Questions

Sunday, July 9, 2017

5g Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating, with reference to his Apology and Seventh Letter, and to Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Hellenica

At 165b Critias defined sôphrosunê as knowing oneself. At 166d Socrates told Critias: ‘I subject the definition to scrutiny (ton logon skopein) chiefly for my own sake (malista men emautou heneka), and perhaps also (isôs de dê kai) for the sake of others (tôn allôn) who need it (epitêdeiôn, 166d3-4).’ Both Jowett and Watt translate epitêdeiôn as ‘my friends’, but in this instance the word has much broader meaning, as can be seen from what Socrates says next: ‘Or don’t you think that it is a common good for almost all men (ê ou koinon oiei agathon einai schedon ti pasin anthrôpois) that each thing that exists should be revealed (gignesthai kataphanes hekaston tôn ontôn) as it is (hopê̢ echei; 166d4-6, tr. Watt)?’ In 166d8-e2 Socrates asks Critias to leave aside whether it is Critias or Socrates who is under the scrutiny, and answer the questions he is going to be asked. In the discussion that followed, to which I devoted the preceding post, Socrates voiced his doubts concerning self-knowledge, questioning the possibility of self-reflexivity in a wide range of instances, ending with the doubts ‘motion moving itself’ and ‘heat burning itself’. Declaring himself incapable of satisfactorily solving these difficulties, he asked Critias to defend his definition.

Socrates: ‘Some great man, my friend, is wanted (megalou dê tinos, ô phile, andros dei), who will satisfactorily determine for us (hostis touto kata pantôn hikanôs diairêsetai) whether there is nothing (poteron ouden tôn ontôn) which has an inherent property of relation to self (tên hautou dunamin auto pros heauto pephuken echein) rather than to something else (alla pros allo), or some things only (ê ta men) and not others (ta d’ ou); and whether in this class of self-related things, if there be such a class, that science which is called sôphrosunê [Jowett: ‘wisdom or temperance’] is included (kai ei estin au hatina auta pros hauta echei, ar’ en toutois estin epistêmê, hên dê hêmeis sôphrosunên phamen einai). I altogether distrust my own power of determining these matters (egô men ou pisteuô emautô̢ hikanos einai tauta dielesthai): I am not certain whether such a science of science can possibly exist (dio kai out’ ei dunaton esti touto genesthai, epistêmês epistêmên einai, echô diischurisasthai); and even if it does undoubtedly exist (out’ ei hoti malista esti), I should not acknowledge it to be sôphrosunê [Jowett: ‘wisdom or temperance’] (sôphrosunên apodechomai auto einai) until I can also see (prin an episkepsômai) whether such a science would or would not do us any good (ei ti an hêmas ôpheloi toiouton on eite mê); for I have an impression that sôphrosunê [Jowett: ‘temperance’] is a benefit and a good (tên gar oun dê sôphrosunên ôphelimon ti kai agathon manteuomai einai). And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus (su oun, ô pai Kallaischrou), as you maintain that sôphrosunê [Jowett: ‘wisdom or temperance’] is a science of science (tithesai gar sôphrosunên tout’ einai, epistêmên epistêmês), and also of the absence of science (kai dê kai anepistêmosunês), I will request you to show in the first place (prôton men touto endeixai), as I was saying before, the possibility (hoti dunaton ho nundê elegon), and in the second place, the advantage, of such a science (epeita pros tô̢ dunatô̢ hoti kai ôphelimon); and then perhaps you may satisfy me (k’ame tach’ an apoplêrôsais) that you are right (hôs orthôs legeis) in your view of sôphrosunê [Jowett: ‘temperance’] (peri sôphrosunês ho estin).’ (169a1-c2, tr. B. Jowett)

Socrates does not give us a detailed account of Critias’ attempt to respond to his request, but he gives his critical assessment of it: ‘When Critias heard this (Kai ho Kritias akousas tauta), and saw that I was in difficulties (kai idôn me aporounta), he seemed to me to be forced by my being in difficulties to fall into difficulties himself, in the way people who see others yawning in their faces are affected similarly (hôsper hoi tous chasmômenous katantikru horôntes t’auton touto sumpaschousin, k’akeinos edoxe moi hup’ emou aporountos anankasthênai kai autos halônai hupo aporias). Well, conscious that he had a reputation to keep up (hate oun eudokimôn hekastote ‘but since he used to excel every time’), he felt ashamed in front of the others (ê̢schuneto tous parontas) and was unwilling to admit to me that he was unable to determine the points on which I was challenging him (kai oute sunchôrêsai moi êthelen adunatos einai dielesthai ha proukaloumên auton). He said nothing clear (elegen te ouden saphes), in an attempt to conceal his difficulties (epikaluptôn tên aporian).’ (169c3-d1, tr. D. Watt)

Socrates’ criticism of Critias is harsh; but does it justify D. Watt’s view of the dialogue?

Donald Watt writes in his ‘Introduction to Charmides’: ‘Part of Plato’s purpose in this dialogue is to exculpate Socrates from any responsibility for the crimes of his former companions … By showing Critias as both quite lacking in sôphrosunê and quite ignorant of its meaning beyond a superficial acquaintance with its conventional use within his aristocratic circle; by representing Charmides as equally unaware of its true purport, despite his possession of the natural sôphrosunê of youth, which he will lose when he reaches adulthood; and by portraying Socrates as trying his best to discover with them the true meaning of sôphrosunê, and as failing to elicit answer from them, though possessing the virtue himself – by all these means Plato is endeavouring to show that Socrates tried to educate Critias and Charmides in sôphrosunê, but failed. But by trying, he saved himself from any possible accusation of responsibility for their later crimes.’ (Plato, Early Socratic Dialogues, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 167.)

If we want to see Socrates’ criticism in the proper light, we must view it in the context of the discussion that followed. For Socrates went on to say: ‘So, to get on with our discussion, I said (k’agô hêmin hina ho logos proïoi, eipon), “Well, if you like (All’ ei dokei), Critias (ô Kritia), let’s grant for the moment (nun men touto sunchôrêsômen) that it is possible for there to be a knowledge of knowledge (dunaton einai genesthai epistêmên epistêmês). We’ll consider whether or not this is the case later on (authis de episkepsometha eite houtôs echei eite mê). Come on then (ithi dê oun), let’s suppose it is perfectly possible (ei hoti malista dunaton touto): how does that increase one’s chances of knowing what one knows and what one doesn’t (ti mallon hoion te estin eidenai ha te tis oide kai ha mê) – which, of course, we said was knowing oneself (touto gar dêpou ephamen einai to gignôskein hauton), that is sôphronein [D. Watt: ‘being self-controlled’] (kai sôphronein), didn’t we (ê gar;)?’ – Critias: ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge). And it does, I think, follow (kai sumbainei ge pou), Socrates (ô Sôkrates). If a man possesses knowledge (ei gar tis echei epistêmên) which knows itself (hê autê hautên gignôskei), he would himself be like what he possesses (toioutos an autos eiê hoionper estin ho echei) … when a man possesses knowledge which is knowledge of itself (hotan de dê gnôsin autên hautês echê̢), he will then, of course, be knowing himself (gignôskôn pou autos heauton tote estai)’. – Socrates: ‘I don’t doubt (Ou touto amphisbêtô) that when a man possesses that which knows itself (hôs ouch hotan to hauto gignôskon tis echê̢) he will know himself (autos hauton gignôskei); but why, when he possesses that, must he necessarily know what he knows and what he doesn’t know (all’ echonti touto tis anankê eidenai ha te oiden kai ha mê oiden;)? – Critias: ‘Because (Hoti), Socrates (ô Sôkrates), the one is the same as the other (t’auton estin touto ekeinô̢).’ – Socrates: ‘Perhaps (Isôs), but I don’t really think I’ve changed at all (all’ egô kinduneuô aei homoios einai), because I still don’t understand how knowing what one knows and knowing what one does not know are the same as that (ou gar au manthanô hôs estin to auto, ha oiden eidenai kai ha tis mê oiden eidenai).’ – Critias: ‘What do you mean (Pôs legeis)?’ (169d2-170a5)

As can be seen, in spite of Socrates’ harsh criticism of Critias, the latter continued to be engaged in the discussion, and what is more, when Socrates ended the discussion in despair at his inability to properly investigate the question of sôphrosunê, and Charmides brushed Socrates’ self-critical misgivings aside, declaring himself to be in need of being charmed by Socrates day by day, Critias said: ‘Charmides (ô Charmidê), by doing that (ên dra̢s touto), you’ll prove to me (emoi estai touto tekmêrion) that you sôphroneis [D. W. ‘are self-controlled’] (hoti sôphroneis) – if you turn to Socrates for charming (ên epa̢dein parechê̢ Sôkratei), and don’t disappoint him (kai mê apoleipê̢ toutou) in anything either great or small (mête mega mête smikron).’ (176b5-8)

Obviously, Watt is wrong when he says that Plato in the dialogue showed Critias as both quite lacking in sôphrosunê and quite ignorant of its meaning. But couldn’t Critias’ endorsement of Charmides’ resolution to become a disciple of Socrates be taken as a testimony that in consequence of his discussion on sôphrosunê with Socrates Critias himself acquired sôphrosunê? If so, it might be argued, then the Charmides can be viewed in the light of Xenophon’s assertion concerning Critias and Alcibiades: ‘So long as they were with Socrates (heôs men Sôkratei sunêstên), they found in him an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions (edunasthên ekeinô̢ chrômenô summachô̢ tôn mê kalôn epithumiôn kratein, Mem. I.ii.24, tr. Marchant).’ Watt’s main point, that Plato in the dialogue showed that Socrates tried to educate Critias and Charmides in sôphrosunê, and that by trying ‘he saved himself from any possible accusation of responsibility for their later crimes,’ could thus stand, and the currently accepted dating of the Charmides – as an early dialogue, written after Socrates’ death – could be preserved after all.

