Euthyphro 2

Socrates: What is your case, Euthyphro (E!stin de\ dh/ soi, w} Eu0qu/fron, ti/j h9 di/kh;)? Are you defending or prosecuting (feu/geij au0th\n h2 diw&keij;)?

Euthyphro: Prosecuting (Diw&kw).

Socrates: Whom (Ti/na;)?

Euthyphro: Such a man that they think I am insane because I am prosecuting him (O$n diw&kwn au] dokw~ mai/nesqai).

Socrates: Why? Are you prosecuting one who has wings to fly away with (Ti/ de/; peto/meno/n tina diw&keij;)?

***

H. N. Fowler, the translator, has a useful note on ‘prosecuting’: ‘The Greek word [diw&kw] has much the same meaning as the Latin prosequor, from which the English “prosecute” is derived, “follow”, “pursue”, and is at the same time the technical term for “prosecute”.’

***

Euthyphro: No flying for him at his ripe old age (Pollpou= ge dei= pe/tesqai, o3j ge tugxa/nei w_n eu] ma/la presbu/thj).

Socrates: Who is he (Ti/j ou[toj;)?

Euthyphro: My father (O( e0mo\j path/r).

Socrates: Your father, my dear man (O( so/j, w} be/ltiste;)?

Euthyphro: Certainly (Pa/nu me\n ou]n).

Socrates: But what is the charge (E!stin de\ ti/ to\ e1gklhma), and what is the suit about (kai\ ti/noj h9 di/kh;)?

Euthyphro: Murder, Socrates (Fo/nou, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: Heracles! (H(ra/kleij!) Surely Euthyphro (h] pou, w} Eu0qu/fron), most people do not know (a0gnoei=tai u9po\ tw~n pollw~n) where the right lies (o3ph| pote\ o0rqw~j e1xei); for I fancy it is not everyone who can rightly do what you are doing (ou0 ga\r oi]mai/ ge tou= e0pituxo/ntoj o0rqw_j au0to\ pra=cai), but only one who is very far advanced in wisdom (a0lla\ po/rrw pou h1dh sofi/aj e0lau/nontoj).

Euthyphro: Very far indeed, Socrates, by Zeus (Po/rw me/ntoi nh\ Di/a, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: Is the one who was killed by your father a relative (E1stin de\ dh\ tw~n oi0kei/wn tij o9 teqnew_j u9po\ tou= sou= patro/j;)? But of course he was (h2 dh=la dh/); for you would not bring a charge of murder against him on a stranger’s account (ou0 ga\r a2n pou/ ge u9pe\r a0llotri/ou e0pech/|eisqa fo/nou au0tw~|).

