Sunday, November 15, 2015

I shall go on busking

And so I went busking this Sunday at St George. The weather forecast was for heavy rain, but mercifully, it was only very windy. I did not busk a penny, and as I was standing in front of St George reading St Paul, I decided that I shall go on busking, once a week, until I begin to receive at least a living wage for what I have been doing for the past thirty five years, ever since I came to Oxford in 1980 at the invitation of the Master of Balliol College at Oxford University.

I enjoyed the Service. The Second Reading was from The Letter of Paul to the Colossians 3:12-17: ‘As God’s chosen ones, holy and beloved …’ I wondered, did anyone in the congregation consider themselves chosen, holy, and beloved? I followed the text in Novum Testamentum Graece. When Paul wrote to the Colossians  as eklektoi (‘chosen’) tou theou (God’s) hagioi (holy) kai êgapêmenoi (and beloved) he did believe the members of the Christian communities to be God’s chosen ones, holy and beloved.

The Vicar started her Sermon by depicting the life of the early Christian communities and the important role they played in the society of their time; similarly, the St George congregation must endeavour to find its place and fulfil its role in the world of today. It was a powerful Sermon.

***
I have always been attracted to Christianity – as a stranger. In my late teens I was full of Tolstoy, and Tolstoy himself was full of Christianity – as a stranger. When I decided to refuse military service, I copied a copy of the English translation of Christ’s Sermon on the Mount. I hoped I could derive spiritual strength from it during my imprisonment. But the police confiscated it.

During my imprisonment I was in a prison camp with some 60 catholic priests. Prisoners in that camp worked as miners in a coal mine. The prison doctor did not allow me to go to the coalmine because of my poor eyesight, and so I waited in that camp for six weeks, for the next escort. Those six weeks were some of the most memorable and most happy weeks in my life. The prison camp was in the middle of beautiful hills, we lived in nice houses, which were built for civilian miners, which were never recruited. And most importantly, one of the priests, Václav Divíšek, took me under his care. I was a vegetarian (inspired by Tolstoy and Gandhi) and Václav enriched my diet by whatever he could buy for me in the canteen. And he gave me a textbook of German, and I read there my first German book, a tiny booklet, The Secret of the Holy Mass by Romano Guardini. (The priests had smuggled many books into the prison camp; at the coal-face there were no prison guards with them, just sympathetic civilian coal miners.) We had long talks during Divíšek’s free hours, walking around and around the courtyard. Our relationship was bitter-sweet; I learnt to admire the spiritual strength the priests derived from their Catholicism, but I could not make it my own, although I was baptized a Catholic. It pained me, my being just a sympathetic outsider; it would have been glorious to attend their secret Masses in the camp, the Holy Communion with wine smuggled in …

***
After reading 1 Corinthians 12-15, I found the Service fascinating. The words ‘For your sake he was crucified, suffered death and was buried. On the third day he rose again in accordance with the Scriptures’ reminded me of 1 Cor. 15, 3-4, 12-17, 19, 32 : ‘I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received, that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the scriptures … Now if Christ is preached as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been raised; if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found misrepresenting God, because we testified of God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised. For if the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised. If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile … If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied … If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.’

***
I can derive great strength from Paul’s words and activities – as a stranger to Christianity; for I can see him and embrace him as a source of much that is good and strong in our present day civilization. There would be no Christianity without Paul’s bringing the Good News to the Gentiles. He was the truly ecumenical man among the apostles. But how can a present day Christian, fed on the popularized neurophysiology, according to which all we are is just brain, put up with Paul? If one reads Paul in the original, his words can’t but sink deep down into one’s subconscious and into one’s consciousness.

Imagine what the brain must do: the visual cortex must be active, the motor centre must be engaged, bringing into play all the muscles involved in speaking, the auditory cortex must be active, to give you the necessary feedback, the short and long time memory must be involved … But in the brain it’s all just action potentials and chemical processes. All those brain activities must be transformed by the sub-conscious into what passes through one’s consciousness when one reads the text aloud. What a job one’s sub-consciousness and one’s consciousness must perform to make all this work!

As I have pointed out in ‘Self-knowledge as an imperative’ on my website and in the related posts on my blog, brain being corporeal, our sub-consciousness and our consciousness must be non-corporeal.


Friday, November 13, 2015

Busking with St Paul and Homer at St George

Dear Vicar,

Allow me to inform you and your congregation that on the forthcoming Sunday, November 15, I intend to busk in front of St George with Homer and St Paul read in the original. I shall start busking at 9am. I then shall attend the Service, and after the Service I should like to talk to anybody interested in my work concerning St Paul, New Testament, and the Ancient Greeks.

