Socrates in Plato’s Republic X, and in Xenophon’s Symposium and Memorabilia – contrasted with Socrates in Republic V

Socrates says in Republic X that ‘the excellence (aretê) and beauty (kai kallos) and rightness (kai orthotês) of every structure, animate or inanimate (hekastou skeuou kai zȏiou), and of every action of man (kai praxeȏs), is relative solely to the use (ou pros allo ti ê tên chreian estin,) for which nature or the artist has intended them (pros ho an hekaston êi pepoiêmenon ê pephukos, 601d4-6, tr. Jowett)’.

Adam notes: ‘The historical Socrates was in the habit of testing the beauty, excellence etc. of an object by the degree in which it fulfilled its function or purpose: see especially Xen. Symp. V.4. ff.’ (The Republic of Plato, Cambridge University Press, digitally printed in 2009, vol. II, p. 404)

To appreciate Adam’s reference, we must begin with the words with which Callias, the giver of the symposium, opens the Ch. V: ‘Critobulus [a young friend and disciple of Socrates], are you going to refuse to enter the lists in the beauty contest with Socrates (‘Su de dê, ȏ Kritoboule, eis ton peri tou kallous agȏna pros Sȏkratên ouk anthistasai;), ?’ – ‘Undoubtedly! (Nê Di’)’ said Socrates (ephê ho Sȏkratês); ‘for probably he notices that the procurer stands high in the favour of the judges (isȏs gar eudokimounta ton mastropon para tois kritais horai.).’ [Asked by Callias at III. 10 ‘Socrates, what are you proud of (epi tini mega phroneis, ȏ Sȏkrates;)?’ Socrates drew up his face into a very solemn expression, and answered, ‘The trade of procurer (Kai hos panu semnȏs anaspasas to prosȏpon, Epi mastropeiai, eipen).’] – ‘But yet in spite of that (All’ homȏs),’ retorted Critobulus (ephȇ ho Kritoboulos) ‘I do not shun the contest (ouk anaduomai). So make your plea (alla didaske), if you can produce any profound reason (ei ti echeis sophon), and prove that you are more handsome than I (hȏs kalliȏn ei emou). Only (monon),’ he added (ephȇ), ‘let some one bring the light close to him (ton lamptȇra engus tis prosenenkatȏ).’ – ‘The first step, then, in my suit,’ said Socrates, ‘is to summon you to the preliminary hearing (Eis anakrisin toinun se, ephȇ, prȏton tȇs dikȇs kaloumai); be so kind as to answer my questions (all’ apokrinou).’ – ‘And you proceed to put them (Su de ge erȏta).’ – ‘Do you hold, then, that beauty is to be found only in man (Poteron oun en antrȏpȏi monon nomizeis to kalon einai), or is it also in other objects (ȇ kai en allȏi tini)?’ – Critobulus:‘In faith, my opinion is that beauty is to be found quite as well in a horse or an ox or in any number of inanimate things (Egȏ men nai ma Di’, ephȇ, kai en hippȏi kai boї kai en apsuchois pollois). I know, at any rate (oida g’oun), that a shield may be beautiful (ousan kai aspida kalȇn), or a sword (kai xiphos), or a spear (kai doru).’ – Socrates: ‘How can it be that all these things are beautiful when they are entirely dissimilar (Kai pȏs, ephȇ, hoion te tauta mȇden homoia onta allȇlois panta kala einai;)?’ – ‘Why, they are beautiful and fine,’ answered Critobulus, ‘if they are well made for the respective functions for which we obtain them, or if they are naturally well constituted to serve our needs (Ên nȇ Di’, ephȇ, pros ta erga hȏn heneka hekasta ktȏmetha eu eirgasmena ȇi ȇ eu pephukota pros ha an deȏmetha, kai taut’, ephȇ ho Kritoboulos, kala).’ – Soc. ‘Do you know (Oistha oun, ephȇ,) the reason why we need eyes (ophthalmȏn tinos heneka deometha;)?’ – Crit. ‘Obviously to see with (Dȇlon, ephȇ, tou horan).’ – ‘In that case (Houtȏ men toinun), it would appear without further ado that my eyes are finer than yours (ȇdȇ hoi emoi ophthalmoi kalliones an tȏn sȏn eiȇsan).’ – ‘How so (Pȏs dȇ)?’ – ‘Because (Hoti), while yours (hoi men soi) see only straight ahead (to kat’ euthu monon horȏsin), mine (hoi de emoi), by bulging out as they do, see also to the sides (kai to ek plagiou dia to epipolaioi eianai).’ (V. 1-5, tr. O. J. Todd)

In Xenophon’s Symposium Socrates does philosophy in a mood of a jester; in his Memorabilia he does the same in a serious mood.