Euthyphro: It is ridiculous (Geloi=on), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), that you think it matters (o3ti oi1ei ti diafe/rein) whether the man who was killed was a stranger or a relative (ei1te a0llo/trioj ei1te oi0kei=oj o9 teqnew&j), and do not see that the only thing to consider is (a0ll’ ou0 tou=to mo/non dei= fula/ttein) whether the action of the slayer was justified or not (ei1te e0n di/kh| e1kteinen o9 ktei/naj ei1te mh/), and that if it was justified (kai\ ei0 me\n e0n di/kh|) one ought to let him alone (e0a=n), and if not (ei0 de\ mh/), one ought to proceed against him (e0pecie/nai), even if he share one’s hearth and eat at one’s table (e0a\n o9 ktei&naj sune/stio/j soi kai\ o9motra/pezoj h]|). For the pollution is the same (i1son ga\r to\ mi/asma gi/gnetai) if you associate knowingly with such a man (e0a\n cunh=|jtw~| toiou/tw| cuneidw&j) and do not purify yourself and him (kai\ mh\ a0fosioi=j seauto/n te kai\ e0kei=non) by proceeding against him (th=| di/kh| e0peciw&n). In this case, the man who was killed was a hired workman of mine (e0pei\ o3 ge a0poqanw_n pela/thj tij h]n e0mo/j), and when we were farming at Naxos (kai\ w(j e0gewrgou=men e0n th=| Na/cw|), he was working there on our land (e0qh/teuen e0kei= par’ h9mi=n). Now he got drunk (paroinh/saj ou]n), got angry with one of our house slaves (kai\ o0rgisqei\j tw~n oi0ketw~n tini tw~n h9mete/rwn), and butchered him (a0posfa/ttei au0to/n). So my father bound him hand and foot (o9 ou]n path\r sundh/saj tou\j po/daj kai\ tou\j xei=raj au0tou=), through him into a ditch (katabalw_n e0j ta/fron tina/), and sent a man here to Athens to ask the religious adviser (pe/mpei deu=ro a1ndra peuso/menon tou= e0chghtou=) what he ought to do (o3 ti xrei/h poiei=n). In the mean time he paid no attention to the man as he lay there bound (e0n de\ tou/tw| tw|~ xro/nw| tou= dedeme/nou w)ligw&rei te), and neglected him (kai\ h0me/lei), thinking that he was a murderer (w(j a0ndrofo/nou) and it did not matter (kai\ ou0de\n o2n pra=gma) if he were to die (ei0 kai\ a0poqa/noi). And that is just what happened to him (o3per ou]n kai\ e1paqen). For he died of hunger and cold and his bonds (u9po\ ga\r limou= kai\ r9i/gouj kai\ tw~n desmw~n a0poqnh/|skei) before the messenger came back from the adviser (pri\n to\n a1ggelon para\ tou= e0chgh/tou a0fike/sqai). Now my father and the rest of my relatives are angry with me (tau=ta dh\ ou]n kai\ a0ganaktei= o3 te path\r kai\ oi9 a1lloi oi0kei=oi), because for the sake of this murderer (o3ti e0gw_ u9pe\r tou= a0ndrofo/nou) I am prosecuting my father for murder (tw|~ patri\ fo/nou e0pece/rxomai). For they say he did not kill him (ou1te a0poktei/nanti, w#j fasin e0kei=noi), and if he had killed him never so much (ou1t’ ei0 o3ti ma/lista a0pe/kteinen), yet since the dead man was a murderer (a0ndrofo/nou ge o1ntoj tou= a0poqano/ntoj), I ought not to trouble myself about such a fellow (ou0 dei=n fronti/zein u9pe\r tou= toiou=tou), because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder (a0no/sion ga\r ei]nai to\ ui9o\n patri\ fo/nou e0pecie/nai). Which shows how little they know what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unholiness (kakw~j ei0do/tej, w} Sw&kratej, to\ qei=on w(j e1xei tou= o9si/ou te pe/ri kai\ tou= a0nosi/ou).

Socrates: But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro (Su\ de\ dh\ pro\j Dio/j, w} Eu0qu/fron), do you think your knowledge about divine laws and holiness and unholiness is so exact (ou9twsi\ a0kribw~j oi1ei e0pi/stasqai peri\ tw~n qei/wn, o3ph| e1xei kai\ tw~n o9si/wn te kai\ a0nosi/wn), that, when the facts are (w#ste tou/twn ou3tw praxqe/ntwn) as you say (w(j su\ le/geij), you are not afraid of doing something unholy  yourself in prosecuting your father for murder (ou0 fobei= dikazo/menoj tw~| patri/, o3pwj mh\ au] su\ a0no/sion pra=gma tugxa/nh|j pra/ttwn;)?

Euthyphro: I should be of no use, Socrates (Ou0de\n ga\r a1n mou o1feloj ei1h, w} Sw&kratej), and Euthyphro would be in no way different from other men (ou0de/ tw| a2n diafe/roi Eu0qu/frwn tw~n pollw~n a0nqrw&pwn), if I did not have exact knowledge about all such things (ei0 mh\ ta\ toiau=ta pa/nta a0kribw~j ei0dei/hn).