The closing scene militates against it. Charmides tells Critias: ‘Rest assured that I will follow him (Hôs akolouthêsontos) and won’t disappoint him (kai mê apoleipsomenou). I’d be behaving terribly (deina gar an poioiên) if I didn’t obey you (ei mê peithoimên soi), my guardian (tô̢ epitropô̢), and didn’t do (kai mê poioiên) what you tell me (ha keleueis).’ – Critias: ‘I’m telling you (Alla mên keleuô egôge).’ – Charmides: ‘Well then, I’ll do it (Poiêsô toinun), starting today (apo tautêsi tês hêmeras arxamenos).’ – Socrates: ‘What are you two plotting to do (Houtoi, ti bouleuesthon poiein;)?’ – Charmides: ‘Nothing (Ouden), we’ve done our plotting (alla bebouleumetha).’ – Socrates, addressing Charmides: ‘Are you going to resort to the use of force (Biasê̢ ara), without even giving me a preliminary hearing (kai oud’ anakrisin moi dôseis)?’ – Charmides: ‘I certainly am (Hôs biasomenou), since Critias here orders me to (epeidêper hode ge epitattei) – which is why you should plot what you’ll do (pros tauta su au bouleuou hoti poiêseis).’ – Socrates: ‘But there’s no time left for plotting (All’ oudemia leipetai boulê). Once you’re intent on doing something (soi gar epicheirounti prattein hotioun) and are resorting to the use of force (kai biazomenô̢), no man alive will be able to resist you (oudeis hoios t’ estai enantiousthai anthrôpôn).’ – Charmides: ‘Well then (Mê toinun), don’t you resist me either (mêde su enantiou).’ – Socrates closes the dialogue with the words: ‘I won’t resist you then’ (Ou toinun enantiôsomai).’ (175e2-176d5)

This is why I am dating the dialogue in 404 B. C., in the early days of the reign of the Thirty, which Xenophon characterises as follows: ‘Now at Athens the Thirty had been chosen (Hoi de triakonta hê̢rethêsan men) as soon as the long walls (epei tachista ta makra teichê̢) and the walls around Piraeus (kai ta peri ton Peiraia) were demolished (kathê̢rethê); although chosen, however (hairethentes de), for the purpose (eph’ hô̢te) of framing a constitution (sungrapsai nomous) under which (kath’ houstinas) to conduct the government (politeusointo), they continually delayed framing and publishing this constitution (toutous men aei emellon sungraphein te kai apodeiknunai), but they appointed a Senate and the other magistrates (boulên te kai tas allas archas katestêsan) as they saw fit (hôs edokei autois). Then (epeita), as a first step (prôton men), they arrested and brought to trial for their lives those persons who, by common knowledge, had made a living in the time of democracy by acting as informers and had been offensive to the aristocrats (hous pantes ê̢desan en tê̢ dêmokratia̢ apo sukophantias zôntas kai tois kalois k’agathois bareis ontas, sullambanontes hupêgon thanatou); and the Senate (kai hê boulê) was glad (hêdeôs) to pronounce these people guilty (autôn katepsêphizeto), and the rest of the citizens (hoi te alloi) – at least all who were conscious that they were not of the same sort themselves (hosoi sunê̢desan heautois mê ontes toioutoi) – were not at all displeased (ouden êchthonto).’ (Hellenica II.iii.11-12, tr. C. L. Brownson)

I cannot see how Plato could have written the closing scene in the Charmides after the Thirty attempted to implicate Socrates in their crimes, of which Socrates said at his trial: ‘when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power (epeidê de oligarchia egeneto), they sent for me and four others into the rotunda (hoi triakonta au metapempsamenoi me pempton auton eis tên tholon), and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis (prosetaxan agagein ek Salaminos Leonta ton Salaminion), as they wanted to put him to death (hina apothanoi) … when we came out of the rotunda (all’ epeidê ek tês tholou exêlthomen) the other four (hoi men tettares) went to Salamis (ô̢chonto eis Salamina) and fetched Leon (kai êgagon Leonta), but I went quietly home (egô de ô̢chomên apiôn oikade). For which I might have lost my life (kai isôs an dia tauta apethanon), had not the power of the Thirty (ei mê hê archê) shortly afterwards come to an end (dia tacheôn kateluthê).’ (Plato, Apology 32c4-d8, tr. B. Jowett)

In his old age, in the Seventh Letter, Plato pointed to this incident as the decisive reason after which ‘I became indignant (eduscherana te) and I withdrew myself (kai emauton epanêgagon) from the evils of those days (apo tôn tote kakôn, 325a4-5)’.

Friday, July 7, 2017

5f Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating, with reference to the Phaedrus

At 165b Critias defined sôphrosunê as knowing oneself. At 165c-166b Socrates raised objection against the possibility and usefulness of such knowledge. At 166 c Critias objected that Socrates was trying to refute him and ignoring what the discussion was all about. At 166c-d Socrates rejected Critias’ criticism: if he was subjecting to rigorous scrutiny what Critias was saying, he was subjecting to scrutiny his own views as well. He did so, for he was afraid that he might think he knew what in fact he did not know.

Socrates: ‘Well then, Critias, don’t be discouraged (Tharrôn toinun, ô makarie), and give me the answer, as you see it, to the question (apokrinomenos to erôtômenon hopê̢ soi phainetai). Never mind (ea chairein) whether it’s Critias (eite Kritias estin) or Socrates (eite Sôkratês) who is the one refuted (ho elenchomenos). Just concentrate on the argument itself (all’ autô̢ prosechôn ton noun tô̢ logô̢), and consider (skopei) what on earth will become of it if it is examined (hopê̢ pote ekbêsetai elenchomenos).’ – Critias: ‘I’ll do that (Alla poiêsô houtô), because I think that what you’re saying is quite reasonable (dokeis gar moi metria legein).’ (166d7-e3)

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D. Watt translates elenchomenos at 166e1 as ‘refuted’, at 166e2 as ‘examined’. In this case, the distinction is arbitrary. With Socrates, the primary aim is always examination – self-examination, whereas with the sophists the primary emphasis was on refuting and not being refuted.

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Socrates: ‘Well then, tell me what do you say about sôphrosunê (Lege toinun peri tês sôphrosunês pôs legeis)?’ – Critias: ‘Well, I say (Legô toinun) that it alone (hoti monê) of the knowledges (tôn allôn epistêmôn) is the knowledge both of itself and of the other knowledges (autê te hautês estin kai tôn allôn epistêmôn epistêmê).’ – S. ‘Would it be a knowledge of ignorance too (Oukoun kai anepistêmosunês epistêmê an eiê), if it is a knowledge of knowledge (eiper kai epistêmês;)? Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge). – S. ‘So the sôphrôn [D.W. ‘the self-controlled man’] alone (Ho ara sôphrôn monos) will know himself (autos te hauton gnôsetai) and be able to examine (kai hoios te estai exetasai) what in fact he knows (ti te tunchanei eidôs) and what he doesn’t (kai ti mê), and he will be capable of looking at other people in the same way (kai tous allous hôsautôs dunatos estai episkopein) to see what any of them knows and thinks he knows (ti tis oiden kai oietai), if he does know (eiper oiden); and what, on the other hand, he thinks he knows (kai ti au oietai men eidenai), but does not (oiden d’ ou). No one else will be able to do that (tôn de allôn oudeis). In fact, that is the sôphronein [D.W. ‘being self-controlled’] (kai estin dê touto to sôphronein te) and sôphrosunê [D.W. ‘self-control’] (kai sôphrosunê) and knowing oneself (kai to heauton auton gignôskein) – knowing (to eidenai) what one knows (ha te oiden) and what one doesn’t (kai ha mê oiden). Is that (ara tauta estin) what you’re saying (ha legeis;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes (Egôge).’ – S. ‘Well then, third time lucky (Palin toinun, to triton tô̢ sôtêri). Let’s go back to the beginning again, as it were (hôsper ex archês), and consider (episkepsômetha) – whether or not it is possible for that to be the case (prôton men ei dunaton estin tout’ einai ê ou) – to know that one knows and that one does not know (to ha oiden kai ha mê oiden eidenai hoti oide kai hoti ouk oiden); and secondly (epeita), if it is perfectly possible (ei hoti malista dunaton), what benefit our knowing that would bring us (tis an eiê hêmin ôphelia eidosin auto).’ – Cr. ‘Indeed we ought to look at that (Alla chrê skopein).’ (166e4-167b5)

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D. Watt notes on ‘third time lucky’ (Palin toinun, to triton tô̢ sôtêri): ‘Literally, “the third (libation) to (Zeus) the Saviour”. The third cup of wine of a libation was dedicated to Zeus the Saviour. To drink this third cup was to pray [my emphasis, J.T.] for good luck.’