‘On visiting Pistias the armourer (Pros de Pistian ton thȏrakopoion eiselthȏn), who showed him (epideixantos autou tȏi Sȏkratei) some well-made breastplates (thȏrakas eu eirgasmenous), Socrates exclaimed: “Upon my word, Pistias, it’s a beautiful invention (Nȇ tȇn Hȇran, ephȇ, kalon ge, ȏ Pistia, to heurȇma), for the breastplate covers the parts that need protection (to ta men deomena skepȇs tou anthrȏpou skepazein ton thȏraka) without impending the use of hands (tais de chersi mȇ kȏluein chrȇsthai). But tell me, Pistias,” he added (atar, ephȇ, lexon moi, ȏ Pistia), “why do you charge more for your breastplates than any other maker, though they are no stronger and cost no more to make (dia ti out’ ischuroterous oute polutelesterous tȏn allȏn poiȏn tous thȏrakas pleionos pȏleis)?” – “Because (Hoti, ephȇ,) the proportions of mine are better, Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates, euruthmoterous poiȏ).”

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Marchant translates Pistias’ euruthmoterous poiȏ ‘the proportions of mine are better’. The translation loses the relation to movement that the word euruthmos expresses [euruthmia - ‘rhythmical order or movement’], in this case the relation to the movements the body makes when a man uses the breastplate in a military campaign. No doubt the buyer would try the breastplate in every movement and posture he could think of before buying it, and paying the high price exacted by Pistias.

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Socrates: “And how do you show their proportions when you ask a higher price – by weight or measure (Ton de ruthmon, ephȇ, potera metrȏi ȇ stathmȏi apodeiknuȏn pleionos timai)? For I presume you don’t make them all of the same weight or the same size (ou gar dȇ isous ge pantas oude homoious oimai se poiein), that is, if you make them to fit (ei ge harmottontas poieis).”

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Again, the translation loses the relation to movement, which the Greek ruthmon (‘their proportions’), and harmottontas (‘to fit’) i.e. ‘in harmony with the body in its movements’ expresses.