I must confess that the reasons for my decision to take recourse to busking are primarily financial. My only income is a State Pension of £26.95 a week; all my appeals to the Pension Service to revise their nonsensical decision to impose on me a debt of £11.956.70, which the Pension Service has been deducing from 2009 from my Pension Credit, and from my State Pension ever since I have lost the Pension Credit, have been in vain (see ‘It is all wrong – a letter to the Pension Service’ and ‘It has nothing to do with Oxford University’ on my blog http://juliustominquestions.blogspot.co.uk/, posted on June 15 and 19 respectively).

Hopefully, my busking with Homer will make people think about the decline that classics and classical philosophy have suffered in the last few decades – I have witnessed their ever accelerating decline since 1980 when I came to Oxford at the invitation of the Master of Balliol College at Oxford University – and about the ways in which that decline could be reversed. And I hope that Paul will carry us back to the days of the early Christian communities, to the foundations upon which St George stands with all the other Christian Churches around the world and from which we all can draw spiritual strength; I’ve chosen for my reading The First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians, Ch. 12-15.

You can listen to my readings of Homer and Paul on my website www.juliustomin.org.
I look forward to the next Sunday service at St George.

Regards,
Julius Tomin
PS
If you want to know more about me and my work, read ‘An Appeal to the Master of Balliol’ on my blog, posted on October 25, 2015.




Thursday, November 12, 2015

Allen’s misrepresentation of Plato’s Parmenides

After finishing his exposition of the greatest difficulty concerning the Forms, Parmenides reflects on the whole preceding discussion concerning the Forms. He opens his remarks with the words: ‘These, and many other difficulties on top of these, necessarily pertain to the Forms (tauta mentoi kai eti alla pros toutois panu polla anankaion echein ta eidê), if these Forms of beings exist (ei eisin hautai hai ideai tȏn ontȏn), and if one is going to define each Form itself (kai horieitai tis auto ti hekaston eidos, 134e9-135a3).

Allen paraphrases: ‘Parmenides now suggests that difficulties or aporiai such as these, and more in addition, are inevitable, if Ideas are to be distinguished as things by themselves, apart from sensibles.’ (R. E. Allen, ‘Comment’, in Plato’s Parmenides, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 203)

Parmenides goes on to say, in Allen’s translation: ‘The result is that the hearer is perplexed (hȏste aporein te ton akouonta) and contends that they do not exist (kai amphisbêtein hȏs oute esti tauta), and that even if their existence is conceded (ei te hoti malista eiê), they are necessarily unknowable by human nature (pollê anankê auta einai têi anthrȏpinêi phusei agnȏsta, 135a3-5).

Allen paraphrases: ‘The hearer will be perplexed, and argue that Ideas do not exist, and that even if they do, they are unknowable to us.’ (loc. cit.)

Parmenides goes on to say, in Allen’s translation: ‘In saying this (kai tauta legonta), he thinks he is saying something significant and (dokein te ti legein kai), as we just remarked (ho arti elegomen), it’s astonishingly hard to convince him to the contrary (thaumastȏs hȏs dusanapeiston einai). Only a man of considerable natural gifts (kai andros panu men euphuous) will be able to understand (tou dunêsomenou mathein) that there is a certain kind of each thing (hȏs esti ti genos hekastou), a nature and reality alone by itself (kai ousia autê kath’ hautên), and it will take a man more remarkable still to discover it (eti de thaumastoterou tou heurêsontos) and be able to instruct someone else (kai allon dunêsomenou didaxai) who has examined all these difficulties with sufficient care (tauta panta hikanȏs dieukrinêsamenon).’ (135a5-b2)

Allen remarks: ‘It will be observed that Parmenides does not suppose that the arguments against participation cannot be solved. He rather supposes they can be solved, but that it will take a man of remarkable gifts to solve them.

It is evident from this single passage that Parmenides does not suppose that his criticisms of the theory of Ideas are a mere tissue of fallacies. On the contrary, they are deep and serious, and raise difficulties that must be thought through if the theory of Ideas is to be sustained. Socrates, young and inexperienced, has not yet thought them through with sufficient care.’ (loc. cit.)

Pace Allen, nothing in what Parmenides said suggests that he ‘does not suppose that his criticisms’ (tauta), ‘and many other difficulties on top of these’ (kai eti alla pros toutois panu polla, 134e9-135a1) can be solved. On the contrary, he maintains that these difficulties ‘necessarily pertain to the Forms’ (anankaion echein ta eidê, 135a1). Yet he views all these criticisms of the theory of Ideas as false. When he says that a man who voices such criticisms ‘thinks he is saying something’ (dokein ti legein), he implies that ‘he is saying nothing’ (ouden legei). Criticisms that Parmenides had raised will be irrelevant to a person who finds the Forms.