Watt’s note goes some way to amending the frivolous ‘third time lucky’. In the discussion that follows, the possibility and the benefit of Socrates’ scrutinizing and investigating himself is exposed to doubt, and in the dialogue it remains unresolved.

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Socrates begins the proposed investigation by disputing the very possibility of self-reflexivity: ‘Come on then (Ithi dê), Critias (ô Kritia), look at it (skepsai), and see whether you can be shown to be closer to a solution in these matters than I (ean ti peri autôn euporôteros phanê̢s emou), because I am at a loss (egô men gar aporô). Shall I tell you where I find myself in difficulties (hê̢ de aporô, phrasô soi;)? – Critias: ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘Well then, if what we were saying a moment ago really is the case, won’t it all amount to this, that there is some one knowledge which is the knowledge of nothing but itself and the other knowledges (Allo ti oun, panta taut’ an eiê, ei estin hoper su nundê eleges, mia tis epistêmê, hê ouk allou tinos estin ê heautês te kai tôn allôn epistêmôn epistêmê), this same knowledge being the knowledge of ignorance too (kai dê kai anepistêmosunês hê autê hautê;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ (167b6-c3)

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D. Watt puts the foregoing Socrates’ entry into a ‘we’ form; in fact, Socrates starts by attributing the starting point of the investigation to Critias, as Jowett correctly translates. Socrates: ‘Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this (Allo ti oun, panta taut’ an eiê, ei estin hoper su nundê eleges): that there must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of other sciences (mia tis epistêmê, hê ouk allou tinos estin ê heautês te kai tôn allôn epistêmôn epistêmê), and that the same is also the science of the absence of science (kai dê kai anepistêmosunês hê autê hautê;)?’

It is only in his next entry that Socrates identifies himself with Critias’ position, using the ‘we’ instead of ‘you’.

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Socrates: ‘See (Ide dê) what a strange thing (hôs atopon) we’re trying to say, my friend (epicheiroumen, ô hetaire, legein). If you look at the same proposition in other cases (en allois gar pou to auto touto ean skopê̢s), it’ll come to seem to you (doxei soi), I think (hôs egô̢mai), that it is impossible (adunaton einai).’ – Critias: ‘How (Pôs dê)? In what cases (kai pou;)?’. – S. ‘In these (En toisde). Consider (ennoei gar) whether you think there is a vision (ei soi dokei opsis tis einai) which is not the vision of what the other visions are visions of (hê hôn men hai allai opseis eisin, ouk estin toutôn opsis), but is the vision of itself and the other visions (heautês de kai tôn allôn opseôn opsis estin), and non-visons in the same way (kai mê opseôn hôsautôs): and though it is a vision, it sees no colour (kai chrôma men hora̢ ouden opsis ousa), only itself (hautên de) and the other visions (kai tas allas opseis). Do you think there is such a vision (dokei tis soi einai toiautê;)?’ – Cr. ‘Heaven’s (Ma Di’), no, I don’t (ouk emoige).’ – S. ‘What about a hearing (Ti de akoên) which hears no sound (he phônês men oudemias akouei); but hears itself and the other hearings (hautês de kai tôn allôn akoôn akouei) and non-hearings (kai tôn mê akoôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘No, not that either (Oude touto).’ – S. ‘Take all the senses together (Sullêbdên dê skopei peri pasôn tôn aisthêseôn). Do you think there is some sense of the senses (ei tis soi dokei einai aisthêseôn men aisthêsis) and of itself (kai heautês) which, however, senses nothing of what the other senses sense (hôn de dê hai allai aisthêseis aisthanontai, mêdenos aisthanomenê;)?’ – Cr. ‘No, I don’t (Ouk emoige).’ – S. ‘Do you think there is some desire (All’ epithumia dokei tis soi einai) which is the desire for no pleasure (hêtis hêdonês oudemias estin epithumia), but for itself (hautês de) and the other desires (kai tôn allôn epithumiôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘Certainly not (Ou dêta).’ – S. ‘Nor indeed, I think, is there a wish (Oude mên boulêsis, hôs egô̢mai) which wishes for no good (hê agathon men ouden bouletai), but which wishes for itself and for the other wishes (hautên de kai tas allas boulêseis bouletai).’ – Cr. ‘No, definitely not (Ou gar oun).’ – S. ‘Would you say there was some love of that kind (Erôta de phaiês an tina einai toiouton), which is actually the love of no beautiful thing (hos tunchanei ôn erôs kalou men oudenos), but of itself (hautou de) and the other loves (kai tôn allôn erôtôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘No, I don’t (Ouk egôge).’ – S. ‘Have you ever observed a fear (Phobon de êdê tina katanenoêkas) which fears itself and the other fears (hos heauton men kai tous allous phobous phobeitai), but fears none of the things which are frightening (tôn deinôn d’ oude hen phobeitai;)?’ – Cr. ‘No, I haven’t (Ou katanenoêka).’ – S. ‘Or any opinion (Doxan de) which is an opinion of opinions (doxôn doxan) and of itself (kai hautês), but which holds no opinion about what the other opinions hold opinions about (hôn de hai allai doxazousin mêden doxazousan;)?’ Cr. ‘Not at all (Oudamôs).’ (167d4-168a5)

Socrates: ‘But it would appear we’re saying that there is some such knowledge (All’ epistêmên, hôs eoiken, phamen tina einai toiautên), which is the knowledge of no branch of learning (hêtis mathêmatos men oudenos estin epistêmê), but is the knowledge of itself and the other knowledges (hautês de kai tôn allôn epistêmôn epistêmê)?’ – Critias: ‘Yes, we are (Phamen gar)!’ – S. ‘Isn’t it strange, then (Oukoun atopon), if it really does exist (ei ara kai estin;)? In fact, let’s not state categorically just yet that it doesn’t exist (mêden gar pô diischurizômetha hôs ouk estin), but let’s keep investigating whether it does exist (all’ ei estin eti skopômen).’ – Cr. ‘You’re right (Orthôs legeis).’ (168a6-b1)

Socrates: ‘Come on, then (Phere dê). This knowledge is (estin hautê hê epistêmê) the knowledge of something (tinos epistêmê), and it has some such faculty (kai echei tina toiautên dunamin), so as to be of something (hôste tinos einai), hasn’t it (ê gar;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘For example, we say that that which is superior has some such faculty (Kai gar to meizon phamen toiautên tina echein dunamin), so as to be superior of something, don’t we (hôste tinos einai meizon;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes, it does (Echei gar).’ – S. ‘Then that something is inferior (Oukoun elattonos tinos), if the other is to be superior (eiper estai meizon).’ – Cr. ’It must be (Anankê).’ – S. ‘Now, if we were to find some superior thing (Ei oun ti heuroimen meizon) which is the superior of those things which are superior (ho tôn men meizonôn estin meizon) and of itself (kai heautou), but the superior of none of those things of which the other superior things are the superiors (hôn de t’alla meizô estin mêdenos meizon), I’m quite sure that what would be the case with it would be this (pantôs an pou ekeino d’ autô̢ huparchoi): if it were the superior of itself (eiper heautou meizon eiê), it would also be the inferior of itself (kai elatton heautou einai), wouldn’t it (ê ou;)?’ – Cr. ‘It would certainly have to (Pollê anankê), Socrates (ô Sôkrates).’ (168b2-c3)

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I don’t know why D. Watt translated meizon (‘bigger’) as ‘superior‘, elatton (‘smaller’) as ‘inferior’; one might imagine that one and the same person can suffer both a superiority and an inferiority complex. Socrates chose ‘greater’ and ‘smaller’, for one and the same thing cannot be greater of itself and smaller of itself. Jowett translates: ‘And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself and greater than other great things (Ei oun ti heuroimen meizon ho tôn men meizonôn estin meizon kai heautou), but not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater (hôn de t’alla meizô estin mêdenos meizon), then that thing would have the property (pantôs an pou ekeino d’ autô̢ huparchoi) of being greater and also less than itself (eiper heautou meizon eiê kai elatton heautou einai, ê ou;)?’ – Critias: ‘That, Socrates, is the inevitable inference (Pollê anankê, ô Sôkrates).’