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Pistias: “Fit? Why, of course! a breastplate is of no use without that! (Alla nȇ Di’, ephȇ, poiȏ, ouden gar ophelos esti thȏrakos aneu toutou)” – “Then are not some human bodies well (Oukoun, ephȇ, sȏmata ge anthrȏpȏn ta men euruthma esti), others ill proportioned (ta de arruthma;)?” – “Certainly (Panu men oun, ephȇ).” – “Then if a breastplate is to fit an ill-proportioned body, how do you make it well-proportioned (Pȏs oun, ephȇ, tȏi arruthmȏi sȏmati harmottonta ton thȏraka euruthmon poieis;)?” – “By making it fit (Hȏsper kai harmottonta, ephȇ); for if it is a good fit (ho harmottȏn gar) it is well-proportioned (estin euruthmos).” – “Apparently (Dokeis moi, ephȇ ho Sȏkratȇs) you mean well-proportioned not absolutely (to euruthmon ou kath’ hauto legein), but in relation to the wearer (alla pros ton chrȏmenon ‘but in relation to the man who uses it’), as you might call a shield well-proportioned for the man whom it fits (hȏsper an ei phaiȇs aspida, hȏi an harmottȇi, toutȏi euruthmon einai,), or a military cape (kai chlamuda) – and this seems to apply to everything according to you (kai t’alla hȏsautȏs echei tȏi sȏi logȏi – ‘according to your argument’). And perhaps (isȏs de) there is another important advantage in a good fit (kai allo ti ou mikron agathon tȏi harmottein prosesti).” – “Tell it me (Didaxon, ephȇ - ‘teach me, he said’), if you know, Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates, ei ti echeis).” – “The good fit is less heavy to wear than the misfit (Hȇtton, ephȇ, tȏi barei piezousin hoi harmottontes tȏn anarmostȏn), though both are of the same weight (ton auton stathmon echontes). For the misfit (hoi men gar anarmostoi), hanging entirely from the shoulders (ȇ holoi ek tȏn ȏmȏn kremamenoi), or pressing on some other part of the body (ȇ kai allo ti tou sȏmatos sphodra piezontes), proves uncomfortable and irksome (dusphoroi kai chalepoi gignontai); but the good fit (hoi de harmottontes), with its weight distributed (dieilȇmmenoi to baros) over the collar-bone (to men hupo tȏn klȇidȏn) and shoulder-blades (kai epȏmidȏn), the shoulders (to d’ hupo tȏn ȏmȏn), chest (to d’ hupo tou stȇthous), back (to de hupo tou nȏtou) and belly (to de hupo tȇs gastros), may almost be called an accessory rather than an encumbrance (oligou dein ou phorȇmati, alla prosthȇmati eoikasin).” – “The advantage you speak of (Eirȇkas, ephȇ,) is the very one (auto,) which I think makes my work worth a big price (di’ hoper egȏ ta ema erga pleistou axia nomizȏ einai). Some (enioi), however (mentoi), prefer to buy the ornamented and the gold-plated breastplates (tous poikilous kai tous epichrusous thȏrakas mallon ȏnountai).” – “Still (Alla mȇn, ephȇ,), if the consequence is (ei ge dia tauta) that they buy misfits (mȇ harmottontas ȏnountai), it seems to me that they buy ornamented and gold-plated trash (kakon emoige dokousi poikilon te kai epichruson ȏneisthai). However (atar, ephȇ), as the body is not rigid (tou sȏmatos mȇ menontos, ‘since the body does not stand still’), but now bent (all tote men kurtoumenou), now straight (tote de orthoumenou,), how can tight breastplates fit (pȏs an akribeis thȏrakes harmottoien;)?” – “They can’t (Oudamȏs, ephȇ).” – “You mean (Legeis, ephȇ,) that the good fits are not the tight ones (harmottein ou tous akribeis), but those that don’t chafe the wearer (alla tous mȇ lupountas en tȇi chreiai ‘in their use’;)?” – “That is your own meaning (Autos, ephȇ, touto legeis), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), and you have hit the right nail on the head (kai panu orthȏs apodechȇi).” (Mem. III. x. 9-15, tr. E. C. Marchant)

Xenophon gave us here a good example of the maker (Pisias) listening to the user (Socrates).

Let us now return to Plato’s view of Socrates in Republic X: ‘And the excellence and beauty and rightness of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative solely to the use (pros tên chreian estin,) for which nature or the artist has intended them.’ – Glaucon: ‘True (Houtȏs).’ – Soc. ‘Then beyond doubt (Pollȇ ara anankȇ) it is the user who has the greatest experience of them (ton chrȏmenon hekastȏi empeirotaton te einai), and he must report to the maker (kai angelon gignesthai tȏi poiȇtȇi) the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use (hoia agatha ȇ kaka poiei en tȇi chreiai hȏi chrȇtai); for example (hoion), the flute-player (aulȇtȇs pou) will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer (aulopoiȏi exangellei peri tȏn aulȏn, hoi an hupȇretȏsi en tȏi aulein); he will tell him how he ought to make them (kai epitaxei hoious dei poiein), and the other will attend to his instructions (ho d’ hupȇretȇsei.)?’ – Glauc. ‘Of course (Pȏs d’ ou;).’– Soc. ‘So the one pronounces with knowledge (Oukoun ho men eidȏs exangellei) about the goodness and badness of flutes (peri chrȇstȏn kai ponȇrȏn aulȏn), while the other, confiding in him, will make them accordingly (ho de pisteuȏn poiȇsei;)?’ – Glauc. ‘True (Nai).’ – Soc. ‘The instrument is the same (Tou d’ autou ara skeuous), but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will possess a correct belief (ho men poiȇtȇs pistin orthȇn hexei peri kallous te kai ponȇrias), since he associates with one who knows (sunȏn tȏi eidoti), and is compelled (kai anankazomenos) to hear what he has to say (akouein para tou eidotos); whereas the user (ho de chrȏmenos) will have the knowledge (epistȇmȇn)?’ – Glauc. ‘True (Panu ge).’ (601d4-602a2, tr. Jowett)

