Wednesday, January 15, 2020

5c C. J. Rowe’s arguments for a late dating of the Phaedrus – the second part of the Phaedrus, with reference to Aristophanes’ Frogs, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Diogenes Laertius, and Plato’s Parmenides


In ‘The argument and structure of Plato’s Phaedrus’ Christopher Rowe comments on what Socrates says about his second speech ‘or, more strictly, about both his speeches at 265c-d: “to me it seems that the rest really was playfully done; but by chance two principles of method were expressed”. The message is that in so far as the speeches were based on these principles, they were axia spoudȇs [axion spoudȇs, ‘worth serious attention, 277e7-8]; the rest was paidia [‘merely for amusement’, 277e6].’ (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 1986, p. 113).

In the last paragraph of his article Rowe reflects ‘on the close resemblance between some of the main ideas contained in Socrates’ [second] speech and those of the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedo [the ‘middle-period’ dialogues]: including, most notably, the idea of separated Forms’: ‘in general, the Phaedrus seems to expound middle-period ideas only to recommend them for scrutiny. If so, it has more in common with the critical musings of the Parmenides than with the optimistic constructions of the middle dialogues themselves.’ (Op. cit. pp. 120-121)

Let me for a moment forget about my arguments against Rowe’s late dating of the Phaedrus, and ask: If Plato wrote Socrates’ second speech with the intention to expose it to criticism in the second part of the dialogue, and thus to expose to criticism the main ideas contained in the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedo, why did he introduce these ideas with the words ‘The region above the heavens  (Ton huperouranion topon) has never yet been celebrated as it deserves …  (oute tis humnȇse pȏ … kat’ axian). But it is like this (echei de hȏde) – for one must be bold enough to say what is true (tolmȇteon gar oun to ge alȇthes eipein), especially when speaking about truth (allȏs te kai peri alȇtheias legonta). This region is occupied by being which really is, which is without colour or shape, intangible, observable by the steersman of the soul alone, by intellect, and to which the class of true knowledge relates (hȇ gar achrȏmatos te kai aschȇmatistos kai anaphȇs ousia ontȏs ousa, psuchȇs kubernȇtȇi monȏi theatȇ nȏi, peri hȇn to tȇs alȇthous epistȇmȇs genos, touton echei ton topon)’ (247c3- d1, translations from the Phaedrus C.J. Rowe)?

And let me for a moment forget my views on the Parmenides as well, and ask: If Plato in the Parmenides recommended his theory of Forms (contained in the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedo) to scrutiny, why did he give it into the mouth of ‘a very young Socrates’ (Sȏkratȇ de einai tote sphodra neon, 127c4-5)? Furthermore, why did he ascertain the authenticity of the discussion by his two brothers Adeimantus and Glaucon (126a2)? When Cephalus tells the two brothers that he came with his friends from Clazomenae (in Asia Minor) to hear from their half-brother the discussion (tous logous) that was once held by Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides (hous pote Sȏkratȇs kai Zȇnȏn kai Parmenidȇs dielechthȇsan), for having often heard them from Pythodorus he can relate them from memory (pollakis akousas tou Puthodȏrou apomnȇmoneuei, 126c1-3), Adeimantus says: ‘True (Alȇthȇ legeis). When Antiphon was young, he used to rehearse them diligently (meirakion gar ȏn autous eu mala diemeletȇsen, 126c6-7, translation R.E. Allen)’?

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In my present post I shall discuss Socrates’ reflection on the two methodical principles he has just announced: ‘Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions and collections (Toutȏn dȇ egȏge autos te erastȇs, ȏ Phaidre, tȏn diaireseȏn kai sunagȏgȏn), so that I may be able both to speak and to think (hina hoios te ȏ legein te kai phronein); and if I think anyone else has the natural capacity to look to one and the many (ean te tin’ allon hȇgȇsȏmai dunaton eis hen kai epi polla pephukoth’ horan), I pursue him “in his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a god” (touton diȏkȏ “katopisthe met’ ichnion hȏste theoio”).’ (266b2-7)

Whom could Socrates consider to be better than himself in having ‘the natural capacity to look to one and the many’ but Plato? If so, then Plato transforms here the relationship between himself and Socrates from the one generally accepted. In Aristophanes’ Frogs, Plato [without being named] is viewed as a man who ‘threw away the art’ (apobalonta mousikȇn) for the sake of ‘sitting with Socrates in empty talk’ (Sȏkratei parakathȇmenon lalein, 1491-3). It is from this supposed fascination by Socrates that Aristophanes in the comic song wants to liberate Plato with his image of Aischylus ascending from Hades to save Athens with his ‘keen intelligent mind’ (echȏn sunesin ȇkribȏmenȇn, 1482-3). Plato wants to correct this image; it is not he who is looking up to Socrates; Socrates is looking up to Plato.