***

Socrates: ‘And if something is the double (Oukoun kai ei ti diplasion estin) both of the other doubles (tôn te allôn diplasiôn) and of itself (kai heautou), it would itself constitute a half (hêmiseos dêpou ontos heautou te), as would the others (kai tôn allôn), if it were double (diplasion an eiê), since there is not (ou gar estin), I’m sure (pou), a double of anything (allou diplasion) but a half (ê hêmiseos).’ – Critias: ‘True (Alêthê).’ – S. ‘That which is superior of itself (Pleon de hautou on ‘That which is more than itself’) will be the inferior of itself too (ou kai elatton estai; ‘won’t it be les than itself as well?’), and what is heavier (kai baruteron on), lighter (kouphoteron), and what is older (kai presbuteron on), younger (neôteron), and so on (kai t’alla panta hôsautôs ‘and the same of other things’, tr. Jowett). Whatever relates its own faculty to itself (hotiper an tên heautou dunamin pros heauto echê̢) will also have that essential nature (ou kai ekeinên hexei tên ousian) to which its faculty was related, won’t it (pros hên hê dunamis autou ên;)? I mean something like this (legô de to toionde): hearing, for example (hoion hê akoê), we say (phamen) is the hearing of nothing other than sound (ouk allou tinos ên akoê ê phônês), isn’t it (ê gar;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes (Nai).’ – S. ‘If it is to hear itself (Okoun eiper autê heautês akousetai), it will hear itself as possessing a sound (phônên echousês heautês akousetai), since it couldn’t hear otherwise (ou gar an allôs akouseien).’ – Cr. ‘Most definitely (Pollê anankê).’ – S. ‘And vision (Kai hê opsis), of course (ge pou), my good friend (ô ariste), if it is to see itself (eiper opsetai autê heautên), must have some colour (chrôma ti autên anankê echein), since vision will certainly never see anything that is colourless (achrôn gar opsis ouden mê pote idê̢).’ – Cr. ‘No, it definitely won’t (Ou gar oun).’ – S. ‘Do you see (Hora̢s), then (oun), Critias (ô Kritia), that of all the examples we’ve gone through (hoti hosa dielêluthamen), for some it seems to us absolutely impossible (ta men autôn adunata pantapasi phainetai hêmin), while in the case of the others it is very difficult to believe (ta d’ apisteitai sphodra), that they could ever relate their own faculty to themselves (mê pot’ an tên heautôn dunamin pros heauta schein;)? It is absolutely impossible for magnitudes and numbers and the like (megethê men gar kai plêthê kai ta toiauta pantapasin adunaton), isn’t it (ê ouchi;)? – Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘Whereas hearing (Akoê d’au) and vision (kai opsis), and also (kai eti ge) motion moving itself (kinêsis autê heautên kinein) and heat burning itself (kai thermotês kaein) and everything like that (kai panta ta toiauta), would excite disbelief in some people (tois men apistian an paraschoi), though perhaps not in others (isôs de tisin ou).’ (168c4-169a1)

***

In the Phaedrus Plato’s Socrates proves the soul’s immortality, defining it as ‘motion moving itself’: ‘All souls is immortal (Psuchê pasa athanatos); for that which is ever in motion is immortal (to gar aeikinêton athanaton). But that which while imparting motion is itself moved by something else (to d’ allo kinoun kai hup’ allou kinoumenon) can cease to be in motion (paulan echon kinêseôs), and therefore can cease to live (paulan echei zôês); it is only that which moves itself (monon dê to hauto kinoun) that never intermits its motion, inasmuch as it cannot abandon its own nature (hate ouk apoleipon heauto, oupote lêgei kinoumenon); moreover this self-mover is the source and first principle of motion for all other things that are moved (alla kai tois allois hosa kineitai touto pêgê kai archê kinêseôs) … The self-mover, then, is the first principle of motion (houtô dê kinêseôs men archê to auto hauto kinoun): and it is as impossible that it should be destroyed as that it should come into being (touto de out apollusthai oute gignesthai dunaton): were it otherwise, the whole universe, the whole of that which comes to be, would collapse into immobility (ê panta ton ouranon pasan te genesin sumpesousan stênai), and never find another source of motion to bring it back into being (kai mêpote authis echein hothen kinêthenta genêsetai). And now that we have seen that that which is moved by itself is immortal (athanatou de pephasmenou tou huph’ heautou kinoumenou), we shall feel no scruple in affirming that precisely that is the essence and definition of the soul, to wit self-motion (psuchês ousian te kai logon touton auton tis legôn ouk aischuneitai 245c5-e3, tr. Hackforth).

***

Putting the definition of the soul as the self-moving motion into Socrates’ mouth, Plato in the Phaedrus fragrantly violated his self-awareness of ignorance. Socrates had to protest; the Apology testifies to it that he must have protested, or else he could not have founded his defence in front of the jury on his philosophic ignorance; Charmides testifies to it that Plato enacted Socrates’ protest in the dialogue that followed the Phaedrus.

Nevertheless, one may say on behalf of Plato as the author of the Phaedrus that the endeavour to attain self-knowledge could be understood as self-motion, and thus as an extension of and reflection on Socrates’ philosophic activities. This is why Socrates has been driven to subject to his radical doubting his pursuit of self-knowledge.

Socrates’ reaction to the Phaedrus appears to have reminded Plato of the way Socrates had reacted to the Pythian oracle, which his friend Chaerephon brought from Delphi: ‘he actually asked the oracle (êreto gar dê) to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was (ei tis emou eiê sophôteros), and the Pythian prophetess answered (aneilen oun hê Puthia) that there was no man wiser (mêdena sophôteron einai)’. (Pl. Apology 21a5-7, tr. Jowett). If so, this is why in the introductory paragraph of the Charmides it is Chaerephon who welcomes Socrates after his return from the military camp at Potidaea (153a-b), and why it is Chaerephon’s praise of Charmides’ beauty that occasions Socrates’ enquiry into sôphrosunê (154d).

***

Giving vent to Socrates’ re-emphasized philosophic not-knowing, Plato at the same time indicated that Socrates’ scrutiny and his doubts did not affect his, that is Plato’s, view of the soul as the self-moving mover. When Socrates’ doubts as to the possibility of self-knowledge reached their finale by pointing to ‘motion moving itself (kinêsis autê heautên kinein) and heat burning itself (kai thermotês kaein)’, he continued: ‘What we need, my friend, is some great man (megalou dê tinos, ô phile, andros dei) to determine satisfactorily for all instances (hostis touto kata pantôn hikanôs diairêsetai) whether none of the things which exist (poteron ouden tôn ontôn) relates its own faculty to itself naturally (tên hautou dunamin auto pros heauto pephuken echein), but to something else instead (alla pros allo), or whether some do (ê ta men), but others don’t (ta d’ ou) … I don’t believe I’m competent to settle these questions (egô men ou pisteuô emautô̢ hikanos einai tauta dielesthai). (169a1-8)

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Let me end this post by noting that in Plato’s thought ‘motion moving itself’ (kinêsis autê heautên kinein) and ‘heat burning itself’ (kai thermotês kaein), with which Socrates’ doubts concerning the possibility of self-reflective entities culminated, are, presumably, closely related. Plato was a Heraclitean prior to his philosophic encounter with Socrates, as Aristotle informs us in Metaphysics 987a33-b1; Heraclitus proclaimed that ‘this cosmos (kosmon tonde), which is the same for all beings (ton auton hapantôn), has not been created by any god or man (oute tis theôn oute anthrôpôn epoiêse), but always was (all’ ên aei), is (kai estin), and will be the ever-living fire (kai estai pur aeizôn, Diels-Kranz, frgm. B 30).’

Sunday, July 2, 2017

5e Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating

To make sense of Socrates’ next entry, I must give a gist of the preceding discussion. Critias defined sôphrosunê as ‘knowing oneself’, and Socrates noted that in that case it is knowledge. Referring to medicine, the knowledge of what is healthy, he said that if one asked what is its use, the answer would be that it produces health. In a similar way he referred to the art of building and pointed out that the same could be said and asked concerning the other arts. Then he asked what is the product of sôphrosunê. So Critias asked what is the product of the art of arithmetic or geometry, maintaining that Socrates could not point to any products concerning such arts.

Socrates: ‘That’s true (Alêthê legeis), but I can point to this (alla tode soi echô deixai) – what each of these knowledges is knowledge of (tinos estin epistêmê hekastê toutôn tôn epistêmôn), that thing being different (ho tunchanei on allo) from the knowledge itself (autês tês epistêmês). For example (hoion), arithmetic (hê logistikê) is the knowledge of the even (estin pou tou artiou) and odd (kai perittou), of the way in which members of the one group are numerically related to one another and to members of the other group (plêthous hopôs echei pros hauta kai pros allêla), isn’t it (ê gar;)?’ – Critias: ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘Aren’t the odd and the even different (Oukoun heterou ontos tou perittou kai artiou) from arithmetic itself (autês tês logistikês;)?’ – Cr. ‘Of course (Pôs d’ ou;).’ – S. ‘And again (Kai mên au), weighing (hê statikê) is the weighing of the heavier and the lighter weight (tou baruterou te kai kouphoterou stathmou estin statikê); but the heavy and the light are different (heteron de estin to baru te kai kouphon) from weighing itself (tês statikês autês). You admit that (sunchôreis;)?’ – Cr. ‘I do (Egôge).’ – S. ‘Tell me (Lege), then (dê), what is sôphrosunê the knowledge of (kai hê sôphrosunê tinos estin epistêmê), that thing being different (ho tunchanei heteron on) from sôphrosunê itself (autês tês sôphrosunês)?’ – Cr. ‘That’s just it (Touto estin ekeino), Socrates (ô Sôkrates). You’ve come in your investigation (ep’ auto hêkeis ereunôn) to the question of what the difference is (to hô̢ diapherei) between sôphrosunê and all the other knowledges (pasôn tôn epistêmôn hê sôphrosunê). You’re trying to find some similarity (su de homoiotêta tina zêteis) between it and the others (autês tais allais). There isn’t any (to d’ ouk estin houtôs). All the others are the knowledges of something else (all’ hai men allai pasai allou eisin epistêmai), not of themselves (heautôn d’ ou). Sôphrosunê alone (hê de monê) is the knowledge both of the other knowledges (tôn te allôn epistêmê esti) and of its own self (kai autê heautês). You’re well aware of that (kai tauta se pollou dei lelêthenai). Indeed I think you’re doing what you said just now you were not doing (alla gar oimai ho arti ouk ephêstha poiein, touto poieis): you’re ignoring the real point at issue in our discussion in your efforts to refute me (eme gar epicheireis elenchein, easas peri hou ho logos estin)’ (166a3-c6)

***

At this point, every attentive reader of Plato’s Phaedrus must have agreed with what Critias says here. In the introductory section of the Phaedrus Socrates proclaimed: ‘I can’t as yet (ou dunamai pô) “know myself”, as the inscription at Delphi enjoins (kata to Delphikon gramma gnônai emauton); and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous (geloion dê moi phainetai touto eti agnoounta) to enquire into extraneous matters (ta allotria skopein, 229e5-230oa1, tr. Hackforth). Viewed from the point of the Charmides, seen in the light of Critias’ words, all that follows this proclamation of Socrates in the Phaedrus can be seen as Plato’s presentation of Socrates endeavouring to satisfy the Delphic command ‘Know thyself’. Viewed from the point of the Phaedrus, it is the Phaedrus that enables Critias to view sôphrosunê, defined as self-knowledge, as ‘the knowledge both of the other knowledges and of its own self’.