Allen’s ‘he thinks he is saying something significant’ is too weak to render the force of dokein ti legein at 135a6, yet even his weak rendering chimes strangely with his insistence that Parmenides’ criticisms of the theory ‘are deep and serious, and raise difficulties that must be thought through if the theory of Ideas is to be sustained;’ it remains unaccounted for in his interpretation of the passage.

The passage, which closes the discussion concerning the difficulties ‘of necessity pertaining to the Forms’, is closely linked to the passage that opened the exposition of ‘the greatest difficulty’; Parmenides’ words ‘as we just remarked, it’s astonishingly hard to convince him to the contrary (thaumastȏs hȏs dusanapeiston einai)’ (135a6-7) refer to his words ‘one could not show to him that he is saying a falsity (hoti pseudetai), unless the objector happened to be a man of great experience and natural ability, willing to follow a man who would show him the Forms in the course of a copious and lengthy undertaking. Otherwise, the man who compels them to be unknowable would be left unconvinced (all’ apithanos eiê ho agnȏsta anankazȏn auta einai)’ (133b6-c1) Plato’s dusanapeiston ‘hard to convince’ at 135a7 elucidates the meaning of apithanos ‘unconvinced’ at 133c1.

***
Socrates fully agrees with Parmenides’ unequivocal dismissal of all objections against the Forms as irrelevant to a man who finds the Forms (tou heurêsontos): ‘I agree with you, Parmenides, for you’re saying very much what I think too (Sunchȏrȏ soi, ȏ Parmenidê, panu gar moi kata noun legeis, 135b3-4, tr. Allen).’

Socrates’ appreciation emphasizes the importance of what Parmenides has just said. But left as such, it would mean that the young Socrates could return to his theory of Forms, all objections against it having been thrown away. But this would obfuscate the difference Parmenides makes between Socrates who conceived the Forms he can’t uphold and a man who is to come, who will find the Forms immune to any objections and any criticism. And so Parmenides disregards Socrates’ enthusiastic agreement, and says: ‘Nevertheless (Alla mentoi), if someone (ei ge tis dê), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), again will not allow that there are the Forms of things that are (au mê easei eidê tȏn ontȏn einai), seeing all the present difficulties and others like them (eis panta ta nundê kai alla toiauta apoblepsas), and will not define as something a Form of each single thing (mêde ti horieitai eidos henos hekastou), he will not even have where to turn his mind (oude hopoi trepsei tên dianoian hexei), not allowing a Form of each of the things that are to be ever the same (mê eȏn idean tȏn ontȏn hekastou tên autên aei einai); and so he will utterly destroy the power of discourse (kai houtȏs tên tou dialegesthai dunamin pantapasi diaphtherei). But you seem to me to be only too well aware of this (tou toioutou men oun moi dokeis kai mallon êisthêsthai).’ – Socrates: ‘You are right (Alêthê legeis).’ – Parmenides: ‘What will you do about philosophy, then (Ti oun poiêseis philosophias peri)? Whither will you turn (pêi trepsêi) with these things unknown (agnooumenȏn toutȏn)? – Socrates: ‘I don’t think at all that I can see (Ou panu moi dokȏ kathoran), at least at present (en ge tȏi paronti).’ (135b5-c7)

Allen’s ‘Socrates, young and inexperienced, has not yet thought them [i. e. the difficulties that of necessity pertain to the Forms] through with sufficient care’ is unobjectionable if it refers to the young Socrates who went to Zeno’s lecture and confronted Zeno and Parmenides with his theory of Forms, such as similarity, which makes all similar things similar, beauty, which makes all beautiful things beautiful, justice, which makes all just things just (130e5-131a3). But this is not what Allen can mean, for in his ‘Comment’ he maintains that the historical Socrates could not have spoken as he will here be made to speak, the chief topic of discussion being the Theory of Ideas (op. cit. p. 74): ‘the theory criticized is essentially that of the Phaedo and Republic’ (op. cit. p. 105).  – So what can Allen possibly mean? How could Plato derogate his most mature works in the way that Allen’s words appear to indicate: ‘Socrates, young and inexperienced, has not yet thought them through with sufficient care’?

***
Next, Allen says: ‘If the criticisms are not trivial, neither are they fatal. Parmenides supposes not only that they can be solved but that they must be solved, and he gives his reason: if the existence of Ideas is denied, intelligence will have no object, and the power and significance of discourse will be utterly destroyed. In short, the man who has criticized the theory of Ideas subscribes to the theory he has criticized. His arguments are not to be understood as a refutation of that theory, but as a set of perplexities that must be thought through if that theory is to be understood. The criticisms are answerable, and the answers must be found if philosophy is to be pursued.’ (loc. cit.)

Allen’s remark refers to Parmenides 135b5-c2 quoted above. There is nothing in this passage, or anywhere else in the dialogue, that suggests that the criticisms of the theory of the Forms ‘not only can be solved but must be solved’.

