23 Xenophon’s Anabasis

Upon  hearing this report Xenophon immediately proceeded to make a libation himself (Euthys oun Xenophón autos te espende), and directed his attendants to fill a cup for the young men (kai tois neaniskois enchein ekeleue) and to pray to the gods who had revealed the dream and the ford (kai euxesthai tois phénasi theois ta te oneirata kai ton poron), to bring to fulfilment the other blessings also (kai ta loipa agatha epitelesai). The libation accomplished (speisas d’), he at once led the young men to Cheirisophus (euthus ége tous neaniskous para ton Cheirisophon), and they repeated their story to him (kai diégountai t’auta). And upon hearing it (akousas de) Cheirisophus also made libation (kai ho Cheirisophos spondas epoiei). Thereafter (speisantes de) they gave orders to the troops to pack up their baggage (tois men allois paréngellon suskeuazesthai), while they themselves (autoi de) called together the generals (sunkalesantes tous stratégous) and took counsel (ebouleuonto) as to how they might best effect a crossing (hopós an kallista diabaien) so as to defeat the enemy in front (kai tous te emprosthen nikóien) without suffering any harm from those in the rear (hupo tón opisthen méden paschoien kakon). The decision was (kai edoxen autois), that Cheirisophus should take the lead (Cheirisophon men hégeisthai) with half the army and attempt a crossing (kai diabainein echonta to hémisu tou strateumatos), that the other half with Xenophon should stay behind for a while (to d’ hémisu eti hupomenein sun Xnophónti), and that the baggage animals (ta de hupozugia) and camp followers (kai ton ochlon) cross between the two divisions (en mesói toutón diabainein).

When these arrangements were satisfactorily made (Epei de tauta kalós eichen), they set out (eporeuonto), the young men leading the way (hégounto de hoi neaniskoi) and keeping the river on the left (en aristerai echontes ton potamon); and the distance to the ford was about four stadia (hodos de én epi tén diabasin hós tettares stadioi). As they proceeded (poreuomenón d‘ autón), the squadrons of the enemy’s cavalry kept along opposite to them (antiparéisan hai taxeis tón hippeón). When they reached the ford (epeidé de ésan kata tén diabasin tou potamou), they halted under arms (ethento ta hopla), and Cheirisophus put a wreath upon his head, threw off his cloak, and took up his arms, giving orders to all the others to do the same (kai autos prótos Cheirisophos stephanósamenos kai apodus elambane ta hopla kai tois allois pasi paréngell); he also directed the captains (kai tous lochagous ekeleuen) to lead their companies in column (agein tous lochous orthious), part of them upon his left and the rest on his right (tous men en aristerai tous d’ en dexiai heautou). Meanwhile the soothsayers were offering sacrifice to the river (kai hoi manteis esphagiazonto eis ton potamon), and the enemy were shooting arrows and discharging slings (hoi de polemioi etoxeuon kai esphendonón), but not yet reaching their mark (all’ ou  pó exiknounto); and when the sacrifices proved favourable (epei kala én ta sphagia), all the soldiers struck up the paean (epaianizon pantes hoi stratiótai) and raised the war shout (kai anélalazon), while the women, every one of them, joined their cries with the shouting of the men (sunolóluzon de kai gunaikes hapasai) – for there was a large number of women in the camp (pollai gar ésan hetairai en tói strateumati).

Then Cheirisophus and his division proceeded into the river (Kai Cheirisophos men enebaine kai hoi sun ekeinói); but Xenophon took the nimblest troops of the rearguard (ho de Xenophón tón opisthophulakón labón tous euzónotatous) and begun running back at full speed to the ford (ethei ana kratos palin epi ton poron) [i.e. the original ford, which had proved impracticable] that was opposite the road which led out into the Armenian mountains (ton kata tén ekbasin tén eis ta tón Arnenión oré), pretending that he meant to cross at that point (prospoioumenos tautéi diabas) and thus cut the horsemen who were by the side of the river (apokleisein tous par ton potamon hippeas). The enemy thereupon (hoi de polemioi), when they saw Cheirisophus and his division crossing the river without difficulty (horóntes men tous amphi Chirisophónta eupetós to hudór peróntas) and likewise saw Xenophon and his men running back (horóntes  de tous amphi Xenophónta theontas eis t’oumpalin), were seized with fear that they might be cut off (deisantes mé apoléphtheiésan), and they fled in full speed to reach the road which led up from the river (pheugousin ana kratos hós pros tén tou potamou anó ekbasin). This road once gained (epei de kata tén hodon egenonto), they hastened on upward in the direction of the mountain (eteinon anó pros to oros). Then Lycius, who commanded the squadron of Greek cavalry (Lukeios d’ ho tén taxin echón tón hippeón), and Aeschines (kai Aischinés), commander of the battalion of peltasts that was with Cheirisophus (ho tén taxin tón peltastón tón amphi Cheirisophon), upon seeing the enemy in full flight (epei heórón ana kratos pheugontas) set off in pursuit (heiponto), while the rest of Greek troops shouted to them not to fall behind (hoi de stratiótai eboón mé  apoleipesthai), but to follow the fugitives right up to the mountain (alla sunekbainein epi to oros). As for Cheirisophus, after getting across (Cheirisophos d’ au epei diebé) he chose not to pursue the hostile cavalry (tous hippeas ouk edióken), but immediately pushed up over the bluffs that reached down to the river (euthus de kata tas prosékousas ochthas epi ton potamon exebainen) against the infantry on top of them (epi tous anó polemious). And these troops (hoi de anó), seeing their own cavalry in flight (horóntss tous men tous heautón hippeas pheugontas) and hoplites advancing upon them (horóntes d hoplitas sphisin epiontas), abandoned the hights above the river (ekleipousi ta huper tou potamou akra).