***

Socrates: ‘How can you believe that if I’m trying my hardest to refute you (Hoion poieis hêgoumenos, ei hoti malista se elenchô), I’m doing it for any other reason (allou tinos heneka elenchein) than that for which I’d investigate what I say myself (ê houper heneka k’an emauton diereunô̢mên ti legô)! You see, my great fear is that I may some time not notice that I’m thinking I know something when in fact I don’t (phoboumenos mê pote lathô oiomenos men ti eidenai, eidôs de mê). And this, I tell you, is what I’m doing now (kai nun dê oun egôge phêmi touto poiein): looking at the argument mostly for my own sake (ton logon skopein malista men emautou heneka), but perhaps for the sake of my friends as well (isôs de dê kai tôn allôn epitêdeiôn). Or don’t you think that it is a common good for almost all men (ê ou koinon oiei agathon einai schedon ti pasin anthrôpois) that each thing that exists should be revealed (gignesthai kataphanes hekaston tôn ontôn) as it is (hopê̢ echei;)?’ – Critias: ‘I do indeed (Kai mala, egôge).’ (166c7-d7)

***

The discussion appears to have reached the point at which Socrates, intent on refuting Critias, is going to refute himself. His motivation in doing so, as he admits, is his fear that he might think he knew something when in fact he didn’t. This might seem to be a position of a genuine sceptic, for whom the acquiescence in not-knowing is the ultimate aim, for he believes that nothing can be known. But such sceptic position is alien to Socrates. He ends the passionate plea to Critias by proclaiming that his preoccupation in all this is his search for knowledge, for truth, for ‘it is a common good for almost all men that each thing that exists should be revealed as it is’.

***

Diogenes Laertius writes in his ‘Life of Plato’: ‘They say (phasi de kai) that, on hearing Plato read the Lysis, Socrates exclaimed, “By Heracles (Sôkratên akousanta ton Lusin anagignôskontos “Hêrakleis”, eipein) what a number of lies this young man is telling about me (hôs polla mou katapseudeth’ ho neaniskos)!” For he has included in the dialogue much that Socrates never said (ouk oliga gar hôn ouk eirêke Sôkratês gegraphen h’anêr).’ (III. 35, tr. R. D. Hicks) Diogenes’ phasi ‘they say’ refers to an indefinite number of sources, in which he found this information.

In the Charmides Plato took the liberty both with Socrates and with Critias. Viewed from the point of the Charmides, Socrates’ two speeches on Love, the subsequent discussion of their merits, which turns into an outline of rhetoric founded on dialectic, and the concluding discussion of the written and the spoken word can be seen as developed from Socrates’ self-examination and as encompassed within his self-knowledge. Viewed from the point of the Phaedrus, the Phaedrus enables Critias to define self-knowledge as ‘the knowledge both of the other knowledges (tôn te allôn epistêmê esti) and of its own self’.

Friday, June 30, 2017

5d Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating, with reference to his Phaedrus and Apology

Critias continues: ‘Indeed, I’d almost say that is what sôphrosunê [D.W. ‘self-control’] really is (schedon gar ti egôge auto touto phêmi einai sôphrosunên), knowing oneself (to gignôskein heauton). I agree with the man who dedicated the inscription to that effect at Delphi (kai sumpheromai tô̢ en Delphois anathenti to toiouton gramma). The fact is, I think that the inscription was dedicated to serve instead of “Hail”, as a greeting from the god to the people entering the temple (kai gar touto houtô moi dokei to gramma anakeisthai, hôs dê prosrêsis ousa tou theou tôn eisiontôn anti tou Chaire), as though the god felt that this form of greeting wasn’t correct (hôs toutou men ouk orthou ontos tou prosrêmatos, tou chairein), and that they ought not to recommend that to one another (oude dein touto parakeleuesthai allêlois), but rather sôphronein [D.W. ‘self-control’] (alla sôphronein). So this is how the god speaks to the people who enter his temple (houtô men dê ho theos prosagoreuei tous eisiontas eis to hieron) … Sôphronei [D.W. “Be self-controlled”] … because, as the inscription implies and as I maintain, “Know yourself” and Sôphronei {D.W. “Be self-controlled”] are the same thing (to gar Gnôthi sauton kai to Sôphronei estin men t’auton, hôs ta grammata phêsin kai egô).’ (164d3-165a1)

***

In the Phaedrus Socrates proclaimed: ‘I can’t as yet (ou dunamai pô) “know myself”, as the inscription at Delphi enjoins (kata to Delphikon gramma gnônai emauton); and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous (geloion dê moi phainetai touto eti agnoounta) to enquire into extraneous matters (ta allotria skopein, 229e5-230oa1, tr. Hackforth).’

I ended ‘5b’ with the following exchange: Socrates: ‘So it’s not the man who does the bad things, but the man who does good things who sôphronei [‘self-controls’] (Ouk ara sôphronei ho ta kaka prattôn, all’ ho agatha;)?’ – Critias: ‘Don’t you think so, my good fellow (Soi de, ô beltiste, ouch houtô dokei;)?’ – Socrates: ‘Never mind (Ea), let’s not consider what I think just yet (mê gar pô to emoi dokoun skopômen), but rather what you’re saying now (all’ ho su legeis nun).’ (163b2-e7)

With Critias defining sôphrosunê as ‘knowing oneself’ (to gignôskein heauton), are we entering the stage in which Socrates will subject to investigation his to emoi dokoun, ‘what I think’?

***

Critias went on to say: ‘I let you have all we said before’ (ta men emprosthen soi panta aphiêmi, 165a8-b1)

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Jowett translates: ‘My object is to leave the previous discussion.’ Critias says: ‘All that was said before, I let go.’ The enclitic soi (the dative of the personal pronoun su ‘you’) doesn’t mean here ‘to you’, i.e. ‘I’m leaving it to you’, as Watt’s translation appears to be suggesting, but simply gives Critias’ words a personal touch.