Euthyphro 1

Euthyphro: What strange thing has happened, Socrates (Ti/ new&teron, w} Sw&kraej, ge/gonen), that you have left your accustomed haunts in the Lyceum (o3ti su\ ta\j e0n Lukei/w| katalipw_n diatriba\j) and are now haunting the portico where the king archon sits (e0nqa/de nu=n diatri/beij peri\ th\n basile/wj stoa/n;)? For it cannot be that you have an action before the king (ou0 ga/r pou kai\ soi/ ge di/kh tij ou]sa tugxa/nei pro\j to\n basile/a), as I have (w#sper e0moi/).

Socrates: Our Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action (Ou1toi dh\ A0qhnai=oi/ ge, w} Eu0qu/fron, di/khn au0th\n kalou=sin), but an indictment (a0lla\ grafh/n).

***

Translation H. N. Fowler, Loeb Classical Library. John Burnet says in his ‘Introductory Note’: ‘The situation assumed in the Euthyphro is that indicated at the end of the Theaetetus (a much later dialogue), where Socrates says he has an appointment at the Hall of the “King” with reference to a charge brought against him by Meletus (210d1) nu=n me\n ou]n a0panthte/on moi ei0j th\n tou= basile/wj stoa\n e0pi\ th\n Melh/tou grafh\n h3n me ge/graptai (John McDowell translates: ‘Well, now I must go to the King’s Porch to face the charge Meletus has brought against me.’ Clarendon Plato Series.).’

Burnet further notes: ‘The basileu/j was the second of the nine archons, and had succeeded to the religious functions of the ancient kings. All the most ancient public sacrifices were therefore performed by him. Otherwise, since he was now appointed by lot and for a single year, his duties were rather formal and administrative. In particular, he was responsible for the Eleusinia.’ (Plato, Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito, edited with notes by John Burnet, Clarendon Paperbacks, Oxford University Press 1924, reprinted 2002.)

Apart from this valuable information, Burnet says in his ‘Introductory Note’: ‘As Euthyphro too had a case before the “King”, and as, at the end of the dialogue, he suddenly remembers another engagement (15e3), we must suppose that his business here is over for the present, and that he is coming out of the basi/leioj stoa/ when he sees Socrates.’

This is wrong. If we are to understand Euthyphro’s ‘For now I am in a hurry to go somewhere (nu=n ga\r speu/dw poi), and it is time for me to go away (kai/ moi w#ra a0pie/nai)’, we must see it in connection with Socrates’ preceding words, with which Socrates dismissed the whole preceding discussion, asking Euthyphro to start all over again: ‘Then we must begin again at the beginning (E0c a0rxh=j a1ra h9mi=n pa/lin skepte/on) and ask what holiness is (ti/ e0sti to\ o3sion) … But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not (nu=n de\ eu] oi]da o3ti safw~j oi1ei ei0de/nai to/ te o3sion kai\ mh/). So tell me (ei0pe\ ou]n), most excellent Euthyphro (w} be/ltiste Eu0qu/fron), and do not conceal your thought (kai\ mh\ a0pokru/yh| o3 ti au0to\ h9gei=).’ Instead of complying with Socrates’ request, Euthyphro hastened away. And there are good reasons to believe that Euthyphro, profoundly shaken by Socrates’ arguments, never returned to the King archon: ‘When Euthyphro had indicted his father for manslaughter, Socrates, after some conversation with him on piety, diverted him from his purpose (Eu0qu/frona de\ tw~| patri\ graya/menon cenoktoni/aj di/khn peri\ o9si/ou tina dialexqei\j a0ph/gage)’. (Diogenes Laertius II. 29)

***

Euthyphro: What (Ti/ fh/|j;)? Somebody has, it seems, brought an indictment against you (grafh\n se/ tij, w(j e1oike, ge/graptai;); for I don’t accuse you of having brought one against anyone else (ou0 ga\r e0kei=no/ ge katagnw&somai, w(j ju\ e3teron).

Socrates: Certainly not (Ou0 ga\r ou]n).