In Republic V Socrates distinguished the philosophers from non-philosophers as follows: ‘And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, art-loving, practical class … and those … who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers … The lovers of sounds and sights are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty … Few are they who are able to attain to this ideal beauty and contemplate it … And he who, having a sense of beautiful things, has no sense of absolute beauty … is he awake or in a dream only?’ (476a9-c4, tr. Jowett)

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The flute-player whom Socrates presents in Republic X as the one who pronounces with knowledge about the goodness and badness of flutes is one of the sound-loving men of Republic V. This is not an accidental ‘discrepancy’. In Republic X Plato takes us into the world of the historical Socrates.

Yet more on the ‘discrepancy’ between Republic V and X

Having defined philosophers as those who can see the Forms, and distinguished them from those who can’t, Socrates in Republic V proceeds to define the faculty that belongs to the former and the faculty that belongs to the latter: ‘He who, having a sense of beautiful things (Ho oun kala men pragmata nomizȏn), has no sense of absolute beauty (auto de kallos mête nomizȏn), or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty, is unable to follow (mête, an tis hêgêtai epi tên gnȏsin autou, dunamenos hepesthai) – of such a one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only (onar ê hupar dokei soi zên;)? Reflect (skopei de): is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object (to oneirȏttein ara ou tode estin, eante en hupnȏi tis eant’ egrêgorȏs to homoion tȏi mê homoion all’ auto hêgêtai einai hȏi eoiken;)?’ – Glaucon: ‘I should certainly say (Egȏ g’oun an phaiên) that such a one was dreaming (oneirȏttein ton toiouton).’ – Soc. ‘But he who, on the contrary (Ti de; ho t’anantia toutȏn), recognizes the existence of absolute beauty (hêgoumenos te ti auto kalon) and is able to contemplate (kai dunamenos kathoran ‘and is able to see distinctly’) both the Idea (kai auto) and the objects which participate in it (kai ta ekeinou metechonta), neither putting the objects in the place of the Idea nor the Idea in the place of the objects (kai oute ta metechonta auto oute auto ta metechonta hêgoumenos) – is he a dreamer, or is he awake (hupar ê onar au kai houtos dokei soi zên;)?’ – Glauc. ‘He is wide awake (Kai mala hupar).’ – Soc. ‘And since he knows, it would be right to describe his state of mind as knowledge (Oukoun toutou men tên dianoian hȏs gignȏskontos gnȏmên an orthȏs phaimen einai), and the state of mind of the other, who opines only, as opinion (tou de doxan hȏs doxazontos;)?’ – Glauc. ‘Certainly (Panu men oun).’ (476c2-d7, tr. Jowett)

After defining the state of mind of the true philosopher as knowledge (gnȏmê), the state of mind of those who can’t see the Forms as opinion (doxa), Socrates outlined the realms within which these two faculties operate: ‘Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing (ho gignȏskȏn gignȏskei ti ê ouden;)?’ – Glaucon: ‘He knows something (gignȏskei ti).’ – Soc. ‘Something that is or is not (Poteron on ê ouk on;)?’ – Glauc. ‘Something that is (On); for how can that which is not ever be known (pȏs gar an mê on ge ti gnȏstheiê)?’ – Soc. ‘And are we assured (Hikanȏs oun touto echomen), after looking at the matter from many points of view (k’an ei pleonachêi skopoimen), that the fully real (hoti to men pantelȏs on) is or may be fully known (pantelȏs gnȏston), but that the utterly unreal (mê on de mêdamêi) is utterly unknown (pantêi agnȏston)?’ – Glauc. ‘Nothing can be more certain (Hikanȏtata).’ – Soc. ‘Good (Eien). But if there be anything which is of such a nature (ei de dê ti houtȏs echei) as to be and not to be (hȏs einai te kai mê einai), that will have a place intermediate (ou metaxu an keoito) between pure being (tou eilikrinȏs ontos) and the absolute negation of being (kai tou au mêdamêi ontos;)?’ – Glauc. ‘Yes, between them (Metaxu) (476e7-477a8) … Thus then we seem to have discovered (Hêurêkamen ara, hȏs eoiken,) that the many notions which the multitude entertains (hoti ta tȏn pollȏn polla nomima) about the beautiful and about all other things (kalou te peri kai tȏn allȏn) are tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and pure not-being (metaxu pou kulindeitai tou te mê ontos kai tou ontos eilikrinȏs).’ – Glauc. ‘We have (Hêurêkamen).’ – Soc. ‘Yes; and we have before agreed (Proȏmologêsamen de ge,) that anything of this kind which we might find (ei ti toiouton phaneiê) was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge (doxaston auto all’ ou gnȏston dein legesthai,); being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty (têi metaxu dunamei to metaxu planêton haliskomenon).’ – Glauc. ‘Quite true (Hȏmologêkamen).’ (479d3-10, tr. Jowett)