Allen is right when he says that Parmenides’ ‘arguments are not to be understood as a refutation of that theory’, but he is wrong when he says that these arguments are to be seen ‘as a set of perplexities that must be thought through if that theory is to be understood … the answers must be found if philosophy is to be pursued.’ The Republic remains Plato’s paradeigma when he writes the Laws, his last work (Laws 739b8-e3).

Aristotle viewed the criticisms raised by Parmenides as valid and as fatal to the theory both in his first book of Metaphysics, in which he speaks as a member of Plato’s Academy, and in the 13th book, in which he disassociates himself from Platonists. What Aristotle had to explain was how it was possible that Plato was immune against any conceivable criticisms of the theory of Forms, for this is what the Parmenides was all about.

Aristotle explains in the 1st book of the Metaphysics: Plato in his youth (ek neou) embraced the Heraclitean doctrines ‘that all things are in constant flux’ (hȏs hapantȏn aei reontȏn). Engrossed in the Heraclitean view, Plato encountered Socrates who focussed his attention to moral terms (peri ta êthika pragmateuomenou) and ‘brought his mind to a standstill, fixing his mind on definitions’ (peri horismȏn epistêsantos tên dianoian). Plato realized ‘that the entities on which Socrates’ mind was fixed and brought to a standstill were different from things perceptible by our senses (hȏs peri heterȏn touto gignomenon kai ou tȏn aisthêtȏn), and he called the entities of this kind Forms (houtos men oun ta men toiauta tȏn ontȏn ideas prosêgoreuse)’. (987a33-b8) According to Diogenes Laertius, Plato was twenty, when this happened: ‘At first he used to study philosophy … as a follower of Heraclitus. Afterwards, when he was about to compete for the prize with a tragedy, he listened to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysus, and then consigned his poems to the flames … From that time onward, having reached his twentieth year (so it is said), he was the pupil of Socrates (III. 5-6).’ This means, in the light of the introductory scene of the Parmenides, that Plato knew of the criticisms directed against the Forms before he discovered the Forms immune against all that criticism or was acquainted with it shortly afterwards. One can imagine the pleasure Antiphon had derived from teasing his older half-brother simply by diligently reciting all the criticisms he had learnt from his friend Pythodorus, criticisms pronounced by Parmenides, a great philosopher.

***
Let me return to Parmenides’ prediction that there will come a man who will discover the Forms ‘and will be able to instruct someone else (kai allon dunêsomenou didaxai) who has examined all these difficulties with sufficient care (tauta panta hikanȏs dieukrinêsamenon)’. Allen unduly narrows down Parmenides’ tauta panta by translating it ‘all these difficulties’. Tauta panta means ‘all these things’, and at this junction it refers to everything that has been said so far. Only a man who rightly judged dieukrinêsamenon all that he was told in the Parmenides (tauta panta), who realized that all possible criticisms of the Forms were irrelevant as far as the Forms were concerned, had a chance of reaching the Forms by studying the Republic.

Aristotle’s passionate plea directed against the Forms in the 1st book of the Metaphysics indicates that after Plato’s departure for Sicily the Parmenides had the effect Plato had hoped for: ‘In general, though philosophy seeks the cause of perceptible things (holȏs de zêtousês tês sophias peri tȏn phanerȏn to aition), we have given this up (touto men eiakamen), for we say nothing of the cause (outhen gar legomen peri tês aitias) from which change takes its start (hothen hê archê tês metabolês); but while we fancy we are stating the substance of perceptible things (tên d’ ousian oiomenoi legein autȏn), we assert the existence of other substances (heteras men ousias einai phamen), while our account of the way in which they are the substances of perceptible things (hopȏs d’ ekeinai toutȏn ousiai) is empty talk (dia kenês legomen); for ‘sharing’ (to gar metechein), as we said before (hȏsper kai proteron eipomen), means nothing  (outhen estin)’ (992a24-29, tr. W. D. Ross with a minor change; Ross translates heteras men ousias einai phamen ‘we assert the existence of a second class of substances’, I have translated ‘we assert the existence of other substances’).

Monday, November 9, 2015

A request addressed to Oxford University classicists and philosophers

Dear All,

Allow me to inform you that I have put on my website www.juliustomin.org the 14th Book of Homer’s Iliad, read in the original. An integral part of my recording Homer is my listening to the recordings. I am 76 years old, my hearing is deteriorating and I need a hearing aid. I looked on Google, the prices on Hearing Direct vary from £169 - £599. My only income is a State Pension of £26.95 a week (see ‘It is all wrong- a letter to the Pension Service’ and ‘It has nothing to do with Oxford University’ posted on my blog on June 15 and 19 respectively). I asked OXFAM for help, but they can’t assist me, for their policy does not allow for loans or grants to individuals. Would you suggest to me a charitable foundation to which I could apply with some hope of success? If you know of any such foundation, would you support my request?