Euthyphro: But someone else against you (A0lla\ se\ a1lloj;)?

Socrates: Quite so (Pa/nu ge).

Euthyphro: Who is he (Ti/j ou[toj;)?

Socrates: I don’t know the man very well myself, Euthyphro (Ou0d’ au0to\j pa/nu ti gignw&skw, w} Eu0qu/fron, to\n a1ndra), for he seems to be a young and unknown person (ne/oj ga/r ti/j moi fai/netai kai\ a0gnw&j). His name, however, is Meletus, I believe (o0noma/zousi me/ntoi au0to/n, w(j e0gw}|mai, Me/lhton). And he is of the deme of Pitthus (e1sti de\ tw~n dh/mwn Pitqeu/j), if you remember any Pitthian Meletus (ei1 tina nw~| e1xeij Pitqe/a Me/lhton), with long hair (oi[on tetano/trixa) and only a little beard (kai\ ou0 pa/nu a0ge/neion), but with a hooked nose (e0pi/grupon de/).

Euthyphro: I don’t remember him (Ou0k e0nnow~), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej). But what sort of an indictment has he brought against you (a0lla\ dh\ ti/na grafh/n se ge/graptai;)?

Socrates: What sort (H#ntina;)? No mean one (ou0k a0gennh=), it seems to me (e1moige dokei=); for the fact that, young as he is (to\ ga\r ne/on o1nta), he has apprehended so important a matter (tosou=ton pra=gma e0gnohke/nai) reflects no small credit upon him (ou0 fau=lo/n e0stin). For he says he knows (e0kei=noj ga/r, w#j fhsin, oi]de) how the youth are corrupted (ti/na tro/pon oi9 ne/oi diafqei/rontai) and who those are who corrupt them (kai\ ti/nej oi9 diafqei/rontej au0tou/j). He must be a wise man (kai\ kinduneu/ei sofo/j tij ei]nai); who seeing my lack of wisdom (kai\ th\n e0mh\n a0maqi/an katidw&n) and that I am corrupting his fellows (w(j diafqei/rontoj tou\j h9likiw&taj au0tou=), comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me (e1rxetai kathgorh/swn mou w(j pro\j mhte/ra pro\j th\n po/lin). And he seems to me to be the only one of the public men who begins in the right way (kai\ fai/netai/ moi tw~n politikw~n mo/noj a1rxesqai o0rqw~j); for the right way is to take care of the young men first (o0rqw~j ga/r e0sti tw~n ne/wn prw~ton e0pimelhqh=nai), to make them as good as possible (o3pwj e1sontai o3 ti a1ristoi), just as a good husbandman (w#sper gewrgo\n a0gaqo/n) will naturally take care of the young plants first (tw~n ne/wn futw~n ei0ko\j prw~ton e0pimelhqh=nai) and afterwards of the rest (meta\ de\ tou=to kai\ tw~n a1llwn). And so Meletus (kai\ dh\ kai\ Me/lhtoj), perhaps (i1swj), is first clearing away us (prw~ton me\n h9ma=j e0kkaqai/rei) who corrupt the young plants (tou\j tw~n ne/wn ta\j bla/staj diafqei/rontaj), as he says (w#j fhsin); then after this (e1peita meta\ tou=to), when he has turned his attention to the older men (dh=lon o3ti tw~n presbute/rwn e0pimelhqei/j), he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State (plei/stwn kai\ megi/stwn a0gaqw~n ai1tioj th=| po/lei genh/setai), – at least, that is the natural outcome of the beginning he has made (w#j ge to\ ei0ko\j cumbh=nai e0k toiau/thj a0rxh=j a0rcame/nw|).