In Republic V Socrates discusses extensively the faculty of opinion-making as a wanderer in the fleeting realm that is intermediate between being and not being. He does so to turn the mind of his listeners (readers) to the realm of true being, of the Forms which are ‘absolute and eternal and immutable’ (auta hekasta kai aei kata t’auta hȏsautȏs echonta, 479e7-8, tr. Jowett). In Republic X Socrates proceeds in the opposite way; strange as it may sound, after he ascribed to the artisans the capacity to see the forms of the objects they are producing, he corrects himself, but he does not correct himself by depriving the artisans of the capacity to see the forms, he does so by abandoning the forms, thus finding ‘what is’, and the knowledge of it, in the realm that Socrates in Republic V deprived of true being and of knowledge.

Socrates: ‘Of the painter (Zȏgraphos) we say (phamen) that he will paint reins (hȇnias te graphei), and he will paint a bit (kai chalinon;)?’ – Glaucon: ‘Yes (Nai.).’ – ‘And the worker in leather and brass will make them (Poiȇsei de ge skutotomos kai chalkeus;)?’ – Glauc. ‘Certainly (Panu ge.).’ – Soc. ‘But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins (Ar’ oun epaiei hoias dei tas hȇnias einai kai ton chalinon ho grapheus;)? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them (ȇ oud’ ho poiȇsas, ho te chalkeus kai ho skuteus,); only the horseman who knows how to use them – he knows their right form (all’ ekeinos hosper toutois epistatai chrȇsthai, monos ho hippikos;).’ (601c6-13, tr. Jowett)

An attentive reader may exclaim at this point: ‘You introduced this passage with the words “strange as it may sound, after he ascribed to the artisans the capacity to see the forms of the objects they are producing, he corrects himself, but he does not correct himself by depriving the artisans of the capacity to see the forms, he does so by abandoning the forms, thus finding what is and the knowledge of it in the realm, which Socrates in Republic V deprived of being and of knowledge”. Plato found you immediately to be wrong, for he deprives the artisans of the ability to see the forms only to ascribe it to the users of objects the artisans produce. It is not accidental that Plato chose “the bit and reins” as an example of the form of which only the horseman knows. He thus takes us in the right direction. Horsemen (hippȇs) were classed as arisocracy; only an aristocrat can see the forms of objects he uses, the artisans must obey his instructions.’

This comment is apposite, but it relies on Jowett, it has nothing to do with Plato’s text. Jowett’s ‘But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins?’ stands for Socrates’ Ar’ oun epaiei hoias dei tas hȇnias einai kai ton chalinon ho grapheus;, which means ‘But does the painter know what the bit and reins are to be?’. Jowett’s ‘only the horseman who knows how to use them – he knows their right form’ stands for Socrates’ all’ ekeinos hosper toutois epistatai chrȇsthai, monos ho hippikos;, which means ‘but the one who knows how to use them, only the horseman’. Jowett’s ‘he knows their right form’ seriously misrepresents the text. It misrepresents the text so as to ‘iron out’ what Jowett perceives as a discrepancy between Republic X and Republic V-VII.