Xenophon no sooner saw that all was going well on the other side (Xenophón epei ta peran heóra kalós gignomena) than he started back with all speed to join the troops that were crossing (apechórei tén tachistén pros to diabainon strateuma), for by this time the Carduchians could be seen descending into the plain with the manifest intention of attacking the hindmost (kai gar hoi Kardouchoi phaneroi édé ésan eis to pedion katabainontes  hós epithésomenoi tois teleutaiois). Meanwhile Cheirisophus was in possession of the bluffs (kai Xeirisophos men ta anó kateiche), and Lycius, venturing a pursuit with his small squadron (Lukios de sun oligois epicheirésas epidióxai), had captured the struggling portion of the enemy’s baggage train (elabe tón skeuophorón ta hupoleipomena) and with it fine apparel and drinking cups (kai meta toutón esthéta te kalén kai ekpómata). And now, with the Greek baggage train and the camp followers in the very act of crossing (kai ta men skeuophora tón Hellénón kai ho ochlos akmén diebaine), Xenophon wheeled his troops so that they took a position facing the Carduchians (Xenophón de strepsas pros tous Kardouchous antia ta hopla etheto), and gave orders to the captains (kai paréngelle tois lochagois) that each man of them should form his own company by squads (kat’ enómotias poiésasthai hekaston ton heautou lochon), moving each squad by the left into line of battle (par’ aspida paragagonts tén antómotian epi phalangos); then the captains and squad leaders were to face toward the Carduchians (kai tous men lochagous kai enómotarchous pros tous Kardouchous einai) and station file closers on the side close to the river (ouragous de katastésasthai pros tou potamou). But as soon as the Carduchians saw the rearguard stripped of the crowd of camp followers (hoi de Kardouchoi hós heórón tous opisthophuakas tou ochlou psiloumenous) and looking now like a small body (kai oligous édé phainomenous), they advanced to the attack all the more rapidly (thaton dé epéisan), singing a kind of songs (óidas tinas aidontes). As for Cheirisophus (ho de Cheirisophos), since everything was safe on his side (epei ta par’ autói asphalós eiche), he sent back to Xenophon the peltasts, slingers, and bowmen (pempei para Xenophónta tous peltastas, kai sphendonétas kai toxotas), and directed them to do whatever Xenophon might order (kai keleuei poiein ho ti an parangelléi). But when he saw them beginning to cross (idón de autous diabainontas), Xenophon sent a messenger (Xenophón pempsas angelon) and directed them to stay where they were (keleuei autou meinai), on the bank of the river (epi tou potamou), without crossing (mé diabantas); at the moment, however, when his own men should begin to cross (hotan d’ arxóntai autoi diabainein), they were to enter the river opposite them, on this side and that (enantious enthen kai enthen sphón embainein), as though they were going to cross it (hós diabésomenous), the javelin men with hand on the thong and the bowmen with arrow on the string (diénkulómenous tous akontistas kai epibeblémenous tous toxotas); but they were not to proceed far into the river (mé prosó de tou potamou probainein). The orders he gave to his own men were (tous de par’ autou paréngellen), that when sling-stones reached them and the shields rang (epeidan sphendoné exiknétai kai aspis psophéi), they were to strike up a paean and charge upon the enemy (paianisantas thein eis tous polemious), and when the enemy turned to flight and the trumpeter on the river-bank sounded the charge (epeidan anastrepsósi hoi polemioi kai ek tou potamou ho salpiktés séménéi to polemikon), they were to face about to the right (anastrepsantas epi doru), the file closers were to take the lead (hégeisthai men tous ouragous), and all of them were to run and cross as fast as they could (thein de pantas kai diabainein hoti tachista héi hekastos tén taxin eichen) with every man keeping his proper place in the line, so that they should not interfere with one another (hós mé empodizein allélous); and he that got to the other side first would be the best man (hoti houtos aristos esoito hos an prótos en tói peran genétai).

22 Xenophon’s Anabasis

For that day again they found quarters in the villages that lie above the plain bordering the Centrites river (Tautén d’ au tén hémeran éulisthésan en tais kómais tais huper tou pediou para ton Kentritén potamon), which is about two plethra in width (euros hós diplethron) and separates (hos horizei) Armenia and the country of the Carduchians (tén Armenian kai tén tón Kardouchón chóran). There the Greeks took breath (kai hoi Hellénes entautha anepneusan), glad to behold a plain (asmenoi idontes pedion); for the river was distant six or seven stadia from the mountains of the Carduchians (apeiche de tón oreón ho potamos hex é hepta stadia tón Kardouchón). At the time, then (tote men oun), they went into their quarters very happily (éulisthésan mala hédeós), for they had provisions (kai ta‘pitédeia echontes) and likewise many recollection of the hardships that were now past (kai polla tón pareléluthotón ponón mnémoneuontes). For during all the seven days of their march through the land of the Carduchians they were continually fighting (hepta gar hémeras hosasper eporeuthésan dia tón Kardouchón pasas machomenoi dietelesan), and they suffered more evils than all which they had suffered taken together at the hands of the King and Tissaphernes (kai epathon kaka hosa oude ta sumpanta hupo basileós kai Tissaphernous). In the feeling, therefore, that they were rid of these troubles (hós oun apéllagmenoi toutón) they lay down happily to rest (hédeós ekoiméthésan).