Euthyphro: ‘I hope it may be so (Bouloi/mhn a1n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej); but I fear (a0l’ o0rrwdw~) the opposite may result (mh\ tou0nanti/on ge/nhtai). For it seems to me that he begins injuring the State at its very heart (a0texnw~j ga/r moi dokei= a0f’ e9sti/aj a1rxesqai kakourgei=n th\n po/lin), when he undertakes to harm you (e0pixeirw~n a0dikei=n se/). Now tell me (kai/ moi le/ge), what does he say you do (ti/ kai\ poiou=nta/ se/ fhsi) that corrupts the young (diafqei/rein tou\j ne/ouj;)?

Socrates: Absurd things (A1topa), my friend (w} qauma/sie), at first hearing (w(j ou3tw g’ a0kou=sai). For he says I am (fhsi\ ga/r me) a maker of gods (poihth\n ei]nai qew~n); and because I make new gods (kai\ w(j kainou\j poiou=nta qeou/j) and do not believe in the old ones (tou\j d’a0rxai/ouj ou0 nomi/zonta), he indicted me for the sake of these old ones (e0gra/yato tou/twn au0tw~n e3neka), as he says (w#j fhsin).

Euthyphro: I understand (Manqa/nw), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej); it is because you say that divine monitor keeps coming to you (o3ti dh\ su\ to\ daimo/nion fh\|j sautw~| e9ka/stote gi/gnesqai). So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion (w(j ou]n kainotomou=nto/j sou peri\ ta\ qei=a ge/graptai tau/thn th\n grafh/n), and he is going into court to slander you (kai\ w(j diabalw~n dh\ e1rxetai ei0j to\ dikasth/rion), knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people (ei0dw_j o3ti eu0dia/bola ta\ toiau=ta pro\j tou\j pollou/j). Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy when I say anything in the assembly about divine things and foretell future to them (kai\ e0mou= ga/r toi, o3tan ti le/gw e0n th=| e0kklhsi/a| peri\ tw~n qei/wn, prole/gwn au0toi=j ta\ me/llonta, katagelw~sn w(j mainome/nou). And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true (kai/toi ou0de\n o3ti ou0k a0lhqe\j ei1rhka w{n proei=pon); but thy are jealous of all such men as you and I are (a0ll’ o3mwj fqonou=sin h9mi=n pa=si toi=j toiou/toij). However, we must not be disturbed (a0ll’ ou0de\n au0tw~n xrh\ fronti/zein), but must come to close quarters with them (a0ll’ o9mo/se i0e/nai).

Socrates: My dear Euthyphro (W} fi/le Eu0qu/fron), their ridicule is perhaps of no consequence (a0lla\ to\ me\n katagelasqh=nai i1swj ou0de\n pra=gma). For the Athenians (A0qhnai/oij ga/r toi), I fancy (w(j e0moi\ dokei=), are not much concerned (ou0 sfo/dra me/lei), if they think a man is clever (a1n tina deino\n oi1wntai ei]nai), provided he does not impart his clever notions to others (mh\ me/ntoi didaskaliko\n th=j au9tou= sofi/aj); but when they think he makes others to be like himself (o4n d’ a2n kai\ a1llouj oi1wntai poiei=n toiou/touj), they are angry with him (qumou=ntai), either through jealousy (ei1t’ ou]=n fqo/nw|), as you say (w(j su\ le/geij), or for some other reason (ei1te di’ a1llo ti).

Euthyphro: I do not much desire to test their sentiments toward me in this matter (Tou/tou ou]n pe/ri o3pwj pote\ pro\j e0me\ e1xousin, ou0 pa/nu e0piqumw~ peiraqh=nai).