More on the ‘discrepancy’ between Republic V and X

In Republic X Socrates by his usual method (eiȏthamen) posits (tithesthai) a form (eidos ti) for all things (peri hekasta ta polla) to which we give the same name (hois t’auton onoma epipheromen, 596a6-7). Thus there are many beds and tables (pollai pou eisi klinai kai trapezai), but there are only two forms of these two products (alla ideai ge pou peri tauta ta skeuê duo), one of a bed (mia men klinês) and one of a table (mia de trapezês): ‘And we have used to say (Oukoun kai eiȏthamen legein) that the maker of the one and the other piece of furniture (hoti ho dêmiourgos hekaterou tou skeuous), looking at the form (pros tên idean blepȏn), one makes beds, the other tables (poiei ho men tas klinas, ho de tas trapezas).’ (596b1-8)

In Republic V Socrates points to the Forms, which only very few (spanioi) can see (dunatoi horan, 476b10-11); these few are ‘the philosophers (tous philosophous) concerning which we dare to say (tinas legontes tolmȏmen phanai) that they are to rule in the State (dein archein) … for it befits them by nature to do philosophy (hoti tois men prosêkei phusei haptesthai te philosophias) and to be leaders in the State (hêgemoneuein t’ en polei), while all the others (tois d’ allois) must not even touch philosophy (mête haptesthai) and must follow the leader (akolouthein te tȏi hêgoumenȏi). (474b5-c3)

A ‘discrepancy’ between Republic V and X; with a glance at the Parmenides

In Republic V Plato’s Socrates explains ‘whom we mean when we dare to say that philosophers are to rule in the State’ (tous philosophous tinas legontes tolmȏmen phanai dein archein, 474b5-6). Glaucon asks: ‘Who then are the true philosophers (Tous de alȇthinous tinas legeis)?’ – Socrates: ‘Those who are lovers of the vision of truth (Tous tȇs alȇtheias philotheamonas).’ – Glaucon: ‘I should like to know what you mean (alla pȏs auto legeis)?’ – Soc. ‘To another I might have a difficulty in explaining (Oudamȏs raidiȏs pros ge allon); but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make (se de oimai homologȇsein moi to toionde).’ – Glauc. ‘What is the proposition (To poion)?’ – ‘That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness (Epeidȇ estin enantion kalon aischrȏi), they are two (duo autȏ einai)?’ – Glauc. ‘Certainly (Pȏs d’ ou).’ – Soc. ‘And inasmuch as they are two (Oukoun epeidȇ duo), each of them is one (kai hen hekateron)?’ – Glauc. ‘True again (Kai touto).’ – Soc. ‘And of just (Kai peri dȇ dikaiou) and unjust (kai adikou), good (kai agathou) and evil (kai kakou), and of every other form (kai pantȏn tȏn eidȏn peri), the same remark holds (ho autos logos): taken singly, each of them is one (auto men hen hekaston einai); but from the various combinations of them with actions and bodies and with one another (tȇi de tȏn praxeȏn kai sȏmatȏn kai allȇlȏn koinȏniai), they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many (pantachou phantazomena polla phainesthai hekaston).’ – Glauc. ‘Very true (Orthȏs legeis).’ – Soc. ‘And this is the distinction which I draw (Tautȇi toinun diairȏ) between the sight-loving, art-loving, practical class which you have mentioned (chȏris men hous nundȇ eleges philotheamonas te kai philotechnous kai praktikous), and those of whom I am speaking (kai chȏris au peri hȏn ho logos), and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers (hous monous an tis orthȏs proseipoi philosophous).’ – Glauc. ‘How do you distinguish them (Pȏs legeis)?’ – Soc. ‘The lovers of sounds and sights are, as I conceive, fond of fine tunes and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made of them (Hoi men oun philȇkooi kai philotheamones tas te kalas phȏnas aspazontai kai chroas kai schȇmata kai panta ta ek tȏn toioutȏn dȇmiourgoumena), but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty (autou de tou kalou adunatos autȏn hȇ dianoia tȇn phusin idein).’ – Glauc. ‘The fact is plain (Echei gar oun dȇ houtȏs).’ – Soc. ‘Few are they who are able to attain to this ideal beauty and contemplate it (Hoi de dȇ ep’ auto to kalon dunatoi ienai te kai horan kath’ hauto ou spanioi an eien;).’ – Glauc. ‘Very true (Kai mala).’ (475e4-476c1, tr. Jowett)

As can be seen, Glaucon is introduced to the Forms directly: since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two, and inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one.