I addressed this request to Balliol academics on October 31, after putting the 13th Book of the Iliad on my website, but I received no answer.

I hope to be hearing from you soon.
Regards,
Julius Tomin


Saturday, November 7, 2015

Plato’s staging of the greatest difficulty concerning the Forms in the Parmenides

Parmenides in the dialogue introduces the greatest difficulty concerning the Forms as follows: ‘If someone should say that the Forms cannot be known, one could not show to him that he is saying a falsity (hoti pseudetai), unless the objector happened to be a man of great experience and natural ability, willing to follow a man who would show him the Forms in the course of a copious and lengthy undertaking (etheloi de panu polla kai porrȏthen pragmateuomenou tou endeiknumenou hepesthai, 133a11-b9).

The objection that the Forms cannot be known is thus qualified as false right from the outset. This qualification transcends the Parmenides by pointing to a man ‘demonstrating the Forms in the course of a copious and lengthy undertaking’. Plato points thus to the Republic in which he demonstrated that only the Forms can be known, for only they truly are; all other things are subject to constant change and can be apprehended only by opinion that lacks the certainty of knowledge. Plato’s pointing to the Republic is prepared in the introductory scene to the Parmenides, in which Plato’s brothers Adeimantus and Glaucon mediate its narrative; in the Republic they compel Socrates to transcend his philosophic ignorance, outline the Form of justice and ascend to the Form of the good.
After thus pointing to the Republic as the place where the true solution of the difficulty is to be looked for, Plato in the Parmenides discusses the suggestion that the Forms are what they are in their relation to one another, but not in relation to things among us, and that the things among us are related only to one another, but not to the Forms (133c8-d5). Parmenides elucidates this point to Socrates by an example: ‘If one of us is a master or slave of someone (ei tis hêmȏn tou despotês ê doulos estin), he is surely not a slave of master itself, what master is (ouk autou despotou dêpou, ho esti despotês, ekeinou doulos estin), nor is a master the master of slave itself, what slave is (oude autou doulou, ho esti doulos, despotês ho despotês), but being a man (all anthrȏpos ȏn), both these belong to a man (anthrȏpou amphotera taut’ estin). But mastership itself (autê de despoteia) is what it is of slavery itself (autês douleias estin ho esti), and slavery in like manner (kai douleia hȏsautȏs) is slavery itself of mastership itself (autê douleia autês despoteias). Things in us do not have their power in relation to things there (all’ ou ta par hêmin pros ekeina tên dunamin echei), nor things there in relation to us (oude ekeina pros hêmas). Rather (all’), as I say (ho legȏ), things there belong to themselves and are relative to themselves (auta hautȏn kai pros hauta ekeina te esti), and things among us are in the same way relative to themselves (kai ta par’ hêmin hȏsautȏs pros hauta). Or don’t you understand what I mean (ê ou manthaneis ha legȏ)?’ – Socrates: ‘Of course I understand (Panu ge manthanȏ)’ (133d7-134a1)
***
The significance of Parmenides’ chosen example, of his question, and of Socrates’ confident ‘Of course I understand’ will become clear when Parmenides returns to it at the closing stage of the difficulty, and Socrates reflects on it.
***
Parmenides goes on to focus on the main point, the difficulty concerning the knowability of the Forms: ‘And knowledge too (Oukoun kai epistêmê), that which is knowledge itself (autê men ho esti epistêmê), would be of that which is the truth itself (tês ho estin alêtheia), of that it would be knowledge (autês an ekeinês eiê epistêmê)?’ – Socrates: ‘Of course (Panu ge). – Parmenides: ‘Yet again, each of the sciences (Hekastê de au tȏn epistêmȏn), which is (hê estin), would be knowledge of each of the beings, what each is (hekastou tȏn ontȏn, ho estin, eiê an epistêmê). Not so (ê ou)?’– Socrates: ‘Yes (Nai)’ – Parmenides: ‘But the knowledge which we have (Hê de par hêmin epistêmê), wouldn’t it be knowledge of the truth which we have (ou tês par hêmin an alêtheias eiê), and again each science which we have (kai au hekastê hê par hêmin epistêmê), wouldn’t it happen to be knowledge of each of the things that we have (tȏn par hêmin ontȏn hekastou an epistêmê sumbainoi einai)?’ – Socrates: ‘Necessarily (Anankê)’. – Parmenides: ‘Moreover (Alla mên), we do not have the Forms themselves, as you agree (auta ge ta eidê, hȏs homologies, oute echomen), nor can they be among us (oute par hêmin hoion te einai).’ – Socrates: ‘Of course not (Ou gar oun).’ – Parmenides: ‘But presumably, the kinds themselves, what each is, are known by the Form of knowledge itself (Gignȏsketai de ge pou hup’ autou tou eidous tou tês epistêmês auta ta genê ha estin hekasta)?’ – Socrates: ‘Yes (Nai).’ – Parmenides: ‘Which we don’t have (Ho ge hêmeis ouk echomen).’ – Socrates: ‘No (Ou gar). – Parmenides: ‘So none of the Forms is known by us (Ouk ara hupo ge hêmȏn gignȏsketai tȏn eidȏn ouden), since we do not have a share of knowledge itself (epeidê autês epistêmês ou metechomen).‘ – Socrates: ‘It seems not (Ouk eoiken).’
***
If Plato’s Parmenides had been interested merely in presenting Socrates with the greatest difficulty confronting the Forms, this was the point to stop. For Parmenides announced the difficulty as follows: ‘There are many other difficulties, but the greatest is this: If someone should say that the Forms cannot be known, if they are such as we maintain they must be’ (133b4-6).  Discussing the Forms ‘as we maintain they must be’, at this point Parmenides appears to have proved the objection to be sound: ‘None of the Forms is known by us, since we do not have a share of knowledge itself.’ (134b11-12)