Socrates: No, for perhaps they think that you are reserved (I!swj ga\r su\ me\n dokei=j spa/nion seauto\n pare/xein) and unwilling to impart your wisdom (kai\ dida/skein ou0k e0qe/lein th\n seautou= sofi/an). But I fear that because of my love of men (e0gw_ de\ fobou=mai, mh\ u9po\ filanqrwpi/aj) they think that I not only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone without payment (dokw~ au0toi=j o3 ti per e1xw e0kkexume/nwj panti\ a1ndri\ le/gein ou0 mo/non a1neu misqou=), but that I would even pay something myself (a0lla\ kai\ prostiqei=j h9de/wj), if anyone would listen to me (ei1 ti/j mou e0qe/loi a0kou/ein). Now if (ei0 me\n ou]n), as I was saying just now (o4 nu=n dh\ e1legon), they were to laugh at me (me/lloie/n mou katagela=n), as you say they do at you (w#sper su\ fh\|j sautou=), it would not be at all unpleasant to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter (ou0de\n a2n ei1h a0hde\j pai/zontaj kai\ gelw~ntaj e0n tw~| dikasthri/w| diagagei=n); but if they are in earnest (ei0 de\ spouda/sontai), then only soothsayers like you can tell how this will end (tou=t’ h1dh o3ph| a0pobh/setai a1dhlon plh\n u9mi=n toi=j ma/ntesin).

Euthyphro: Well. Socrates, perhaps it won’t amount to much (A0ll’ i1swj ou0de\n e1stai, w} Sw&kratej, pra=gma), and you will bring your case to a satisfactory ending (a0lla\ su/ te kata\ nou=n a0gwniei= th\n di/khn), as I think I shall mine (oi]mai de\ kai\ e0me\ th\n e0mh/n).

Meno 20 – Enigmatic End of the Meno

At the end of the Meno, just before leaving, Socrates presents the results of the discussion:

‘If through all this discussion (ei0 de\ nu=n h9mei=j e0n panti\ tw~| lo/gw| tou/tw|) our queries and statements have been correct (kalw~j e0zhth/same/n te kai\ e0le/gomen), virtue is found to be neither natural (a0reth\ a2n ei1h ou1te fu/sei) nor taught (ou1te didakto/n), but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation (a0lla\ qei/a| moi/ra| paragignome/nh) without understanding (a1neu nou=) in those who receive it (oi[j a2n paragi/gnhtai), unless there should be somebody among the statesmen (ei0 mh/ tij ei1h toiou=toj tw~n politikw~n a0ndrw~n) capable of making a statesman of another (oi[oj kai\ a1llon poih/sai politiko/n). And if there should be any such (ei0 de\ ei1h), he might fairly be said to be among the living (sxedo\n a1n ti ou[toj le/goito toiou=toj e0n toi=j zw~sin) what Homer says Teiresias was among the dead (oi[on e1fh O#mhroj e0n toi=j teqnew~si to\n Teiresi/an ei]nai, le/gwn peri\ au0tou= o3ti) – “He alone has comprehension (oi]oj pe/pnutai tw~n e0n A#idou); the rest are fleeting shades (ai9 de\ skiai\ a0i5ssousi),” In the same way he on earth, in respect of virtue, will be a real substance among shadows (tau0to\n a2n kai\ e0nqa/de o9 toiou=toj w#sper para\ skia\j a0lhqe\j a2n pra=gma ei1h pro\j a0reth/n).’

Meno: ‘I think you put it excellently (Ka/llista dokei=j moi le/gein), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).’

***

The question is: what entitled Socrates to the Homeric accolade of the statesman capable of making a statesman of another, and what entitled Meno to his praise of Socrates on account of it?

My answer to this question? Philosophic mysteries, to which Socrates alludes at 76e: ‘But it is not [the better definition] (A0ll’ ou0k e1stin), son of Alexidemus (w} pai= A0lecidh/mou), as I am persuading myself (w(j e0gw_ e0mauto\n pei/qw), but the other definition is better (a0ll’ e0kei/nh belti/wn) and I think it would seem so to you as well (oi]mai de\ ou0d’ a2n soi\ do/cai), if you would not have to leave, as you said yesterday, before the mysteries (ei0 mh/, w#sper xqe\j e1legej, a0nagkai=o/n soi a0pie/nai pro\ tw~n musthri/wn), but if you stayed and got initiated (a0ll’ ei0 perimei/naij kai\ muhqei/hj).’

