3 The dating of Plato’s Phaedrus with a reference to his Republic

At Socrates’ request, Polemarchus specified what he thought Simonides meant by justice: ‘He thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend (tois gar philois oietai opheilein tous philous agathon men ti dran) and never evil (kakon de mȇden, 332a9-10, in this post the translations from the Republic will be Jowett’s)’. – Socrates: ‘And enemies (Ti de; tois echtrois)? Should we restore to them whatever we owe them (apodoteon hoti an tuchȇi opheilomenon; 332b5)?’ – Polemarchus: ‘By all means (Pantapasi men oun) what we owe them (ho ge opheiletai autois), and an enemy, I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him (opheiletai de ge oimai para tou echtrou tȏi echtrȏi hoper kai prosȇkei), an evil (kakon ti).’ – Socrates: ‘Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice (Êinixato ara, hȏs eoiken, ho Simȏnidȇs poȇtikȏs to dikaion ho eiȇ); for he really meant to say (dienoeito men gar, hȏs phainetai) that justice is (hoti tout’ eiȇ dikaion) the giving to each man what is proper to him (to prosȇkon hekastȏi apodidonai), and this he termed a debt (touto de ȏnomasen opheilomenon).’ – Pol. ‘That must have been his meaning (Alla ti oiei;).’ (332b5-332b8)

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Jowett’s ‘That must have been his meaning’ loses Polemarchus’ self-assurance expressed in his Alla ti oiei;  Polemarchus had just said ‘that an enemy owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him (opheiletai de ge oimai para tou echtrou tȏi echtrȏi hoper kai prosȇkei). Socrates merely applied ‘giving to each man what is proper to him’ to friends in their relation to friends. Polemarchus’ Alla ti oiei means literally ‘But what [else ] do you mean [he could have meant]?’

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In response to Polemarchus’ Alla ti oiei Socrates unleashes his questioning:

‘Tell me, pray, If I asked him (Ȏ pros Dios, ei oun tis auton ȇreto) what due or proper thing is given by art named medicine, and to whom (hȇ tisin oun ti apodidousa opheilomenon kai prosȇkon technȇ iatrikȇ kaleitai;), what answer do you think that he would make to us (ti an oiei hȇmin auton apokrinasthai;)?’ – Pol. ‘He would surely reply (Dȇlon hoti) that medicine gives drugs and food and drink to human bodies (hȇ sȏmasin pharmaka te kai sitia kai pota).’ (332c5-10) … Soc. ‘And what is that which justice gives, and to whom (hȇ oun dȇ tisin ti apodidousa technȇ dikaiosunȇ an kaloito)?’ – Pol. ‘If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances (Ei men ti dei akolouthein, ȏ Sȏkrates, tois emprosthen eirȇmenois), then justice is the art which gives benefit to friends and injury to enemies (hȇ tois philois te kai echthrois ȏphelias te kai blabas apodidousa).’ (332d2-6)

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It is Socrates who introduces the notion of justice as technȇ; Jowett, who translates technȇ as art makes Polemarchus introduce this notion, wrongly. Adam notes ad loc.: ‘The Socratic view that justice is an art – a view that dominates the whole of the conversation with Polemarchus – is thus introduced quite incidentally.’

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Soc. ‘He means, then, by justice doing good to friends and harm to enemies (To tous philous ara eu poiein kai tous echthrous kakȏs dikaiosunȇn legei)? – Pol. ‘I think so (Dokei moi).’ … Soc. ‘And in what sort of actions or with a view to what results is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and confer benefit upon his friend (Ti de ho dikaios; en tini praxei kai pros ti ergon dunatȏtatos philous ȏphelein kai echthrous blaptein)?’ – Pol. ‘In going to war against the one and in making alliance with the other (En tȏi prospolemein kai en tȏi summachein, emoige dokei).’ – Soc. ‘But when a man is well (Eien, mȇ kamnousi ge mȇn), my dear Polemarchus (ȏ phile Polemarche), there is no need of a physician (iatros achrȇstos ‘a physician is useless’, 332e6-7)?’ Pol. ‘No (Alȇthȇ, ‘True’).’ (332d7-e8) … Soc. ‘Then in time of peace justice will be of no use (Ara kai tois mȇ polemousi ho diakios achrȇstos; ‘Is then the just man, too, useless to those who are not in war?’, 332e11)?’ – Pol. ‘I do not think that is quite true (Ou panu moi dokei touto).’ (332e11-12)

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By translating Socrates’ iatros achrȇstos as ‘there is no need of a physician’ instead of ‘a physician is useless’ at 332e6-7 Jowett loses the analogy with ‘‘Is then the just man, too, useless’ Ara kai ho diakios achrȇstos,  to which Socrates arrives at 332e11.

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Soc. ‘You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war (Chrȇsimon ara kai en eirȇnȇi dikaiosunȇ;)?’ – Pol. ‘Yes (Chrȇsimon).’ – Soc. ‘Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?’ – Pol. ‘Yes.’ (Soc. Kai gar geȏrgia, ȇ ou; – Pol. Nai ‘Yes’ – Soc. Pros ge karpou ktȇsin; – Pol. Nai ‘Yes’) (332e13-333a5) … Soc. ‘And (Ti de dȇ;) what similar service would you say that justice can render, or what can it help us to acquire, in time of peace (tȇn dikaiosunȇn pros tinos chreian ȇ ktȇsin en eirȇnȇi phaiȇs an chrȇsimon einai;)?’ (333a10-11)

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There is no ‘similar service’ in what Socrates says; he is more subtle in making the analogy.