In my view, the comic song of the chorus of the Frogs authenticates the story concerning Plato’s and Socrates’ first philosophic encounter: ‘When Plato was about to compete for the prise with tragedy (mellȏn agȏnieisthai tragȏidiai), he then listened to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysus (pro tou Dionusiakou theatrou Sȏkratous akousas), and then consigned his poems to the flames (katephlexe ta poiȇmata), with the words (eipȏn): “Come hither, O fire-god (Hȇphaiste, promol’ hȏde), Plato now has need of thee (Platȏn nu ti seio chatizei).” From that time onward, having reached his twentieth year, so it is said, (t’ounteuthen dȇ gegonȏs, phasin, eikosin etȇ) he was the pupil of Socrates (diȇkouse Sȏkratous).’ (Diog. Laert. III. 5-6, tr. R.D. Hicks)

As can be seen, the ancient tradition preserved in Diogenes Laertius agrees with Aristophanes’ comic song. But Aristotle’s testimony in his Metaphysics gives us a picture of the first philosophic encounter between Plato and Socrates, which appears to give substance to Socrates’ ‘if I think anyone else has the natural capacity to look to one and the many, I pursue him “in his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a god”’. For Aristotle says that when Plato was young, ‘he embraced the Heraclitean doctrines (sunȇthȇs genomenos tais Hȇraklȇteiois doxais) according to which everything we can perceive with our senses is in constant flux (hȏs hapantȏn tȏn aisthȇtȏn aei reontȏn), and there is no science concerning them (kai epistȇmȇs peri autȏn ouk ousȇs); these things (tauta men, i.e. the many things as opposed to the Forms) he viewed in this way even afterwards (kai husteron houtȏs hupelaben [i.e. after his encounter with Socrates and his concomitant discovery of Forms]). As Socrates was discussing ethical problems (Sȏkratous peri ta ȇthika pragmateuomenou) with his mind brought to a standstill on definitions (peri horismȏn epistȇsantos tȇn dianoian), Plato held (hupelaben) that this [i.e. Socrates’ fixation of mind] was taking place in relation to other entities (hȏs peri heterȏn touto gignomenon) and not the perceptible things (kai ou tȏn aisthȇtȏn), for there can be no common definition of any perceptible thing (adunaton gar einai ton koinon horon tȏn aisthȇtȏn tinos) as they are always changing (aei ge metaballontȏn). Beings of this sort he called Forms (houtos oun ta men toiauta tȏn ontȏn ideas prosȇgoreuse), and said that the things that are perceived by our senses (ta d’ aisthȇta) are all named after these and in virtue of a relation to these (para tauta kai kata tauta legesthai panta).’ (987a32-b9, in translating these lines I consulted W.D. Ross’s translation).

What fascinated Plato primarily was not Socrates but the Forms to which the firm fixation of Socrates’ mind on moral terms pointed him.

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In the Parmenides the young Socrates asks Zeno: ‘Do you not believe that there is (ou nomizeis einai), alone by itself (auto kath’ hauto), a certain form of likeness (eidos ti homoiotȇtos), and again, another opposite to it (kai tȏi toioutȏi allo ti enantion), what it is to be unlike (ho estin anomion); and that in these two (toutoin de duo ontoin) you and I and the other things we call many participate (kai eme kai se kai t’alla ha dȇ polla kaloumen metalambanein; 128e6-129a3)?’