At daybreak, however (Hama de téi hémerai), they caught sight of horsemen at a place across the river (horósin hippeas pou peran tou potamou), fully armed (exóplismenous) and ready to dispute their passage (hós kólusontas diabainein), and likewise foot-soldiers drawn up in line of battle upon the bluffs above the horsemen (pezous para tais ochthais paratetagmenous anó tón hippeón), to prevent their pushing into Armenia (hós kólusontas eis Armenian ekbainein).  All these were the troops of Orontas and Artuchas (ésan d‘ houtoi Oronta kai Artoucha), and consisted of Armenians (Armenioi), Mardians (Mardoi), and Chaldean mercenaries (kai Chaldaioi misthophoroi). The Chaldaeans were said to be an independent and valiant people (elecgonto de hoi Chaldaioi eleutheroi te kai alkimoi einai); they had as weapons (hopla d’ eichon) long wicker shields (gerra makra) and lances (kai lonchas). Now the bluffs just mentioned (hai de ochthai hautai), upon which these troops were drawn up (eph’ hón paratetagmenoi houtoi ésan), were distant three or four plethra from the river (tria é tettara plethra apo tou potamou apeichon), and there was only one road to be seen that led up them (hodos de mia horómené én agousa anó), apparently an artificial road (hósper cheiropoiétos); so at this point the Greeks undertook to cross the river (tautéi epeirónto diabainein hoi Hellénes.). When they made the attempt, however, the water proved to be more then breast deep (epei de peirómenois to te hudór huper tón mastón ephaineto) and the river bed was rough with large, slippery stones (kai trachus én ho potamos megalois lithois kai olisthérois); furthermore, they could not carry their shields in the water (kai out’ en tói hudati ta hopla én echein), for if they tried that, the current would snatch them away (én de mé, hérpazen ho potamos), while if a man carried them on his head (epi tés kephalés ta hopla ei tis pheroi), his body was unprotected against arrows and other missiles (gumnoi egignonto pros ta toxeumata kai t’alla belé); so they turned back (anechórésan) and went into camp there by the side of the river (kai autou estratopedeusanto para ton potamon). Meanwhile, at the point where they have themselves spent the previous night (entha de autoi tén prosthen nukta ésan), on the mountain side (epi tou orous), they could see the Carduchians gathered together under arms in great numbers (heórón tous Kardouchous). Then it was that great despondency fell upon the Greeks (entautha dé pollé athumia én tois Hellésin), as they saw before them a river difficult to cross (horósi men tou potamou tén dusporian), beyond it troops that would obstruct their crossing (horósi de tous diabainein kólusontas), and behind them the Carduchians, ready to fall upon their rear when they tried to cross (horósi de tois diabainousi epikeisomenous tous Kardouchous opisthen).

That day and night, accordingly, they remained there (tautén men oun tén hémeran kai nukta emeinan), in great perplexity (en polléi aporiai ontes). But Xenophon had a dream (Xenophón de onar eiden); he thought that he was bound in fetters (edoxen en pedais dedesthai), but that the fetters fell off from him of their ow accord (hautai de autói automatai perirruénai), so that he was released (hóste luthénai) and could take as long steps as he pleased (kai diabainein hoposon ebouleto). When dawn came (epei de orthros én), he went to Cheirisophus (erchetai pros ton Cheirisophon), told him he had hopes that all would be well (kai legei hoti elpidas echei kalós esesthai), and related to him his dream (kai diégeitai autói to onar). Cheirisophus was pleased (ho de hédeto te), and as soon as the day began to break (kai hós tachista heós hupephainen), all the generals were at hand and proceeded to offer sacrifices (ethuento pantes hoi stratégoi). And with the very first victim the omens were favourable (kai ta men hiera kala én euthus apo tou prótou). Then the generals and the captains withdrew from the sacrifice (kai apiontes apo tón hierón hoi sratégoi kai lochagoi) and gave orders to the troops to get their breakfasts (paréngellon téi stratiai aristopoieisthai).

While Xenofon was breakfasting (Kai aristónti tói Xenophónti), two young men were running to him (prosetrechon duo neaniskó); for all knew (éidesan gar pantes) that they might go to him whether he was breakfasting or dining (hoti exéiei autói kai aristónti kai deipnounti proselthein), and that if he were asleep, they might awaken him (kai ei katheudoi epegeiranta) and tell him whatever they might have to tell that concerned the war (eipein, ei tis ti echoi tón pros ton polemon). In the  present case the young men reported (kai tote elegon) that they happened to be gathering dry sticks for the purpose of making a fire (hoti tunchanoien phrugana sullegontes hós epi pur), and while so occupied they had descried across the river, among some rocks that reached down to the very edge of the river (ka’peita katidoien en tói peran en petrais kathékousais ep‘ auton ton potamon), an old man and a woman and some little girls (geronta te kai gunaika kai paidiskas) putting away what looked like bags of clothes in a cavernous rock (hósper marsipous himatión katatithemenous en petrai antróidei). When they saw this proceeding (idousi de sphisi), they said, they made up their minds that it was safe for them to cross (doxai asphales einai diabénai), for this was a place that was not accessible to enemy’s cavalry (oude gar tois polemiois hippeusi prosbaton einai kata touto). They accordingly stripped (ekduntes d’ ephasan), keeping only their daggers (echontes ta encheiridia), and started across naked, supposing that they would have to swim (gumnoi hós neusomenoi diabainein); but they went on and got across without wetting themselves up to the middle (poreuomenoi de prosthen diabénai prin brexai ta aidoia); once on the other side (kai diabantes), they took the clothes and came back again (lambanontes ta himatia palin hékein).