But this clearly was not Plato’s intention, for when Parmenides introduced ‘the greatest difficulty’, he qualified it as false: ‘To a man saying this one could not show that he is saying a falsity, unless he happened to be a man of great experience and natural ability, willing to follow a man who would show him the Forms in the course of a copious and lengthy undertaking’ (133b6-9). After highlighting ‘the greatest difficulty’ in the strongest terms in the lines that begin at 134a3 and end at 134b12, Parmenides now goes on to show the difficulty as paradoxical, impious, and thus wrong.

***
Parmenides begins to undermine the validity of the objection against the knowability of the Forms by highlighting its negative consequences: ‘Unknown to us (Agnȏston ara hêmin) is the beautiful itself (kai auto to kalon), which is (ho esti), and the good (kai to agathon), and everything we at this point accept as being the Forms themselves (kai panta ha dê hȏs ideas autas ousas hupolambanomen)’. – Socrates: ‘That’s the danger’ (Kinduneuei)’ (134b14-c2).

I accept Allen’s imaginative ‘at this point’ for Parmenides’ dê, for up to this point Socrates appears simply to follow and accept as valid the case Parmenides makes for the argument against the possibility of knowing the Forms. Socrates’ ‘That’s the danger’ should be taken seriously as the expression of great unease he begins to experience at this point. Allen completely misjudged the situation when he translates Socrates’ Kinduneuei: ‘Very likely’. Equally misleading is Allen’s rendering of Parmenides’ response to Socrates’ Kinduneuei: ‘Consider then whether the following is still more remarkable.’ Parmenides says: ‘See then the following, which is even more alarming than this (Hora dê eti toutou deinoteron tode)’.

***
Socrates asks: ‘What kind of thing (To poion)’, and Parmenides begins to explain: ‘You’d say, presumably (Phaiês an pou), that if there is a kind itself of knowledge (eiper esti auto ti genos epistêmês), it is much more exact (polu auto akribesteron einai) than knowledge that we have (ê tên par hêmin epistêmên), and so too of beauty, and all the rest (kai kallos kai t’alla panta houtȏ).’ – Socrates: ‘Yes (Nai).’ – Parmenides: ‘Then if anything else has a share of knowledge itself (Oukoun eiper ti allo autês epistêmês metechei), nobody has the most exact knowledge more than god (ouk an tina mallon ê theon echein tên akribestatên epistêmên)?’ – Socrates: ‘Necessarily (Anankê).’ – Parmenides: ‘Will then the god be able (Ar’ oun hoios te au estai ho theos) to know things among us (ta par’ hêmin gignȏskein), having knowledge itself (autên epistêmên echȏn)?’ – Socrates: ‘Why not (Ti gar ou)?’ – ‘Because, Socrates, we agreed (Hoti hȏmologêtai hêmin, ȏ Sȏkrates) that neither those Forms have the power they have in relation to things among us (mête ekeina ta eidê pros ta par hêmin tên dunamin echein hên echei), nor things among us in relation to those (mête ta par hêmin pros ekeina), but only themselves in relation to themselves (all’ auta pros hauta hekatera) .’ – Socrates: ‘This has been agreed (Hȏmologêtai gar).’ (134c5-d8).
***
Plato’s Parmenides goes on to show the absurdity of this agreement by returning to the master-slave example: ‘Then if in the god’s realm (Oukoun ei para tȏ theȏi) is the most exact mastership itself (hautê estin hê akribestatê despoteia) and the most exact knowledge itself (kai hê akribestatê epistêmê), neither would their mastership ever master us (out an hê despoteia hê ekeinȏn hêmȏn pote an desposeien), nor would knowledge know us (oud an epistêmê hêmas gnoiê) or anything else where we are (oude ti allo tȏn par hêmin). But similarly (alla homoiȏs), we do not govern them (hêmeis te ekeinȏn ouk archomen) by our authority here (têi par hêmin archêi), and we don’t know anything divine (oude gignȏskomen tou theiou ouden) by our knowledge (têi hêmeterai epistêmêi), and they again (ekeinoi te au), by the same account (kata ton auton logon), are not our masters (oute despotai hêmȏn eisin) and don’t know human things (oute gignȏskousi ta anthrȏpeia pragmata), being gods (theoi ontes).’ – Socrates: ‘But surely, it would be too strange an account (Alla mê lian thaumastos ho logos), if one were to deprive the god of knowing (ei tis ton theon aposterêsei tou eidenai).’ (134d9-e8)
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Parmenides rounds up the discussion concerning the Forms by reiterating that ‘in these and many other difficulties are the Forms necessarily involved (tauta mentoi kai eti alla pros toutois panu polla anankaion echein ta eidê), if these Forms of beings exist (ei eisin hautai hai ideai tȏn ontȏn), and if one is going to define each Form itself (kai horieitai tis auto ti hekaston eidos) (134e9-135a3) … it will take a man of considerable natural  gifts (kai andros panu men euphuous), who will be able to learn (tou dunêsomenou mathein) that there is a certain kind of each thing (hȏs esti genos ti hekastou), and being by itself (kai ousia autê kath’ hautên), and an even more admirable man (eti de thaumastoterou) who will discover it (tou heurêsontos) and will be able to teach it to someone else (kai allon dunêsomenou didaxai) after having sufficiently and well examined all these things (tauta panta hikanȏs dieukrinêsamenon).’ (135a7-b2)
With these words Parmenides points to Plato, who is to come.