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Pol. ‘It serves for making contracts (Pros ta sumbolaia), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates).’ – Soc. ‘And by contracts you mean partnerships (Sumbolaia de legeis koinȏnȇmata ȇ ti allo;)?’ – Pol. ‘Exactly (Koinȏnȇmata dȇta).’ – Soc. ‘But is the just man or a skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts (Ar’ oun ho dikaios agathos kai chrȇsimos koinȏnos eis pettȏn thesin, ȇ ho petteutikos;)?’ – Pol. ‘The skilful player (Ho petteutikos).’ (333a12-b3) … Soc. ‘Then in what sort of partnership (All’ eis tina dȇ koinȏnian) is the just man a better partner (ho dikaios ameinȏn koinȏnos) than the builder and the harp-player (tou oikodomikou te kai kitharistikou), as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better partner than the just man (hȏsper ho kitharistikos eis kroumatȏn;)?’ – Pol. ‘In a money partnership (Eis arguriou), I suppose (emoige dokei).’ – Soc. ‘Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money when the partners contemplate the purchase or sale of a horse (Plȇn g’ isȏs, ȏ Polemarche, pros to chrȇsthai arguriȏi, hotan deȇi arguriou koinȇi priasthai ȇ apodosthai  hippon); a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that (tote de, hȏs egȏ oimai, ho hippikos), would he not (ȇ gar;)?’ – Pol. ‘Certainly (Phainetai).’ (333b7-c2) … Soc. ‘Then what is that joint use of silver or gold (Hotan oun ti deȇi arguriȏi ȇ chrusiȏi koinȇi chrȇsthai), in which the just man is to be preferred to other partners (ho dikaios chrȇsimȏteros tȏn allȏn;)?’ – Pol. ‘When you want a deposit to be kept safely (Hotan parakatathesthai kai sȏn einai, ȏ Sȏkrates).’ – ‘You mean (Oukoun legeis) when money is not wanted for use (hotan mȇden deȇi autȏi chrȇsthai), but allowed to lie (alla keisthai;)?’ – Pol. ‘Precisely (Panu ge).’ – Soc. ‘That is to say, justice is useful when the money which it supervises is useless (Hotan ara achrȇston ȇi argurion, tote chrȇsimos ep’ autȏi hȇ dikaiosunȇ;)?’ – Pol. ‘That is the inference (Kinduneuei).’ (333c5-d2) … Soc. ‘Then justice is not worth much (Ouk an oun, ȏ phile, panu ge ti spoudaion eiȇ hȇ dikaiosunȇ), if it deals only with useless things (ei pros ta achrȇsta chrȇsimon on tunchanei). But let us consider this further point (tode de skepsȏmetha): Is not he who can best strike a blow (Ar’ ouch ho pataxai deinotatos) in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting (en machȇi eite puktikȇi eite tini kai allȇi) best able to ward a blow (houtos kai phulaxasthai)?’ – Pol. ‘Certainly (Panu ge).’ – Soc. ‘And he who is skilful in giving protection against a disease (Ar oun kai noson hostis deinos phulaxasthai), is best able to implant it without being observed (kai lathein houtos deinotatos empoiȇsas;)?’ – Pol. ‘True (Emoige dokei).’ (333e1-8) … Soc. ‘Then if the just man (Ei ara ho dikaios) is good at keeping money (argurion deinos phulattein), he is good at stealing it (kai kleptein deinos).’ – Pol. ‘That is implied by the argument (Hȏs goun ho logos sȇmainei).’ – Soc. ‘Then after all the just man has turned out to be a kind of thief (Kleptȇs ara tis ho dikaios anapephantai). And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer (kai kinduneueis par’ Homȇrou memathȇkenai auto); for he (kai gar ekeinos), speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his (ton tou Odusseȏs pros mȇtros pappon Autolukon agapai te), affirms that (kai phȇsin auton) “He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury” (pantas anthrȏpous kekasthai kleptosunȇi th’ horkȏi te). And so, you and Homer and Simonides seem to be agreed that justice is an art of theft (eoiken oun hȇ dikaiosunȇ kai kata se kai kath’ Homȇron kai kata Simȏnidȇn kleptikȇ tis einai); to be practiced however “for the benefit of friends and for the harm of enemies” (ep’ ȏpheliai mentoi tȏn philȏn kai epi blabȇi tȏn echtrȏn), – that was what you were saying (ouch houtȏs eleges ‘wasn’t this what you were saying;)?’ (334a7-b6)

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When Plato’s contemporaries came to this concept of justice, to which Socrates pointed as that which Polemarchus had learnt from Homer and Simonides, could they help thinking of the speech Against Eratosthenes in which Lysias said that when the Thirty confiscated their property, they found treasures ‘beyond what they had ever expected to get’? If Polemarchus believed that he and his father accumulated their riches in strict adherence to the principles of justice, Socrates simply compelled him to look into the mirror: ‘And so, you and Homer and Simonides seem to be agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practiced however “for the benefit of friends and for the harm of enemies”.

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Polemarchus: ‘No, certainly not that (Ou ma ton Di’), though I do not know what I did say (all’ ouketi oida egȏge ‘but I do not know any more’ hoti elegon ‘what I said’); but still I think (touto mentoi emoige dokei eti) that justice is beneficial to friends (ȏphelein men tous philous hȇ dikaiosunȇ) and harmful to enemies (blaptein de tous echthrous, 334b7-9).’

In Republic VI Plato says to the point: ‘Then a forgetful soul (Epilȇsmona ara psuchȇn) can never be ranked among genuine philosophic natures (en tais hikanȏs philosophois mȇ pote enkrinȏmen, 486d1-2).’