21 Xenophon’s Anabasis

At this time (Kai en toutói tói chronói) Archagoras the Argive came up in flight (élthen Archagoras ho Argeios pepheugós) and reported (kai legei) that the Greeks had been dislodged from the first hill (hós apekopésan apo tou lophou), that Cephisodorus and Amphicrates had been killed (kai hoti tethnasi Képhisodóros kai Amphikratés), and likewise all the rest (kai hoi alloi) except such as had leaped down the rocks and reached the rearguard (hosoi mé halamenoi kata tés petras pros tous opisthophulakas aphikonto). After accomplishing this achievement (tauta de diapraxamenoi) the barbarians came to a hill opposite the round hill (hoi barbaroi hékon ep’ antiporon lophon tói mastói), and Xenophon (kai ho Xenophón), through an interpreter, had a colloquy with them in regard to a truce (dielegeto autois di’ herméneós peri spondón) and asked them to give back the bodies of the Greek dead (kai tous nekrous apéitei). They replied that they would give then back (hoi de ephasan apodósein) on condition (eph’ hói) that the Greeks should not burn their houses (mé kaiein tas oikias). To this Xenophon agreed (sunómologei tauta ho Xenophón). But while the rest of the army was passing by (en hói de to men allo strateuma paréiei) and they were engaged in this conference (hoi de tauta dielegonto), all the enemy from that neighbourhood had streamed together to the spot (pantes hoi ek toutou tou topou sunerruésan entautha hoi polemioi); and as soon as Xenophon and his men began to descend from the round hill (kai epei érxanto katabainein apo tou mastou), in order to join the rest of the Greeks at the place where they were halted under arms (pros tous allous entha ta hopla ekeinto), the enemy took this opportunity to rush upon them in great force and with a great deal of uproar (hiento dé hoi polemioi pollói pléthei kai thorubói). When they had reached the crest of the hill (kai epei egenonto epi tés koruphés tou mastou) from which Xenophon was descending (aph’ hou Xenophón katebainen), they proceeded to roll down stones (ekulindoun petrous). They broke one man’s leg (kai henos men kateaxan to skelos), and Xenophon found himself deserted by the servant who was carrying his shield (Xenophónta de ho hupaspistés echón tén aspida apelipen); but Eurylochus of Lusi (Eurylochos Lousieus), a hoplite, ran up to him (prosedramen autói hoplités) and, keeping his shield in front of them both, fell back with him (kai pro amphoin probeblémenos apechórei); and the rest also (kai hoi alloi) made good their retreat to the main array (pros tous suntetagmenous apélthon).

Then (Ek de toutou) the entire Greek army United (pan homou egeneto to Hellénikon), and the troops took up quarters there (kai eskénésan autou) in many fine houses (en pollais kai kalais oikiais) and in the midst of abundant supplies (kai epitédeois dapsilesi); for the inhabitants had wine in such quantities (kai gar oinos polus én) that they kept it in cemented cisterns (hóste en lakkois koniatois eichon). Meanwhile Xenophon and Cheirisophus effected an arrangement (Xenophón de kai Cheirisophos diepraxanto) by which they recovered the bodies of their dead (hóste labontes tous nekrous) and gave back the guide (apedosan ton hégemona); and they rendered to the dead, so far as their means permitted (kai panta epoiésan tois apothanousin ek tón dunatón), all the usual honours that are paid to great men (hósper nomizetai andrasin agathois).

On the next day (téi de husteraiai) they continued their march without a guide (aneu hégemonos eporeuonto), while the enemy, by fighting and by seizing positions in advance wherever the road was narrow (machomenoi d’ hoi polemioi kai hopéi eié stenon chórion), tried to prevent their passage (prokatalambanontes ekóluon tas parodous). Accordingly, whenever they prevented the march of the van (hopote oun tous prótous kóluoien) Xenophon would push forward from the rear to the mountains (Xenophón opisthen ekbainón pros ta oré) and break the blockade of the road for the van (elue tén apophraxin tés hodou tois prótois) by trying to get higher  than those who were halting it (anóteró peirómenos genesthai tón kóluontón), and whenever they attacked the rear (hopote de tois opisthen epithointo), Cheirisophus would sally forth (Cheirisophos ekbainón) and, by trying to get higher than the obstructing force (kai peirómenos anó gignesthai tón kóluontón), would break the blockade of the passage-way for the rear (elue tén apophraxin tés parodou tois opisthen); in this way they continually aided  one another (kai aei houtós eboéthoun allélois) and took zealous care for one another (kai ischurós allélón epemelonto). There were times, indeed (én de), when the barbarians caused a great deal of trouble even to the troops who had climbed to a higher position (kai hopote autois tois anabasi polla pragmata pareichon hoi barbaroi), when they were coming down again (palin katabainousin); for their men were so agile (elaphroi gar ésan) that even if they took to flight from close at hand (hóste kai enguthen pheugontes), they could escape (apopheugein); for they had nothing to carry (ouden gar eichon allo) except bows and slings (é toxa kai sphendonas). As bowmen they were most excellent (aristoi de kai toxotai ésan); they had bows nearly three cubits long (eichon gar toxa eggus tripéché) and their arrows were more than two cubits (ta de toxeumata pleon é dipéché), and when they shot, they would draw their strings by pressing with the left foot against the lower end of the bow (heilkon de tas neuras hopote toxeuoien pros to kató tou toxou tói aristerói podi prosbainontes); and their arrows (ta de toxeumata) would go straight through the shields (echórei dia tón aspidón) and breastplates (kai dia tón thórakón). Whenever they got hold of them, the Greeks would use these arrows as javelins (echrónto de autois hoi Hellénes, epei laboien, akontiois), fitting them with thongs (enankulóntes). In these regions (en toutois tois chóriois) the Cretans made themselves exceedingly useful (hoi Krétes chrésimótatoi egenonto). They were commanded by a Cretan named Stratocles (érche de autón Stratoklés Krés).