***

Critas continued: ‘perhaps you were more right there (isôs men gar ti su eleges peri autôn orthoteron), perhaps I was (isôs d’ egô), but nothing of what we said was absolutely clear (saphes d’ ouden panu ên hôn elegomen). Now, however (Nun d’), I am willing (ethelô) to explain this fully to you (toutou soi didonai logon), unless you do agree (ei mê homologeis) that sôphrosunê is (sôphrosunên einai) knowing oneself (to gignôskein auton heauton).’ – Socrates: ‘But (All’), Critias (ô Kritia), you’re treating me as if I’m maintaining that I know what I’m asking about (su men hôs phaskontos emou eidenai peri hôn erôtô prospherê̢ pros me), and as if I’ll agree with you if I really want to (kai ean dê boulômai, homologêsontos soi). But it’s not like that (to d’ ouch houtôs echei). In fact (alla), I’m going along with you in investigating (zêtô gar aei meta sou) whatever proposition is made (to protithemenon), because I myself am in ignorance (dia to mê autos eidenai). So, when I’ve considered it (skepsamenos oun), I’m prepared to tell you (ethelô eipein) whether or not I agree with you (eite homologô eite mê). But wait (all’ episches) until I’ve considered it (heôs an skepsômai).’ – Cr. ‘Consider it (Skopei), then (dê).’ – S. I am (Kai gar skopô). If indeed sôphrosunê is knowing something (ei gar dê gignôskein ge ti estin hê sôphrosunê), it will obviously be a knowledge (dêlon hoti epistêmê tis an eiê) and a knowledge of something (kai tinos), won’t it (ê ou;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes (Estin), of oneself (heautou ge).’ – S. ‘Now (Oukoun), isn’t medicine the knowledge of what is healthy (kai iatrikê epistême estin tou hugieinou;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘Well then, if you asked me (Ei toinun me eroio su), “What use is medicine to us, inasmuch as it is the knowledge of what is healthy (iatrikê hugieinou epistêmê ousa ti hêmin chrêsimê estin)? What does it produce (kai ti apergazetai)?”, I’d say (eipoim’ an) that it is of considerable benefit (hoti ou smikran ôphelian) in that it produces health, a splendid product, for us (tên gar hugieian kalon hêmin ergon apergazetai). Do you accept that (ei apodechê̢ touto)?’ – Cr. ‘I do (Apodechomai).’ – S. ‘Well, if you then asked me what product I say the art of building, which is the knowledge of building, produces (Kai ei toinun me eroio tên oikodomikên, epistêmên ousan tou oikodomein, ti phêmi ergon apergazesthai), I’d say buildings (eipoim’ an hoti oikêseis); and the same for the other arts (hôsautôs de kai tôn allôn technôn). Now, since you say that sôphrosunê is the knowledge of oneself, you ought to be able to tell me the answer in the case of sôphrosunê, when I ask (chrê oun kai se huper tês sôphrosunês, epeidê phê̢s autên heautou epistêmên einai echein eipein erôtêthenta), “Critias (Ô Kritia), what splendid product worthy of the name does sôphrosunê, in so far as it is knowledge of oneself, produce for us (sôphrosunê, epistêmê ousa heautou, ti kalon hêmin ergon apergazetai kai axion tou onomatos;)?” Come on then (ithi oun), tell me (eipe).’ – Cr. ‘But (All’) Socrates (ô Sôkrates), your method of investigating the question is wrong (ouk orthôs zêteis). It isn’t like the other knowledges (ou gar homia hautê pephuken tais allais epistêmais), and they aren’t like one another either (oude ge hai allai allêlais); but you’re conducting the investigation as if it were (su d’ hôs homoiôn ousôn poiê̢ tên zêtêsin). For tell me (epei lege moi), what is the product of the art of arithmetic or geometry, in the way the house is the product of the art of building (tês logistikês technês ê tês geômetrikês ti estin toiouton ergon hoion oikia oikodomikês), a cloak of the art of weaving (ê himation huphantikês), or many other such products of many arts which one could point to (ê alla toiaut’ erga, ha polla an tis echoi pollôn technôn deixai;)? Can you point to any such products of those arts (echeis oun moi kai su toutôn toiouton ti ergon deixai)? You won’t be able to (all’ ouch hexeis).’ (165b1-166a2)

***

Doesn’t Critias have a point? Or are we to qualify the observation that Socrates’ investigation goes wrong as a manifestation of Critias’ ‘lacking in sôphrosunê’ and of his being ‘quite ignorant of its meaning beyond a superficial acquaintance with its conventional use within his aristocratic circle’, as D. Watt characterizes Critias’ performance in his ‘Introduction to Charmides’ (Plato, Early Socratic Dialogues, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 167)?

On my dating of the Phaedrus and the Charmides, the readers, who had just read the former, must wonder what’s going on. In the former Socrates clearly considered knowing oneself, enjoined by the Delphic inscription, as the most important knowledge one can aspire to, and the greatest task for himself personally. How can he now question its usefulness and its benefit?

Those who subscribe to the dominant twentieth century dating of the Phaedrus – Plato’s late dialogue, written after the Republic – and of the Charmides – an early dialogue, written after the death of Socrates as all the other dialogues – may rejoice. Don’t they have here a good reason to reject my dating of these two dialogues?

So let me point to the Apology, to the passage in which Socrates sheds light on his philosophic not-knowing. He says that his friend Chaerephon went to Delphi to ask the oracle ‘whether anyone was wiser than I was’ (ei tis emou eiê sophôteros), and that ‘the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser’ (aneilen oun Puthia mêdena sophôteron einai, 21a5-7): ‘When I heard the answer (tauta gar egô akousas), I said to myself (enethumoumên houtôsi), What can the god mean when he says that I am the wisest of men (Ti pote legei ho theos)? And what is the interpretation of this riddle (kai ti pote ainittetai)? For I know that I have no wisdom, small or great (egô gar dê oute mega oute smikron sunoida emautô̢ sophos ôn). What then can he mean (ti oun pote legei) when he says that I am the wisest of men (phaskôn eme sophôtaton einai;)? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie (ou gar dêpou pseudetai ge); that would be against his nature (ou gar themis autô̢). After long perplexity (kai polun men chronon êporoun ti pote legei), I thought of a method of trying the question (epeita mogis panu epi zêtêsin autou toiautên tina etrapomên). I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him (êlthon epi tina tôn dokountôn sophôn einai, hôs entautha eiper pou exelenxôn to manteion kai apophanôn tô̢ chrêsmô̢ hoti), “Here is a man who is wiser than I am (Houtosi emou sophôteros esti); but you said that I was the wisest (su d’ eme ephêstha).” Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him (diaskopôn oun touton) – his name I need not mention (onomati gar ouden deomai legein), he was a politician (ên de tis tôn politikôn); and in the process of examining him and talking with him, this, men of Athens, was what I found (pros hon skopôn toiouton ti epathon, ô andres Athênaioi, kai dialegomenos autô̢). I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself (edoxe moi houtos ho anêr dokein men einai sophos allois te pollois anthrôpois kai malista heautô̢, einai d’ ou); and thereupon I tried to explain to him (k’apeita epeirômên autô̢ deiknunai) that he thought himself wise (hoti oioito men einai sophos), but was not really wise (eiê d’ ou); and the consequence was (enteuthen oun) that he hated me (toutô̢ te apêchthomên), and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me (kai pollois tôn parontôn). So I left him, saying to myself as I went away (pros emauton d’oun apiôn elogizomên): Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really worth knowing, I am at least wiser than this fellow (hoti toutou men tou anthrôpou egô sophôteros eimi, kinduneuei men gar hêmôn oudeteros ouden kalon k’agathon eidenai) – for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows (all’ houtos men oietai ti eidenai ouk eidôs); I neither know nor think that I know (egô de, hôsper oun ouk oida, oude oiomai). In this little point, then, I seem to have advantage of him (eoika goun toutou ge smikrô̢ tini autô̢ toutô̢ sophôteros einai, hoti ha mê oida oude oiomai eidenai). Then I went to another (enteuthen ep’ allon ê̢a) who had still higher pretensions to wisdom (tôn ekeinou dokountôn sophôterôn einai), and my conclusion was exactly the same (kai moi t’auta tauta edoxe). Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others beside him (kai entautha k’akeinô̢ kai allois pollois apêchthomên). Then I went to one man after another (Meta taut’ oun êdê ephexês ê̢a), being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this (aisthanomenos men kai lupoumenos kai dediôs hoti apêchthanomên): but necessity was laid upon me (homoiôs de anankaion) – the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first (edokei einai to tou theou peri pleistou poieisthai). And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle (iteon oun, skopounti ton chrêsmon ti legei, epi pantas tous ti dokountas eidenai).’ (21b2-22a1, tr. B. Jowett)

As can be seen, self-knowledge was central to Socrates’ philosophic activities.

But what if one dated the Apology really late, took it as Plato’s imaginary piece about his imaginary Socrates? Can’t D. Watt’s thesis that Plato in the Charmides ‘is endeavouring to show that Socrates tried to educate Critias and Charmides in sôphrosunê, but failed. But by trying, he saved himself from any possible accusation of responsibility for their later crimes’ (Plato, Early Socratic Dialogues, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 167.), be thus preserved?

How is Socrates supposed to try to educate Critias and Charmides in sôphrosunê by casting doubt on the usefulness and benefit of self-knowledge?

On any dating of the dialogue, there is a problem. Will the further discussion of self-knowledge, which follows 165c-d, help us understand what’s going on in this dialogue?

Wednesday, June 28, 2017

5c Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating, with reference to his Republic

