperance, which follows, for my next entry, and turn to the last section of the dialogue, in which Socrates ends his discussion with Critias bewailing his inability to investigate anything worthwhile concerning temperance (hoti oden chrȇston peri sȏphrosunȇs skopȏ, 175a 10-11}, and that, worst of all, after doing their best to obtain a definition of temperance, temperance thus defined appeared to them to be useless (touto hȇmin anȏpheles on apephaine, 175d4-5).

Socrates says: ‘As far as I am concerned (to men oun emon), I lament it less (kai hȇtton aganaktȏ), but concerning you (huper de sou), Charmides (ȏ Charmidȇ), I lament it very much (panu aganaktȏ), if you (ei su), having such beauty (toioutos ȏn tȇn idean) and furthermore (kai pros toutȏi), being most temperate of soul (tȇn psuchȇn sȏphronestatos), should have no profit or good in life from this temperance (mȇden onȇsȇi apo tautȇs tȇs sȏphrosunȇs). And still more I lament (eti de mallon aganaktȏ) about the charm (huper tȇs epȏidȇs) which I learned from the Thracian (hȇn para tou Thraikos emathon), if for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth (ei mȇdenos axiou pragmatos ousan) I was learning it with much effort (autȇn meta pollȇs spoudȇs emanthanon). This then (taut’ oun) I really do not think (panu men ouk oiomai) to be like this (houtȏs echein), but I think that I am a bad enquierer (all’ eme phaulon einai zȇtȇtȇn); for temperance (epei tȇn ge sȏphrosunȇn) is a great good (mega ti agathon einai), and if you have it (kai eiper ge echeis auto), you are a blessed man (makarion einai se). But see (all’ hora) if you have it (ei echeis te) and have no need of the charm (kai mȇden deȇi tȇs epȏidȇs); for if you do (ei gar echeis), I would rather advise you (mallon an egȏge soi sumbouleusaimi) to regard me simply as a fool (eme men lȇron hȇgeisthai einai) who is never able to reason out anything (kai adunaton logȏi hotioun zȇtein); but that you yourself (seauton de), the more wise and temperate you are (hosȏper sȏphronesteros ei), the happier you are (tosoutȏi einai kai eudaimonesteron).’ (175d5-176a5)

Charmides said (kai ho Charmidȇs): ‘But, dear God (Alla ma Di’)’, said he (ȇ d’ hos), I myself (egȏge), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), do not know (ouk oida) whether I have (out’ ei echȏ) or do not have it (out’ ei mȇ echȏ); for how could I know (pȏs gar an eideiȇn), that which even you and Critias are (ho ge mȇd’ humeis) unable to discover (hoioi te este exeurein) what it is (hoti pot’ estin), as you say (hȏs phȇis su)? But I do not really believe you (egȏ mentoi ou panu soi peithomai), and I think that I (kai emauton), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), am very much in need of the charm (panu oimai deisthai tȇs epȏidȇs), and as far as I am concerned (kai to g’ emon), nothing stands in the way (ouden kȏluei) of my being charmed by you (epaidesthai hupo sou) daily (hosai hȇmerai), until you say (heȏs an phȇis su) that I have had enough (hikanȏs echein).’ (176a6-b4)

‘Very good (Eien)’ said Critias (ephȇ ho Kritias), ‘Charmides (ȏ Charmidȇ), if you do this (ȇn drais touto) I shall have a proof (emoig’ estai touto tekmȇrion) of your temperance (hoti sȏphroneis), that is if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates (ȇn epaidein parechȇis Sȏkratei), and never desert him (kai mȇ apoleipȇi toutou) at all (mȇte mega mȇte smikron).’

‘You may depend on my following and not deserting him (Hȏs akolouthȇsontos kai mȇ apoleipomenou),’ said Charmides (ephȇ) ‘for I should be very wrong (deina gar an poioiȇn) not to obey you (ei mȇ peithoimȇn soi) who are my guardian (tȏi epitropȏi), and if I didn’t do (kai mȇ poioiȇn) what you command me to do (ha keleueis).’

‘And I do command you,’ he said (Alla mȇn, ephȇ, keleȏ  egȏge).

‘Then I will do as you say (Poiȇsȏ toinun),’ said Charmides (ephȇ), ‘and begin this very day (apo tautȇsi tȇs hȇmeras arxamenos).’ (176b5-c4)

‘You sirs (Houtoi),’ I said (ȇn d’ egȏ), ‘what are you conspiring about (ti bouleuesthon poiein)?’

‘We are not conspiring (Ouden)’, said Charmides (ephȇ ho Charmidȇs), ‘we have conspired already (alla bebouleumetha).’

‘Are you about to use violence (Biasȇi ara),’ said I (ȇn d’ egȏ), ‘without even going through the forms of justice (kai oud’ anakrisin moi dȏseis)?’

‘Yes, I shall use violence (Hȏs biasomenou),’ he replied (ephȇ), ‘since Critias here (epeidȇper hode ge) orders me (epitattei); and you had better consider well (pros tauta su au bouleuou hoti poiȇseis).’

‘But the time for consideration had passed,’ I said (All’ oudemia, ephȇn egȏ, leipetai boulȇ), ‘when you are intent on doing something (soi gar epicheirounti prattein hotioun), and are taking recourse to violence (kai biazomenȏi), no man will be able to resist you (oudeis hoios t’ estai enantiousthai anthrȏpȏn).’

‘Do not you resist me then,’ he said (Mȇ toinun, ȇ d’ hos, mȇde su enantiou).

‘I will not resist you then,’ I replied (Ou toinun, ȇn d’ egȏ, enantiȏsomai).

With Socrates’ words Ou toinun, ȇn d’ egȏ, enantiȏsomai (‘I will not resist you then,’ I replied) the dialog ends.

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How could Plato have written the Charmides, as he did, after the Thirty had ordered Socrates and four other Athenians to go to Salamis, arrest Leon the Salaminian, and bring him to death; the four did as they were commanded, but Socrates went home (see Epistle VII, 324e-325a, Apology 32c4-32d7)?