20 Xenophon’s Anabasis

But Xenophon with half the rearguard (Xenophón de echón tón opisthophulakón tous hémiseis) set out by the same route which the party with the guide had followed (eporeueto héiper hoi ton hégemona echontes), because this was the easiest route for the baggage animals (euodótaté gar én tois hupozugiois); and behind the baggage animals he posted the other half of the rearguard (tous de hémiseis opisthen tón hupozugión etaxe). As they proceeded they came upon a hill above the road which had been seized by the enemy (poreuomeoi d’ entunchanousi lophói huper tés hodou kateilémmenói hupo tón polemión), and found themselves compelled either to dislodge them (hous é apokopsai én ananké) or be completely separated from the rest of the Greeks (é diezeuchthai apo tón allón Hellénón); and while, as far as the troops themselves were concerned (kai autoi men), they might have taken the same route that the rest followed (an eporeuthésan héiper hoi alloi), the baggage animals could not get through by any other road (ta de hupozugia ouk én alléi) than this one by which Xenophon was proceeding (é tautéi ekbénai). Then and there, accordingly (entha dé), with words of cheer to one another (parakeleusamenoi allélois), they charged upon the hill (prosballousi pros ton lophon) with their companies in column (orthiois tois lochois) not surrounding it (ou kuklói), but leaving the enemy a way of retreat (alla katalipontes aphodon tois polemiois) in case they chose to use it (ei boulointo pheugein). For a while (kai teós men), as the Greeks were climbing up by whatever way they severally could (autous anabainontas hopéi edunato hekastos), the barbarians discharged arrows and other missiles upon them (hoi barbaroi etoxeuon kai eballon); they did not let them get near, however (engus ou prosiento), but took to flight and abandoned the place (alla phugéi leipousi to chórion). No sooner had the Greeks passed by this hill (kai touton te pareléluthesan hoi Hellénes), than they saw a second one ahead similarly occupied by the enemy (kai heteron horósi emprosthen lophon katechomenon), and decided to proceed against this one in its turn (epi touton authis edokei poreuesthai). Xenophon, however, becoming apprehensive lest, if he should leave unoccupied the hill he had just captured (ennoésas de ho Xenophón mé, ei erémon katalipoi ton hélókota lophon), the enemy might take possession of it again (palin labontes hoi polemioi) and attack the baggage train as it passed (epithointo tois hupozugiois pariousin) (and the train stretched out a long way (epi polu d’ én ta hupozugia) because of the narrowness of the road it was following (hate dia stenés tés hodou poreuomena), left three captains upon the hill (kataleipei epi tou lophou lochagous), Cephisodorus (Képhisodóron), son of Cephisophon (Képhisophóntos), an Athenian (Athénaion), Amphicrates, son of Amphidemus, also an Athenian (Amphikratén Amphidémou Athénaion), and Archagoras, an Argive exile (kai Archagoran Argeion phugada); while he himself with the rest of the troops proceeded against the second hill (autos de sun tois loipois eporeueto epi ton deuteron lophon), which they captured in the same way as the first (kai ton auton tropon kai touton hairousin).

There still remained a third round hill (eti de autois tritos mastos loipos én), far the steepest of them all (polu orthiótatos), the one that rose above the guard post, by the fire (ho huper tés epi tói puri kataleiphtheisés phulakés), which had been captured during the night by the volunteers (ekataleiphtheis tés nuktos hupo tón ethelontón). But when the Greeks got near this hill (epei d’ engus egenonto hoi Hellénes), the barbarians abandoned it without striking a blow (leipousin hoi barbaroi amachéti ton maston), so that everybody was filled with surprise (hóste thaumaston pasi genesthai) and imagined that they had quit the place out of fear that they might be surrounded and blockaded (kai hupópteuon deisantas autous mé kuklóthentes poliorkointo apolipein). As it proved,  however, they had seen, looking down from their hight, what was going on farther back, and were all setting out to attack the Greek rearguard (hoi d’ ara apo tou akrou kathoróntes ta opisthen gignomena pantes epi tous opisthophulakas echóroun). Meanwhile Xenophon proceeded to climb the abandoned height with his youngest troops (kai Xenophón men sun tois neótatois anebainen epi to akron), ordering the rest to move on slowly (tous de allous ekeleusen hupagein) in order that the hindmost companies might catch up (hopós hoi teleutaioi lochoi prosmeixeian); then they were to advance along the road (kai proelthontes kata tén hodon) and halt under arms on the plateau at the top of the pass (en tói homalói thesthai ta hopla eipe).

19 Xenophon’s Anabasis

Thereupon it was decided (Entautha d’ edokei) to call together the captains (sunkalesantas lochagous), both of peltasts and hoplites (kai peltastas kai tón hoplitón), to set forth to them the existing situation (legein te ta paronta), and to ask (kai erótan) if there was any one among them (ei tis autón estin) who would like to prove himself a brave man (hostis anér agathos etheloi an genesthai) and to undertake this expedition as a volunteer (kai hupostas ethelontés poreuesthai). Volunteers came forward, from the hoplites Aristonymus of Methydriun and Agasias of Stymphalus (huphistatai tón men hoplitón Aristónumos Methudrieus kai Agasias Stumphalios), while in rivalry to them (antistasiazón autois) Callimachus of Parrhasia said (Kallimachos Parrasios ephé) he was ready to make the expedition (ethelein poreuesthai) and take with him volunteers from the entire army (proslabón ethelontas ek pantos tou strateumatos); “for I know,” he continued (egó gar, ephé, oida), “that many of the young men will follow if I am in the lead (hoti hepsotai polloi tón neón emou hégoumenou).” Then they asked (ek toutón erótósin) whether any one among the captains of light troops (ei tis kai tón gumnétón taxiarchón) wanted to join in the march (etheloi sumporeuesthai). The volunteer was Aristeas of Chios (huphistatai Aristeas Chios), who on many occasions proved himself valuable to the army for such services (hos pollachou pollou axios téi stratiai eis ta toiauta egeneto).