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In Republic X Socrates investigates imitation (mimȇsis); he wants to know what it is (hoti pot’ estin, 595c7): ‘Well then, shall we begin the enquiry at this point (Boulei oun enthende arxȏmetha episkopountes), following our usual method (ek tȇs eiȏthuas methodou): Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume that there is one corresponding idea or form (eidos gar pou ti hen hekaston eiȏthamen tithesthai peri hekasta ta polla, hois t’auton onoma epipheromen): – do you understand me (ȇ ou manthaneis)?’ – Glauc. ‘I do.’ (596a5-9)

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R. M. Hare & D. A. Russell in their edition of Jowett’s translation are obviously unhappy with his translation of the last sentence, and they give what they think to be a better alternative: “[Or (probably better): we have been accustomed to assume that there is one single idea corresponding to each group of particulars: and to these we give the same name (as we give the idea),’ See J. A. Smith, C.R. xxxi (1917).]

Neither Smith nor Jowett properly expresses Socrates’ ‘positing one form (eidos ti hen tithesthai) in each case where to many particulars (peri hekasta ta polla ) we give one and the same name (hois t’auton onoma epipheromen)’.

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Socrates goes on: ‘Let us take (Thȏmen), for our present purpose (dȇ kai nun), any instance of such a group (hoti boulei tȏn pollȏn); there are beds and tables in the world – many of each, are there not (hoion, ei theleis, pollai pou eisi klinai kai trapezai)?’ Glauc. ‘Yes (Pȏs d’ou;).’ – Soc. ‘But there are only two ideas or forms of such furniture (Alla ideai ge pou peri tauta ta skeuȇ duo) – one the idea of a bed (mia men klinȇs), the other of a table (mia de trapezȇs).’ – Glauc. ‘True (Nai).’ – Soc. ‘And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea – that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances (Oukoun kai eiȏthamen legein hoti ho dȇmiourgos hekaterou tou skeuous pros tȇn idean blepȏn houtȏ poiei ho men tas klinas, ho de tas trapezas, hais hȇmeis chrȏmetha, kai t’alla kata t’auta) – but no artificer makes the idea itself (ou gar pou tȇn ge idean autȇn dȇmiourgei oudeis tȏn dȇmiourgȏn): how could he (Pȏs gar;)? – Glauc. ‘Impossible (Oudamȏs).’ (596a10-b11, tr. Jowett)

When Socrates says in the tenth Book ‘we begin the enquiry following our usual method’ he is as far as he can be from Socrates whom Plato’s two brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, compelled in the second Book to overcome his philosophic ignorance and properly investigate the nature of justice. He is as far as can be from Socrates whom in the fifth Book Glaucon compels to go so far as to announce that ‘philosophers are to rule in the State’, if the state is to be governed well. The only justification for viewing philosophers as the only true rulers is that only they can see the Forms. The Forms a true philosopher can see are not Forms of the tenth Book, which are posited by Socrates on the basis of his observation that a number of individuals have a common name. The forms discussed by Socrates in the tenth Book are the forms with which the young Socrates challenged Zeno and Parmenides during they visit in Athens, the forms that Parmenides subjected to severe criticism, while assuring Socrates that if someone were not to allow the forms of things to be (ei ge tis mȇ easei eidȇ tȏn ontȏn einai) because of the difficulties which he had pointed out, and other such difficulties concerning them (eis panta ta nundȇ kai alla toiauta apoblepsas), he would completely destroy the power of discussion (houtȏs tȇn tou dialegesthai dunamin pantapasi diaphterei, Parm. 135b6-c2). Parmenides adds that it seems to him that Socrates is well aware of this (tou toioutou men oun moi dokeis kai mallon ȇisthȇsthai, 135c2-3).

The forms that Socrates posited following his usual method did not allow him to determine them ontologicaly as separate entities, but they allowed him to enter into discussion concerning them with anybody capable of seeing that there are countless instances, with which each of us is well acquainted, where many particular things have the same name because of their having the same characteristic. This allowed him to compel his interlocutors to admit that this common characteristic is something, and that it is something different from each of those things barring the same name, and thus to become involved in a discussion of ‘what it is’. Socrates found these enquiries fascinating, they led him to his theory of Reminiscence and thus opened to him a life-long span of daily philosophic activities. But these philosophic enquiries entitled neither him nor his interlocutors to think of themselves as natural ‘rulers of State’; by contrast, the Forms opened to the sight of Glaucon in the fifth Book of the Republic entitled the true philosophers to view themselves as such.