When Socrates affirmed this to have been the case, Parmenides raised a series of objections against Socrates’ theory, beginning with what became known as infinite regress: ‘What about the large itself (Ti d’ auto to mega) and the other thigs that are large (kai t’alla ta megala), if with your soul you should look at them all in the same way (ean hȏsautȏs tȇi psuchȇi epi panta idȇis), will not some one large again appear (ouchi hen ti au mega phaneitai), by which they all appear to be large (hȏi tauta panta megala phainesthai;)?’ – Socrates: ‘It seems so (Eoiken).’ – Parmenides: ‘So another form of largeness will have made its appearance (Allo ara eidos megethous anaphanȇsetai), that came to being alongside largeness itself (par’ auto te to megethos gegonos) and the things which have a share of it (kai ta metechonta autou); and over and above all those, again, a different one (kai epi toutois au pasin heteron), by which they will all be large (hȏi tauta panta megala estai). And then each of the forms will no longer be one for you (kai ouketi dȇ hen hekaston soi tȏn eidȏn estai), but unlimited in multitude (alla apeira to plȇthos).’ (132a6-b2)

After expounding some more objections, Parmenides concluded: ‘These difficulties (Tauta mentoi) and many more still in addition (kai eti alla pros toutois panu polla) necessarily hold of the forms (anankaion echein ta eidȇ), if these forms of things that are exist (ei eisin hautai hai ideai tȏn ontȏn), and one is to distinguish (kai horieitai tis) each form as something by itself (auto ti hekaston eidos). The result is that the hearer is perplexed (hȏste aporein te ton akouonta) and contends that they do not exist (kai amphisbȇtein hȏs oute esti tauta), and that even if their existence is conceded (ei te hoti malista eiȇ), they are necessarily unknowable by human nature (pollȇ anankȇ auta einai tȇi anthrȏpinȇi phusei agnȏsta). In saying this (kai tauta legonta), he thinks he is saying something significant and (dokein te ti legein kai), as we just remarked (ho arti elegomen), it’s astonishingly hard to convince him to the contrary (thaumastȏs hȏs dusanapeiston einai). Only a man of considerable natural gifts (kai andros panu men euphuous) will be able to understand (tou dunȇsomenou mathein) that there is a certain kind of each thing (hȏs esti genos ti hekastou), a nature and reality alone by itself (kai ousia autȇ kath’ hautȇn), and it will take a man more remarkable still (eti de thaumastoterou) to discover it (tou heurȇsontos) and be able to instruct someone else who has examined all these things with sufficient care (kai allon dunȇsomenou didaxai tauta panta hikanȏs dieukrinȇsamenon).’ – Socrates: ‘I agree with you (Sunchȏrȏ soi). You’re saying very much what I think too (panu gar moi kata noun legeis).’ – Parmenides: ‘Nevertheless (Alla mentoi), if in light of all the present difficulties and others like them, Socrates, one will not allow that there are forms of things that are (ei ge tis dȇ, ȏ Sȏkrates, au mȇ easei eidȇ tȏn ontȏn einai, eis panta ta nundȇ kai alla toiauta apoblepsas), and will not define as something a form of each single thing (mȇde ti horieitai eidos henos hekastou), he will not even have anything to which to turn his mind (oude hopoi trepsei tȇn dianoian hexei), since he will not allow that there is a form, ever the same, of each of the things that are (mȇ eȏn idean tȏn ontȏn hekastou tȇn autȇn einai); and so he will utterly destroy the power of discourse (kai houtȏs tȇn tou dialegesthai dunamin pantapasi diaphtherei). I think you are only too aware of that sort of consequence (tou toioutou men oun moi dokeis kai mallon ȇisthȇsthai).’ – Socrates: ‘What you say is true (Alȇthȇ legeis).’ – Parmenides: ‘What will you do about philosophy, then (Ti oun poiȇseis philosophias peri)? Which way will you turn (Pȇi trepsȇi) while these things are unknown (agnooumenȏn toutȏn;)? – Socrates: ‘For the moment, at least, I am not really sure I see (Ou panu moi dokȏ kathoran en ge tȏi paronti).’ (134e9-135c7)

From Plato’s point of view there was nothing to be solved concerning the Forms; it was their derivation from the way the many things appear to be that was to be abandoned. If one succeeds in seeing the Forms with one’s mind’s eye, one cannot doubt their existence.

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The question is, why Plato avoided the term Forms when he introduced ‘the entities that truly are’ (ta onta ontȏs) in the Phaedrus? The answer can be found, I believe, in the Parmenides; Plato did not want to contaminate his presentation of the truth (alȇtheia, Phaedrus 247c) with the difficulties that Parmenides raised against the forms.

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Having discovered the Forms, Plato had every reason to take Socrates’ ‘if I think anyone else has the natural capacity to look to one and the many, I pursue him in his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a god’, directed at himself, seriously. But how seriously are we to take it? I shall try to answer this question in my next post.

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