It was now late afternoon (Kai én men deilé), and they ordered the volunteers (hoi d’ ekeleuon autous) to take a snatch of food (emphagontas) and set out (poreuesthai). They also bound the guide (kai ton hégemona désantes) and turned him to the volunteers (paradidoasin autois), and made an agreement with them that in case they should capture the height, they were to guard it through the night and give a signal at daybreak with a trumpet (kai suntithentai tén men nukta, én labósin to akron, to chórion phulattein, hama de téi hémerai téi salpingi sémainein); then those on the height (kai tous men anó ontas) were to proceed against the Carduchians who were holding the visible way out (ienai epi tous katechontas tén phaneran ekbasin), while the main army was to come to their support (autoi de sumboéthésein), pushing forward as fast as they could (ekbainontes hós an dunóntai tachista). This agreement concluded (tauta sunthemenoi), the volunteers, about two thousand in number, set out on their march (hoi men eporeuonto pléthos hós dischilioi); and there was a heavy downpour of rain (kai hudór polu én ex ouranou); at the same time Xenophon with the rearguard began advancing toward the visible way out (Xenophón de echón tous opisthophulakas hégeito pros tén phaneran ekbasin), in order that the enemy might be giving their attention to that road (hopós tautéi téi hodói hoi polemioi prosechoien ton noun) and that the party taking the roundabout route might, so far as possible, escape observation (kai hós malista lathoien hoi pperiiontes). But as soon as the troops of the rearguard were at a gorge which they had to cross before marching up the steep hill (epei de ésan epi charadrai hoi opisthophulakes hén edei diabantas pros to orthion ekbainein), at that moment the barbarians began to roll down round stones large enough for a wagon-load (ténikauta ekilindoun hoi barbaroi holoitrochous hamaxiaious), with larger and smaller ones also (kai meizous kai elattous); they came down with a crash upon the rocks below and the fragments of them flew in all directions, so that it was quite impossible even to approach the ascending road (hoi pheromenoi pros tas petras paiontes diesphendonónto, kai pantapasin oude pelasai hoion t’ én téi eisodói). Then some of the captains (enioi de tón lochagón), unable to proceed by this route (ei mé tautéi dunainto), would try another (alléi epeirónto), and they kept this up (kai tauta epoioun) until darkness came on (mechri skotos egeneto). It was not until they imagined that their withdrawal would be unobserved (epei de óionto aphaneis einai apiontes) that they went back to dinner (tote apélthon epi to deipnon) – and it chanced that they had no breakfast either (etunchanon de kai anaristoi ontes). The enemy, however (hoi mentoi polemioi), never stopped rolling down their stones all through the night (ouden epausanto di’ holés tés nuktos kulindountes tous lithous), as one could judge from the noise (tekmairesthai d’ én tói psophói).

Meanwhile the party with the guide (hoi d’ echontes ton hégemona), proceeding by a roundabout route (kuklói periiontes), found the guards sitting by the fire (katalambanousi tous phulakas amphi pur kathémenous), and after killing some of them (kai tous men katakainontes) and chasing away the others (tous de katadióxantes) they remained at the post themselves (autoi entauth’ emenon), supposing that they held the hight (hós to akron katechontes). In fact, they were not holding it (hoi d’ ou kateichon), for it was a round hill around them and past it ran this narrow road upon which the guards had been sitting (alla mastos én huper autón par’ hon én stené hauté hodos eph’ héi ekathénto hoi phulakes). Nevertheless, from the place they did hold there was a way of approach to the road, upon the visible road, where the main body of the enemy were stationed (ephodos mentoi autothen epi tous polemious én hoi epi téi phanerai hodói ekathénto). At this place, then, they passed the night (kai tén men nukta entautha diégagon), and when the day was beginning to break (epei d’ hémera hupephainen), they took up their march silently (eporeuonto sigéi) in battle array against the enemy (suntetagmenoi epi tous polemious); for there was a mist (kai gar homichlé egeneto), and consequently they got close up to them without being observed (hóst’ elathon engus proselthontes). When they did catch sight of one another (epei de eidon allélous), the trumpet sounded (hé te salpinx ephthenxato) and the Greeks raised the battle cry and rushed upon the enemy (kai alalaxantes hiento epi tous anthrópous). And the Carduchians did not meet their attack (hoi de ouk edexanto), but abandoned the road (alla lipontes tén hodon) and took to flight (pheugontes); only a few of them, however, were killed (oligoi apethnéiskon), for they were agile fellows (euzónoi gar ésan). Meanwhile Cheirisophus and his command (hoi de amphi Cheirisophon), hearing the trumpet (akousantes tés salpingos), charged immediately up the visible road (euthus hiento anó kata tén phaneran hodon); and some of the other generals (alloi de tón stratégón) made their way without following any road from the points where they severally chanced to be (kata atribeis hodous eporeuonto héi etuchon hekastoi ontes), clambering up as best they could (kai anabantes hós edunanto), pulled one another with their spears (animón allélous tois dorasi); and it was they who were first to join the troops that had already gained possession of the place (kai houtoi prótoi sunemeixan tois prokatalabousi to chórion).