Thursday, November 5, 2015

5 Arguments against the Forms in Plato’s Parmenides and Aristotle’s critical remarks on the Forms

When Socrates proved unable to defend the Forms against the difficulties raised by Parmenides, the latter pointed out to him that ‘there are many other difficulties (polla men kai alla), but the greatest is this (megiston de tode): If someone should say that the Forms cannot be known (Ei tis phaiê mêde prosêkein auta gignȏskesthai, 133b4-5) … ‘those Forms that are what they are in their relation to one another (hosai tȏn ideȏn pros allêlas eisin hai eisin) have their being in their relation to themselves (autai pros hautas tên ousian echousin), but not in relation to things among us (all ou pros ta par hêmin), resemblances, or whatever one may posit them to be (eite homoiȏmata eite hopêi dê tis auta tithetai), which we possess and call to be (hȏn hêmeis metechontes eiani hekasta eponomazometha); and the things that are among us and have the same name with the Forms (ta de par hêmin tauta homȏnuma onta ekeinois) are again related only to one another (auta au pros hauta estin), but not to the Forms (all’ ou pros ta eidê), and belong to themselves (kai heautȏn) but not to the Forms that have the same name again (all’ ouk ekeinȏn hosa au onomazetai houtȏs, 133c8-d5).’

Plato had good reasons to call this the greatest difficulty concerning the Forms. Aristotle writes in Metaphysics A: ‘Above all one might discuss the question (pantȏn de malista diaporêseie an tis) what on earth the Forms contribute (ti pote sumballetai ta eidê) to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be (tois aidiois tȏn aisthêtȏn ê tois gignomenois kai phtheiromenois). For they cause neither movement nor any change in them (oute gar kinêseȏs oute metabolês oudemias estin aitia autois). But again they help in no wise either towards the knowledge of the other things (alla mên oute pros tên epistêmên outhen boêthei tên tȏn allȏn), for they are not even the substance of these (oude gar ousia ekeina toutȏn), else they would have been in them (en toutois gar an ên), or towards their being (oute eis to einai), if they are not in the particulars which share in them (mê enuparchonta tois metechousin).’ (991a8-14, tr. W. D. Ross; Ross notes on tois aidiois tȏn aisthêtȏn: ‘the heavenly bodies’.)

Plato did not shrink from voicing the grave consequences of this objection. Parmenides: ‘So none of the Forms is known to us (Ouk ara hupo ge hêmȏn gignȏsketai tȏn eidȏn ouden), since we do not have a share of knowledge itself (epeidê autês epistêmês ou metechomen).’ – Socrates: ‘It seems not (Ouk eoiken).’ – Parmenides: ‘Unknowable to us is therefore beautiful itself (Agnȏston ara hêmin kai auto to kalon), what it is (ho esti), and the good (kai to agathon), and everything we assume as being the Forms themselves (kai panta ha dê hȏs ideas autas ousas hupolambanomen).’ (134b11-c2)

That Plato did not see this objection as relevant is clear from the way in which he introduces and closes the discussion of it in the Parmenides. But it is equally clear that Aristotle persisted in considering it an insurmountable difficulty for the theory especially concerning its ethical aspects.