Critias: ‘Well (Alla mentoi), I’m saying that it is not the man who doesn’t do good things but does bad who is self-controlled (ton mê agatha alla kaka poiounta ou phêmi sôphronein), but that it is the man who does good things (ton de agatha) and not bad (all mê kaka) who is (sôphronein). That is, I define sôphrosunê [D.W. ‘self-control] quite plainly as doing good things (tên gar tôn agathôn praxin sôphrosunên einai saphôs soi diorizomai).’ – Socrates: ‘There’s probably no reason why that shouldn’t be true (Kai ouden ge se isôs kôluei alêthê legein). However, I am surprised (tode ge mentoi thaumazô) that you believe that men who are self-controlled do not know that they are self-controlled (ei sôphronountas anthrôpous hêgê̢ su agnoein hoti sôphronousin)’.’ – Cr. ‘But I don’t (All’ ouch hêgoumai).’ – S. ‘Weren’t you saying a short while ago (Ouk oligon proteron elegeto hupo sou) that there was no reason why craftsmen shouldn’t be self-controlled, even when making other people’s things (hoti tous dêmiourgous ouden kôluei kai au ta tôn allôn poiountas sôphronein)?’ – Cr. ‘I was (Elegeto gar), but what of it (alla ti touto;)?’ – S. Nothing (Ouden). But tell me whether you think that a doctor (alla lege ei dokei tis soi iatros), when making someone healthy (huguia tina poiôn), does what is beneficial not only to himself but also to the man he is curing (ôphelima kai heautô̢ poiein kai ekeinô̢ hon iô̢to;)?’ – Cr. ‘I do (Emoige).’ – S. ‘Is the man who does that doing what he should (Oukoun ta deonta prattei ho ge tauta prattôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘Yes (Nai).’ – S. ‘Isn’t the man who does what he should self-controlled (Ho ta deonta prattôn ou sôphronei;)?’ – Cr. ‘He certainly is (Sôphronei men oun).’ – S. ‘Then must a doctor know (ê oun kai gignôskein anankê tô̢ iatrô̢) when his curing is beneficial (hotan te ôphelimôs iatai) and when it’s not (kai hotan mê;)? Must every craftsman know (kai hekastô̢ tôn dêmiourgôn) when he’s likely to profit (hotan mellê̢ onêsesthai) from whatever work he does (apo tou ergou hou an prattê̢) and when he’s not (kai hotan mê;)?’ – Cr. Perhaps not (Isôs ou).’ – S. ‘So sometimes (Eniote ara) the doctor does something beneficial or harmful (ôphelimôs praxas ê blaberôs ho iatros) without knowing which he has done (ou gignôskei heauton hôs epraxen). And yet, according to what you say, in doing what is beneficial, he has done what is self-controlled (kaitoi ôphelimôs praxas, hôs ho soi logos, sôphronôs epraxen). Wasn’t that your point (ouch houtôs eleges;)? – Cr. ‘Yes, it was (Egôge).’ – S. ‘Then it would appear that sometimes (Oukoun, hôs eoiken), when he does what is beneficial (ôphelimôs praxas), he does what is self-controlled (prattei men sôphronôs kai sôphronei), though he does not know (agnoei d’ heauton) that he is being self-controlled (hoti sôphronei)? – Cr. ‘But that could never happen, Socrates (Alla touto men, ô Sôkrates, ouk an pote genoito). Still (all’), if you think that that must follow as a result of what I admitted earlier (ei ti su oiei ek tôn emprosthen hup’ emou hômologêmenôn eis touto anankaion einai sumbainein), I’d rather retract part of that admission (ekeinôn an ti egôge mallon anatheimên) – and I’d not be ashamed (kai ouk an aischuntheiên) to say that I was wrong (mê ouchi orthôs phanai eirêkenai) – than ever allow that a man who does not know himself is self-controlled (mallon ê pote sunchôrêsaim’ an agnoounta auton heauton anthrôpon sôphronein).’ (163e8-164d3)

Donald Watt writes in the introductory note to this section: ‘Socrates … turns to the question of whether it is possible for the self-controlled man to be ignorant of his being self-controlled. His argument is as follows: (i) self-control is doing what one should; (ii) doing what one should is doing good; therefore, by implication, (iii) self-control is doing good; but (iv) one may do good without knowing it; therefore (v) one may be self-controlled without knowing it. Critias consequently abandons this line of argument. The implication of this section, of course, is that self-control is doing good knowingly: self-control is the knowledge of (the doing of) the good.’ (Plato, Early Socratic Dialogues, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 190.)

If Watt is right, then Plato accomplished a remarkable developmental journey from the Charmides to the Republic, for in the former both Socrates and Critias assume that craftsmen (tous dêmiourgous) can be ‘self-controlled’ (sôphronein), which on Watt’s interpretation means that those of them, who are self-controlled, have ‘the knowledge of (the doing of) the good’. But in the Republic ‘the Form of the good is the highest knowledge’ (hê tou agathou idea megiston mathêma, 505a2), which can be acquired only by true philosophers; it is this knowledge that entitles them to rule. But is Watt right? In my view, he misconstrued the argument.

Critias defined sôphrosunê as ‘doing good things’ (tên tôn agathôn praxin, 163e10-11). Socrates then asked whether a doctor must know (ê oun kai gignôskein anankê tô̢ iatrô̢) when his curing is beneficial (hotan te ôphelimôs iatai) and when it’s not (kai hotan mê), and every craftsman (kai hekastô̢ tôn dêmiourgôn) when he’s likely to profit (hotan mellê̢ onêsesthai) from whatever work he does (apo tou ergou hou an prattê̢) and when he’s not (kai hotan mê,164b7-9). When Critias admitted that there was no such necessity (Isôs ou, 164b10), Socrates concluded that ‘sometimes (Eniote ara) the doctor does something beneficial or harmful (ôphelimôs praxas ê blaberôs ho iatros) without knowing which he has done (ou gignôskei heauton hôs epraxen, 164b11-c1)’, which means that ‘sometimes, when he does what is beneficial (ôphelimôs praxas), he does what is self-controlled (prattei men sôphronôs kai sôphronei), though he does not know (agnoei d’ heauton) that he is being self-controlled (hoti sôphronei, 164c5-6).’

This Critias cannot accept, for in his view self-reflection is a necessary constituent of sôphrosunê.

It may be argued, in support of Watt’s interpretation, that in my abbreviated version of the argument I omitted Socrates’ introduction of ‘doing what one should’ (ta deonta prattein). The fact is that Socrates’ two questions concerning this point, and Critias’ responses to them, which I marked with the bold script, can be taken away without any detriment to the argument, which consists in Socrates’ refutation of Critias’ definition of sôphrosunê as ‘doing good things’. It does not mean that the definition of sôphrosunê as ‘doing what one should’ is otiose within the framework of the dialogue, for it harks back to the definition of sôphrosunê as ‘doing one’s own business’ (to ta heautou prattein), clarifying it without losing the self-reflection implied in ‘one’s own’ (ta heautou): any doctor and any craftsman who does what he should do, knows that he should do it.

Why is this important definition brought in by Socrates, yet left without being discussed? Consider Socrates’ investigative not-knowing, to which all the other definitions of sôphrosunê in the dialogue fall prey, on the one hand, and on the other hand the closing section, in which Charmides does not accept Socrates’ self-professed ignorance, resolves to be ‘charmed’ by Socrates day by day, Critias concurs with his resolve, and Socrates complies with it.

Tuesday, June 27, 2017

5b Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating

Referring to his discussion with Charmides concerning his attempt at defining sôphrosunê as to ta heautou prattein – for which see the preceding post – Socrates narrates: ‘Now Critias had clearly long been champing at the bit in his eagerness to impress Charmides and the others present (Kai ho Kritias dêlos men ên kai palai agôniôn kai philotimôs pros te ton Charmidên kai pros tous parontas echôn). He had only with great difficulty managed to restrain himself up to then (mogis d’ heauton en tô̢ prosthen katechôn), and this was the last straw (tote ouch hoios te egeneto). (162c1-4)

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Watt’s ‘last straw’ marks Socrates’ reference to the end of his discussion with Charmides on the definition of sôphrosunê, which Charmides remembered to have heard from ‘some wise man’. Socrates asked Charmides: ‘So what on earth would doing one’s job be (Ti oun an eiê pote to ta hautou prattein; echeis eipein;)?’ – Charmides replied: ‘Heavens, I don’t know (Ouk oida, ma Dia, egôge). I dare say there is no reason why even the man who said it should have the slightest idea of what he meant (all’ isôs ouden kôluei mêde ton legonta mêden eidenai hoti enoei).’ – ‘And as he said that (Kai hama tauta legôn), he gave a little smile (hupegela te) and looked at Critias (kai eis ton Kritian apeblepen)’, Socrates observed. (162b8-11)

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Socrates continues: ‘I think it’s absolutely certain (dokei gar moi pantos mallon alêthes einai) – as I assumed at the time (ho egô hupelabon) – that it was from Critias (tou Kritiou) that Charmides had heard (akêkoenai ton Charmidên) this answer (tautên tên apokrisin) about sôphrosunê (peri tês sôphrosunês). So Charmides (ho men oun Charmidês), who did not want to explain the answer himself, but to have Critias do it (boulomenos mê autos hupechein logon all’ ekeinon tês apokriseôs), kept trying to provoke him (hupekinei auton ekeinon) and pointing out that he had been refuted (kai enedeiknuto hôs exelêlegmenos eiê). This was too much for Critias (ho d’ ouk ênescheto). It appeared to me as though he had got irritated with Charmides (alla moi edoxen orgisthênai autô̢), just as a poet might do (hôsper poiêtês) with an actor (hupokritê̢) who treated his poetry badly (kakôs diatithenti ta heautou poiêmata). So he gave him a look and said (hôst’ emblepsas autô̢ eipen), “Is that what you think (Houtôs oiei), Charmides (ô Charmidê)? That if you don’t know (ei su mê oistha) what on earth the man meant (ho ti pot’ enoei) who said that doing one‘s own job was sôphrosunê (hos ephê sôphrosunên einai to ta heautou prattein), he doesn’t know either (oude ekeinon eidenai;)?” (162c4-d6)

***

Socrates’ insistence on attributing the provenance of the principle of ta hautou prattein to Critias is striking; consider the initial rebuke from Charmides concerning Socrates’ inquisitiveness. When Socrates said to Charmides: ‘You heard that from Critias here (Kritiou toude akêkoas auto), Charmides reposted: ‘But what difference does it make (Alla ti diapherei), Socrates (ô Sôkrates), who I heard it from (hotou êkousa;)?’ Socrates at that point conceded that it made no difference: ‘None at all (Ouden).’ (161b8-c5)