18 Xenophon’s Anabasis

When they had breakfast and were setting out upon the march (epei de aristésantes eporeuonto), the generals quietly stationed men in the defile (hupostésantes en tói stenói hoi stratégoi) and proceeded to take away from the troops such of the things specified as had not been given up if they found any (ei ti heuriskoien tón eirémenón mé apheimenon, aphéirounto); and the soldiers submitted (hoi d’epeithonto), except in cases where a man had smuggled through a handsome boy or woman, for example, that he had set his heart upon (plén ei tis eklepsen, hoion é paidos epithymésas é gynaikos tón euprepón). So they went on for that day (kai tautén men tén hémeran houtós eporeuthésan), now fighting a little (ta men ti machomenoi) and now resting (ta de ti anapauomenoi). On the next day (eis de tén husteraian) there was a heavy storm (gignetai cheimón polus), but they had to continue their march (anankaion d‘ én poreuesthai), for they had not an adequate supply of provisions (ou gar én hikana t‘apitédeia); and Cheirisophus led the way (kai hégeito men Cheirisophos) while Xenophon commanded the rearguard (ópisthophulakei de Xenophón). Here the enemy began a vigorous attack (kai hoi polemioi ischurós epetithento), and in the narrow places on the road (kai stenón ontón tón chórión) came close up to discharge their bows and slings (engus prosiontes etoxeuon kai esphendonón). The result was that the Greeks were forced to give chase and then fall back, and hence made but a slow progress (hóste énankazonto hoi Hellénes epidiókontes kai palin anachazontes scholéi poreuesthai); and time after time, when the enemy pressed them hard, Xenophon would send word to Cheirisophus to wait a little (kai thamina paréngellen ho Xenophón hupomenein, hote hoi polemioi ischurós epikeointo). Now while Cheirisophus was accustomed to wait whenever such word was given (entautha ho Cheirisophos  allote men hote parenguóito hupemene), on this occasion he did not do so (tote de ouch hupemene), but led on rapidly (all‘ ége tacheós) and passed back the order to keep up with him (kai paréngua hepesthai). It was evident, therefore, that something was the matter, but there was no time to go forward and find out the reason for this haste; consequently the progress of the rearguard became more like a flight than a march (hóste délon én hoti pragma ti eié, scholé d’ ouk én idein parelthonti to aition tés spoudés, hóste hé poreia homoia fugéi egigneto tois opisthophulaxi). Then it was that a brave man was killed (kai entautha apothnéiskei anér agathos), Leonymus the Laconian (Lakónikos Leónumos), who was pierced in the side by an arrow that went through his shield and cuirass (toxeutheis dia tés aspidos kai spolados); also Basias the Arcadian (kai Basias Arkas), who was shot clean through the head (diamperes tén kephalén).

As soon as they reached a halting place (epei de aphikonto epi stathmon), Xenophon went straight to Cheirisophus, just as he was, and proceeded to reproach him for not waiting (euthus hósper eichen ho Xenophón elthón pros Cheirisophon éitiato auton hoti ouch hupemenen), but compelling them to flee and fight at the same time (all’ énankazonto pheugontes hama machesthai); “and now,” he went on, “two fine brave fellows have lost their lives (kai nun duo kaló te kai agathó andre tethnaton), and we were not able to pick up their bodies or bury them” (kai oute anelesthai oute thapsai edunametha). Cheirisophus’ reply was (apokrinetai ho Cheirisophos), “Take a look,” (Blepson) said he (ephé), “at the mountains (pros ta oré), and observe (kai ide) how impassable all of them are (hós abata panta esti). The only road is the one there (mia d‘ hauté hodos), which you see (hén horais), a steep one, too (orthia), and on that you can see the great crowd of people (kai epi tautéi anthrópón horan exesti soi ochlon tosouton) who have taken possession of it and are guarding our way out (hoi kateiléphotes phulattousi tén ekbasin). That’s the reason why I was hurrying (taut’ egó espeudon) and why I would not wait for you (kai dia touto se ouch hupemenon), for I hoped to reach the pass and occupy it before they did (ei pós dunaimén phthasai prin kateiléphthai tén huperbolén). The guides that we have say there is no other road (hoi d’ hégemones hous echomen ou phasin einai allén hodon). And Xenophon answered (ho de Xenophón legei), “Well, I also have two men (all’ egó echó duo andras). For at the time the enemy was giving us trouble (epei gar hémin pragmata pareichon), we set an ambush (enédreusamen). It allowed us, for one thing, to catch our breath (hoper hémas kai anapneusai epoiése); but, besides, we killed a number of them (kai apekteinamen tinas autón), and we took especial pains to get some prisoners (kai zóntas prouthuméthémen labein) for this very purpose (autou toutou heneka), of being able to employ as guides men who know the country (hopós hégemosin eidosi tén chóran chrésaimetha).”

They brought up the two men at once (kai euthus agagontes tous anthrópous) and questioned them (élenchon) separately (dialabontes) as to whether they knew any other road (ei tina allén eideien hodon) besides the one that was in plain sight (é tén phaneran). The first man said he did not (ho men oun heteros ouk ephé), despite the numerous threats that were made to him (mala pollón phobón prosagomenón); and since he would give no information (epei de ouden óphelimon elegen), he was slaughtered before the eyes of the second one (horóntos tou heterou katesphagé). The latter now said (ho de loipos elexen) that the reason why this first man had maintained that he did not know any other road (hoti houtos ou phaié dia tauta eidenai), was because he chanced to have a daughter living in that neighbourhood with a husband to whom he had given her (hoti autói etunchane thugatér ekei par’ andri ekdedomené); but as for himself (autos d’), he said that he would lead the Greeks by a road that could be traversed even by baggage animals (ephé hégésesthai dunatén kai hupozugiois poreuesthai hodon). Upon being asked (erótómenos d’) whether there was any point on it which was difficult to pass (ei eié ti en autéi duspariton chórion), he replied that there was a height (ephé einai akron) which they could not possibly pass unless they should seize it beforehand (ho ei mé tis prokatalépsoito, adunaton esesthai parelthein).