Meno replies: ‘But I should stay (A0lla\ perime/noim’ a1n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), if you would tell me many such things (ei1 moi po/lla toiau=ta le/goij).’

Socrates responds by assuring Meno that he is ready and willing to do everything in his power to make him stay and be initiated: ‘Well then, I will spare no endeavour (A0lla\ mh\n proqumi/aj ge ou0de\n a0polei/yw), both for your sake and for my own (kai\ sou= e3neka kai\ e0mautou=), to continue saying such things (le/gwn toiau=ta).’

Let me now give the two definitions. At 76a Socrates defines sxh=ma (figure): ‘In every instance of figure (kata\ panto\j sxh/matoj tou=to le/gw) I call that figure in which the solid ends (ei0j o4 to\ stereo\n perai/nei, tou=t’ ei]nai sxh=ma); and I may put that more succinctly by saying that figure is “limit of solid” (o3per a2n sullabw_n ei1poimi stereou= pe/raj sxh=ma ei]nai).’

Meno is not enamoured with this definition; instead of expressing his opinion about it, he asks Socrates to define colour. Socrates complies with his request: ‘Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias (Bou/lei ou]n soi kata\ Gorgi/an a0pokri/nwmai), which you would find easiest to follow (h[| a2n su\ ma/lista a0kolouqh/saij;)?’

Meno: ‘I should like that (Bou/lomai), of course (pw~j ga\r ou1;).’   

Socrates: ‘Do not both of you say there are certain effluences of existent things (Ou0kou=n le/gete a0porroa/j tinaj tw}n o1ntwn), as Empedocles held (kata\ E)mpedokle/a;)?’

Memo: ‘Certainly’ (Sfo/dra ge).

Socrates: ‘And passages (Kai\ po/rouj) into which (ei0j ou43j) and through which (kai\ di’ w{n) the effluences pass (ai9 a0porroai\ poreu/ontai;)?’

Meno: ‘To be sure (Pa/nu ge).’

Socrates: ‘And some of the effluences fit into various passages (Kai\ tw~n a0porrow~n ta\j me\n a9rmo/ttein e0ni/oij tw~n po/rwn), while some are too small or too large (ta\j de\ e0la/ttouj h2 mei/zouj ei]nai;)?’

Meno: ‘That is so (E1sti tau=ta).’

Socrates: ‘And further, there is what you call sight (Ou0kou=n kai\ o1yin kalei=j ti;)?’

Meno: ‘Yes (E!gwge).’

Socrates: So now “conceive my meaning,” as Pindar says: colour is an effluence of figures, commensurate with sight and sensible (E)k tou/twn dh\ cu/nej o3 toi le/gw, e1fh Pi/ndaroj. e1sti ga\r xro/a a0porroh\ sxhma/twn o1yei su/mmetroj kai\ ai0sqhto/j).’

Meno: ‘Your answer, Socrates, seems to me excellently put (A1rista/ moi dokei=j, w} Sw&kratej, tau/thn th\n a0po/krisin ei0rhke/nai).’

***

We may now ask, and I believe that Plato wants us to ask, on what grounds Socrates prefers his definition of sxh=ma (figure) to the definition of colour according to Gorgias and Empedocles? Let us visualise the definition of sxh=ma: ‘In every instance of figure (kata\ panto\j sxh/matoj tou=to le/gw) I call that figure in which the solid ends (ei0j o4 to\ stereo\n perai/nei, tou=t’ ei]nai sxh=ma); and I may put that more succinctly by saying that figure is “limit of solid” (o3per a2n sullabw_n ei1poimi stereou= pe/raj sxh=ma ei]nai).’ If we succeed in doing so, we have succeeded in visualising the Platonic Form (i0de/a) of sxh=ma.