In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle says: ‘Let us say that in the first place to assert the existence of a Form not only of good (legȏmen hoti prȏton men to einai idean mê monon agathou) but of anything else (alla kai allou hotououn) is empty talk (legetai logikȏs kai kenȏs) … next (epeita), even granting that Forms and the Form of good do exist (ei kai hoti malist’ eisin hai ideai kai agathou idea), it can’t be of any practical value for the good life or for actions (mê pot’ oude chrêsimos pros zȏên agathên oude pros tas praxeis). (1217b20-25)

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle introduces the problem as follows: ‘We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it (To de katholou beltion isȏs episkepsasthai kai diaporêsai pȏs legetai), although such an inquiry is made an uphill task (kaiper prosantous tês toiautês zêtêseȏs gignomenês) by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own (dia to philous andras eisagagein ta eidê). Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better (doxeie d’ an isȏs beltion einai), indeed to be our duty (kai dein), for the sake of maintaining the truth (epi sȏtêriai ge tês alêtheias) even to destroy what touches us closely (kai ta oikeia anairein), especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom (allȏs te kai philosophous ontas); for, while both are dear (amphoin gar ontoin philoin), piety requires us to honour truth above our friends (hosion protiman tên alêtheian).’ (1096a11-17, tr. W. D. Ross)

Wednesday, November 4, 2015

4b Lasting repercussions of what happened thirty five years ago

Radovan Richta wrote to Professor Diemer: ‘In some parts of the Western press the matter is presented as though Tomin were a distinguished philosopher persecuted and silenced for his views etc. But in fact he is worth nothing in philosophy, he has never published any scientific book, and his output comprises … one manuscript, a tiny study in the middle of the 1970s, which was not published because it was condemned by highly competent referees for its absolutely negligible scientific content.’

In the middle of 1970, when I was working in the Prague Power-plant as a turbine operator, I wrote a book on Descartes entitled I think – I am (Myslím – jsem). I was prompted to write it by Milan Sobotka’s claim that ‘Descartes wrote the first outline of the Meditations in 1629’ (the ‘Introductory note’ to Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, Svoboda, Prague 1970, p. 132). I doubted that Descartes could have written an outline of his Meditations before he wrote the World, of which he reported in the Discourse on the Method in 1636 (it remained unpublished during his lifetime). I got Descartes’ Oeuvres published by Adam and Tannery from the University Library, read Descartes’ World, and my doubts grew stronger. Sobotka based his claim on Descartes’ letter to G. Gibieuf from 18th July 1629, and so I read Descartes’ correspondence from the years 1628 to 1630. This transformed my doubts into certainty: the theory about Descartes’ outline of the Meditations written in 1629 is mistaken.

Concerning I think – I am I wrote in ‘An account of an experiment’ addressed to the Institute of Philosophy: ‘It is not a small thing, what I succeeded in demonstrating. The theory of Descartes’ early Metaphysics is not only the theory held by C. Güttler, to whom Sobotka refers as his source. It is a theory held by the foremost interpreters of Descartes for centuries. In the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century it was advocated by the editors of Descartes’ Works Adam and Tannery, in the 19th by J. Millet, and its roots go back to the 17th century Life of Descartes written by A. Baillet (Vie de Descartes, Paris 1691).’

After writing the I think – I am, I took it to the Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. In ‘An account of an experiment’ I wrote about it: ‘I went to the Publishing House to submit the book for editorial assessment. My request was rejected with an air of incredulity: “How could you think that we might possibly consider publishing your work?” – I pleaded: “I am interested simply in getting the book properly examined and assessed.” – “Do you really think that some academic might read your book, at the present time?” I went home, I felt sick.’

As I have already noted, I addressed ‘An account of an experiment’ to the Institute of Philosophy; Radovan Richta was the Director of it. So let me end this post by comparing my account of my visit at the Publishing House with Radovan Richta’s letter to Professor Diemer, President of the International Federation of Philosophic Societies: ‘he [i.e. Tomin] has never published any scientific book, and his output comprises … one manuscript, a tiny study in the middle of the 1970s, which was not published because it was condemned by highly competent referees for its absolutely negligible scientific content.’

The I think – I am was published in the samizdat Petlice on the recommendation of the two greatest philosophers of those days in our country, Professor Jan Patočka and Professor Karel Kosík. Well informed as Richta was, he undoubtedly knew about it. But more importantly, when Richta wrote and published his letter to Professor Diemer, he was sure that I would never be allowed to question his allegations in Public Media, and that no Publishing House would publish my book on Descartes.