17 Xenophon’s Anabasis

Book |V (D)

When it was about the last watch (Hénika d’ én amphi tén teleutaian phulakén), and enough of the night remained to allow them to cross the plain in the dark (kai eleipeto tés nuktos hoson skotaious dielthein to pedion), at that time they arose upon the word of command (ténikauta anastantes apo parangelseós) and set out on their march (poreuomenoi); and hey reached the mountain at daybreak (aphiknountai hama téi hémerai pros to oros). Here Cheirisophus with his own division and all the light-armed troops, led the van (entha dé Cheirisophos men hégeito tou strateumatos labón to amph’ auton kai tous gumnétas pantas), while Xenophon followed behind with the hoplites of the rearguard (Xenophón de sun tois opistophulaxi hoplitais heipeto), but without any light troops at all (oudena echón gumnéta); for there seemed to be no danger (oudeis gar kindunos edokei einai) of any pursuit from behind while they were proceeding uphill (mé tis anó poreuomenón ek tou opisthen epispoito). And Cheirisophus reached the summit of the pass before any of the enemy perceived him (kai epi men to akron anabainei Cheirisophos prin tinas aisthesthai tón polemión); then he led on slowly (epeita d‘ huphégeito), and each division of the army as it passed over the summit followed along to the villages (epheipeto de aei to huperballon tou strateumatos eis tas kómas) which lay in the hollows and nooks of the mountains (tas en tois ankesi te kai muchois tón oreón). Then it was (entha dé) that the Carduchians abandoned their houses (hoi men Kardouchoi eklipontes tas oikias) and fled to the mountains with their wives and children (echontes tas gunaikas kai paidas epheugon epi ta oré). As for provisions (ta de epitédeia), there was abundance for the Greeks to take (polla én lambanein), and the houses were also supplied with bronze vessels in great numbers (ésan de kai chalkómasi pampollois kataskeuasmenai hai oikiai); the Greeks, however, did not carry any of these (hón ouden epheron hoi Hellénes), and did not pursue the people themselves (oude tous anthrópous ediókon), refraining from harshness (hupopheidomenoi) on the chance that the Carduchians might perhaps be willing to let them pass through their country in friendship (ei pós etheléseian hoi Kardouchoi diienai autous hós dia philias tés chóras), seeing that thy also were enemies of the King (epeiper basilei polemioi ésan); but they did take whatever they chanced upon in the way of provisions (ta mentoi epitédeia hotói tis epitunchanoi elambanen), for that was necessary (ananké gar én). The Carduchians, however (hoi de Kardouchoi), would neither listen when they called to them (oute kalountón hupékouon) nor give any other sign of friendliness (oute allo philikon ouden epoioun). And when the rearguard of the Greeks was descending from the summit of the pass to the villages (epei de hoi teleutaioi tón Hellénón katebaion eis tas kómas apo tou akrou) – and by this time it was dark (édé skotaioi),  for on account of the road being narrow their assent and descent lasted through the entire day (dia gar to stenén einai tén hodon holén tén hémeran hé anabasis autois egeneto kai katabasis) – at this moment (tote dé) some of the Carduchians gathered together (sullegentes tines tón Kardouchón) and attacked the hindmost Greeks (tois teleutaiois epetithento); and they killed some (kai apekteinan tinas) and wounded others severely with stones and arrows  (kai lithois kai toxeumasi katetrósan), though they were themselves but a few in number (oligoi ontes); for the Greek army had come upon them unexpectedly (ex aprosdokétou gar autois epepese to Hellénikon). If, however, a large number of them had gathered together at that time (ei mentoi tote pleious sunelegésan), a great part of the army would have been in danger of being destroyed (ekinduneusen an diaphtharénai polu tou strateumatos). Thus the Greeks bivouacked for he night in the villages (kai tautén men tén nukta houtós en tais kómais éulisthésan), while the Carduchians (hoi de Kardouchoi) kindled many fires round about on the mountains (pura polla ekaion kuklói epi tón oreón) and kept shouting to one another (kai suneboón allélous).

At daybreak (Hama de téi hémerai) the generals and captains of the Greeks came together (sunelthousi tois stratégois kai lochagois tón Hellénón) and resolved (edoxe) to keep with them on the march only the indispensable and most powerful baggage animals (tón te hupozygión ta anankaia kai dunatótata echontas poreuesthai) and to leave the rest behind (katalipontas t’alla); likewise (kai), to let go all the newly taken captives that were in the army, to the last man (hosa én neósti aichmalóta andrapoda en téi stratiai panta apheinai). For the baggage animals and the captives, numerous as they were, made the march slow (scholaian gar epoioun tén poreian polla onta ta hupozygia kai ta aichmalóta), and the large number of men who had charge of them were thus taken out of the fighting line (polloi de hoi epi toutón ontes apomachoi ésan); besides, with so many people to feed it was necessary to procure and to carry twice the amount of provisions (diplasia te epitédeia edei porizesthai kai pheresthai pollón tón anthrópón ontón). This decision once reached (doxan de tauta), they published the order to carry it into effect (ekéruxan houtó poiein).