Now we can properly understand Socrates’ message, with which the dialogue ends: ‘It is now time for me to go my way (nu=n d’ e0moi\ me\n w#ra poi i0e/nai), but do you persuade our friend Anytus of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded (su\ de\ tau=ta a3per au0to\j pe/peisai pei=qe kai\ to\n ce/non to/nde A1nuton), so as to put him in a gentler mood (i3na pra|o/teroj h]|); for if you can persuade him (w(j e0a\n pei/sh|j tou=ton), you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also (e1stin o3 ti kai\ A0qhnai/ouj o0nh/seij).’

What is now Meno himself persuaded of? He is persuaded that Plato, a statesman, is capable of making a statesman of another.

That Meno in the end proved not to be up to the task – the task of becoming, or trying to become, a philosopher statesman in Thessaly – that he betrayed Plato and himself, that was Meno’s tragedy.

In the Anabasis, Xenophon ends his account of Meno with ‘the facts which everybody knows’ (a4 de\ pa/ntej i1sasi ta/d’ e0sti/): ‘From Aristippus he secured, while still in the bloom of his youth, an appointment as general of his mercenaries’ (para\ A0risti/ppou me\n e1ti w(rai=oj w@n strathgei=n diepra/cato tw~n ce/nwn, II. 28); incidentally, in the opening speech in the Meno, Socrates alludes to Aristippus as Meno’s lover (o9 so\j e0rasth\j A0ri/stippoj, 70b4-5, e9tai=roj 70b2).

It seems that securing the leadership of Aristippus’ mercenaries was not an easy task; Xenophon mentions that Cyrus was already several days on his march ‘when Menon the Thessalian arrived, with a thousand hoplites and five hundred peltasts’ (kai\ h[ke Me/nwn o9 Qettalo\j o9pli/taj e1xwn xili/ouj kai\ peltasta\j pentakosi/ouj, I. ii. 6).

Of Meno’s betrayal of the Greek mercenaries Xenophon spoke just after the capture of the Greek generals in the tent of Tissaphernes, and the slaughter of the Greek captains in front of his tent. Persian messengers said that “Clearchus (Kle/arxoj me/n), men of Greece (w} a1ndrej E!llhnej), inasmuch as he was shown to be perjuring himself (e0pei\ e0piorkw~n te e0fa/nh) and violating the truce (kai\ ta\j sponda\j lu/wn), has received his deserts (e1xei th\n di/khn) and is dead (kai\ te/qnhke), but Proxenus and Menon (Pro/cenoj de\ kai\ Me/nwn), because they gave information about his plotting, are held in high honour’ (o3ti kath/ggeilan au0tou= th\n e0piboulh/n, e0n mega/lh| timh=| ei0sin) (II. v. 38). In fact, Clearchus was not dead, but held captive; it is not difficult to guess why the Persian messengers declared him to be dead. I have not emphasized Proxenus in bold, for there are good reasons for exculpating him from the betrayal of the Greeks; unlike Meno, Proxenus was beheaded like Clearchus and the other captured generals.

But let me return to Xenophon’s narrative of ‘the facts which everybody knows’ about Meno: ‘Now when Menon’s fellow-generals were put to death (a0poqnh|sko/ntwn de\ tw~n sustrath/gwn) for joining Cyrus for his expedition against the King (o3ti e0stra/teusan e0pi\ basile/a su\n Ku/rw|), he, who had done the same thing, was not so treated (tau0ta\ pepoihkw_j ou0k a0pe/qane), but it was after the execution of the other generals (meta\ de\ tw~n a1llwn qa/naton tw~n strathgw~n) that the King visited the punishment of death upon him (timwrhqei\j u9po\ basile/wj a0pe/qanen); and he was not, like Clearchus and the rest of the generals, beheaded (ou0x w#sper Kle/arxoj kai\ oi9 a1lloi strathgoi\ a0potmhqe/ntej ta\j kefala/j) – a manner of death which is counted speediest (o3sper ta/xistoj qa/natoj dokei= ei]nai) – but, report says, was tortured alive for a year and so met the death of a scoundrel (a0lla\ zw~n ai0kisqei\j e0niauto\n w(j ponhro\j le/getai th=j teleuth=j tuxei=n).’