In view of the importance of to ta hautou prattein in Plato’s political thought – in the Phaedrus it figures as the principle which is observed by the gods in their administration of the world (247a4-6) – it seems that in this way, free from flattery, Plato expressed his indebtedness to Critias for it, and at the same time emphasized its importance in the days to come, in which, as he had hoped, the aristocrats ‘would administer the State by leading it out of an unjust way of life into a just way’ (ek tinos adikou biou epi dikaion tropon agontas dioikêsein tên polin, Seventh Letter 324d-5)

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Socrates: ‘Why (All’), Critias, my dear fellow (ô beltiste Kritia), it is not at all surprising that at his age Charmides doesn’t understand it (touton men ouden thaumaston agnoein têlikouton onta); but, of course, it’s natural for you to possess that knowledge (se de pou eikos eidenai) in view of your age (kai hêlikias heneka) and your devotion to study (kai epimeleias). So if you agree (ei oun sunchôreis) that sôphrosunê is (tout’ einai sôphrosunên) what Charmides says it is (hoper houtosi legei), and are willing to take the argument over (kai paradechê̢ ton logon), I’d much rather investigate with you (egôge polu an hêdion meta sou skopoimên) whether what we said is true or not (eit’ alêthes eite mê to lechthen).’ – Critias: ‘Well (Alla), I do agree (panu sunchôrô), and am willing to take it over (kai paradechomai).’ – Socrates: ‘That’s very good of you (Kalôs ge su toinun poiôn). Tell me (kai moi lege), do you also agree with what I was asking a minute ago (ê kai ha nundê êrôtôn egô sunchôreis), that all craftsmen (tous dêmiourgous pantas) make something (poiein ti;)?’ – Cr. ‘I do (Egôge).’ – S. ‘Well then (Ê oun), do you think (dokousi soi) they make only their own things (ta heautôn monon poiein) or other people’s things too (ê kai ta tôn allôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘Other people’s things too (Kai ta tôn allôn).’ – S. ‘Then are they self-controlled (Sôphronousin oun) in so far as they’re not making only their own things (ou ta heautôn monon poiountes)? (162d7-163a4)’

***

Watt’s ‘Then are they self-controlled’ stands for sôphronousin oun, where sôphrosunê figures in a verb form, as an activity: ‘do they self-control?’

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Critias: ‘What objection is there (Ti gar kôluei;)?’ – Socrates: ‘None as far as I’m concerned (Ouden eme ge). But watch (All’ hora) that there is not one for the man (mê ekeinon kôluei) who assumes (hos hupothemenos) that doing one’s own job is sôphrosunê (sôphrosunên einai to ta heautou prattein), and then (epeita) says that there is no objection (ouden phêsi kôlueien) to those who do other people’s jobs being self-controlled too (kai tous ta tôn allôn prattontas sôphronein).’ – Cr. ‘I suppose I’ve agreed (Egô gar pou touth’ hômologêka) that those who do other people’s jobs are self-controlled (hôs hoi ta tôn allôn prattontes sôphronousin), by agreeing that those who make other people’s things are (ei tous ta tôn allôn poiountas hômologêsa).’ (163a5-12)

***

Jowett tries to make sense of Critias’ last response by interpreting instead of translating it: ‘Nay, did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I said, those who make, not those who do.’ It was Socrates who introduced the term ‘make’ (poiein) at 162e8-9: ‘do you also agree with what I was asking a minute ago (ê kai ha nundê êrôtôn egô sunchôreis), that all craftsmen (tous dêmiourgous pantas) make something (poiein ti;)?’ To which Critias replied positively: ‘I do (Egôge).’ Then, in the last exchange, Socrates took the two terms – ‘doing’ (prattein) and ‘making’ (poiein) – as equivalent, and thus ‘saw an implicit difficulty’ concerning Critias’ definition of sôphrosunê; Critias insists on their difference, thus refusing to accept any inconsistency in his argument.

***

Socrates: ‘Tell me (Eipe moi), don’t you call “making” and “doing” the same thing (ou t’auton kaleis to poiein kai to prattein;)?’ – Critias; ‘No, I don’t (Ou mentoi), nor for that matter (oude ge to) “working” (ergazesthai) and “making” (kai to poiein). I learned that (emathon gar) from Hesiod (par Hêsiodou), who said (hos ephê), “Work is no disgrace (ergon d’ ouden einai oneidos).” Now, do you suppose (oiei oun) that if he had been calling the sort of thing you were speaking of a minute ago “works” and “working” and “doing” (auton, ei ta toiauta erga ekalei kai ergazesthai kai prattein, hoia nundê su eleges), he would have said there was no disgrace in being a cobbler (oudeni an oneidos einai skutotomounti) or selling salt fish (ê tarichopôlounti) or being employed in a brothel (ê ep’ oikêmatos kathêmenô̢;)? (163b1-8)

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Jowett translates 163b5-8 similarly: ‘Now do you imagine that if Hesiod had meant by working and doing such things as you were describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them – for example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling dried fish, or sitting for hire in a house of ill fame?’

Does it then mean that Critias viewed as disgrace such activities as making of shoes, selling dried fish – named by him – and activities named by Socrates, to which he refers in the same breath, such as pupils learning to write and read, teachers teaching pupils to read and write, furthermore healing, building, weaving, and producing any piece of skilled work whatsoever (161d-e)? Although Critias was a sworn aristocrat, I find it difficult to accept, and the text militates against Jowett’s and Watt’s interpretation. They both fail to take into account Critias’ oudeni ‘for no one’. Since the principle of ta heautou prattein was an important principle in Plato’s political thinking, I presume that by putting the oudeni into Critias’ mouth he wants to say something important: for those, who are best fitted and best skilled to make shoes, making shoes is no disgrace; by making shoes they do their job – ta heautôn prattousi.

***

Critias continues: ‘Don’t you believe it (Ouk oiesthai ge chrê ‘It’s not to be believed’), Socrates (ô Sôkrates). Hesiod too, in my opinion, considered making to be different from doing and working (alla kai ekeinos oimai poiêsin praxeôs kai ergasias allo enomizen). A thing which was made sometimes brought disgrace (kai poiêma men gignesthai oneidos eniote) when it lacked beauty (hotan mê meta tou kalou gignetai); ((163b8-c2)

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Watt’s ‘when it lacked beauty’ for Critias’ hotan mê meta tou kalou gignetai, literally ‘when it does not happen with the beauty,’ is hardly appropriate. Jowett translated: ‘when the employment was not honourable’; in doing so Jowett attempted to express the fact that Critias’ meta tou kalou does not refer only to the beauty of the object made, but to the circumstances in which it was made, the maker, his/her qualification, motives, application to the work at hand etc.

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Critias continues: ‘while a work could never be any disgrace at all (ergon de oudepote ouden oneidos). Things that are beautifully and beneficially made (ta gar kalôs te kai ôphelimôs poioumena) he called “works” (erga ekalei), and such “makings” he called “workings” and “doings” (kai ergasias te kai praxeis tas toiautas poiêseis). It must be stated (phanai de ge chrê) that he believed only things like that to be a man’s proper business (kai oikeia mona ta toiauta hêgeisthai auton), while everything that was harmful was other people’s business (ta de blabera panta allotria). So we must conclude that both Hesiod (hôste kai Hêsiodon chrê oiesthai) and any other knowledgeable person (kai allon hostis phronimos) call the man who does his own job sôphrona [Watt: ‘self-controlled’] (ton ta hautou prattonta phronimon).’ – Socrates: ‘Critias (Ô Kriria), the minute you begin to speak (kai euthus archomenou sou) I was pretty sure of your thesis (schedon emanthanon ton logon) – that you called what is proper to a man and what is his own job good things (hoti ta oikeia te kai ta hautou agatha kaloiês), and what you called the “makings” of good things (kai tas tôn agathôn poiêseis) “doings” (praxeis). I have heard Prodicus drawing his innumerable distinctions between names, you know (kai gar Prodikou muria tina akêkoa peri onomatôn diairountos). But I give you my permission to assign each name as you wish (all’ egô soi tithesthai men tôn onomatôn didômi hopê̢ an boulê̢ hekaston); only do make it plain (dêlou de monon) to what you are applying whichever name you use (eph’ hoti an pherê̢s t’ounoma hoti an legê̢s). Now then (nun oun), go back to the beginning again (palin ex archês) and give us a clear definition (saphesteron horisai). Are you saying that this doing or making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things is sôphrosunê (ara tên tôn agathôn praxin ê poiêsin ê hopôs su boulei onomazein, tautên legeis su sôphrosunên einai;)?’ – Critias: ‘I am (Egôge).’ – S. ‘So it’s not the man who does the bad things, but the man who does good things who sôphronei [a verb form: ‘who self-controls’, D. Watt: ‘is self-controlled’] (Ouk ara sôphronei ho ta kaka prattôn, all’ ho agatha;)?’ – Cr. ‘Don’t you think so, my good fellow (Soi de, ô beltiste, ouch houtô dokei;)?’ – S. ‘Never mind (Ea), let’s not consider what I think just yet (mê gar pô to emoi dokoun skopômen), but rather what you’re saying now (all’ ho su legeis nun).’ (163b2-e7)

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Socrates’ mê gar pô to emoi dokoun skopômen ‘let’s not investigate what I think just yet’ is intriguing. Does it mean that at some point in the forthcoming discussion Socrates and Critias are going to investigate Socrates’ own thinking: ‘what I think’ (to emoi dokoun, 163e6)?